Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Hazard Categorization”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2017

MN471017, Safety Basis Manual Appendix NF-01. Nuclear Facility Hazard Categorization

The purpose of this appendix is to provide a consistent approach for establishing the hazard category for a nuclear facility as required in 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management, Subpart B, "Safety Basis Requirements," Section 202 (b)(3). As defined, this approach is consistent with DOE-STD-1027-92 Change Notice No. 1, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports (hereafter DOE-STD-1027-92), and facilitates the use of updated dosimetry and release fractions as provided in NNSA SD G 1027 Admin Change 1, Guidance on Using Release Fraction and Modern Dosimetric Information Consistently with DOE STD 1027-92, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, Change Notice No. 1 (hereafter NNSA SD G 1027).

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Comparison of Light-Weight Radioisotope Heater Unit (LWRHU) Historical Testing to Special Form Testing Requirements

This paper compares the Light-Weight Radioisotope Heater Unit (LWRHU) historical testing to Department of Transportation (DOT) Special Form criteria per 49 CFR Part 173, Shippers-General Requirements for Shipments and Packages, Section 469, Tests for special form Class 7 (radioactive) materials as specified in DOE-STD-1027, Hazard Categorization of DOE Nuclear Facilities. Compliance with the aforementioned criteria allows for the exclusion of radioactive sources from the facility’s nuclear material inventory. As part of a new program at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), LWRHUs are planned to be moved into TA-55, PF-5 Power Source Assembly Area (PSAA) for assembly and testing activities. The PSAA Facility is categorized as a low hazard, non-nuclear facility per DOE STD-1027 and is described in TA55-PF-5-FHC-11-001, Facility Hazard Categorization of the PSAA at PF-5, TA-55. The Facility Hazard Categorization document states, there must be documentation that radioactive sources are engineered to pass the special form testing specified by DOT in 49 CFR 173.469, Tests for special form Class 7 (radioactive) materials or ANSI N43.6, Sealed Radioactive Sources - Classification. This paper documents the extensive historical environmental safety testing of the LWRHU and demonstrates its ability to survive potential launch safety accident scenarios. The testing results are used herein to demonstrate through a comparative analysis that the robust design of the LWRHU meets or exceeds the special form testing specifications in 49 CFR 173.469, enabling the LWRHU to be transported and handled in PF-5 in support of testing and assembly program.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2016

