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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2019

Dose Modeling for Harborview Research and Training Facility

The Harborview Research and Training (R&T) Facility at the University of Washington (UW) was accidently contaminated from a breached sealed source of Cesium-137. The release occurred during removal of the sealed source from its holder within a portable hot cell in the loading dock area near room 220. The loading dock and northeast corner of the building above the ground floor were impacted by the release, whereas the remaining portions of the R&T Facility were minimally affected. Detailed descriptions of the R&T Facility and the affected area/rooms are included in Section 2. The RESRAD Team in the Environmental Science Division of Argonne National Laboratory visited the site on August 12, 2019, and interviewed the R&T Facility building manager and staff working in the building at that time. Site- and building-specific data were collected including building floor plan CAD drawings, building occupants’ working hours, contaminated rooms photos and their dimensions, building air exchange rates, building materials and “curtain wall” details, and so forth. These data are being used in the dose modeling for potential occupants of the building after it is remediated. The dose modeling was performed using the RESRAD-BUILD computer code, which is designed for the evaluation of radiologically contaminated buildings (Yu et al. 2003). Two hypothetical building occupants of the Harborview R&T Facility were evaluated: a researcher occupying room 726 (a research laboratory on the seventh floor) and a custodian occupying room 220 (loading dock and trash compactor room with a rollup door). A maintenance worker that will be spending less time in impacted areas was not modeled because it will be bounded by other two hypothetical building occupants modeled. A summary description of the RESRAD-BUILD is provided in Appendix A, and the modeling of potential doses to a researcher and a custodian is described in detail in Section 3. A summary and a discussion of the dose modeling results are included in Section 4. The parameters used in the RESRAD-BUILD modeling are included in Appendix B. This report documents the dose modeling results; it does not describe measurements of the actual radioactivity levels at the Harborview R&T Facility, nor does it set any expectation for the actual final radioactivity levels. The radiation doses presented are modeling results based on the generic screening values of Cs-137 and several conservative assumptions and are meant only to assist in decision making regarding decontamination of the Harborview R&T Facility.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Site 300 Small Firearms Training Facility Project Soil Sampling and Analysis Plan

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) Project Management Office (PMO) is planning to execute a construction project at the Small Firearms Training Facility within LLNL's Experimental Test Site, Site 300 (S300). The proposed project will include extensive dirt work from a removal of a berm, the installation of a cinder block wall, and the replacement of a canopy and a fence with an access gate. This Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) outlines the procedures to collect environmental samples for the management and/or disposition of excess soil generated from the project site and geotechnical samples for building pad and pavement designs. This SAP has been prepared and is organized to be consistent with LLNL's Soil Screening and Management Plan (SSMP) (LLNL, 2021), as well as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Data Quality Objectives (DQO) programs (EPA, 2006).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2013

Decommissioning and Environmental Cleanup of a Small Arms Training Facility - 13225

