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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Fissionable Materials Handlers Operators-Initial Training

These courses were designed for all Initial Fissionable Material Handlers Operators and Supervisors whose job activities will require the performance of Fissile Material Operations located within the Plutonium Facility (PF-4). The course requirements are based on DOE order 426.2, Personnel Section, Qualification, and Training Requirements for Fissionable Material Handlers. These courses are required training for all initial Fissionable Material Handlers and is specific to TA-55 FMH Certification. It covers the core areas and topics in Criticality Safety, Material-at-Risk, Nuclear Material Control and Accountability, Radiological Protection, TA-55 Material Handling and Movement.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2015

An overview of the 2014 revision of ANSI/ANS-ANS-8.1-2014, 'Nuclear criticality safety in operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors' - 14577

A revision to the American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/American Nuclear Society (ANS) standard, 'Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors' [ANSI/ANS-8.1 (ANS-8.1)], was completed and published in 2014. The approved scope for the 2014 revision included two major efforts: (1) an editorial revision to clarify the meaning of the process analysis requirement (PA) and the double contingency principle recommendation (DCP) and (2) the generation of new subcritical limits for uranium and uranium compounds for enrichments less than 10 wt % {sup 235}U. After a clarification request was submitted regarding the PA and DCP in 2009, the scope of the revision became focused almost entirely on the editorial revision. With approval from the ANS-8 subcommittee chairman, the computational effort was postponed until the editorial revision could be completed. The 2014 revision of ANS-8.1 involved nuclear criticality safety experts from 14 different sites, each with many years of experience, either maintaining the standard as a working group member or as a criticality safety practitioner. Many of the represented sites had implemented the PA with the language of the DCP to ensure that process operations with fissionable materials would be subcritical. However, the early working group deliberations made it clear that the general industry focus was on the DCP rather than the PA, which requires that 'all normal and credible abnormal conditions remain subcritical'. Over the course of the revision, two new definitions and a new appendix (Appendix B) were developed to enhance understanding of the PA and DCP. The emphasis of Appendix B is on the requirement for subcriticality (PA) rather than the DCP. The phrase 'credible abnormal conditions' in the PA is broader in meaning than 'changes in process conditions,' as recommended by the DCP. This is because a single credible abnormal condition can potentially affect multiple independent process conditions, and consequently, multiple process parameters, simultaneously. The DCP is a technical practice meant to support the PA and cannot be applied to all situations. However, when it can be properly applied, the DCP technical practice, in most cases, ensures compliance with the PA because two unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes in process conditions are generally judged not to be a credible abnormal condition, as specified in the PA. This paper elaborates on the intense working group discussions over the course of the ANSI/ANS-8.1 standard revision and summarizes the modifications made to the revised standard. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Increased fissionable material loading of vitrified borosilicate glass in support of efficient disposition of nuclear materials at Savannah River - 15299

The US DOE is vitrifying liquid HLW, converting it into a glass form suitable for long term storage and disposal. The waste includes fissionable isotopes and, as a consequence, may possess an inadvertent criticality hazard. The technical basis for determining when an inadvertent criticality hazard exists is unclear. ANS criticality safety standards do not provide relevant subcritical safety limits and little experimental data exist to support development of such a limit. As a result, the DOE has implemented a conservative limit of 897 grams of fissile nuclides per cubic meter of glass. However, this limit has the potential to impede efficient disposal of various fissionable materials at the Savannah River Site. Work is being conducted to establish an alternate fissionable material limit which would be less restrictive, but still ensure criticality safety. A series of computer models are constructed and analyzed using a general purpose Monte Carlo N-Particle neutron transport code. First, a baseline model is established and analyzed. Next, numerous variations to the baseline model (i.e., perturbations) are analyzed with the code to understand the impact of the change. Based on the results, it is evident the atomic ratio of B-10 to equivalent Pu-239 would be an effective means to ensure subcriticality of HLW vitrified in a borosilicate glass matrix. The proposed limit, its technical basis, and all necessary application constraints are discussed. This proposed limit is expected to permit significantly higher quantities of fissile nuclides in the vitrified waste form. It will also account for several non-fissile, fissionable nuclides which are expected to add reactivity to the glass waste form. The proposed limit embodies large conservatisms intended to provide assurance of safety in spite of the significant uncertainties associated with its development. The single most important uncertainty arises from the inability to validate the calculations which form its technical basis. While they are done with the latest available nuclear data and well established analytical methods, they are, nonetheless, not validated as required for subcritical safety limits. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

