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Passive high explosive neutron inspection (PHENIX): a new method to confirm the presence or absence of high explosives for nuclear treaty verification

Advanced instruments and methods need to be developed now to create a technical basis to support the negotiation of future nuclear arms control treaties. One new capability that is anticipated is the ability to confirm either the declared presence or declared absence of high explosive (HE) material in the presence of special nuclear material (SNM). Towards this goal, Passive HE Neutron Inspection (PHENIX) has been developed and demonstrated as a method for confirming the presence or absence of HE in the presence of plutonium. The method exploits the inherent presence of neutrons associated with the decay of plutonium as an internal probe source for performing prompt gamma-ray neutron activation analysis (PGNAA), searching for the presence of HE as revealed by the emission of characteristic gamma rays following neutron absorption in hydrogen and nitrogen which are building blocks of present-day, military-grade HE. Tests using stoichiometrically-correct hemishells of mock HE with plutonium show that a system can be expected to positively confirm the presence or absence of these signatures, supporting determination of HE presence or absence with Pu, in a few hours. To protect other potentially sensitive gamma-ray signatures from a treaty accountable item, an analog information barrier has been conceptualized and tested which physically prevents the collection of gamma-ray spectral data outside of user selected energy windows strategically chosen to view only narrow spectral regions corresponding to the hydrogen (2223.2 keV) and nitrogen (9807.2 keV, 10,318.2 keV, and 10,829.2 keV) PGNAA signatures.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

FAST irradiations and initial post irradiation examinations – Part I

The Advanced Fuels Campaign Fission Accelerated Steady-state Test (FAST) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) completed its first irradiation cycle within the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR). The test focused on the irradiation of alloy fuel forms for use in sodium fast reactors. Tests included the use of fuel additives (Sn, Sb, and Pd) for reducing the gettering of lanthanide fission products, zirconium liners to mitigate fuel-cladding chemical interaction, and annular fuel geometry for sodium-free fuel designs. The first cycle of FAST testing was completed and a series of rodlets were removed for the initial post irradiation examination (PIE) of FAST rodlets. The rodlet irradiation conditions was evaluated using Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) for as-run power history and COMSOL for temperature analysis. These rodlets include a set of low burnups (~2.5 % heavy metal [%FIMA]) control rodlets and a helium bonded annular rodlet (4.7 %FIMA). Initial non-destructive PIE has been completed and includes, visual inspection, neutron radiography and gamma scanning of the FAST rodlets. Radiography confirmed the integrity of the experiments as well as showing the complete filling of the annulus in the annular fuel at a modest burnup (4.7 %FIMA) and potential slumping of the cooler rodlets at lower burnup. Precision gamma scanning indicated mostly usual fission product behavior with the exception of the ceasium in the He-bonded annular fuel. Future destructive PIE will be necessary in order to fully understand the effects of accelerated irradiation on U-Zr metallic fuel behavior.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A physical unclonable neutron sensor for nuclear arms control inspections

Abstract Classical sensor security relies on cryptographic algorithms executed on trusted hardware. This approach has significant shortcomings, however. Hardware can be manipulated, including below transistor level, and cryptographic keys are at risk of extraction attacks. A further weakness is that sensor media themselves are assumed to be trusted, and any authentication and encryption is done ex situ and a posteriori. Here we propose and demonstrate a different approach to sensor security that does not rely on classical cryptography and trusted electronics. We designed passive sensor media that inherently produce secure and trustworthy data, and whose honest and non-malicious nature can be easily established. As a proof-of-concept, we manufactured and characterized the properties of non-electronic, physical unclonable, optically complex media sensitive to neutrons for use in a high-security scenario: the inspection of a military facility to confirm the absence or presence of nuclear weapons and fissile materials.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Wellbore detector with azimuthal and spectral energy resolution

A wellbore inspection device includes a radiation generation source operable to emit neutrons, and a radiation detector fixed relative to the radiation generation source and operable to detect backscattered neutron radiation from a surrounding environment. The radiation detector includes a plurality of individually addressable detector elements arranged in one or more concentric rings. Respective amounts of backscattered neutron radiation detected by the individually addressable detector elements within a ring is indicative of the azimuthal direction of the detected backscattered neutron radiation, and the respective amount of backscattered neutron radiation detected by the individually addressable detector elements of two or more concentric rings is indicative of an energy level of the backscattered neutron radiation. The inspection device determines whether a potential anomaly is present in or around the wellbore, based at least in part on the respective amounts of backscattered radiation detected by the individually addressable detector elements.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Neutron Transmission Imaging with a Portable D-T Neutron Generator

