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At least 19 records

Economic Risk-Informed Maintenance Planning and Asset Management (Final Report)

The proposed work will provide a holistic framework for cost-minimizing risk-informed maintenance planning, including inspection, in light water reactors (LWRs). Specifically, we develop a two-tier framework that (a) coarsely minimizes the total maintenance cost during the remaining normal operating cycle of the plant prior to the next scheduled outage (long-term), subject to safety requirements, and (b) uses the outputs of the first model to develop a secondary optimization model to finely schedule maintenance activities to maximize the financial impact of these activities in the next week (short-term).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

HPC Analytics of Fused Thermal Plants Data to Optimize Operating Envelope

In this project, ORNL extensively reviewed the ORAP RAM data, and it guided us to develop machine learning models that can predict time to next failures and forecast failure trends, which will be useful for optimizing power plant operation strategies. More specifically, we trained multiple random forest models and evaluated the model accuracy to validate with 10+ years of historical data. In addition, we implemented a web-based graphical user interface system for the models to show how our models can be used in more intuitive ways. This proof of concept allowed exploration of model use with power plant operators in mind. Developed machine learning models will be helpful for managing risks, planning maintenance and operation, ultimately reducing the down time and increasing the service hours. For future work, there are several interesting research topics including but not limited to model enhancement, creating synergy with traditional failure modeling approaches, and data-driven actionable recommendation and suggestions.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

Complex Failure Forewarning System - DHS Conference Proceedings

As the critical infrastructures of the United States have become more and more dependent on public and private networks, the potential for widespread national impact resulting from disruption or failure of these networks has also increased. Securing the nation s critical infrastructures requires protecting not only their physical systems but, just as important, the cyber portions of the systems on which they rely. A failure is inclusive of random events, design flaws, and instabilities caused by cyber (and/or physical) attack. One such domain, aging bridges, is used to explain the Complex Structure Failure Forewarning System. We discuss the workings of such a system in the context of the necessary sensors, command and control and data collection as well as the cyber security efforts that would support this system. Their application and the implications of this computing architecture are also discussed, with respect to our nation s aging infrastructure.

5th Annual University Network Summit↗

Forewarning of Failure in Complex Systems

As the critical infrastructures of the United States have become more and more dependent on public and private networks, the potential for widespread national impact resulting from disruption or failure of these networks has also increased. Securing the nation s critical infrastructures requires protecting not only their physical systems but, just as important, the cyber portions of the systems on which they rely. A failure is inclusive of random events, design flaws, and instabilities caused by cyber (and/or physical) attack. One such domain is failure in critical equipment. A second is aging bridges. We discuss the workings of such a system in the context of the necessary sensors, command and control and data collection as well as the cyber security efforts that would support this system. Their application and the implications of this computing architecture are also discussed, with respect to our nation s aging infrastructure.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

NGNP Risk Management Database: A Model for Managing Risk

To facilitate the implementation of the Risk Management Plan, the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) Project has developed and employed an analytical software tool called the NGNP Risk Management System (RMS). A relational database developed in Microsoft® Access, the RMS provides conventional database utility including data maintenance, archiving, configuration control, and query ability. Additionally, the tool’s design provides a number of unique capabilities specifically designed to facilitate the development and execution of activities outlined in the Risk Management Plan. Specifically, the RMS provides the capability to establish the risk baseline, document and analyze the risk reduction plan, track the current risk reduction status, organize risks by reference configuration system, subsystem, and component (SSC) and Area, and increase the level of NGNP decision making.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Modernizing the Legacy Fission Wire Measurement System for the Advanced Test Reactor-Critical Facility