US DOE performed a (CERCLA) non-time critical removal (NTCR) action at the Small Arms Training Area (SATA) Site Evaluation Area (SEA) located at the Savannah River Site (SRS), in Aiken, South Carolina. From 1951 to May 2010, the SATA was used as a small weapons practice and qualifying firing range. The SATA consisted of 870.1 ha (2,150 ac) of woodlands and open field, of which approximately 2.9 ha (7.3 ac) were used as a firing range. The SATA facility was comprised of three small arms ranges (one static and two interactive), storage buildings for supplies, a weapons cleaning building, and a control building. Additionally, a 113- m (370-ft) long earthen berm was used as a target backstop during live-fire exercises. The berm soils accumulated a large amount of spent lead bullets in the berm face during the facilities 59- years of operation. The accumulation of lead was such that soil concentrations exceeded the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) residential and industrial worker regional screening levels (RSLs). The RSL threshold values are based on standardized exposure scenarios that estimate contaminant concentrations in soil that the USEPA considers protective of humans over a lifetime. For the SATA facility, lead was present in soil at concentrations that exceed both the current residential (400 mg/kg) and industrial (800 mg/kg) RSLs. In addition, the concentration of lead in the soil exceeded the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) (40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] 261.24) regulatory limit. The TCLP analysis simulates landfill conditions and is designed to determine the mobility of contaminants in waste. In addition, a principal threat source material (PTSM) evaluation, human health risk assessment (HHRA), and contaminant migration (CM) analysis were conducted to evaluate soil contamination at the SATA SEA. This evaluation determined that there were no contaminants present that constitute PTSM and the CM analysis revealed that no constituents posed a migration risk to groundwater. The NTCR action involved removal of approximately 12,092 m{sup 3} (15,816 yd{sup 3}) of spent bullets and lead-impacted soil and off-site disposal. The removal action included soils from the berm area, a fill area that received scraped soils from the berm, and soil from a drainage ditch located on the edge of the berm area. Also included in the removal action was a mixture of soil, concrete, and asphalt from the other three range areas. Under this action, 11,796 m{sup 3} (15,429 yd{sup 3}) of hazardous waste and impacted soil were removed from the SATA and transported to a permitted hazardous waste disposal facility (Lone Mountain Facility in Oklahoma) and 296 m{sup 3} (387 yd{sup 3}) of nonhazardous waste (primarily concrete debris) were removed and transported to a local solid waste landfill for disposal. During the excavation process, the extent was continuously assessed through the use of a hand-held, field-portable X-ray fluorescence unit with results verified using confirmation sampling with certified laboratory analysis. Following the completion of the excavation and confirmation sampling, final contouring, grading, and establishment of vegetative cover was performed to stabilize the affected areas. The NTCR action began on August 17, 2010, and mechanical completion was achieved on April 27, 2011. The selected removal action met the removal action objectives (RAOs), is protective of human health and the environment both in the short- and long-term, was successful in removing potential ecological risks, and is protective of surface water and groundwater. Furthermore, the selected NTCR action met residential cleanup goals and resulted in the release of the SEA from restricted use contributing to the overall footprint reduction at SRS. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Neutron Source Facility Training Simulator Based on EPICS

A plant operator training simulator is developed for training the plant operators as well as for design verification of plant control system (PCS) and plant protection system (PPS) for the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology Neutron Source Facility. The simulator provides the operator interface for the whole plant including the sub-critical assembly coolant loop, target coolant loop, secondary coolant loop, and other facility systems. The operator interface is implemented based on Experimental Physics and Industrial Control System (EPICS), which is a comprehensive software development platform for distributed control systems. Since its development at Argonne National Laboratory, it has been widely adopted in the experimental physics community, e.g. for control of accelerator facilities. This work is the first implementation for a nuclear facility. The main parts of the operator interface are the plant control panel and plant protection panel. The development involved implementation of process variable database, sequence logic, and graphical user interface (GUI) for the PCS and PPS utilizing EPICS and related software tools, e.g. sequencer for sequence logic, and control system studio (CSS-BOY) for graphical use interface. For functional verification of the PCS and PPS, a plant model is interfaced, which is a physics-based model of the facility coolant loops implemented as a numerical computer code. The training simulator is tested and demonstrated its effectiveness in various plant operation sequences, e.g. start-up, shut-down, maintenance, and refueling. It was also tested for verification of the plant protection system under various trip conditions.

Park, Young Soo↗
DOE OSTI2013

NETL- AVESTAR

NETL's Advanced Virtual Energy Simulation Training and Research, or AVESTAR, Center is designed to promote operational excellence for the nation's energy systems, from smart power plants to smart grid. The AVESTAR Center brings together advanced dynamic simulation and control technologies, state-of-the-art simulation-based training facilities, and leading industry experts to focus on the optimal operation of clean energy plants in the smart grid era.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2022

Current Status of the DOE/NNSA Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Hands-on Criticality Safety Training Courses

