Results for “Contractor Oversight”

NASA NTRS2014

Software Engineering for Human Spaceflight

The Spacecraft Software Engineering Branch of NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) provides world‐class products, leadership, and technical expertise in software engineering, processes, technology, and systems management for human spaceflight. The branch contributes to major NASA programs (e.g. ISS, MPCV/Orion) with in‐house software development and prime contractor oversight, and maintains the JSC Engineering Directorate CMMI rating for flight software development. Software engineering teams work with hardware developers, mission planners, and system operators to integrate flight vehicles, habitats, robotics, and other spacecraft elements. They seek to infuse automation and autonomy into missions, and apply new technologies to flight processor and computational architectures. This presentation will provide an overview of key software‐related projects, software methodologies and tools, and technology pursuits of interest to the JSC Spacecraft Software Engineering Branch.

Fredrickson, Steven E.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Organizational Considerations for Implementing Systems Engineering and Integration in the Ares Projects Office

Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) is a critical discipline in developing new space systems. In 2005, NASA performed an internal study of 24 agency and Department of Defense (DoD) programs to evaluate methods of integrating SE&I practices and determine their effectiveness. The goal of the study was to determine the best SE&I implementation strategy for the Ares Projects Office. The study identified six SE&I organizational structures: 1. Lead systems integrator (LSI) with SE&I responsibility and government technical insight. 2a. Integration contractor with government SE&I responsibility (government insight). 2b. Integration contractor with government SE&I responsibility (government oversight). 3a. Prime contractor with SE&I responsibility (government insight). 3b. Prime contractor with SE&I responsibility (government oversight). 3c. Prime contractor with SE&I responsibility (government/industry partnership). 4a.Prime contractor with government SE&I responsibility (government insight). 4b. Prime contractor with government SE&I responsibility (government oversight). 4d.Prime contractors with total system performance responsibility (TSPR). 5. Prime contractor with government SE&I responsibility and integration products through a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC). 6. Government/FFRDC in-house development with SE&I responsibility and function. The organizational structure used most often was number 4, using a prime contractor with government SE&I responsibility and government technical insight. However, data analyses did not establish a positive relationship between program development costs and specific SE&I organizational types, nor did it positively determine the relationship between successful programs or projects and their SE&I structure. The SE&I study reached the following conclusions: (1) Large, long-duration, technically complex programs or projects reach their technical goals, but rarely meet schedule or cost goals. NASA's recent successes have been smaller, short-duration development projects using heritage hardware/software, focused technology development, technical oversight and stable external factors. (2) Programs and projects have failed or been terminated due to lack of technical insight, relaxing of SE&I processes, and unstable external factors. (3) The study did not find a single, clear optimum SE&I organization type to fit all projects. However, while any organizational structure can be made to work, the fewer complexities in the program, the better the likelihood of success. (4) The most common successful SE&I organization structure type in the study was type 4b, where the government maintained integration responsibility, with the prime contractor providing SE&I products and the government providing technical oversight. This study was instrumental in helping the APO select organization structure 4, following the same SE&I and oversight process used during humanlund7s last voyages to the Moon.

Thomas, LeAnn↗

NASA NTRS2018

How government oversight adds time to contractor engineering work

Explore the source record for details and available documents.

Samantha M. Brainard↗

NASA NTRS2001

Evaluation Of The NASA Quality Surveillance System Pilot In Meeting Requirements For Contractor Surveillance Under Performance Based Contracting

The use of performance-based contracting at Kennedy Space Center has necessitated a shift from intrusive oversight of contractor activities to an insight surveillance role. This paper describes the results of a pilot implementation of the NASA Quality Surveillance System (NQSS) in the Space Shuttle Main Engines Processing Facility. The NQSS is a system to sample contractor activities using documented procedures, specifications, drawings and observations of work in progress to answer the question "Is the contractor doing what they said they would do?" The concepts of the NQSS are shown to be effective in providing assurance of contractor quality. Many of the concepts proven in the pilot are being considered for incorporation into an overall KSC Quality Surveillance System.

Schmahl, Karen E.↗

NASA NTRS2002

Evaluation of the NASA Quality Surveillance System Pilot in Meeting Requirements for Contractor Surveillance Under Performance Based Contracting

The use of performance-based contracting at Kennedy Space Center has necessitated a shift from intrusive oversight of contractor activities to an insight surveillance role. This paper describes the results of a pilot implementation of the NASA Quality Surveillance System (NQSS) in the Space Shuttle Main Engines Processing Facility. The NQSS is a system to sample contractor activities using documented procedures, specifications, drawings and observations of work in progress to answer the question "Is the contractor doing what they said they would do?" The concepts of the NQSS are shown to be effective in providing assurance of contractor quality. Many of the concepts proven in the pilot are being considered for incorporation into an overall KSC Quality Surveillance System.

