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Feasibility Study For Use Of Commercial Cask Vendor Dry Transfer Systems To Unload Used Fuel Assemblies In L-Area

The purpose of this study is to determine whether a commercial dry transfer system (DTS) could be used for loading or unloading used nuclear fuel (UNF) in L-Basin and to determine if a DTS pool adapter could be made for L-Basin Transfer Pit #2 that could accommodate a variety of DTS casks and fuel baskets or canisters up to 24” diameter.[1, 2] This study outlines the technical feasibility of accommodating different vendor dry transfer systems in the L-Basin Transfer Bay with a general work scope. It identifies equipment needing development, facility modifications, and describes the needed analyses and calculations. After reviewing the L-Basin Transfer Bay area layout and information on the only DTS system currently in use for the Nuclear Assurance Corporation Legal Weight Truck cask (NAC LWT), the authors conclude that use of a dry transfer cask is feasible. AREVA was contacted and acknowledged that they currently do not have a design for a dry transfer cask for their new Transnuclear Long Cask (TN-LC) cask. Nonetheless, this study accounted for a potential future DTS from AREVA to handle fuel baskets up to 18” in diameter. Due to the layout of the Transfer Bay, it was determined that a DTS cask pool adapter designed specifically for spanning Pit #2 and placed just north of the 70 Ton Cask lid lifting superstructure would be needed. The proposed pool adapter could be used to transition a fuel basket up to 24” in diameter and ~11 feet long from a dry transfer cask to the basin. The 18” and 24” applications of the pool adapter are pending vendor development of dry transfer casks that accommodate these diameters. Once a fuel basket has been lowered into Pit #2 through a pool adapter, a basket cart could be used to move the basket out from under the pool adapter for access by the 5 Ton Crane. The cost to install a dry transfer cask handling system in L-Area capable of handling multiple vendor provided transport and dry transfer casks and baskets with different diameters and lengths would likely be on the same order of magnitude as the Basin Modifications project. The cost of a DTS capability is affected by the number of design variations of different vendor transport and dry transfer casks to be considered for design input. Some costs would be incurred for each vendor DTS to be handled. For example, separate analyses would be needed for each dry transfer cask type such as criticality, shielding, dropping a dry transfer cask and basket, handling and auxiliary equipment, procedures, operator training, readiness assessments, and operational readiness reviews. A DTS handling capability in L-Area could serve as a backup to the Shielded Transfer System (STS) for unloading long casks and could support potential future missions such as the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Exchange or transferring UNF from wet to dry storage.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Microbiological and Chemical Test Results on an Unknown Material from the L-Area Spent Fuel Basin

Two sampling events were completed to obtain cobweb-like material from the L-Area basin to determine what the material is and any potential impacts the material may have on the basin. The first sampling indicated that the material has a biological component but the low amount of material obtained from sampling was insufficient for full microbial and chemical analysis. The amount from the second sampling was more, approximately 50 ml. The material consisted of microorganisms, trace metals, and crystalline materials. The microorganisms are mostly, if not exclusively bacteria and this result indicates that the material and formation was mostly likely the result of biological activities. The highest concentration metals measured in the basin material include silica, aluminum, titanium, and iron. This microbiological matrix was dominated by many different types of heterotrophic bacteria, meaning that they are dependent upon external supplies of organic carbon and nutrients. Without these external inputs the bacteria cannot sustain themselves. Inferred from the measured levels of microbial diversity measured these requirements are currently being met. Further study of the water chemistry, examination of the cobweb-like material using scanning electron microscopy (SEM), and visual inspection of the fuel storage materials are recommended to further assess the mechanisms the microbial materials use for growth and assess the impact, if any, the material has on the underlying aluminum spent fuel. Additional testing and mitigation options include additional monitoring with strategically placed coupons, targeted testing at SRNL, further analysis of the microbiological matter, and removal of the material from the basin.