Fast-neutron transmission imaging provides complementary information to x-ray transmission imaging. While fast neutron imaging resolution is generally below x-ray imaging, 14-MeV neutrons have an advantage over portable x-ray systems. Neutrons have higher transmission through high-Z materials due to a more uniform attenuation as a function of material atomic number Z compared to X-rays, and can therefore image low-Z materials inside high-Z materials. As a result, portable neutron transmission imaging has many applications, including inspection of concrete and welds for corrosion in vehicles, bridges, and other infrastructure, measurement of material levels in containers, and inspection of suspicious packages. Fast-neutron imaging is also more practical for field use than thermal-neutron imaging due to the size and shielding requirements typical of thermal-imaging systems compared to the availability of small 14.1 MeV D-T neutron generators. However, there are limitations in portable fast-neutron imaging systems, including limited neutron output, limited light produced by neutron scintillators, and lower resolution due to neutron source spot size and 2-3 mm scintillator thickness. In addition, digital-panel dark-noise is roughly 100x higher than neutron scintillator light, and variations in noise across the panel and in time is comparable to the imaging signal. Here we discuss recent efforts in developing a portable fast-neutron radiography system, including an improved neutron scintillator, mitigation of panel noise, and new commercial portable D-T neutron generators. We also present MCNP efforts to model neutron imaging, including scintillator resolution and the effects of neutron scattering from the object and surrounding materials.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Active Neutron Interrogation as a Method for Verification of the Absence of Special Nuclear Material in Arms Control Dismantlement

The next step in arms control reductions will deal with both strategic and non-strategic weapons, presenting new and hard challenges for verification. One verification approach that might be used in support of these reductions is the concept of deferred verification, which forgoes inspections at sensitive nuclear sites and relies on an inspection regime having access to the open segment of a State's nuclear sector, in "monitored transfer zones." A component of this approach is the anticipated need for an instrument suite capable of detecting well-shielded highly-enriched uranium or plutonium where it isn't supposed to be. This specific need was recently identified by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in an enabling operating concept they call "contain and dispose." At the foundation of this approach is the idea that items declared as "not nuclear" are, by definition, not treaty limited and are thus "fair-game" for inspection and questioning. Active Neutron Interrogation (ANI), using beta-delayed neutron emissions as the signature for special nuclear material (SNM) detection, is a promising method to address this challenge. The method is quick, has high sensitivity and high specificity for detecting shielded SNM, is robust against changing background radiation environments, is robust against the presence of unknown shielding, and avoids the use of gamma-ray spectrometry which may introduce complications due to the potential release of sensitive information. This paper will present recent research activities exploring technical aspects of using ANI as a FAIRGAME verification method and discuss future prospects and research needs

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗

Optimization and characterization of a silicon photomultiplier-based ZnS(Ag) proton recoil fast neutron detector for nuclear fuel performance monitoring at TREAT

The restart of the Transient Reactor Test Facility (TREAT) at Idaho National Laboratory and consequent refurbishment of the Fuel Motion Monitoring System (FMMS), or Hodoscope, offers the opportunity to upgrade the detector system used for neutron imaging. Silicon photomultipliers (SiPMs) are a viable option for updating the Hodoscope to yield improved fuel monitoring capability. The Hodoscope uses ZnS(Ag) proton recoil scintillators (PRS) that provide good gamma-ray suppression and discrimination. Previous work showed that the Hamamatsu S13360-6075CS SiPM offers the best neutron detection and gamma-ray discrimination capability with the ZnS PRS. This work optimizes a SiPM-based detector and develops a PRS prototype for testing. Specifically, possible overvoltages for use are determined by confirming steady operation over extended measurement times. In addition, various SiPM-circuit implementations are tested to optimize the detector according to desired properties, and ultimately a PRS prototype is developed with modifiable components for versatile testing. Measurements of the neutron detection efficiency and gamma-ray rejection efficiency of SiPM-based PRS detectors and a reference PMT-based detector are also carried out. Neutron detection efficiency ranges between 1-2%, and detected gamma-ray rejection efficiency is on the order of 10 -7 . In conclusion, use of a low-pass filter only or a low-pass filter and 50-ω shunt resistor is recommended for the SiPM-based detector, and both configurations demonstrate improved performance over the PMT-based detector.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗

Sensitivity analysis towards trace-uranium detection with γ-γ coincidence NAA

An improved approach for detection of trace amounts of 238 U by means of neutron activation analysis (NAA) is presented. The analysis enhancement is obtained by utilizing γ-γ coincidence counting. An empirical method for evaluating the sensitivity gain in the presence of a large source-related background is presented. A comparison of detection limits is made between two counting schemes; namely, counting single gammas using one HPGe detector versus counting coincident gammas using two HPGe detectors placed face-to-face. Furthermore, a data-validated radiation transport model, created in GEANT4 for a single HPGe detector, is extended to handle the two detector setup. In this counting scheme, a 238 U-detection sensitivity enhancement of about a factor of 8 is predicted for a sample of Saint-Gobain G3 Sapphire when compared to the simpler singles counting approach.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Characterization of a SiPM-based monolithic neutron scatter camera using dark counts

The Single Volume Scatter Camera (SVSC) Collaboration aims to develop portable neutron imaging systems for a variety of applications in nuclear non-proliferation. Conventional double-scatter neutron imagers are composed of several separate detector volumes organized in at least two planes. A neutron must scatter in two of these detector volumes for its initial trajectory to be reconstructed. As such, these systems typically have a large footprint and poor geometric efficiency. We report on the design and characterization of a prototype monolithic neutron scatter camera that is intended to significantly improve upon the geometrical shortcomings of conventional neutron cameras. The detector consists of a 50 mm×56 mm× 60 mm monolithic block of EJ-204 plastic scintillator instrumented on two faces with arrays of 64 Hamamatsu S13360-6075PE silicon photomultipliers (SiPMs). The electronic crosstalk is limited to < 5% between adjacent channels and < 0.1% between all other channel pairs. SiPMs introduce a significantly elevated dark count rate over PMTs, as well as correlated noise from after-pulsing and optical crosstalk. In this article, we characterize the dark count rate and optical crosstalk and present a modified event reconstruction likelihood function that accounts for them. We find that the average dark count rate per SiPM is 4.3 MHz with a standard deviation of 1.5 MHz among devices. The analysis method we employ to measure internal optical crosstalk also naturally yields the mean and width of the single-electron pulse height. Here, we calculate separate contributions to the width of the single-electron pulse-height from electronic noise and avalanche fluctuations. We demonstrate a timing resolution for a single-photon pulse to be (128 ± 4) ps. Finally, coincidence analysis is employed to measure external (pixel-to-pixel) optical crosstalk. We present a map of the average external crosstalk probability between 2×4 groups of SiPMs, as well as the in-situ timing characteristics extracted from the coincidence analysis. Further work is needed to characterize the performance of the camera at reconstructing single- and double-site interactions, as well as image reconstruction.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Multi-barrier wellbore integrity inspection system with eccentricity correction

A downhole inspection system includes a neutron imaging device operable to generate data for detecting potential wellbore anomalies and an electromagnetic imaging device operable to generate data for detecting potential wellbore eccentricity. The neutron imaging device includes a neutron generator operable to emit neutrons, and a neutron detector fixed relative to the neutron generation unit and operable to detect backscattered neutrons from a surrounding environment. The electromagnetic imaging device includes at least one transmitter for generating electromagnetic pulse, and at least one receiver for detecting returning electromagnetic pulse. Correlation of the neutron imaging data with the electromagnetic imaging data provides additional data regarding the potential wellbore anomalies.