Experimental Fuels Facility Re-categorization Based on Facility Segmentation

The Experimental Fuels Facility (EFF) (MFC-794) at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) located on the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Site was originally constructed to provide controlled-access, indoor storage for radiological contaminated equipment. Use of the facility was expanded to provide a controlled environment for repairing contaminated equipment and characterizing, repackaging, and treating waste. The EFF facility is also used for research and development services, including fuel fabrication. EFF was originally categorized as a LTHC-3 radiological facility based on facility operations and facility radiological inventories. Newly planned program activities identified the need to receive quantities of fissionable materials in excess of the single parameter subcritical limit in ANSI/ANS-8.1, “Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors” (identified as “criticality list” quantities in DOE-STD-1027-92, “Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports,” Attachment 1, Table A.1). Since the proposed inventory of fissionable materials inside EFF may be greater than the single parameter sub-critical limit of 700 g of U-235 equivalent, the initial re-categorization is Hazard Category (HC) 2 based upon a potential criticality hazard. This paper details the facility hazard categorization performed for the EFF. The categorization was necessary to determine (a) the need for further safety analysis in accordance with LWP-10802, “INL Facility Categorization,” and (b) compliance with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 830, Subpart B, “Safety Basis Requirements.” Based on the segmentation argument presented in this paper, the final hazard categorization for the facility is LTHC-3. Department of Energy Idaho (DOE-ID) approval of the final hazard categorization determined by this hazard assessment document (HAD) was required per the DOE-ID Supplemental Guidance for DOE-STD-1027-92 based on the proposed downgrade of the initial facility categorization of Hazard Category 2.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Department of Energy Operational Readiness Review for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has completed an Operational Readiness Review (ORR) for the restart of Contact Handled (CH) waste emplacement at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) located near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The ORR team assessed the readiness of Nuclear Waste Partnership, LLC (NWP) to manage and perform receipt through CH waste emplacement, and associated waste handling and management activities, including the ability of the National TRU Program (NTP) to evaluate the waste currently stored at the WIPP site against the revised and enhanced Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC). Field work for this review began on November 14, 2015 and was completed on November 30, 2016. The DOE ORR was conducted in accordance with the Department of Energy Operational Readiness Review Implementation Plan for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, dated November 8, 2016, and DOE Order 425.1D, Verification of Readiness to Start Up or Restart Nuclear Facilities. The review activities included personnel interviews, record reviews, direct observation of operations and maintenance demonstrations, and observation of multiple operational and emergency drills/exercises. The DOE ORR also evaluated the adequacy of the contractor’s ORR (CORR) and the readiness of the DOE Carlsbad field Office (CBFO) to oversee the startup and execution of CH waste emplacement activities at the WIPP facility. The WIPP facility is categorized as a Hazard Category 2 DOE Nonreactor Nuclear Facility for all surface and Underground (UG) operations per DOE-STD-1027-92, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. In addition, the WIPP experienced two events in February, 2014 that resulted in Accident Investigations being performed in accordance with the requirements of DOE Order 225.1B, Accident Investigations. Based upon the results of the accident investigations and hazard categorization of the facility, the team placed significant emphasis on the following areas: fire protection, emergency preparedness, radiological protection, nuclear safety, and operations. The identification of specific focus areas was not intended to diminish the importance of other areas of the review, but to ensure that these areas received a particularly thorough and in-depth evaluation due to their significance with respect to the safe operation of the facility.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Methodology for SNL Nuclear Facility Categorization

This administrative operating procedure (AOP) provides the process for performing the initial and final hazard categorization for a nuclear facility or activity to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 830.202. This AOP provides guidance on the application of the PHS process (refer to MN471017, Safety Basis Manual, Appendix NF-01,"Nuclear Facility Hazard Categorization") and describes the analyses that might be required to finalize a facility's hazard categorization.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2016

C-400 and C-409 Criticality Incredible Road Map

Many guides and standards describe a process for evaluating process operations with known quantities of fissile material. The accepted industry guides and standards for performing criticality evaluations for fissile material operations are not well suited for operating systems that may contain residual fissile material. The Paducah Site deactivation activities includes large process components that have unfavorable geometries for the {sup 235}U enrichment levels present. The fissile material holdup in these components can range from negligible residual quantities to significant deposits weighing several hundred pounds. The purpose of this white paper is to outline a methodology that can be used to declare a facility as criticality incredible (CI). For the purpose of this paper, criticality incredible means that the inventory and its form and distribution within the facility does not need Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) type (e.g., administrative or engineered) controls. This assumes of course that certain project assumptions are maintained. For example in the facilities that will be discussed within this paper, wet decontamination is not part of the planned demolition and disposal operations. The proposed methodology for deactivation of a facility to the point that criticality incredible can be declared will be applied to the C-400 Chemical Cleaning Building and to the C-409 Decontamination Facility at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP). The purpose and intent of the CI declaration is to release a facility from Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) requirements and simplify the demolition of the facility. In practical terms, this means the facility can be re-categorized as < a Hazard Category 3 facility per DOE-STD-1027-92 Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, NCS controls are not needed, and the Criticality Accident Alarm Systems (CAAS) can be removed from service. The only involvement from the site NCS program following the declaration would be to ensure that the underlying assumptions are not violated through discovered conditions or project changes. This includes the institutional control of preventing new fissile material from being introduced into the facility. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2018

