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Fusion Safety Program Peer Review (August 31 and September 1, 1999) [Slides]

The Fusion Safety Program Peer Review conference, held on August 31 and September 1, 1999, focuses on advancing the understanding and management of radioactive and hazardous materials within deuterium-tritium (D-T) fusion machines. The conference aims to investigate the behavior of significant sources of radioactive materials, such as activation products, dust, tritium, and beryllium. Additionally, it seeks to comprehend how various energy sources in fusion facilities—such as magnets, plasma, decay heat, and chemical reactions—can mobilize these materials. A key objective of the conference is to develop integrated, state-of-the-art analytic tools to demonstrate the safety and environmental potential of fusion technology. Furthermore, the conference assesses and evaluates safety and environmental issues associated with emerging fusion concepts, including those in the ARIES, ALPS, APEX, and IFE projects. This comprehensive approach aims to ensure the safe and sustainable advancement of fusion energy.

70 - PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY

The Development of Kinetic and Radiation Hydrodynamics Modeling of Thermonuclear Burn Propagation in Isochoric p - 11 B Through the Support of the INFUSE Program

The report summarizes DOE INFUSE-supported work between HB11 Energy and the University of Rochester’s TriForce Institute to improve computational modeling of advanced fusion fuels, especially proton–boron-11 (p- 11 B). The project extended the TriForce particle-in-cell/Monte Carlo collision code to include physics needed for dense, high-temperature p- 11 B burn studies, including p- 11 B fusion reactions, three-alpha-particle reaction products, relativistic Coulomb collisions, large-angle nuclear scattering, bremsstrahlung radiation, inverse bremsstrahlung absorption, and photon transport. The upgraded models were verified against focused physics tests and against known deuterium–tritium burn behavior. The study then used one-dimensional spherical simulations to estimate the conditions required for thermonuclear burn propagation in isochoric p- 11 B fuel. The calculations found that burn propagation is possible in the model, but only under very extreme hot-spot conditions, such as about 7000 g/cm 3 at 500 keV or 9000 g/cm 3 at 300 keV for a 20-micron hot spot. These conditions are much more demanding than current demonstrated inertial confinement fusion hot spots. The report concludes that the INFUSE collaboration successfully advanced kinetic and radiation modeling capabilities for p- 11 B fusion and provided useful estimates of ignition requirements. However, the simulated fuel gains remain below what would be needed for practical inertial fusion energy, and further work is needed to reconcile differences among kinetic, radiation-hydrodynamic, and analytic models and to identify more achievable target designs.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY

The Trajectory of Recent Solid State Fusion Results

Both NASA and Google have explored and funded Low Energy Nuclear Reaction (LENR) aka Solid-State Fusion or Lattice Confinement Fusion (LCF) research. NASA has funded efforts since 1989, and Google Research began in 2014. Google, and researchers initially-funded by Google, published significant scientific papers in Nature, Nature Communications and the Journal of Applied Physics. NASA began a significant set of LENR-triggering programs in 2012 resulting in papers in Physical Review C, the Journal of Electroanalytical Chemistry and the Journal of Condensed Matter Nuclear Science. Both NASA and Google engaged researchers across fields of nuclear physics, chemistry, electrochemistry, material science and more. NASA built upon early novel gas pumping experiments then followed the patented work of the US Navy SPAWAR (US8,419,919, “System and Method to Generate Particles”) and experiments with the Naval Surface Warfare Centers. Google supported researchers at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), the University of British Columbia (UBC), MIT and others. This resulted in patent applications and two granted patents (US10264661B2, “Target structure for enhanced electron screening” and US10566094B2 “Enhanced electron screening through plasmon oscillations”). These separate efforts, unknown to the researchers at the time, provided the impetus for the DoE ARPA-E LENR program followed by the DARPA DSO “Mechanisms for Amplification of Fusion Reaction Rates in Solids” (MARRS) program. This document briefly describes the overlapping NASA and Google Research efforts in plasma loading and electron screening emphasizing the results of the latest paper in Nature Communications. The papers and patents cited are listed.

electron screening

Research Reports: 2001 NASA/ASEE Summer Faculty Fellowship Program

For the thirty-seventh consecutive year, a NASA/ASEE (American Society for Engineering Education) Summer Faculty Fellowship Program was conducted at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). The program was conducted by The University of Alabama in Huntsville and MSFC during the period May 29 - August 3, 2001. Operated under the auspices of the American Society for Engineering Education, the MSFC program, as well as those at other NASA Centers, was sponsored by the University Affairs Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC. The basic objectives of the programs, which are in the thirty-seventh year of operation nationally, are (1) to further the professional knowledge of qualified engineering and science faculty members; (2) to stimulate an exchange of ideas between participants and NASA; (3) to enrich and refresh the research and teaching activities of the participants' institutions; and (4) to contribute to the research objectives of the NASA Centers. The Faculty Fellows spent ten weeks at MSFC engaged in a research project compatible with their interests and background and worked in collaboration with a NASA MSFC colleague. This document is a compilation of Fellows' reports on their research during the summer of 2001.