Kasten, Ansas Matthias↗

Gamma-Ray and Cosmic Ray Muon Modalities for Cargo Inspection

Screening and inspection of cargo containers are two essential methods to nondestructively examine the contents of shipment. These methods enable the detection of illicit transportation of unauthorized materials such as nuclear and radioactive materials, explosives, drugs, and so on, typically at borders or secure facilities. Although high-energy X-ray transmission is a standard system and is widely used for cargo inspection, the inherent challenges of high false-positive rates and high attenuation factors necessitate the development of complementary techniques that can increase the detection efficiency and accuracy in large and dense materials. Gamma-rays, which possess higher penetration characteristics because of their high energy, offer an alternative nonintrusive modality for cargo scanning. They represent a promising inspection method when compared to X-rays for three reasons: (1) improved ability to detect nuclear and radioactive materials, (2) higher inspection throughput rates, and (3) lower false-positive rates. Currently, there are two main gamma-ray inspection techniques, active and passive interrogation. Active interrogation can be further grouped into (1) gamma-ray transmission imaging and (2) neutron-induced gamma-ray emission detection. Gamma-ray transmission imaging utilizes differences in material densities for mapping the shipment contents and detecting anomalies. It is analogous to the X-ray transmission method; however, the high-energy photons make it more difficult to shield against, which enables more efficient performance in large and dense material inspection. Neutron-induced gamma-ray emission inspection is designed for the detection of nuclear and radioactive material because those materials emit characteristic gamma-rays when they are activated by neutron absorption. On the other hand, passive interrogation techniques rely on high-efficiency detectors to detect radiation emitted from hidden special nuclear or other radioactive materials. Similar to passive interrogation, cosmic ray muon monitoring and imaging are relatively new techniques that do not require external radioactive sources. These techniques have received attention as a potential next-generation radiographic probe to identify illicit transportation of nuclear and radioactive materials in cargo containers. Cosmic ray muons have unique features, (1) much higher energies than X-rays or gamma-rays (on the order of 10−1—104 GeV), (2) enhanced penetration capability, and (3) natural occurrence, thereby eliminating the need for induced radiation sources. These features enable cosmic ray muons to be utilized for detection of special nuclear materials in high-background-noise environments. By analyzing incoming and outgoing muon trajectories, scattering angles, and energies, it has been shown that it would be possible to locate hidden and well-shielded materials in cargo containers via three-dimensional muon tomography images or signal analysis. Gamma-rays, cosmic ray muons, and other nonintrusive cargo inspection modalities are complementary to each other, allowing them to address various cargo inspection conditions (i.e., scanning time, cost, radiation exposure level, and types of target materials). This chapter presents a detailed review of the theoretical fundamentals and technical principles behind the current gamma-ray and cosmic ray muon modalities for cargo inspection. Additionally, critical assessments and suggestions for the future directions to advance the use of gamma and muon modalities are discussed.

Bae, Junghyun↗

Consequences of long-term water exposure for bulk crystal structure and surface composition/chemistry of nickel-rich layered oxide materials for Li-ion batteries

Water exposure of layered nickel-rich transition metal oxide electrodes, widely used in high-energy lithium-ion batteries, has detrimental effects on the electrochemical performance, which complicates electrode handling and prevents implementation of environmentally benign aqueous processing procedures. Elucidating the degradation mechanisms in play may help rationally mitigate/circumvent key challenges. Here, the bulk structural consequences of long-term (>2.5 years) deuterated water (D2O) exposure of intercalation materials with compositions Li x Ni 0.5 Co 0.2 Mn 0.3 O 2 (NCM523) and Li x Ni 0.8 Co 0.1 Mn 0.1 O 2 (NCM811) are studied by neutron powder diffraction (NPD). Detailed inspection of the NPD data reveals gradual formation of a secondary crystalline phase in all exposed samples, not previously reported for this system. This unknown phase forms faster in liquid- compared to vapor-exposed compounds. Structural modelling of the NPD data shows a stable level of Li/Ni anti-site defects and does not indicate any significant changes in lattice parameters or hydrogen-lithium (D + /Li + ) exchange in the structure. Consequently, the secondary phase formation must take place via transformation rather than modification of the parent material. X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy data indicate formation of LiHCO 3 /Li 2 CO 3 at the surface and a Li-deficient oxide in the sub-surface region of the pristine compounds, and the presence of adsorbed water and transition metal hydroxides at the exposed sample surfaces.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Realistic application of short-lived fission product delayed neutron, gamma-ray analysis for simultaneous nondestructive trace quantification of U, Pu mixtures on cellulose swipes

Detection and characterization of fissile traces are of interest to the international nuclear nonproliferation community, including the International Atomic Energy Agency. Pre-inspection check samples are analyzed by neutron activation analysis at the High Flux Isotope Reactor operated by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory under the umbrella of the IAEA Network of Analytical Laboratories. The simultaneous quantification of U and Pu mixtures was accomplished using the combined delayed neutron (DN) delayed gamma-ray (DG) method to analyze cellulose swipes with actinide loading <1ng in a blind field trial. The total fissile quantity was measured by the DN counts and the relative proportions of U, Pu were determined by calibration of the 104 Tc / 141 Ba fission product count ratio using known mixtures. The DNDG method demonstrated high accuracy in flagging the presence of 239 Pu in uranium down to <100 pg mass loading. In conclusion, peak significance tests helped to control false positive Pu flagging and simultaneous quantification of U and Pu loading was accomplished on samples that passed the significance tests.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Physical properties of intergrowth compound Eu 2 CuZn 2 P 3