Schmahl, Karen E.↗

NASA NTRS2003

Improving the Agency's Software Acquisition Capability

External development of software has oftc n led to unsatisfactory results and great frustration for the assurE 7ce community. Contracts frequently omit critical assuranc 4 processes or the right to oversee software development activitie: At a time when NASA depends more and more on software to in plement critical system functions, combination of three factors ex; cerbate this problem: I ) the ever-increasing trend to acquire rather than develop software in-house, 2) the trend toward performance based contracts, and 3) acquisition vehicles that only state softwar 2 requirements while leaving development standards and assur! ince methodologies up to the contractor. We propose to identify specific methods at d tools that NASA projects can use to mitigate the adverse el ects of the three problems. TWO broad classes of methoddt ~ols will be explored. The first will be those that provide NASA p ojects with insight and oversight into contractors' activities. The st cond will be those that help projects objectively assess, and thus i nprwe, their software acquisition capability. Of particular interest is the Software Engineering Institute's (SEI) Software Acqt isition Capability Maturity Model (SA-CMMO).

Hankinson, Allen↗

NASA NTRS2013

Manager's Role in Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Control

This presentation captures the essence of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) engineering from a project manager's perspective. It explains the basics of EMC and the benefits to the project of early incorporation of EMC best practices. The EMC requirement products during a project life cycle are identified, along with the requirement verification methods that should be utilized. The goal of the presentation is to raise awareness and simplify the mystique surrounding electromagnetic compatibility for managers that have little or no electromagnetics background

Safety↗

NASA NTRS2010

Structured Transition of Wind Tunnel Operations Skills from Government-to Contractor-Managed

In 2004, NASA awarded the Research, Operations, Maintenance, and Engineering (ROME) contract at NASA Langley Research Center to a team led by Jacobs Technology, Inc. A key component of the contract was the transitioning of the five large wind tunnel facilities from NASA managed and NASA or NASA/contractor workforces to fully contractor operated. The contractor would manage daily operations while NASA would continue to develop long-term strategies, make decisions regarding commitment of funds and commitment of facilities, and provide oversight of the contractor's performance. A major challenge would be the transition of knowledge of facility operations and maintenance from the incumbent civil servant workforce to the contractor workforce. While the contract has since been modified multiple times, resulting in a blended NASA/ROME workforce across the facilities, the processes developed and implemented to capture and document facility knowledge from the incumbent subject matter experts, build training and certification programs, and grow individual skills across subject areas and across facilities, are worthy of documentation. This is the purpose of this paper.

Dunn, Steven C.↗

NASA NTRS2000

Shuttle Upgrade Using 5-Segment Booster (FSB)

In support of NASA's continuing effort to improve the over-all safety and reliability of the Shuttle system- a 5-segment booster (FSB) has been identified as an approach to satisfy that overall objective. To assess the feasibility of a 5-segment booster approach, NASA issued a feasibility study contract to evaluate the potential of a 5-segment booster to improve the overall capability of the Shuttle system, especially evaluating the potential to increase the system reliability and safety. In order to effectively evaluate the feasibility of the 5-segment concept, a four-member contractor team was established under the direction of NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). MSFC provided the overall program oversight and integration as well as program contractual management. The contractor team consisted of Thiokol, Boeing North American Huntington Beach (BNA), Lockheed Martin Michoud Space Systems (LMMSS) and United Space Alliance (USA) and their subcontractor bd Systems (Control Dynamics Division, Huntsville, AL). United Space Alliance included the former members of United Space Booster Incorporated (USBI) who managed the booster element portion of the current Shuttle solid rocket boosters. Thiokol was responsible for the overall integration and coordination of the contractor team across all of the booster elements. They were also responsible for all of the motor modification evaluations. Boeing North American (BNA) was responsible for all systems integration analyses, generation of loads and environments. and performance and abort mode capabilities. Lockheed Martin Michoud Space Systems (LMMSS) was responsible for evaluating the impacts of any changes to the booster on the external tank (ET), and evaluating any design changes on the external tank necessary to accommodate the FSB. USA. including the former USBI contingent. was responsible for evaluating any modifications to facilities at the launch site as well as any booster component design modifications.