Downgrade of the 9204-2 Facility at Y-12 National Security Complex

This paper describes the downgrade of nuclear operations carried out in the 9204-2 facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex. Downgrading the 9204-2 Facility to non-nuclear status presented a unique challenge as an adjacent facility, 9204-2E, conducted nuclear operations in 9204-2 and analyzed those operations in the safety basis for the 9204-2 Facility. This paper discusses the methodologies used to downgrade the 9204-2 Facility and determine the final hazard categorization.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

Calculation of Hazard Category 2/3 Threshold Quantities Using Contemporary Dosimetric Data

The purpose of this report is to describe the methodology and selection of input data utilized to calculate updated Hazard Category 2 and Hazard Category 3 Threshold Quantities (TQs) using contemporary dosimetric information. The calculation of the updated TQs will be considered for use in the revision to the Department of Energy (DOE) Technical Standard (STD-) 1027-92 Change Notice (CN)-1, “Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.” The updated TQs documented in this report complement an effort previously undertaken by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which in 2014 issued revised Supplemental Guidance documenting the calculation of updated TQs for approximately 100 radionuclides listed in DOE-STD-1027-92, CN-1. The calculations documented in this report complement the NNSA effort by expanding the set of radionuclides to more than 1,250 radionuclides with a published TQ. The development of this report was sponsored by the Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Safety (AU-30) within the Associate Under Secretary for Environment, Health, Safety, and Security organization.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2020

FY2020 Rotating Bed Reactor for Iodine Removal from WTP Melter Effluent to Support DFLAW Start-Up

In Performance Assessment (PA) of the Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF), 129 I is a significant contributor to the risk. The 2017 IDF PA accounted for 0.22% of the total 129 I inventory in Hanford tank waste as residing in the solidified liquid waste from the Effluent Treatment Facility (ETF). However, recent estimates suggest that higher percentages of the iodine processed at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) may be present in the liquid waste routed to the Liquid Effluent Retention Facility (LERF) for eventual treatment at the ETF. In addition, a recent integrated melter test performed at the Vitreous State Laboratory (VSL) at The Catholic University of America (CUA) showed the possibility that a significant fraction (>50%) of the total iodine in the melter feed could be present in the aqueous waste stream destined for the ETF. This stream represents a combination of the Effluent Management Facility (EMF) evaporator overhead condensate and the liquid waste from the WTP off-gas caustic scrubber. Higher levels of 129 I in this stream could affect the LERF and ETF Hazard Categorizations as well as the acceptability of the solidified ETF liquid secondary waste brine for disposal at the IDF. Accordingly, there is a need to investigate and develop potential methods and processes to mitigate this risk. Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) tasked Atkins and VSL to perform development and testing work to evaluate potential methods for removal of iodine species from the waste stream routed to the LERF. In particular, the testing investigated the use of an Atkins-SpinIonic™ Rotating Bed Reactor (RBR) system as a potential alternative to conventional column-based ion exchange or absorption processes. The present report provides results obtained from testing with an RBR system for the removal of iodine from simulants of the projected WTP waste stream that discharges to the LERF.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Radioactive Material Inventory Optimization Using the Plutonium-239 Equivalent Curie Methodology

ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to provide the technical basis for application of the Plutonium 239 equivalent curies (PEC) concept used to optimize and limit the material-at-risk (MAR) in the Irradiated Materials Characterization Laboratory (IMCL) located at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC). The PEC concept offers a method to normalize all radionuclides to a common radiotoxic hazard index that can be summed to a single value. This paper describes the technical approach to applying the PEC concept, documents the weighting factors and specific activities to be utilized in the calculation, and provides an example of the application of the concept to a radionuclide distribution that is representative of materials encountered in the IMCL. The IMCL is operated to provide a dynamic, re-configurable capability to analyze and characterize irradiated or non-irradiated radioactive material samples. The operations unique to the IMCL include sample storage, preparation, and analysis using experiment-specific instrumentation such as, Electron probe micro-analyzer (EPMA), Focused ion beam (FIB), Transmission electron microscope (TEM), and Scanning electron microscope (SEM). The methodology used to characterize the radioactive material inventory enables the IMCL to operate in such a way that complements their capability and program goals without compromising the safety of the worker, co-located worker, or the general public. The PEC concept offers a method in which all radionuclide inventory is normalized to a common radiotoxic hazard index that can be summed to a single value. The PEC concept is useful in the comparison of various material types for hazard categorization and for identifying worst-case and bounding inventory.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Weather effects on the lifecycle of U.S. Department of Defense equipment replacement (WELDER)