Berry, C. J.↗

L-Area STS MTR/NRU/NRX Grapple Assembly Closure Mechanics Review

A review of the closure mechanics associated with the Shielded Transfer System (STS) MTR/NRU/NRX grapple assembly utilized at the Savannah River Site (SRS) was performed. This review was prompted by an operational event which occurred at the Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) utilizing a DTS-XL grapple assembly which is essentially identical to the STS MTR/NRU/NRX grapple assembly used at the SRS. The CNL operational event occurred when a NRU/NRX fuel basket containing spent nuclear fuel assemblies was inadvertently released by the DTS-XL grapple assembly during a transfer. The SM review of the STS MTR/NRU/NRX grapple assembly will examine the operational aspects of the STS and the engineered features of the STS which prevent such an event at the SRS. The design requirements for the STS NRU/NRX modifications and the overall layout of the STS are provided in other documents.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Mark-18A Target Material Recovery Program: Initial Hot Startup

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has been tasked by the National Nuclear Security Administration to recover highly valued isotopes from irradiated Mark-18A (Mk-18A) targets. The Savannah River Site (SRS) has sixty-five Mk-18A targets available for the recovery of the high valued materials. The Mk-18A targets were manufactured with Pu-242 then irradiated under high neutron flux in K-Reactor at the SRS from 1968 to 1978. The sixty-five Mk-18A targets are currently stored in the SRS L-Area Basin and will be removed one at a time and individually transported to SRNL. Upon receipt at SRNL, the Mk-18A target material will be removed from the confinement, dissolved, chemically separated, and calcined to a stable oxide. The flowsheet is designed to recover the plutonium as well as the trivalent actinides. The original targets were manufactured with varying quantities of Pu-242, ranging from 5.2 grams to 121.5 grams. Taking a graded approach to process start up, the lowest loaded target (FT-80-03) was selected as the first target to be received and processed at SRNL. As operational experience and knowledge is gained from processing targets, higher loaded targets will be selected for processing to increase the quantities of valuable isotopes recovered. Due to dose concerns, the receipt and processing of the Mk-18A targets is performed in the SRNL Shielded Cells Facility. The targets are stored in a double J-can confinement in the L-Area Basin. A specially designed cask was procured for transport of the targets from L-Area to SRNL. Once received at SRNL, the targets are loaded into the back of Cell 7 and resized as they enter the cell. The resized targets (1/4 length) are then processed one at a time through the following processes: caustic dissolution and filtration, acidic dissolution and filtration, elutable Reillex anion exchange, diglycolamide (DGA) resin extraction, and DGA calcination. This processing results in two product streams. The first is an aqueous plutonium solution which is removed from the shielded cells and taken to a glovebox for further purification and conversion to an oxide. The second is a calcined oxide product containing the Am and Cm as well as other lanthanide fission products which is removed from the shielded cells using a bagless transfer system. Both materials are packaged for shipment to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). This paper will discuss the operating experience, lessons learned, and results from initial process hot startup.

Armstrong, Christopher [Savannah River National La↗

Mark-18A Cold Runs

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) is tasked by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to recover highly valued isotopes from irradiated Mark-18A (Mk-18A) targets. The Savannah River Site (SRS) has sixty-five Mk-18A targets available for the recovery of the high valued materials. The sixty-five Mk-18A targets are currently stored in the L-Area Basin and will be removed one at a time and individually transported to SRNL. Upon receipt at SRNL, the Mk-18A target material will be removed from the confinement, dissolved, chemically separated, and calcined to a stable oxide. The flowsheet is designed to recover the plutonium as well as the trivalent actinides. The remaining unrecovered material will be discarded to the high activity drain (HAD) system in SRNL. A specially designed cask was procured for transport of the targets from L-Area to SRNL. Once received at SRNL, the targets will be loaded into the back of Cell 7 and resized as they enter the cell. The resized targets (1/4 lengths) will then be processed one at a time through the following processes: caustic dissolution and filtration; acidic dissolution and filtration, Reillex anion exchange, diglycolamide (DGA) cation exchange; and DGA calcination. This processing will result in two product streams. The first is an aqueous plutonium solution which will be removed from the shielded cells and taken to a glovebox for further purification and conversion to an oxide. The second is a calcined oxide containing the Am and Cm as well as other lanthanide fission products which will be removed from the shielded cells using a bagless transfer system. Both materials will be packaged for shipment to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). All equipment to carry out this process was designed, procured or fabricated, and installed in a mock-up facility (716-4A) at SRS to allow for simulation testing in a non-radioactive area. This equipment was then dismantled and transferred from 716-4A to 773-A and installed in the SRNL Shielded Cells. After installation in the shielded cells facility testing was performed using water followed by surrogates and cold chemicals. Issues were identified during these evaluations, including equipment issues as well as technical challenges. Many of the issues were rectified during performance of the cold runs, and the remaining have a resolution identified. Table ES-1 provides a summary of all issues identified during the cold run operations, as well as the status and identified resolutions to outstanding issues.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