Sauvageau, Donald R.↗

NASA NTRS1992

Teamwork for Oversight of Processes and Systems (TOPS). Implementation guide for TOPS version 2.0, 10 August 1992

As the nation redefines priorities to deal with a rapidly changing world order, both government and industry require new approaches for oversight of management systems, particularly for high technology products. Declining defense budgets will lead to significant reductions in government contract management personnel. Concurrently, defense contractors are reducing administrative and overhead staffing to control costs. These combined pressures require bold approaches for the oversight of management systems. In the Spring of 1991, the DPRO and TRW created a Process Action Team (PAT) to jointly prepare a Performance Based Management (PBM) system titled Teamwork for Oversight of Processes and Systems (TOPS). The primary goal is implementation of a performance based management system based on objective data to review critical TRW processes with an emphasis on continuous improvement. The processes are: Finance and Business Systems, Engineering and Manufacturing Systems, Quality Assurance, and Software Systems. The team established a number of goals: delivery of quality products to contractual terms and conditions; ensure that TRW management systems meet government guidance and good business practices; use of objective data to measure critical processes; elimination of wasteful/duplicative reviews and audits; emphasis on teamwork--all efforts must be perceived to add value by both sides and decisions are made by consensus; and synergy and the creation of a strong working trust between TRW and the DPRO. TOPS permits the adjustment of oversight resources when conditions change or when TRW systems performance indicate either an increase or decrease in surveillance is appropriate. Monthly Contractor Performance Assessments (CPA) are derived from a summary of supporting system level and process-level ratings obtained from objective process-level data. Tiered, objective, data-driven metrics are highly successful in achieving a cooperative and effective method of measuring performance. The teamwork-based culture developed by TOPS proved an unequaled success in removing adversarial relationships and creating an atmosphere of continuous improvement in quality processes at TRW. The new working relationship does not decrease the responsibility or authority of the DPRO to ensure contract compliance and it permits both parties to work more effectively to improve total quality and reduce cost. By emphasizing teamwork in developing a stronger approach to efficient management of the defense industrial base TOPS is a singular success.

Strand, Albert A.↗

NASA NTRS1997

Implementation of Insight Responsibilities in Process Engineering

This report describes an approach for evaluating flight readiness (COFR) and contractor performance evaluation (award fee) as part of the insight role of NASA Process Engineering at Kennedy Space Center. Several evaluation methods are presented, including systems engineering evaluations and use of systems performance data. The transition from an oversight function to the insight function is described. The types of analytical tools appropriate for achieving the flight readiness and contractor performance evaluation goals are described and examples are provided. Special emphasis is placed upon short and small run statistical quality control techniques. Training requirements for system engineers are delineated. The approach described herein would be equally appropriate in other directorates at Kennedy Space Center.

Osborne, Deborah M.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Risk Mitigation Approach to Commercial Resupply to the International Space Station

In August 2006, NASA awarded Space Act Agreements (SAAs) for Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) under the Commercial Crew and Cargo Project Office at Johnson Space Center. One of the goals of the SAAs is to facilitate U.S. private industry demonstration of cargo transportation capabilities, ultimately achieving reliable, cost effective access to low-Earth orbit (LEO). Each COTS provider is required to complete International Space Stations (ISS) Integration activities, which includes meeting the physical and functional interfaces and interface requirements between the ISS and COTS vehicles. These requirements focus on the areas of risk to the ISS during rendezvous and proximity operations, as well as the integration operations while the COTS vehicle is berthed to the ISS. On December 23, 2008, NASA awarded Commercial Resupply Service (CRS) contracts to provide resupply services to the ISS, following the Shuttle retirement. In addition to performing any ISS Integration activities, NASA will be performing independent assessments of the launch vehicle and orbital vehicle to evaluate the readiness of the contractor to deliver NASA cargo safely to the ISS. This paper will address the activities NASA Centers, both JSC and KSC, in the oversight and insight function over commercial visiting vehicles to the ISS.