In 2011, the US Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) developed and piloted a 2-week nuclear criticality safety (NCS) practitioner course to support training and qualification of new NCS staff. The course was developed in accordance with the American National Standard Institute/American Nuclear Society (ANSI/ANS) standard for NCS training and qualifications (ANSI/ANS-8.26-2007). In 2013, an NCS manager’s course was developed for process supervisors, managers, regulators, and other professionals with NCS-related responsibilities. These courses consist of classroom education, facility training, and hands-on subcritical and critical experiments training. Each course is currently offered twice per year. The 2-week practitioner course offers a week of classroom training, with practical workshops and exercises focused on teaching students how to perform an NCS evaluation. The second week of training involves hands-on critical and subcritical experiments and measurements. The first week is offered in Las Vegas, Nevada, at the DOE Nevada Field Office or the National Atomic Testing Museum. Depending on the student’s clearance level, the second week is offered at Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) (uncleared and L-cleared students) or at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) (Q-cleared students). The 1-week manager’s course is offered at SNL or NCERC, depending on clearance or interest, and includes classroom and hands-on critical and subcritical experiments and measurements. This paper provides an overview and status report for the DOE/NNSA NCSP training courses in NCS and provides information about future course offerings.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2014

Mock Nuclear Processing Facility-Safeguards Training Requirements

This document outlines specific training requirements in the topical areas of Material Control and Accounting (MC&A) and Physical Protection(PP) which are to be used as technical input for designing a mock Integrated Security Facility (ISF) at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). The overall project objective for these requirements is to enhance the ability to deliver training on Material Protection Control and Accounting (MC&A) concepts regarding hazardous material such as irradiated materials with respect to bulk processing facilities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Intelligent Process Visualization through Nuclear Operation Process Modeling, Reasoning, and Object Detection from Field Videos (Final Report)

This report is a deliverable for the “Final Report” task of DOE NEET Project 19-16790, "Context-Aware Safety Information Display for Nuclear Field Workers." This project's overall goal is to test the hypothesis that integrating computer vision and process reasoning methods will enable proactive visualization of the safe operation and maintenance processes of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) for field workers. Augmented Reality (AR) glasses adopting such proactive safety information visualization techniques can significantly increase personnel safety and reduce the NPP’s operating costs. The current practice of monitoring NPPs requires workers to switch between digital models, data, and physical workspaces in identifying relevant but potentially occluded objects and in assessing the risks of operation and maintenance processes. On the other hand, frequently changed field conditions require field workers to report to supervisors for real-time guidance. Such guidance is essential to ensure that changing conditions will not invalidate or endanger the work order and other ongoing processes that may jeopardize NPP operations. Additionally, incorrect recognition of equipment objects can result in communication errors and safety problems. AR techniques can assist engineers in viewing the physical workspaces with objects labeled with detailed operation procedures and safety reminders during field operations. The project team developed an “Intelligent Context-Aware Safety Information Display” (ICAD) for supporting Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) field workers in achieving safe and efficient execution of a series of operational tasks in uncertain and changing workspaces of an NPP. Before designing the ICAD-AR prototype, the project team synthesized NPP operational knowledge models through literature review studies, surveys, interviews with domain experts, and knowledge modeling. The project team conducted an extensive study of the operational procedures of various NPPs, and digital technologies that can support the safe and efficient execution of those procedures in different NPP operational contexts. This literature review helped the project team conduct surveys and interviews with nuclear engineers and field workers to identify three categories of information. The NPP knowledge modeling efforts reveal that the three categories of information identified have different levels of importance in a typical procedure of carrying out a series of tasks to achieve a specific NPP operation goal (e.g., shutdown, mode changes). These three categories of information include 1) Workspace dynamics – the changing spatial arrangements of workspaces, tools, protection equipment, and supporting materials, 2) Workflow prognostics – the dynamic dependencies between different parts of an NPP that functionally support and influence each other in terms of safety and efficiency, and 3) Hazards – objects and spaces that contain hazardous materials or physical conditions that can pose risks to workers or mechanical systems. The project team has profiled the importance levels of these categories of information into a knowledge model. This knowledge model specifies what types of information are more critical for a given task in a given workspace so that computers can automatically identify critical objects and sensors in a scene for delivering context-ware safety information to field workers through AR devices. Significant research development of this project results in technical research outcomes and a prototyping system that illustrates the technical feasibility of establishing an ICAD-AR system supporting the proactive safety information display for nuclear field workers. This final report summarizes the project team’s technological achievements in the past three years. Overall, the project team completed the development and integration of five techniques into a prototype ICAD Augmented Reality (ICAD-AR) system and demonstrated the developed system’s real-time execution in a mechanical room. The project team completed the analysis of using this prototype in other types of workspaces based on 3D image data and digital design models collected from two additional workspaces (a water treatment plant and a flow loop training facility). The integrated techniques include 1) Natural Language Processing (NLP) algorithms supporting the generation and updates of nuclear fieldwork process models based on text analysis of work packages and operation manuals; 2) sensor log analysis for predicting control actions in given sensor reading contexts; 3) computer vision algorithms for automatic localization and navigation of workers; 4) object detection algorithms for identifying task-related objects and correlated sensors for safety checking; 5) AR technique as a platform for supporting the integration. The testing results of these five techniques have shown that 1) the sensor log analysis model can predict the next control action with an accuracy of 0.883; 2) the trained natural language processing model can extract more than 80% of the critical information from paper-based procedures (PBPs); 3) the navigation algorithm with the integration of Visual Inertial Odometry (VIO) and Non-Recursive Bayesian Filter methods make operator’s trajectory estimation resilient to drift error; 4) the computer vision algorithm can detect task-specific and safety-critical objects with an average accuracy of 95.3%. The project team used work procedures collected from a flow loop training facility and two datasets collected from two mechanical rooms simulating the workspaces of NPPs to demonstrate the technical capabilities of the developed ICAD-AR prototype. The demonstration validated the technical feasibility of establishing the ICAD-AR system for nuclear field workers and identified the challenges in 1) automatic text analysis of work packages; 2) use of limited samples of sensor logs for predicting the proper timings of control actions; 3) reliably tracking workers and their task progress in mechanical rooms with many similar objects.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Current Status of the DOE/NNSA Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Hands-On Criticality Safety Training