DEVELOPMENT OF METHODOLOGY AND FIELD DEPLOYABLE SAMPLING TOOLS FOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL INTERROGATION IN LIQUID STORAGE

This project developed methodology and field deployable tools (test kits) to analyze the chemical and microbiological condition of the fuel storage medium and determine the oxide thickness on the spent fuel basin materials. The overall objective of this project was to determine the amount of time fuel has spent in a storage basin to determine if the operation of the reactor and storage basin is consistent with safeguard declarations or expectations. This project developed and validated forensic tools that can be used to predict the age and condition of spent nuclear fuels stored in liquid basins based on key physical, chemical and microbiological basin characteristics. Key parameters were identified based on a literature review, the parameters were used to design test cells for corrosion analyses, tools were purchased to analyze the key parameters, and these were used to characterize an active spent fuel basin, the Savannah River Site (SRS) L-Area basin. The key parameters identified in the literature review included chloride concentration, conductivity, and total organic carbon level. Focus was also placed on aluminum based cladding because of their application to weapons production. The literature review was helpful in identifying important parameters, but relationships between these parameters and corrosion rates were not available. Bench scale test systems were designed, operated, harvested, and analyzed to determine corrosion relationships between water parameters and water conditions, chemistry and microbiological conditions. The data from the bench scale system indicated that corrosion rates were dependent on total organic carbon levels and chloride concentrations. The highest corrosion rates were observed in test cells amended with sediment, a large microbial inoculum and an organic carbon source. A complete characterization test kit was field tested to characterize the SRS L-Area spent fuel basin. The sampling kit consisted of a TOC analyzer, a YSI multiprobe, and a thickness probe. The tools were field tested to determine their ease of use, reliability, and determine the quality of data that each tool could provide. Characterization was done over a two day period in June 2011, and confirmed that the L Area basin is a well operated facility with low corrosion potential.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

HFIR Dissolution Nuclear Criticality Analysis Information

The purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate the safety of High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) dissolution from a criticality safety perspective and to establish any Criticality Safety Limits (CSLs) that may be necessary. HFIR fuel consists of two annular elements that are designed to be nested together with a beryllium reflector in the reactor configuration. HFIR cores are currently stored in L-Area as separate inner elements and outer elements, each on a unique aluminum carrier. HFIR elements will be shipped to H-Canyon in the 70-ton Cask Railcar and loaded into the dissolver with the HFIR insert installed. The HFIR insert consists of a small well for the inner fuel element and a large well for the outer fuel element.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Characterization of Oxyhydroxides on a Dry-Stored Fuel Plate From L-Basin

This report describes the characterization of oxyhydroxide (oxide) films on a fuel plate that was previously irradiated in an RU-1 pool type reactor in Uruguay and subsequently stored in vented dry storage, first in Uruguay and most recently in L-Area on the Savannah River Site. Characterization of the as-received oxides includes the oxide morphology, thickness, structure, and chemical composition. The results from this work will, in a future report, be compared to characterizations of oxide films grown on alloys in the laboratory under prototypic conditions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Reduced Neutralization Feasibility Study for H-Canyon Accelerated Basin De- Inventory (ABD) Program

An alternative approach to Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) and Nuclear Material Processing was developed for future H-Canyon (HCAN) and L-Area operations that involves a paradigm shift from current HCAN, Concentrate, Storage, and Transfer Facility (CSTF), and Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) operations. The alternative, referred to as Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD), requires that all Domestic and Foreign Research Reactor SNF currently at the Savannah River Site (SRS) will be dissolved, stored, and then transferred to CSTF without recovery of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). Concentrated nitric acid is utilized to dissolve aluminum spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) in HCAN. The vessels and piping in HCAN are fabricated from 304L stainless steel and are ideally suited to handle the acidic waste stream. However, as the waste is transferred to the CSTF and DWPF, it will contact the carbon steel waste tanks in CSTF. In order to prevent corrosion of the carbon steel, the acidic waste is neutralized (i.e., pH adjusted over 11) by the addition of sodium hydroxide (NaOH). The NaOH is added until the final solution contains 1.2 M excess -OH. Additionally, if the waste is not neutralized to a pH greater than 11, then aluminum hydroxide (Al(OH) 3 ) would form, and solids may form in the piping as it is transferred to CSTF. This document presents an analysis of the influence of reducing the excess caustic that is added to the neutralization tanks on the corrosion protection scheme primarily for the CSTF waste tanks. The implications to HCAN and DWPF were also assessed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Increased Fissile Loading Flowsheet Review