System and method for fissionable material detection with a short pulse neutron source

A system and method is disclosed for detecting fissionable materials. In one embodiment the system may incorporate a neutron pulse generator configured to generate multiple short pulses of neutrons, or a single pulse of sufficient intensity, in a vicinity of an object of interest. The source pulse of neutrons includes neutrons which each have a full width half maximum time duration of less than about 100 ns and a peak energy level no greater than about 20 MeV. A fast response detector is used which is able to detect single neutron events indicative of fission neutrons having been produced by the source pulse of neutrons interacting with fissionable material associated with the object of interest, and which arrive at the fast response detector within a predetermined time window immediately before arrival of the source neutron pulses.

Podpaly, Yuri↗
DOE OSTI2024

Computational Discovery of Intermolecular Singlet Fission Materials Using Many-Body Perturbation Theory

Intermolecular singlet fission (SF) is the conversion of a photogenerated singlet exciton into two triplet excitons residing on different molecules. SF has the potential to enhance the conversion efficiency of solar cells by harvesting two charge carriers from one high-energy photon, whose surplus energy would otherwise be lost to heat. The development of commercial SF-augmented modules is hindered by the limited selection of molecular crystals that exhibit intermolecular SF in the solid state. Computational exploration may accelerate the discovery of new SF materials. The GW approximation and Bethe–Salpeter equation (GW+BSE) within the framework of many-body perturbation theory is the current state-of-the-art method for calculating the excited-state properties of molecular crystals with periodic boundary conditions. In this Review, we discuss the usage of GW+BSE to assess candidate SF materials as well as its combination with low-cost physical or machine learned models in materials discovery workflows. We demonstrate three successful strategies for the discovery of new SF materials: (i) functionalization of known materials to tune their properties, (ii) finding potential polymorphs with improved crystal packing, and (iii) exploring new classes of materials. In addition, three new candidate SF materials are proposed here, which have not been published previously.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2017

Assembly of Fissionable Material in the Presence of a Weak Neutron Source

Here, the probability distribution in time at which the neutron population in a slightly supercritical system attains a prescribed level is considered for the case where a source injects well under one neutron per neutron lifetime. For the case of ramp insertion of reactivity, it is shown that the energy released in the consequent burst of fissions may in some cases (e.g., unmoderated enriched uranium systems) exceed by over a factor of 100 the energy release predicted by the reactor kinetics equations.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Angular Correlation Date Measurements with the GeRMAC system

Advanced modeling and simulation efforts have improved at Idaho National Laboratory in recent years with a solid foundation of experimental results. Current computational methods represent significant modeling capabilities but are limited by the accuracy and availability of nuclear data. The creation of pre- and post-processing software tools to address these limitations is fundamental to the improvement of nuclear science modeling capacities. One aspect of predictive modeling tools deals with gamma-rays emitted from radionuclides, including fissile or fissionable material, fission products, or activation products, produced in reactor experiments or other neutron environments. The resulting radionuclides decay in unique ways, providing complications upon measurement as a result of random and cascade, or true, coincidence summing. These effects are not easily quantified during modeling efforts of gamma-ray source terms., The germanium rotational measurements for angular correlation (GeRMAC) system was built to quantify the relative angles for gamma rays emitted by radionuclides of interest to investigate true coincidence, or cascade, summing as well as the nuclear energy levels of decay schemes of interest. Proof of concept studies utilize a series of laboratory check sources to provide validity, and it will soon be used to perform the same measurements for fission products of interest. The resulting data can be used to implement into a Monte Carlo code, such as Geant4, to provide more precise gamma-ray source terms following irradiations of materials.