The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) has conducted two-week Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Practitioner courses since 2011 to support the training and qualification of new NCS staff. The course was developed in accordance with the American National Standard Institute/American Nuclear Society (ANSI/ANS) standard for NCS training and qualifications (ANSI/ANS-8.26-2007). In 2013, an NCS Manager’s course was developed for process supervisors, managers, regulators, and other professionals with NCS-related responsibilities. This course was revised in 2019 for Criticality Safety Officers (CSOs) based on an NCSP Criticality Safety Support Group tasking (2018-01). This course was piloted at the Nevada Field Office and the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) in June 2021. These courses consist of the following training components: classroom education, facility training, and hands-on subcritical and critical experiments training. The two-week Practitioner course offers a week of classroom training, with practical workshops and exercises focused on teaching students how to perform an NCS evaluation. The second week of training involves hands-on critical and subcritical experiments and measurements. The first week is offered in Las Vegas, Nevada, at the DOE Nevada Field Office or the National Atomic Testing Museum. Depending on the student’s clearance level, the second week is offered at Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) (uncleared and L-cleared students) or at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (Q-cleared students). The one-week Manager’s course is offered at SNL or NCERC, depending on clearance or interest, and includes classroom and hands- on critical and subcritical experiments and measurements. This paper provides an overview and status report for the DOE/NNSA NCSP training courses in NCS and to provide information about future course offerings. This paper discusses the challenges associated with executing the training courses during the COVID-19 pandemic. The 2-week Practitioner and 1-week manager courses are currently offered twice per year and adjustments are made based upon demand.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Current Status of the DOE/NNSA Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Hands-On Criticality Safety Training [Abstract]