A request was made by H-Canyon Process Engineering to assess the impact of blending dissolved, neutralized Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) with future sludge batches and their impact on downstream processing facilities including the Concentration, Storage and Transfer Facilities (CSTF), the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF), the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF), Saltstone, and the Effluent Treatment Facility (ETF). The purpose of this change is to accelerate the deinventory of SNF which is currently stored in the L-Area Disassembly Basin. The addition of SNF increases the mass of fissiles in each future sludge batch, due to their high enrichment. This high enrichment has the potential to complicate the programs to eliminate criticality events in the downstream processing facilities and will increase the number of canisters produced by DWPF because of the SNF mass increase. A separate report addressed the impacts to glass. The review and subsequent calculations were based on average predicted compositions of Accelerated Basin Deinventory (ABD) slurry, average compositions for predicted future sludge batches, average past salt batches and average past recycle batches to predict the feeds that will be processed in SWPF, DWPF, Saltstone, the 2H evaporator and ETF. Each of the processes was evaluated for potential issues.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Increased Fissile Loading Flowsheet Review

A request was made by H-Canyon Process Engineering to assess the impact of blending dissolved, neutralized Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) with future sludge batches and their impact on downstream processing facilities. The purpose of this change is to accelerate the deinventory of SNF which is currently stored in the L-Area Disassembly Basin.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Evaluation of the Potential for Precipitation of Solids during Storage of Non-Aluminum SNF Solutions

Non-aluminum clad spent nuclear fuels (NASNF) stored in the L-Area basin will be dissolved in H-Canyon using the 6.3D electrolytic dissolver. The solutions will be stored in either the hot or warm canyon until the preparation of a sludge batch for the Defense Waste Processing Facility. Spent nuclear fuel solutions could be stored for 1-2 years before transfer to the H-Area Tank Farm depending on the interval between sludge batches. The solution level in the storage tanks will be maintained; therefore, precipitation of solids due to evaporation is not an issue. However, the precipitation of solids from completely dissolved SNF due to solution instabilities has been observed during intermediate storage of solutions generating hydrated oxides.The presence of fissile material in these solids is generally associated with zirconium molybdate, which is known to act as a host lattice for Pu and can carry the actinides upon precipitation. The formation of zirconium molybdate solids which carry fissile material is a potential concern for the storage of NASNF solutions. To address this concern, the Savannah River National Laboratory performed a literature review to identify knowledge gaps which may require experimental work to determine if the formation of solids is a concern during storage of these solutions. Based on the literature review, the precipitation of zirconium molybdate solids from the Campaign 1 NASNF solutions during intermediatestorage is expected. This conclusion is supported by the identification of zirconium molybdate solids found on the H-Canyon 6.1D Dissolver MK-12 insert spacer. The formation of the zirconium molybdate solids is attributed to hydrolysis and radiolytic processes in the nitric acid solution. As the molybdate solids form, U and Pu can substitute for Zr in the crystal lattice resulting in co-precipitation. Generally, the Pu substitutes directly into the crystal lattice during precipitation while the U associated with the molybdate solids more likely absorbs from the solution. The U in the NASNF solutions is present as uranyl nitrate, a 2+ cation which will not substitute as easily into the molybdate crystal lattice for the Zr 4+ ion.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

L AREA WASTEWATER STORAGE DRUM EVALUATION

This report documents the determination of the cause of pressurization that led to bulging deformation of a 55 gallon wastewater drum stored in L-Area. Drum samples were sent to SRNL for evaluation. The interior surface of these samples revealed blistering and holes in the epoxy phenolic drum liner and corrosion of the carbon steel drum. It is suspected that osmotic pressure drove permeation of the water through the epoxy phenolic coating which was weakened from exposure to low pH water. The coating failed at locations throughout the drum interior. Subsequent corrosion of the carbon steel released hydrogen which pressurized the drum causing deformation of the drum lid. Additional samples from other wastewater drums on the same pallet were also evaluated and limited corrosion was visible on the interior surfaces. It is suspected that, with time, the corrosion would have advanced to cause pressurization of these sealed drums.