Here, the physical properties of single-crystalline Eu 2 ⁢CuZn 2 ⁢P 3 were inspected via thermodynamic, transport, and neutron diffraction measurements. Eu 2 ⁢ CuZn 2⁢ P 3 is composed of EuCuP and EuZn 2 ⁢ P 2 motifs stacked in a one-to-one ratio. The magnetic response of Eu 2 ⁢ CuZn 2 ⁢ P 3 is similar to that of EuZn 2 ⁢ P 2 in its A-type antiferromagnetic (semiconducting) state. A Néel temperature of T N = 40.3K is obtained from the specific heat capacity. Single-crystal neutron diffraction reveals a (001) magnetic propagation vector, with primarily in-plane moments coupled along [001] in an up-up-down-down pattern. This spin structure retains the ferromagnetic EuCuP motifs and antiferromagnetic coupling across the EuZn 2 ⁢P 2 motifs. The electrical resistivity is characterized by metallic behavior above 100 K, an increase in ρ upon cooling below ≈ 75K, and a large negative magnetoresistance below T N . First principles calculations evidence a narrow band gap for antiferromagnetic ordering and semimetallic behavior for the ferromagnetic state. This is consistent with the observed effect of magnetic field on the electrical resistivity. Hall effect measurements reveal a field-induced, negative anomalous Hall effect that increases on cooling down to 2 K. Also, an unconventional contribution to the Hall effect dominates the low-field Hall signal, particularly near T N , and is similar in appearance to a topological Hall effect. However, further work is necessary to understand if any of the transport properties have topological origins or if magnetism-induced modifications to the Fermi surface induce these unusual Hall effect signals in this and related materials.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Effects of Build Orientation and Heat Treatment on Neutron Irradiation Hardening in Inconel 625 Fabricated via Laser Powder Bed Fusion

Various Inconel 625 coupons fabricated via Laser Powder Bed Fusion (L-PBF) were neutron irradiated using the inside reflector of the reactor at the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR). Effects of build orientation and heat treatment on neutron-induced hardening were investigated by inspecting L-PBF samples built vertically or at a 45º angle in the following heat-treated conditions: as-built (no heat treatment), 700 ºC for 1 hour, 900 ºC for 1 hour, and 1050 ºC for 1 hour. The microhardness results of L-PBF samples before and after neutron irradiation were compared with traditional wrought Inconel 625. All samples underwent an irradiation flux of 6.61 x 1013 neutrons/cm²/s for 310 hours for an estimated damage of 0.012 dpa. Results indicate that as-built L-PBF specimens are less prone to radiation hardening relative to their wrought counterparts. As-printed diagonal specimens were shown to harden by 8% as compared to 1.2% hardening in as-printed vertical specimens.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Performance evaluation of neutron noise analysis in detecting special nuclear materials

Reliable and rapid inspection techniques play a vital role in preventing illicit trafficking of special nuclear materials. Active interrogation systems using neutrons produced by portable, high-flux deuterium-deuterium or deuterium-tritium neutron generators are being actively developed as a secondary scanning tool for this purpose. In this study, a neutron noise analysis-based approach for detecting unshielded and shielded special nuclear materials by using a pulsed deuterium-tritium neutron generator was evaluated. Here, this approach analyzes the fluctuation of neutron counts. Its performance was quantified with regard to time-to-detection to achieve a minimum probability of detection of 99% and a probability of false alarm of less than 1% considering various amounts of special nuclear materials and different shielding configurations. It was demonstrated that this approach could detect 17 uranium slugs in 5 s given a neutron generator yield of 8.1 × 10 7 n/s. These slugs could be detected within a reasonable time frame (200 s) when they were shielded by 10.16 cm of high-density polyethylene. The results obtained using the neutron noise analysis approach were compared with those obtained using the commonly used differential die-away analysis technique, a sensitive technique for detecting the presence of fissile materials by utilizing the prompt fission neutrons produced when the source neutrons from a neutron generator are completely diminished. For example, the time to detect 2 unshielded uranium slugs was 2.1 s when using the differential die-away analysis technique; it increased to 93 s for the neutron noise analysis approach. Although the noise analysis-based approach exhibits an overall performance which is not as good as that of differential die-away, neutron noise provides an alternative method for effective detection of special nuclear materials.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