The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) has conducted two-week Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Practitioner courses since 2011 to support the training and qualification of new NCS staff. The course was developed in accordance with the American National Standard Institute/American Nuclear Society (ANSI/ANS) standard for NCS training and qualifications (ANSI/ANS-8.26-2007). In 2013, an NCS Manager’s course was developed for process supervisors, managers, regulators, and other professionals with NCS-related responsibilities. This course was revised in 2019 for Criticality Safety Officers (CSOs) based on an NCSP Criticality Safety Support Group tasking (2018-01). This course was piloted at the Nevada Field Office and the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) in June 2021. These courses consist of the following training components: classroom education, facility training, and hands-on subcritical and critical experiments training. The two-week Practitioner course offers a week of classroom training, with practical workshops and exercises focused on teaching students how to perform an NCS evaluation. The second week of training involves hands-on critical and subcritical experiments and measurements. The first week is offered in Las Vegas, Nevada, at the DOE Nevada Field Office or the National Atomic Testing Museum. Depending on the student’s clearance level, the second week is offered at Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) (uncleared and L-cleared students) or at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (Q-cleared students). The one-week Manager’s course is offered at SNL or NCERC, depending on clearance or interest, and includes classroom and hands-on critical and subcritical experiments and measurements. This paper provides an overview and status report for the DOE/NNSA NCSP training courses in NCS and to provide information about future course offerings. This paper will also discuss the challenges associated with executing the training courses during the COVID-19 pandemic. The 2-week Practitioner and 1-week manager courses are currently offered twice per year and adjustments are made based upon demand.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2024

HEU Removal from MNSR Reactors

This artifact is a slide presentation about spent HEU core removal of a Chinese-built Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR). The presentation describes the Skoda VPVR/M cask in detail and the auxiliary equipment needed to safely remove the spent HEU and transport it. Removal activities of MNSR spent HEU from Ghana and Nigeria MNSRs, and air transport from these countries to China are discussed. The International MNSR Training Facility in Ghana is also mentioned.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Task Order 22 – Engineering and Technical Support, Deep Borehole Field Test. AREVA Summary Review Report

Under Task Order 22 of the industry Advisory and Assistance Services (A&AS) Contract to the Department of Energy (DOE) DE-NE0000291, AREVA has been tasked with providing assistance with engineering, analysis, cost estimating, and design support of a system for disposal of radioactive wastes in deep boreholes (without the use of radioactive waste). As part of this task order, AREVA was requested, through a letter of technical direction, to evaluate Sandia National Laboratory’s (SNL’s) waste package borehole emplacement system concept recommendation using input from DOE and SNL. This summary review report (SRR) documents this evaluation, with its focus on the primary input document titled: “Deep Borehole Field Test Specifications/M2FT-15SN0817091” Rev. 1 [1], hereafter referred to as the “M2 report.” The M2 report focuses on the conceptual design development for the Deep Borehole Field Test (DBFT), mainly the test waste packages (WPs) and the system for demonstrating emplacement and retrieval of those packages in the Field Test Borehole (FTB). This SRR follows the same outline as the M2 report, which allows for easy correlation between AREVA’s review comments, discussion, potential proposed alternatives, and path forward with information established in the M2 report. AREVA’s assessment focused on three primary elements of the M2 report: the conceptual design of the WPs proposed for deep borehole disposal (DBD), the mode of emplacement of the WP into DBD, and the conceptual design of the DBFT. AREVA concurs with the M2 report’s selection of the wireline emplacement mode specifically over the drill-string emplacement mode and generically over alternative emplacement modes. Table 5-1 of this SRR compares the pros and cons of each emplacement mode considered viable for DBD. The primary positive characteristics of the wireline emplacement mode include: (1) considered a mature technology; (2) operations are relatively simple; (3) probability of a radiological release due to off-normal events are relatively low; (4) costs are relatively low; and (5) maintenance activities are relatively simple. The primary drawback associated with the wireline emplacement mode for DBD is the number of emplacement trips-in to the borehole, which results in a relatively higher probability for a drop event. Fortunately, the WPs can be engineered with impact limiters that will minimize the likelihood of a breach of the WP due to a drop. The WP designs presented in the M2 report appear to be focused on compatibility with the drill-string emplacement mode (e.g., the threaded connections). With the recommendation that the wireline emplacement mode be utilized for the DBFT, some changes may be warranted to these WPs. For example, the development of a WP release connection that is more reliable than the currently credited connection, which is considered to have a high failure probability, and the integration of an impact limiter into its design. The M2 report states the engineering demonstration of the DBFT will occur in the FTB over a 4-year period. AREVA recommends development and testing of the WP emplacement handling equipment occur separately (but concurrently, if not earlier) from the FTB at a mock-up facility. The separation of this activity would prevent schedule interference between the science and engineering thrusts of the project. Performing tests in a mock-up facility would allow additional control and observation compared to the FTB. The mock-up facility could also be utilized as a training facility for future operations. Terminal velocity and impact limiter testing would require the FTB for testing, since these areas would be difficult to reproduce in a limited depth mock-up. Although only at the end of the conceptual stage of design development, DBD appears to be a viable solution for some waste forms produced by the nuclear industry. However, regulatory requirements have yet to be established for pre- and post-closure performance of DBD and should be established as soon as possible. Some of the main areas of focus from a regulatory perspective include: (1) establishing acceptable performance requirements for the long-term behavior of DBD; (2) determining acceptable borehole abandonment criteria; (3) establishing retrievability requirements; (4) developing a consensus on the factor of safety (FoS) for the emplacement mode and WP; and (5) establishing safety and safeguards performance requirements for DBD. Although conservative requirements have been utilized to provide the foundation for the conceptual design of DBD, regulatory requirements and feedback are necessary to confirm recommendations made herein and to ensure the long-term performance of DBD is acceptable. The combination of the M2 report and this SRR is intended to facilitate the completion of the conceptual design for DBD for the Cs and Sr capsules and calcined waste forms. Using the conceptual design, preliminary design activities (the second stage of a three-stage process described in the M2 report) can proceed and the DBFT utilized to support, demonstrate, and confirm engineering elements of this design.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Current Progress of the Final Design of a Subcritical Assembly at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory

During the past decade, the US Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) has been coordinating nuclear criticality safety (NCS) courses to provide training and qualification to new staff, supervisors, managers, regulators, and other professionals involved with NCS. To address the growing need for more NCS training possibilities, a subcritical assembly was designed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The Oak Ridge Subcritical Assembly (ORSA), operated at ORNL, could be used in a new course for fissile material handlers/operators or as a backup training facility for currently existing NCSP hands-on NCS training. This paper describes some of the design steps necessary for obtaining a final ORSA design, beginning with a successful feasibility study performed in 2020. Numerous parameters within each main element of the assembly were considered, such as the reflector used, the type of fuel coating or plating used, and the number of fuel plates used. The design choices related to each parametric study described in this paper are detailed and justified at the end of each subsection. An overview of the current final design characteristics of ORSA and the experiments’ possibilities is also provided. ORSA will be built with fuel plates from legacy Aerojet General Nucleonics (AGN)-201M research reactors currently stored at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12). The cylindrical fuel plates comprise UO 2 particles embedded in polyethylene and have a nominal enrichment of 19.5 ± 0.5 wt % 235 U. The basis for the final design was the feasibility study from 2020. In the feasibility study, ORSA achieved k eff = 0.95, corresponding to a multiplication factor of 20, with approximately 620 g of 235 U (four 4 cm plates, three 2 cm plates, and two 1 cm plates) and an 8.5 cm thick graphite reflector radially and on top of the assembly. The bottom of the assembly has a graphite thickness of 5 cm, and the chosen graphite density was 2.3 g/cm 3 . All design calculations were performed using SCALE 6.2.4 KENO-VI and with the ENDF/B VII.1 Continuous Energy cross-section library.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Supplemental Environmental Baseline Survey for Proposed Land Use Permit Modification for Expansion of the Dynamic Explosive Test Site (DETS) 9940 Main Complex Parking Lot