73 - NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Effects of Chlorine Capture and a Proposed Density Law on the Reactivity of Plutonium Solution Systems

During fissionable material processing, all normal and credible abnormal conditions must remain safely subcritical. Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) uses a number of methods to determine subcriticality, one of which is the use of neutron transport codes such as MCNP6. In order to create models for use with MCNP6, both the geometry and materials in fissionable material processes must be known, or assumptions must be made and quantified for the impact to bias. One of the systems with a significant amount of bias due to material modeling assumptions is in the area of aqueous plutonium processing. These solutions are typically plutonium nitrate solutions or plutonium chloride solutions, which are modeled as fictitious plutonium metal-water mixtures because little is known about the actual density of the solution and there is no current predictive capability approved for use at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for modeling them. This research is currently underway to fill the gap and develop an algorithm for use with MCNP6 to model the density of plutonium chloride solutions. The method is to be validated with experimental data for density, and also validated with critical experiments using MCNP6. Note that the Chlorine Worth Study (CWS) was performed in December 2021 to help bridge the gap in chlorine data for critical experiments, and is currently awaiting International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) review. This study was performed by LANL at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Additional information regarding this experiment may currently be found in LA-UR- 22-29180. Additionally, the Chemistry-Actinide Analytical Chemistry (C-AAC) at LANL has performed a number of solution density measurements for PuCl 3 -HC 1 -H 2 O, allowing for such data be used to create a semi-empirical density via the Pitzer method. The published dataset for the measurements is documented in LA-UR-22-25454. This method has already been tested successfully for aqueous plutonium nitrate solutions in SCALE. Current solution density measurements exist of plutonium concentrations of 0-~142g/L, all at 2M HC1, at temperatures 20-40°C. Additional data was taken for HC1-corrected density values, which essentially mimics the data for a pure PuCl x -water solution. The calculations in this report aim to support the current research by demonstrating the difference in system reactivity for the current modeling method when compared to the new proposed modeling with a density law implementation, which is being written as a Python tool to be used with MCNP6.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2013

Spent nuclear fuel reprocessing modeling

The long-term wide development of nuclear power requires new approaches towards the realization of nuclear fuel cycle, namely, closed nuclear fuel cycle (CNFC) with respect to fission materials. Plant nuclear fuel cycle (PNFC), which is in fact the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel unloaded from the reactor and the production of new nuclear fuel (NF) at the same place together with reactor plant, can be one variant of CNFC. Developing and projecting of PNFC is a complicated high-technology innovative process that requires modern information support. One of the components of this information support is developed by the authors. This component is the programme conducting calculations for various variants of process flow sheets for reprocessing SNF and production of NF. Central in this programme is the blocks library, where the blocks contain mathematical description of separate processes and operations. The calculating programme itself has such a structure that one can configure the complex of blocks and correlations between blocks, appropriate for any given flow sheet. For the ready sequence of operations balance calculations are made of all flows, i.e. expenses, element and substance makeup, heat emission and radiation rate are determined. The programme is open and the block library can be updated. This means that more complicated and detailed models of technological processes will be added to the library basing on the results of testing processes using real equipment, in test operating mode. The development of the model for the realization of technical-economic analysis of various variants of technologic PNFC schemes and the organization of 'operator's advisor' is expected. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

In Silico Versus In Situ: The Challenging Landscape of Nuclear Criticality Safety Training

Nuclear criticality safety grew out of the ranks of experimentalists studying the physics of chain-reacting systems at critical experiment facilities. Consequently, critical experiment facilities provide the best forum for conducting training in nuclear criticality safety. As the nuclear renaissance gains traction, there is an increased demand to train personnel in nuclear criticality safety (NCS). Strides have been made in both on-line and virtual reality based NCS training. While these are perhaps a necessary component of NCS training, hands-on training at critical experiments facilities remains the most effective means of developing competency for fissionable material handlers, managers of fissionable material operations, criticality safety analysts, and experimentalists. This paper explores the challenges of developing and maintaining workforce competency in nuclear criticality safety to support safe and efficient fissionable material operations.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2018

Criticality Safety Evaluation for 700 and 350 Gram Moderated Fissionable Equivalent (MFE) Criticality Control Areas (CCAs)