Avionics

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 35, No. 2, July-December 1994]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 179 Consideration of Postaccident Consequences in the Determination of Safety Objectives for Future Nuclear Power Plants in France, D. Queniart, A. Sugier, and J. Lochard; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 187 Nuclear Safety Research: The Phebus FP Severe Accident Experimental Program, P. von der Hardt, A. V. Jones, C. Lecomte, and A. Tattegrain; 205 Containment Performance Analysis of the Advanced Neutron Source Reactor at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, S. H. Kim, R. P. Taleyarkhan, and V. Georgevich; 213 Assessment of Fission Product Deposits in the Reactor Coolant System: The DEVAP Program, G. Le Marois and M. Megnin; 222 Erratum to “A Review of the Available Information on the Triggering Stage of a Steam Explosion," Vol. 35, No. 1, CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 223 Effects of Normal Aging on Calibration and Response Time of Nuclear Plant Resistance Temperature Detectors and Pressure Sensors, H. M. Hashemian; DESIGN FEATURES: 235 Defense in Depth Against the Hydrogen Risk—A European Research Program, F. Fineschi; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 246 Technical Note: A Preliminary Analysis of the Risks to Hong Kong Resulting from Potential Accidents of Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant, Z. Shi and X. Wei; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 253 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; SPECIAL SECTION ON TMI-2 VESSEL INVESTIGATION PROJECT: 256 Three Mile Island—New Findings 15 Years After the Accident A. M. Rubin and E. Beckjord; 269 Relocation of Molten Material to the TMI-2 Lower Head, J. R. Wolf, D. W. Akers, and L. A. Neimark; 280 Insight Into the TMI-2 Core Material Relocation Through Examination of Instrument Tube Nozzles, L. A. Neimark; 288 Physical and Radiochemical Examinations of Debris from the TMI-2 Lower Head, D. W. Akers and B. K. Schuetz; 301 Results of Metallographic Examinations and Mechanical Tests of Pressure Vessel Samples from the TMI-2 Lower Head, D. R. Diercks and G. E. Korth; 313 Margin-to-Failure Calculations for the TMI-2 Vessel, J. Rempe, L. Stickler, S. Chavez, G. Thinnes, R. Witt, and M. Corradini; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 328 1993 Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) Program Results, L. N. Vanden Heuvel, J. W. Cletcher, D. A. Copinger, J. W. Minarick, B. W. Dolan, and P. D. O’Reilley; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 339 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 345 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1994; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 234 Thirty-First Annual Meeting of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements; 356 1995 International Incineration Conference; 358 Fifth International Controls and Instrumentation Conference; 359 ANS International Topical Meeting on Safety of Operating Reactors; 359 Fifth International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Safety; 360 International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment Methodology and Applications; 351 The Authors; 357 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol. 35.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS

Summary of NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Program activities

A summary of NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Program Activities is presented. The NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Program represents a unified NASA wide effort with the overall objective of providing NASA with the policy and posture which will increase the safety, performance, and reliability of space power systems. The specific objectives of the program are to: enhance cell/battery safety and reliability; maintain current battery technology; increase fundamental understanding of primary and secondary cells; provide a means to bring forth advanced technology for flight use; assist flight programs in minimizing battery technology related flight risks; and ensure that safe, reliable batteries are available for NASA's future missions.