The “subject property” is comprised of a parcel of land within the Kirtland Military Reservation, Bernalillo County, New Mexico, as shown on the map in Appendix B of this document. The land requirement for the parking lot addition to the 9940 Main Complex is approximately 2.7 acres. The scope of this Supplemental Environmental Baseline Survey (SEBS) is for the parking lot addition land transfer only. For details on the original 9940 Main Complex see Environmental Baseline Survey, Land Use Permit Request for the 9940 Complex PERM/0-KI-00-0001, August 21, 2003, and for details on the 9940 Complex Expansion see Environmental Baseline Survey, Proposed Land Use Permit Expansion for 9940 DETS Complex, June 24, 2009. The 2.7-acre parcel of land for the new parking lot, which is the subject of this EBS (also referred to as the “subject property”), is adjacent to the southwest boundary of the original 12.3- acre 9940 Main Complex. No testing is known to have taken place on the subject property site. The only activity known to have taken place was the burial of overhead utility lines in 2014. Adjacent to the subject property, the 9940 Main Complex was originally a 12.3-acre site used by the Department of Energy (DOE) under a land use permit from the United States Air Force (USAF). Historical use of the site, dating from 1964, included arming, fusing, and firing of explosives and testing of explosives systems components. In the late 1970s and early 1980s experiments at the 9940 Main Complex shifted toward reactor safety issues. From 1983 to 1988, fuel coolant interaction (FCI) experiments were conducted, as were experiments with conventional high explosives (HE). Today, the land is used for training of the Nuclear Emergency Response community and for research on energetic materials. In 2009, the original complex was expanded to include four additional 20-acre areas: 9940 Training South, 9940 Training East, T-Range 6, and Training West Landing Zone. The proposed use of the subject property is for the purpose of adding a parking lot to serve the increase in customer vehicles that is occurring as the 9940 Main Complex is more heavily utilized, and as the 2009 Expansion areas come online as operational training facilities. The subject property would be used only for parking, not for testing or training activities. The parking lot would have a gravel surface. Current and future work at the 9940 Main Complex involves arming, fuzing, and firing of explosives and the testing of explosive systems components in both terrestrial and aquatic settings. It also involves specialized training activities for a variety of first responder customers, both DOE and non-DOE agencies. The approach was to perform a document search, supplemented by a visual site inspection, to identify potential environmental contamination associated with the property. Factors evaluated included hazardous substances; petroleum products and derivatives; environmental restoration sites; areas of concern; storage tanks; oil/water separators; grease traps; wash racks; waste tanks; pesticides; military munitions/ordnance; medical or bio-hazardous waste; radioactive waste; solid/municipal waste; indoor air quality; groundwater; wastewater treatment, collection, and disposal/discharge; drinking water quality; utilities; asbestos; polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs); radon; lead-based paint; cultural resources; floodplains; and natural/biological resources. Each of these factors is evaluated separately in Section 5, Findings for Subject Property. The property categorization for this subject property would be considered Category 1- “An area or real property where no storage, release, or disposal of hazardous substances or petroleum products or their derivatives has occurred into the environment or structures or disposed on the subject property (including no migration of these substances from adjacent properties).” There appears to be sufficient information to categorize the subject property and it appears that no further effort needs to be made to obtain additional information. There are no findings of an adverse nature on the subject property itself or from adjacent properties. It is recommended that the proposed transfer of the subject property from the USAF to DOE proceed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

Supplemental Environmental Baseline Survey for Proposed Land Use Permit Modification for Expansion of the Dynamic Explosive Test Site (DETS) 9940 Main Complex Parking Lot

The proposed use of the subject property is for the purpose of adding a parking lot to serve the increase in customer vehicles that is occurring as the 9940 Main Complex is more heavily utilized, and as the 2009 Expansion areas come online as operational training facilities. The subject property would be used only for parking, not for testing or training activities. The parking lot would have a gravel surface. Current and future work at the 9940 Main Complex involves arming, fuzing, and firing of explosives and the testing of explosive systems components in both terrestrial and aquatic settings. It also involves specialized training activities for a variety of first responder customers, both DOE and non-DOE agencies.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