08 HYDROGEN↗

FIELD-DEPLOYABLE SAMPLING TOOLS FOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL INTERROGATION IN LIQUID STORAGE

Methodology and field deployable tools (test kits) to analyze the chemical and microbiological condition of aqueous spent fuel storage basins and determine the oxide thickness on the spent fuel basin materials were developed to assess the corrosion potential of a basin. this assessment can then be used to determine the amount of time fuel has spent in a storage basin to ascertain if the operation of the reactor and storage basin is consistent with safeguard declarations or expectations and assist in evaluating general storage basin operations. The test kit was developed based on the identification of key physical, chemical and microbiological parameters identified using a review of the scientific and basin operations literature. The parameters were used to design bench scale test cells for additional corrosion analyses, and then tools were purchased to analyze the key parameters. The tools were used to characterize an active spent fuel basin, the Savannah River Site (SRS) L-Area basin. The sampling kit consisted of a total organic carbon analyzer, an YSI multiprobe, and a thickness probe. The tools were field tested to determine their ease of use, reliability, and determine the quality of data that each tool could provide. Characterization confirmed that the L Area basin is a well operated facility with low corrosion potential.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

SAVANNAH RIVER SITE'S H-CANYON FACILITY: IMPACTS OF FOREIGN OBLIGATIONS ON SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL DISPOSITION

The US has a non-proliferation policy to receive foreign and domestic research reactor returns of spent fuel materials of US origin. These spent fuel materials are returned to the Department of Energy (DOE) and placed in storage in the L-area spent fuel basin at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The foreign research reactor returns fall subject to the 123 agreements for peaceful cooperation. These “123 agreements” are named after section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and govern the conditions of nuclear cooperation with foreign partners. The SRS management of these foreign obligations while planning material disposition paths can be a challenge.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Thermal Evaluations for Hypothetically Drain-Down Spent Fuel Storage Facility at SRS

The L-Area Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) underwater storage facility at Savannah River Site (SRS), referred to as L-Basin SNF facility, has an array of Vertical Tube Storage (VTS) racks and a group of High Flux Irradiation Reactor (HFIR) fuel cores. The underwater facility is integrally designed as a wet SNF storage system with a chemically-controlled water pool. The SNF storage racks are seismically qualified. The L-Basin pool holds about 3.4 million gallons of water with concrete wall thickness of about 5 ft and water depths of 17 ft to 30 ft. The facility has mainly two different elevation levels of 30 ft and 17 ft below the ground level. At the level 30 ft below the ground, a maximum of 110 racks of VTS and 5 racks of Dry Cave can be stored. At the level of 17 ft below the ground, 120 HFIR cores can be stored, considering that each rack contains two HFIR cores. In case of a hypothetical accident, all cooling water in the storage pool may be drained away, resulting in dry SNF storage condition. The primary objective of the work is to estimate the maximum fuel temperature in a conservative manner when the L-Basin facility is completely dry due to the hypothetical drain-down of the pool water. A three-dimensional Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) modeling approach was taken for the thermal evaluations of the water-drained SNF storage facility. The modeling calculations were performed, assuming that all of the storage racks in L-Basin are fully loaded with SNF assemblies containing decay heat sources. In the case of full loading, the L-Basin facility stores 14,600 SNF assemblies in VTS racks and 120 cores in HFIR racks. The thermal analysis results of the L-Basin model yielded maximum temperatures of VTS and HFIR fuel assemblies for different fuel loading scenarios and boundary conditions of the SNF storage racks.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NASNF Processing and Packaging Technical Study

The ABD program will require development of a strategy for the dispositioning the Non-Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel (NASNF), some of which will be very challenging to handle and dissolve as described in this report. Not all the NASNF is suitable for processing through the electrolytic dissolver. The strategy may involve dissolution of the majority of the NASNF inventory in the electrolytic dissolver combined with some other disposition alternative(s) for the fraction that is not suitable for electrolytic dissolution. This report highlights the risks and challenges associated with the baseline approach of using the electrolytic dissolver to process all of the NASNF. In addition, the characteristics of the NASNF and how those characteristics relate to the risks associated with electrolytically dissolving the specific fuel types.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