Manzo, Michelle

Wide-Bandgap Semiconductor Amplifiers for Fusion Plasma Heating and Control

This paper discusses power electronics developed under the ARPA-E GAMOW program to support nuclear fusion power production. The goal of this project was to develop and assess the potential for wide-bandgap (WBG) semiconductor devices in power electronics to enable high-efficiency and high-voltage solid-state systems for fusion plasma generation, heating, and control. The power electronics use an architecture in which multiple high-power boards can be combined to produce megawatt-level power, where using multiple boards provides high reliability. Two main areas of power electronics boards are developed in this project for fusion plasma heating and control applications: (1) pulse generation and control and (2) radiofrequency generation. The first area is for boards capable of driving high-voltage millisecond pulses at high duty cycles. The envisioned application of these pulses is in plasma control of magnetohydrodynamic instabilities, plasma position, and edge-localized modes. Pulse-width modulation allows for the implementation of a wide variety of linear and nonlinear control systems. The boards developed for this project could actuate control coils based on digital input signals and can be parallelized to provide megawatts of output power. The design of the pulse generator is a low-side load switch. A load switch was designed and constructed that utilized 2-kV-rated field-effect transistor (FET)-based cascodes developed by Qorvo under this project to perform initial testing of these cascodes. The second area is being implemented using class E amplifiers with WBG devices and a reactance steering network to handle inductive or capacitive plasma loads. Applications include ion cyclotron resonance heating (ICRH) and high-harmonic fast-wave (HHFW) heating. A class E reactance steering network is demonstrated in modeling and experiment with a resistive-inductive load that models an inductively-coupled plasma. Power combining of boards with class E reactance steering networks is also simulated and demonstrated experimentally, to enable scaling up to high power. Modeling of high-power-density cooling and remaining useful life is conducted to enable reliable, effectively cooled high-power electronics for fusion applications.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report: Volume One

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's independent investigation into the February 1, 2003, loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its seven-member crew lasted nearly seven months. A staff of more than 120, along with some 400 NASA engineers, supported the Board's 13 members. Investigators examined more than 30,000 documents, conducted more than 200 formal interviews, heard testimony from dozens of expert witnesses, and reviewed more than 3,000 inputs from the general public. In addition, more than 25,000 searchers combed vast stretches of the Western United States to retrieve the spacecraft's debris. In the process, Columbia's tragedy was compounded when two debris searchers with the U.S. Forest Service perished in a helicopter accident. This report discusses the attributes of an organization that could more safely and reliably operate the inherently risky Space Shuttle, but does not provide a detailed organizational prescription. Among those attributes are: a robust and independent program technical authority that has complete control over specifications and requirements, and waivers to them; an independent safety assurance organization with line authority over all levels of safety oversight; and an organizational culture that reflects the best characteristics of a learning organization. This report concludes with recommendations, some of which are specifically identified and prefaced as "before return to flight." These recommendations are largely related to the physical cause of the accident, and include preventing the loss of foam, improved imaging of the Space Shuttle stack from liftoff through separation of the External Tank, and on-orbit inspection and repair of the Thermal Protection System. The remaining recommendations, for the most part, stem from the Board's findings on organizational cause factors. While they are not "before return to flight" recommendations, they can be viewed as "continuing to fly" recommendations, as they capture the Board's thinking on what changes are necessary to operate the Shuttle and future spacecraft safely in the mid- to long-term.

CAIB

Primary battery design and safety guidelines handbook

This handbook provides engineers and safety personnel with guidelines for the safe design or selection and use of primary batteries in spaceflight programs. Types of primary batteries described are silver oxide zinc alkaline, carbon-zinc, zinc-air alkaline, manganese dioxide-zionc alkaline, mercuric oxide-zinc alkaline, and lithium anode cells. Along with typical applications, the discussions of the individual battery types include electrochemistry, construction, capacities and configurations, and appropriate safety measures. A chapter on general battery safety covers hazard sources and controls applicable to all battery types. Guidelines are given for qualification and acceptance testing that should precede space applications. Permissible failure levels for NASA applications are discussed.

Bragg, Bobby J.

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report: Volume Four

Volume IV of the Report contains appendices that were not cited in Volume I. These consist of documents produced by NASA and other organizations, which were provided to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board in support of its inquiry into the February 1, 2003 destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia. The documents are compiled in this volume in the interest of establishing a complete record, but they do not necessarily represent the views of the Board. Volume I contains the Board's findings, analysis, and recommendations. The documents in Volume III through V are also contained in their original color format on the DVD disc in the back of Volume II. Volumes II – VI contain a number of conclusions and recommendations, several of which were adopted by the Board in Volume I. The other conclusions and recommendations drawn in Volumes II – VI do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Board, but are included for the record. When there is conflict, Volume I takes precedence.