Koons, Diane S.↗

NASA NTRS1999

Lithium-Ion Polymer Rechargeable Battery Developed for Aerospace and Military Applications

A recently completed 3 -year project funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) under the Technology Reinvestment Program has resulted in the development and scaleup of new lithium-ion polymer battery technology for military and aerospace applications. The contractors for this cost-shared project were Lockheed Martin Missiles & Space and Ultralife Batteries, Inc. The NASA Lewis Research Center provided contract management and technical oversight. The final products of the project were a portable 15-volt (V), 10-ampere-hour (A-hr) military radio battery and a 30-V, 50-A-hr marine/aerospace battery. Lewis will test the 50-A-hr battery. The new lithium-ion polymer battery technology offers a threefold or fourfold reduction in mass and volume, relative to today s commonly used nickel-cadmium, nickel-hydrogen, and nickel-metal hydride batteries. This is of special importance for orbiting satellites. It has been determined for a particular commercial communications satellite that the replacement of 1 kg of battery mass with 1 kg of transponder mass could increase the annual revenue flow by $100 000! Since this lithium-ion polymer technology offers battery mass reductions on the order of hundreds of kilograms for some satellites, the potential revenue increases are impressive.

Hagedorn, orman H.↗

NASA NTRS1996

Review of Issues Associated with Safe Operation and Management of the Space Shuttle Program

At the request of the President of the United States through the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), the NASA Administrator tasked the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel with the responsibility to identify and review issues associated with the safe operation and management of the Space Shuttle program arising from ongoing efforts to improve and streamline operations. These efforts include the consolidation of operations under a single Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC), downsizing the Space Shuttle workforce and reducing costs of operations and management. The Panel formed five teams to address the potentially significant safety impacts of the seven specific topic areas listed in the study Terms of Reference. These areas were (in the order in which they are presented in this report): Maintenance of independent safety oversight; implementation plan for the transition of Shuttle program management to the Lead Center; communications among NASA Centers and Headquarters; transition plan for downsizing to anticipated workforce levels; implementation of a phased transition to a prime contractor for operations; Shuttle flight rate for Space Station assembly; and planned safety and performance upgrades for Space Station assembly. The study teams collected information through briefings, interviews, telephone conversations and from reviewing applicable documentation. These inputs were distilled by each team into observations and recommendations which were then reviewed by the entire Panel.

Johnstone, Paul M.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Operating a Crewed Spacecraft in the Age of Commercial Space Using Private/Government Partnership

Fifty years after humans completed a large-scale United States government-funded and government-engineered effort of landing humans on the moon, human spaceflight has entered a new paradigm. Private companies are now investing their own money and taking on an ever-increasing role in human spaceflight, in partnership with the U.S. government. This paper will describe the development of one of these partnerships through the lens of its mission operations team. As part of the Commercial Crew Program (CCP), NASA selected Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner as one of the next generation of crewed vehicles. Boeing opted to partner with the US Government for their Starliner operations by contracting with NASA’s Mission Control teams in the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) at the Johnson Space Center to create its own Mission Operations (MO) flight controllers. Partnering with FOD provided benefits to both Boeing and NASA while also creating new challenges. MO brought over 60 years of crewed spaceflight experience and infrastructure to Boeing’s new program. Within certain legal constraints, MO was able to work closely and efficiently with their FOD counterparts who were performing both integration duties and, under the auspices of the CCP, insight of the contractors, in this case Boeing. Involvement of NASA as the Boeing operations agent did lead to what management deemed a ‘healthy tension’ within FOD, challenging old processes and often creating better, more robust teamwork. Successful development of the framework and boundaries of both the legal aspects and the oversight tensions has been one of the keys to developing a successful corporate/government partnership. Due to the highly automated nature of the Starliner, the MO organization was designed to be much smaller than previous NASA’s flight control teams for past programs. NASA has learned through the decades that spacecraft design and operations need to be as flexible and forgiving as possible. NASA’s Commercial Crew Program was established to sponsor corporate development of economical vehicles that could get humans to and from low Earth orbit. These companies, of course, need to meet contractual obligations in providing a safe means of transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS), but also need to do so in a manner that leads to the venture resulting in a profit at the same time. Through MO’s involvement in the development of this spaceflight paradigm shift, there are ample lessons to be conveyed to future teams and programs working to develop similar missions.