Extreme weather has a direct and significant impact on buildings and infrastructure, resulting in billions of dollars of damage each year. This problem continues to grow as climate patterns change and buildings are exposed to new and different hazards than what they were designed to withstand. In order to better plan for the long-range sustainment, restoration, modernization, and eventual recapitalization of these buildings, organizations with large building portfolios, such as the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), must have an awareness of the risks that these extreme weather events present. This research aimed to develop an approach to estimate condition loss and reduction in service life for the components of a building due to extreme weather hazards, to understand the risks that may be present in certain buildings and building systems. To achieve this objective, a damage association matrix was developed that categorizes climate hazards, the damage modes that they produce, and the individual component types impacted. This damage matrix formally links state-of-the-art climate model output, which provides projections of the probability of various climate hazards with a damage effects model that quantifies the consequence on component-level condition and service life. This method is applied to an actual portfolio of buildings in a particular geographic location and with a pre-defined component inventory that comprises the building. This approach can be aggregated to the system-, facility-, and site-level thus helping support billions of dollars in recapitalization decisions related to restoration/modernization of facilities.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Plan evaluation for heat resilience: complementary methods to comprehensively assess heat planning in Tempe and Tucson, Arizona

Abstract Escalating impacts from climate change and urban heat are increasing the urgency for communities to equitably plan for heat resilience. Cities in the desert Southwest are among the hottest and fastest warming in the U.S., placing them on the front lines of heat planning. Urban heat resilience requires an integrated planning approach that coordinates strategies across the network of plans that shape the built environment and risk patterns. To date, few studies have assessed cities’ progress on heat planning. This research is the first to combine two emerging plan evaluation approaches to examine how networks of plans shape urban heat resilience through case studies of Tempe and Tucson, Arizona. The first methodology, Plan Quality Evaluation for Heat Resilience, adapts existing plan quality assessment approaches to heat. We assess whether plans meet 56 criteria across seven principles of high-quality planning and the types of heat strategies included in the plans. The second methodology, the Plan Integration for Resilience Scorecard™ (PIRS™) for Heat, focuses on plan policies that could influence urban heat hazards. We categorize policies by policy tool and heat mitigation strategy and score them based on their heat impact. Scored policies are then mapped to evaluate their spatial distribution and the net effect of the plan network. The resulting PIRS™ for Heat scorecard is compared with heat vulnerability indicators to assess policy alignment with risks. We find that both cities are proactively planning for heat resilience using similar plan and strategy types, however, there are clear and consistent opportunities for improvement. Combining these complementary plan evaluation methods provides a more comprehensive understanding of how plans address heat and a generalizable approach that communities everywhere could use to identify opportunities for improved heat resilience planning.

Environmental Sciences & Ecology↗
DOE OSTI2020

Hazard Contribution Modes of Machine Learning Components

Amongst the essential steps to be taken towards developing and deploying safe systems with embedded learning-enabled components (LECs)—i.e., software components that use machine learning (ML)—are to analyze and understand the contribution of the constituent LECs to safety, and to assure that those contributions have been appropriately managed. This paper addresses both steps by, first, introducing the otion of hazard contribution modes (HCMs)—a categorization of the ways in which the ML elements of LECs can contribute to hazardous system states; and, second, describing how argumentation patterns can capture the reasoning that can be used to assure HCM mitigation. Our framework is generic in the sense that the categories of HCMs developed i) can admit different learning schemes, i.e., supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement learning, and ii) are not dependent on the type of system in which the LECs are embedded, i.e., both cyber and cyber-physical systems. One of the goals of this work is to serve a starting point for systematizing LEC safety analysis towards eventually automating it in a tool.