NASA

Revisiting the Soyuz-1 Parachute Failure in the Context of Safety in the Modern Era

The Soyuz‑1 accident remains one of the most consequential parachute related failures in human spaceflight history and provides enduring lessons for modern Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) system design. Occurring during the height of the Cold War and the Space Race, the mission unfolded under extraordinary political and schedule pressure as the Soviet Union sought to maintain its early leadership in space achievements following the death of chief designer Sergei Korolev. Despite unresolved propulsion, electrical, and parachute system deficiencies, Soyuz‑1 proceeded to launch and immediately encountered critical inflight anomalies, including a failed solar panel deployment, attitude control issues, and communication dropouts. Upon reentry, a malfunction in the parachute system, driven by a primary main canopy that failed to deploy, and subsequent entanglement of the reserve main canopy with the primary drogue parachute, resulted in insufficient deceleration and the fatal crash of cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov. Subsequent investigations revealed deep rooted cultural and organizational issues within the Soviet space program, including inadequate testing, suppression of dissent, undocumented last minute design changes, and the absence of integrated parachute system verification. More than 200 design flaws were identified after the accident, and firsthand accounts, including those from Yuri Gagarin, highlighted widespread concern prior to launch. Over time, the Soviet program implemented substantial reforms: systematic design corrections, rigorous process documentation, and an extensive series of drop tests that ultimately transformed the Soyuz system into one of the world’s most reliable human-rated return vehicles. This paper examines the technical architecture of the Soyuz‑1 parachute system, reconstructs the likely deployment sequence and failure mechanism, and analyzes the cultural contributors that shaped the accident. The study draws parallels to modern spacecraft parachute development, emphasizing the critical importance of integrated system testing, transparent engineering culture, and continuous hardware surveillance. These lessons remain directly relevant to today’s NASA and Commercial Crew Programs (CCP), where the Government continues to refine its understanding of aggregate risk and strengthen overall astronaut safety in the face of increasingly complex parachute systems.

Aaron L Morris

NASA aerospace battery systems program update

An overview of a battery systems program designed to enhance the safety, reliability, and performance of NASA's aerospace primary and secondary batteries as well as battery power systems is presented. The status of research in all three areas is reviewed. The approach to achieving the program objectives involves increasing the fundamental understanding of primary and secondary cells; providing for improved nickel-cadmium manufacturing process control; providing for the establishment of a NASA standard nickel-hydrogen cell design; establishing specifications, design and operational guidelines for both primary and secondary cells and batteries; providing training relating to the above areas; and opening and maintaining communication lines within NASA and the aerospace battery community.

Manzo, Michelle A.

NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Program: Recommendations for Technical Requirements for Inclusion in Aerospace Battery Procurements

This NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group was chartered within the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). The Battery Working Group was tasked to complete tasks and to propose proactive work to address battery related, agency-wide issues on an annual basis. In its first year of operation, this proactive program addressed various aspects of the validation and verification of aerospace battery systems for NASA missions. Studies were performed, issues were discussed and in many cases, test programs were executed to generate recommendations and guidelines to reduce risk associated with various aspects of implementing battery technology in the aerospace industry. This document contains Part 2 - Volume II Appendix A to Part 2 - Volume I.

Jung, David S.

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 36, No. 2, July-December 1995]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHORNOBYL ACCIDENT: 195 The Chornobyl Accident Revisited, Part III: Chernobyl Source Term Release Dynamics and Reconstruction of Events During the Active Phase, A. R. Sich; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 218 Second ANS Workshop on the Safety of Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Plants, R. A. Bari; 234 Elements of a Nuclear Criticality Safety Program, C. M. Hopper; 243 Rickover, Excellence, and Criticality Safety Programs, R. E. Wilson; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 249 Transient Analysis of the PIUS Advanced Reactor Design with the TRAC-PF1/MOD2 Code, B. E. Boyack, J. L Steiner, S. C. Harmony, H. J. Stumpf, and J. F. Lime; 278 The Hierarchy-By-Interval Approach to Identifying Important Models that Need Improvement in Severe-Accident Simulation Codes, T. J. Heames, M. Khatib-Rahbar, J. E. Kelly, R. P. Jenks-Johnson, and Y.-S. Chen; 290 RELAP5/MOD3 Code Coupling Model, R. P. Martin; 299 Missiles Caused by Severe Pressurized-Water Reactor Accidents, R. Krieg; DESIGN FEATURES: 310 Validation of COMMIX with Westinghouse AP-600 PCCS Test Data, J. G. Sun, T. H. Chien, J. Ding, and W T. Sha; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 321 Spent Nuclear Fuel Characterization for a Bounding Reference Assembly for the Receiving Basin for Off-Site Fuel, S. D. Kahook, R. L. Garrett, L. R. Canas, and M J. Beckum; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 332 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 335 Reactor Coolant System Blowdown at Wolf Creek on September 17, 1994, J. V. Kauffman and S. L. Israel; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 344 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Oueener; 349 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1995; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 320 Symposium on Acceptability of Risk From Radiation—Application to Manned Space Flight; 320 24th DOE/NRC Nuclear Air Cleaning and Treatment Conference; 361 Radiation Biology and Radiation Protection— Modern Developments and Tendencies in Radiation Biology; 362 1997 IEEE Sixth Conference on Human Factors and Power Plants; 354 The Authors; 360 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol. 36.