Robert C Dempsey↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Operating a Crewed Spacecraft in the Age of Commercial Space Using Private/Government Partnership

Fifty years after humans completed a large-scale United States government-funded and government-engineered effort of landing humans on the moon, human spaceflight has entered a new paradigm. Private companies are now investing their own money and taking on an ever-increasing role in human spaceflight, in partnership with the U.S. government. This paper will describe the development of one of these partnerships through the lens of its mission operations team. As part of the Commercial Crew Program (CCP), NASA selected Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner as one of the next generation of crewed vehicles. Boeing opted to partner with the US Government for their Starliner operations by contracting with NASA’s Mission Control teams in the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) at the Johnson Space Center to create its own Mission Operations (MO) flight controllers. Partnering with FOD provided benefits to both Boeing and NASA while also creating new challenges. MO brought over 60 years of crewed spaceflight experience and infrastructure to Boeing’s new program. Within certain legal constraints, MO was able to work closely and efficiently with their FOD counterparts who were performing both integration duties and, under the auspices of the CCP, insight of the contractors, in this case Boeing. Involvement of NASA as the Boeing operations agent did lead to what management deemed a ‘healthy tension’ within FOD, challenging old processes and often creating better, more robust teamwork. Successful development of the framework and boundaries of both the legal aspects and the oversight tensions has been one of the keys to developing a successful corporate/government partnership. Due to the highly automated nature of the Starliner, the MO organization was designed to be much smaller than previous NASA’s flight control teams for past programs. NASA has learned through the decades that spacecraft design and operations need to be as flexible and forgiving as possible. NASA’s Commercial Crew Program was established to sponsor corporate development of economical vehicles that could get humans to and from low Earth orbit. These companies, of course, need to meet contractual obligations in providing a safe means of transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS), but also need to do so in a manner that leads to the venture resulting in a profit at the same time. Through MO’s involvement in the development of this spaceflight paradigm shift, there are ample lessons to be conveyed to future teams and programs working to develop similar missions.

Robert C. Dempsey↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Operating a Crewed Spacecraft in the Age of Commercial Space Using Private/Government Partnership

Fifty years after humans completed a large-scale United States government-funded and government-engineered effort of landing humans on the moon, human spaceflight has entered a new paradigm. Private companies are now investing their own money and taking on an ever-increasing role in human spaceflight, in partnership with the U.S. government. This paper will describe the development of one of these partnerships through the lens of its mission operations team. As part of the Commercial Crew Program (CCP), NASA selected Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner as one of the next generation of crewed vehicles. Boeing opted to partner with the US Government for their Starliner operations by contracting with NASA’s Mission Control teams in the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) at the Johnson Space Center to create its own Mission Operations (MO) flight controllers. Partnering with FOD provided benefits to both Boeing and NASA while also creating new challenges. MO brought over 60 years of crewed spaceflight experience and infrastructure to Boeing’s new program. Within certain legal constraints, MO was able to work closely and efficiently with their FOD counterparts who were performing both integration duties and, under the auspices of the CCP, insight of the contractors, in this case Boeing. Involvement of NASA as the Boeing operations agent did lead to what management deemed a ‘healthy tension’ within FOD, challenging old processes and often creating better, more robust teamwork. Successful development of the framework and boundaries of both the legal aspects and the oversight tensions has been one of the keys to developing a successful corporate/government partnership. Due to the highly automated nature of the Starliner, the MO organization was designed to be much smaller than previous NASA’s flight control teams for past programs. NASA has learned through the decades that spacecraft design and operations need to be as flexible and forgiving as possible. NASA’s Commercial Crew Program was established to sponsor corporate development of economical vehicles that could get humans to and from low Earth orbit. These companies, of course, need to meet contractual obligations in providing a safe means of transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS), but also need to do so in a manner that leads to the venture resulting in a profit at the same time. Through MO’s involvement in the development of this spaceflight paradigm shift, there are ample lessons to be conveyed to future teams and programs working to develop similar missions.

Robert C. Dempsey↗

NASA NTRS1991

FY 1991 safety program status report

In FY 1991, the NASA Safety Division continued efforts to enhance the quality and productivity of its safety oversight function. Recent initiatives set forth in areas such as training, risk management, safety assurance, operational safety, and safety information systems have matured into viable programs contributing to the safety and success of activities throughout the Agency. Efforts continued to develop a centralized intra-agency safety training program with establishment of the NASA Safety Training Center at the Johnson Space Center (JSC). The objective is to provide quality training for NASA employees and contractors on a broad range of safety-related topics. Courses developed by the Training Center will be presented at various NASA locations to minimize travel and reach the greatest number of people at the least cost. In FY 1991, as part of the ongoing efforts to enhance the total quality of NASA's safety work force, the Safety Training Center initiated development of a Certified Safety Professional review course. This course provides a comprehensive review of the skills and knowledge that well-rounded safety professionals must possess to qualify for professional certification. FY 1992 will see the course presented to NASA and contractor employees at all installations via the NASA Video Teleconference System.

Source record↗