This evaluation is intended to generically apply to facilities and/or areas designated as CCAs that store and/or handle greater than 15 grams of fissionable material but no more than 700 grams of MFE. This evaluation includes facilities and/or areas designated as CCAs limited to no more than 350 grams of MFE. Activities performed in these CCAs may include general laboratory activities to include work in radiological areas, chemical procurement, material handling, sampling, imaging, non-destructive analysis, and disposing of nuclear and radiological materials. Materials included in these activities may include radioactive-contaminated oil, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and/or equipment. Fissionable materials may consist of transuranic (TRU) waste, sources containing fissionable material, uranium in various forms such as metal, oxide and silicide, however other forms of uranium and plutonium may be present. Fissionable materials may consist of fines from cutting, be solid forms mounted on a ring and embedded in epoxy or be in small volumes of dilute solutions resulting from cleaning or other processes. Major equipment located in these CCAs may include inert gas environment gloveboxes, fume hoods, ultrasonic testing equipment, hot presses, rolling mills, furnaces, gamma irradiators, autoclaves, machining equipment, tensile testing equipment, shears, forklifts and cranes.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2013

Comparison between the United States and United Kingdom Criticality Safety Personnel Training Program Guidance

The discipline of criticality safety (CS) has been developed in order to maintain safety in operations where significant amounts of fissionable material are to be manipulated. The operation is assessed by an individual or team of CS practitioners and an operational safety envelope is developed. The envelope can consist of limits on materials (i.e. fissionable mass, reflectors, moderators etc.), geometry (i.e. spacing, volume, etc.), and/or proscribed operating procedures which uphold a level of safety margin for personnel and equipment involved. The following paper is an overview of the similarities and differences in guidance on training programs for CS personnel at United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) laboratories. This work was performed under the auspices of Joint Working Group 30 of the Mutual Defence Agreement between the United States and United Kingdom.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Hydrogen and its detection in fusion and fission nuclear materials – a review

We report fusion and fission reactions are profoundly dependent on hydrogen for sustained reactions. Fusion is fueled by the isotopes of hydrogen, and predominantly hydrogen-based moderators slow fission neutrons to propagate chain reactions. Intentional tritium production in fusion and concomitant tritium production in fission reactors introduce challenges. The technology to efficiently extract, harvest, and quantify tritium in and from advanced fission molten salt coolants and fusion molten tritium breeder materials will require more pronounced research and development. Measuring and quantifying hydrogen is necessary in all areas of nuclear materials. Although many characterization techniques cannot directly detect hydrogen, numerous techniques provide the necessary information to understand the behavior of hydrogen in nuclear materials.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

An Assessment of the Safeguards Implications of Particle and Alloy Formation in MSRs

Molten salt reactors (MSRs) present unique challenges for applying safeguards measures and differ significantly from traditional nuclear reactors. Although the special fissionable materials within MSRs principally exist as dissolved species within the fuel salt, key actinides of interest may also be converted to solid phases including alloys and precipitated oxides via chemical and electrochemical reactions. These solid-phase components will complicate the nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) approaches that have, so far, primarily targeted measurements of the liquid salt itself. For example, most of the proposed monitoring and characterization methods for MSRs are reliant on homogeneity of the salt and the ability to maintain accountable materials in solution. Solid deposits and particulates could invalidate the assumption of homogeneity and necessitate the use of new models and measurement tools to permit a full accounting of all nuclear material in an MSR. To address this, the likelihood of solids formation in MSRs, estimated the rate at which these solids could form, and assessed the monitoring tools that are available to account for the presence of these materials were examined. Specifically, three solid forming mechanisms were investigated, including (1) the accumulation of actinides within the MSR’s structural materials due to alloying, (2) the accumulation of actinides within noble metal fission product particulates, and (3) the generation of actinide oxides from interactions with salt impurities. These modeling-informed studies were completed with considerations to both fluoride- and chloride-containing salts. It was determined that, although measurable amounts of special fissionable material were expected to alloy with the structural elements and fission products, the predicted amounts were below levels considered as significant quantities (SQ) by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, it was determined that sufficiently large oxygen concentrations could potentially lead to significant quantities of special fissionable material being converted to solid oxide phases. As such, a comparative study of technologies that are commercially available to assist in monitoring and accountancy of this material was presented. Policy implications, design recommendations, and suggestions for follow-on experimental work were also presented to further assist reactor vendors in designing and controlling the fuel salt chemistry to address potential safeguards considerations.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