05 NUCLEAR FUELS

NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Program: Recommendations for Technical Requirements for Inclusion in Aerospace Battery Procurements

This NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group was chartered within the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). The Battery Working Group was tasked to complete tasks and to propose proactive work to address battery related, agency-wide issues on an annual basis. In its first year of operation, this proactive program addressed various aspects of the validation and verification of aerospace battery systems for NASA missions. Studies were performed, issues were discussed and in many cases, test programs were executed to generate recommendations and guidelines to reduce risk associated with various aspects of implementing battery technology in the aerospace industry. This document contains Part 2 - Volume I: Recommendations for Technical Requirements for Inclusion in Aerospace Battery Procurements of the program's operations.

Jung, David S.

Physics basis for the reference flat-top plasma scenario in the ST–E1 fusion power plant

As part of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Milestone-Based Fusion Energy Development Program, Tokamak Energy has completed the pre-concept design of the ST–E1 fusion power plant. ST–E1 is envisaged to operate in two phases: a pilot plant phase, targeting sustained net power production of 300 - 500 MWe for a duration >1 hr, followed by a commercial power plant phase targeting steady-state operations and a normalised overnight capital cost of ⩽12 000 $\$$/kWe. The design process adopted was highly iterative, integrating all major plant systems and progressing in a phased fidelity approach. At the pre-conceptual stage, the emphasis has been on exploring the design space, identifying the main system-level trade-offs, and making the key decisions that define the overall plant concept, rather than optimising a single operating point. This paper, part of a focused collection detailing the ST–E1 pre-concept design, addresses the development of a series of reference flat-top plasma operating points for the pilot plant phase. A modelling workflow was established to develop and assess candidate plasma design points and explore key dependencies. The workflow includes integrated core plasma modelling, magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) stability assessment, equilibrium generation, scrape-off-layer and exhaust modelling, heating & current drive design and optimisation, and turbulent transport modelling. Using this framework, the impact of several key parameters on the flat-top operating space was investigated, including the density limit, core radiation fraction and divertor power loading, level of external heating and curent drive power and assumed pedestal characteristics. The MHD stability, controllability and micro-stability characteristics of these plasmas were also analysed. These investigations informed the definition of a set of fully non-inductive, flat-top reference operating points that satisfy the high-level ST–E1 mission, including a low and high density case, a case that is stable to resistive wall modes and a case with reduced divertor power loading.

ST–E1

An Overview of the NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Program

The NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Program is an agency-wide effort aimed at ensuring the quality, safety, reliability and performance of flight battery systems for NASA applications. The program provides for the validation of primary and secondary cell and battery level technology advances to ensure their availability and readiness for use in NASA missions. It serves to bridge the gap between the development of technology advances and the realization and incorporation of these advances into mission applications. The program is led by the Glenn Research Center and involves funded task activities at each of the NASA mission centers and JPL. The overall products are safe, reliable, high quality batteries for mission applications. The products are defined along three product lines: 1. Battery Systems Technology - Elements of this task area cover the systems aspects of battery operation and generally apply across chemistries. This includes the development of guidelines documents, the establishment and maintenance of a central battery database that serves a central repository for battery characterization and verification test data from tests performed under the support of this program, the NASA Battery Workshop, and general test facility support. 2. Secondary Battery Technology - l h s task area focuses on the validation of battery technology for nickel-cadmium, nickel-hydrogen, nickel-metal-hydride and lithium-ion secondary battery systems. Standardized test regimes are used to validate the quality of a cell lot or cell design for flight applications. In this area, efforts are now concentrated on the validation and verification of lithium-ion battery technology for aerospace applications. 3. Primary Battery Technology - The safety and reliability aspects for primary lithium battery systems that are used in manned operations on the Shuttle and International Space Station are addressed in the primary battery technology task area. An overview of the task areas supported under this program will be presented.

Manzo, Michelle A.

NASA aerospace flight battery systems program

The major objective of the NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Program is to provide NASA with the policy and posture to increase and ensure the safety, performance and reliability of batteries for space power systems. The program plan has been modified in the past year to reflect changes in the agency's approach to battery related problems that are affecting flight programs. Primary attention in the Battery Program is being devoted to the development of an advanced nickel-cadmium cell design and the qualification of vendors to produce cells for flight programs. As part of a unified Battery Program, the development of a nickel-hydrogen standard and primary cell issues are also being pursued to provide high performance NASA Standards and space qualified state-of-the-art primary cells. The resolution of issues is being addressed with the full participation of the aerospace battery community.

Manzo, Michelle A.