An Experimental Feasibility Study on Applying Neutron Tomography to Encapsulated Spent Nuclear Fuel - 20050

Visual inspection makes easier to ensure the integrity and safety of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) than any classical techniques. Various classical techniques have been applied but there are no reliable methods to qualitatively and quantitatively verify spent fuel in dry storage. Thus, the present authors have developed the prototype safeguards apparatus for dry storage employing the array of He-4 gas scintillation detectors (S670E, Arktis Radiation Detectors Ltd., Switzerland), newly designed to simultaneously measure thermal and fast neutrons without any moderators. The S670E detector has a cylindrical shape with a diameter of 52 mm and active length of 600 mm (total length: 875 mm). The detector is filled by He-4 gas with an approximate pressure of 180 bar for fast neutron detection, and its inner wall is coated by Li-6 for thermal neutron detection. The scintillation lights generated via Li-6 nuclear reaction and elastic scattering are collected by 24 SiPMs linearly paired at the center of the detector. The detector delivers a TTL (Transistor-Transistor Logic) output for pulse readout and UART (Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter) for device control. In order to assess feasibility of the apparatus, an experimental system has been designed, built, and optimized via computational studies. Cf-252 neutron sources and linearly arrayed detectors, working as a single detector, were occupied for this study due to the difficulties in working with SNF. The laboratory scale cask (diameter: 0.67 m, height: 1.5 m), minimized by a factor of 10 compared to the actual thickness of a commercial TN-32 cask, was also manufactured. The detector array was designed to rotate the lab-scale cask and obtain 36 image profiles at every 10 degrees. All profiles were aligned in single frame image called a sinogram, and the cross-sectional image was then fabricated by the inverse radon transform algorithm. These experiments have been repeated with different configurations and numbers of sources. Some gamma-ray sources were also measured with neutron sources in order to distinguish between neutron and gamma-ray pulses. Basically, a He-4 detector is designed to run on Linux OS so it is difficult to directly apply to Windows-based equipment widely used in S. Korea. Therefore, a new data acquisition board working on Windows OS was designed and built. The board mainly consists of FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array) and SoC (System on Chip) for TTL pulse readout, sorting measured data, and transferring data to a user interface. In conclusion, the tomographic system at lab-scale has shown considerable potential to detect a partial or gross defect of encapsulated assemblies in dry storage. Next steps of this study will be to 1) repeatedly carry out experiments to demonstrate scientific reliability and validity, and 2) numerically integrate signals with weight factors to enhance the image quality since the suggested system based on passive interrogation method requires longer measurement time. Finally, the system will apply to a commercial dry storage phased out soon in S. Korea. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Through-Thickness Microstructure Characterization in a Centrifugally Cast Austenitic Stainless Steel Nuclear Reactor Primary Loop Pipe Using Time-of-Flight Neutron Diffraction

The US code of Federal Regulations mandates regular inspection of centrifugally cast austenitic stainless steel pipe, commonly used in primary cooling loops in light-water nuclear power plants. These pipes typically have a wall thickness of ~8 cm. Unfortunately, inspection using conventional ultrasonic techniques is not reliable as the microstructure strongly attenuates ultrasonic waves. Work is ongoing to simulate the behavior of acoustic waves in this microstructure and ultimately develop an acoustic inspection method for reactor inspections. In order to account for elastic anisotropy in the material, the texture in the steel was measured as a function of radial distance though the pipe wall. Experiments were conducted on two 10 × 12.7 × 80 mm radial sections of a cast pipe using neutron diffraction scans of 2 mm slices using the HIPPO time-of-flight neutron diffractometer at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE, Los Alamos, NM, USA). Strong textures dominated by a small number of austenite grains with their (100) direction aligned in the radial direction of the pipe were observed. ODF analysis indicated that up to 70% of the probed volume was occupied by just three single-grain orientations, consistent with grain sizes of almost 1 cm. Texture and phase fraction of both ferrite and austenite phases were measured along the length of the samples. These results will inform the development of a more robust diagnostic tool for regular inspection of this material.

42 ENGINEERING↗