Smith, Colin↗
DOE OSTI2020

Taxonomy of Wastes

This document outlines the various ways to categorize waste, including solid (hazardous and non-hazardous) and non-solid waste types.

waste reduction, waste diversion, solid waste, non↗
DOE OSTI2019

Real-Time Automated Health Information Technology Hazard Detection

The objective of this project is to develop an automated surveillance tool that will help the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to detect potential hazards in health information technology (HIT) systems. To achieve this objective, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) researchers have developed computational methods and a surveillance tool that will detect safety concerns and identify opportunities to improve HIT and safety within the VA system using Corporate Data Warehouse (CDW) data. This work is limited to the safe operation and safe use of HIT. It does not address the use of HIT to make health care safer. This project leveraged ORNL expertise in computational sciences and its computing resources accordingly.This report documents the FY 2019 accomplishments on this project. There were three major tasks. The first task developed data extraction approaches, which helped provide a better overall understanding of the important data elements in CDW. The outputs of this task served as inputs into the second task, which is the hazard detection and characterization task. This second task involved development of three methods that can be categorized into probabilistic model, event-based hazards detection, and system-based reliability performance evaluation. The third task dealt with the design, development, and demonstration of the automated surveillance tool. The tool currently resides in ORNL’s Private Health Information enclave at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and operates on the VA’s CDW data. The developed capabilities and tool have been tested on CDW data from different clinical domains including Consult, Radiology, Laboratory, and Medication.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Safety and Security Defense-in-Depth for Nuclear Power Plants

This report describes the risk-informed technical elements that will contribute to a defense-in-depth assessment for cybersecurity. Risk-informed cybersecurity must leverage the technical elements of a risk-informed approach appropriately in order to evaluate cybersecurity risk insights. HAZCADS and HAZOP+ are suitable methodologies to model the connection between digital harm and process hazards. Risk assessment modeling needs to be expanded beyond HAZCADS and HAZOP+ to consider the sequence of events that lead to plant consequences. Leveraging current practices in PRA can lead to categorization of digital assets and prioritizing digital assets commensurate with the risk. Ultimately, the culmination of cyber hazard methodologies, event sequence modeling, and digital asset categorization will facilitate a defense-in-depth assessment of cybersecurity.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Alcohol consumption and breast cancer risk in Japan: A pooled analysis of eight population‐based cohort studies

Abstract Although alcohol consumption is reported to increase the incidence of breast cancer in European studies, evidence for an association between alcohol and breast cancer in Asian populations is insufficient. We conducted a pooled analysis of eight large‐scale population‐based prospective cohort studies in Japan to evaluate the association between alcohol (both frequency and amount) and breast cancer risk with categorization by menopausal status at baseline and at diagnosis. Estimated hazard ratios (HR) and 95% confidence intervals were calculated in the individual cohorts and combined using random‐effects models. Among 158 164 subjects with 2 369 252 person‐years of follow‐up, 2208 breast cancer cases were newly diagnosed. Alcohol consumption had a significant association with a higher risk of breast cancer in both women who were premenopausal at baseline (regular drinker compared to nondrinker: HR 1.37, 1.04‐1.81, ≥23 g/d compared to 0 g/d: HR 1.74, 1.25‐2.43, P for trend per frequency category: P = .017) and those who were premenopausal at diagnosis (≥23 g/d compared to 0 g/d: HR 1.89, 1.04‐3.43, P for trend per frequency category: P = .032). In contrast, no significant association was seen in women who were postmenopausal at baseline or at diagnosis, despite a substantial number of subjects and long follow‐up period. Our results revealed that frequent and high alcohol consumption are both risk factors for Asian premenopausal breast cancer, similarly to previous studies in Western countries. The lack of a clear association in postmenopausal women in our study warrants larger investigation in Asia.

Iwase, Madoka↗