Operational lifetime extensions of existing research reactors have emphasized the need for refurbishment, replacements, and upgrades to supporting equipment and instrumentation. The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), which entered service in 1967, has recently completed the sixth core internals change-out and has scheduled operations until at least 2040. Reactor maintenance and operational risk management is critically important in the research reactor community, however supporting measurement systems sometimes get overlooked when maintenance is planned. The Fission Wire Measurement System (FWMS) is a custom measurement system designed in the 1960s to measure the beta-particle activity of irradiated uranium-aluminum fission wires. This measurement is conducted to determine the fission rate profile of the Advanced Reactor Test Critical (ATR-C) facility. The ATR-C is an open-pool, low-power test reactor that was purpose driven to resemble ATR and is used to qualify experiment configurations and verify core models prior to full-power experiment irradiations in ATR. A power distribution measurement in ATR-C uses uranium-aluminum wires that are distributed throughout the ATR-C core to validate simulation and modeling results. These measurements require 340 to 1500 wires to be irradiated and measured within a 12-hour window. The activity of the wires is measured in the required time with the FWMS, which was put into service in 1965 at the Radiation Measurements Laboratory (RML). The system consists of 4 measurement channels and one reference channel, each with a 2-pi proportional gas flow detector and the measurement channels each have an automated sample changer. This legacy system is crucial to the continued operations of ATR and has undergone some minor hardware upgrades since 1965, however the system presently relies on custom control boards, custom gas ion chambers, analog amplifiers/discriminators, and a user interface (UI) for the system written in outdated code. Much of the equipment and software is custom with no commercial replacements or support and limited documentation. The existing control software requires an operating system that is no longer supported, creating more vulnerabilities to continued operations. A project is underway with a third-party vendor to design, build, and document a new control and data acquisition system (CDAS) for the FWMS. The new upgrade will replace the control system, computer, UI, sample changer motors, and main power supply while maintaining the interface with existing detector hardware. The upgraded system will be operated in parallel with the current hardware and software to conduct validation testing. This equipment upgrade demonstrates the commitment at ATR to ensuring successful operations and potential future research reactors at INL.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗

Assessing Risk and Driving Risk Mitigation for First-of-a-Kind Advanced Reactors

Planning and decision making amidst programmatic and technological risks represent significant challenges for projects. This presentation addresses the four step risk-assessment process needed to determine clear path forward to mature needed technology and design, license, and construct advanced nuclear power plants, which have never been built before, including Small Modular Reactors. This four step process has been carefully applied to the Next Generation Nuclear Plant. STEP 1 - Risk Identification Risks are identified, collected, and categorized as technical risks, programmatic risks, and project risks, each of which result in cost and schedule impacts if realized. These include risks arising from the use of technologies not previously demonstrated in a relevant application. These risks include normal and accident scenarios which the SMR could experience including events that cause the disablement of engineered safety features (typically documented in Phenomena Identification Ranking Tables (PIRT) as produced with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) and design needs which must be addressed to further detail the design. Product - Project Risk Register contained in a database with sorting, presentation, rollup, risk work off functionality similar to the NGNP Risk Management System . STEP 2 - Risk Quantification The risks contained in the risk register are then scored for probability of occurrence and severity of consequence, if realized. Here the scoring methodology is established and the basis for the scoring is well documented. Product - Quantified project risk register with documented basis for scoring. STEP 3 - Risk Handling Strategy Risks are mitigated by applying a systematic approach to maturing the technology through Research and Development, modeling, test, and design. A Technology Readiness Assessment is performed to determine baseline Technology Readiness Levels (TRL). Tasks needed to mature the technology are developed and documented in a roadmap. Product - Risk Handling Strategy. STEP 4 - Residual Risk Work off The risk handling strategy is entered into the Project Risk Allocation Tool (PRAT) to analyze each task for its ability to reduce risk. The result is risk-informed task prioritization. The risk handling strategy is captured in the Risk Management System, a relational database that provides conventional database utility, including data maintenance, archiving, configuration control, and query ability. The tool's Hierarchy Tree allows visualization and analyses of complex relationships between risks, risk mitigation tasks, design needs, and PIRTs. Product - Project Risk Allocation Tool and Risk Management System which depict project plan to reduce risk and current progress in doing so.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DE-EE0006714 Final Report-Project Icebreaker™

Project Icebreaker, a 20 Megawatt offshore wind project 8 miles north of Cleveland, OH in Lake Erie, has been under development by the Lake Erie Energy Development Corporation since 2009. Significant development efforts were completed prior to the award of DE-EE0006714 (December 2014). This report describes the status of the work performed under award DE-EE0006714. The work was organized into several categories or tasks. The report presents the status of that work in each of eleven (11) main tasks: 1) State and Federal Permits; 2) Mono Bucket Foundation Engineering; 3) Construction and Installation Engineering; 4) Cable Route Survey; 5) Electrical System Design; 6) Power Off-take; 7) Project Costs and Risk Management; 8) Operations and Maintenance Planning; 9) Domestic Supply Chain Development; 10) Instrumentation Planning; and 11) Department of Energy Review.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

LANSCE Facility Longevity Assessment

This LANSCE Facility Longevity Assessment examined 34 total systems critical to the operation of the LANSCE accelerator complex. These systems are primarily owned, operated, and maintained by AOT Division. Based on the criteria used in this assessment, there are 12 AOT Division systems that are potential high risk as related to longterm LANSCE operations. These systems may also impact the success of LAMP. Also summarized in this report are the facility activities planned over the next decade. These include general facility maintenance and infrastructure upgrades, as well as planned electrical system upgrades. The LANSCE Facility Operations (LFO) Division is responsible for this activity scope and budget planning. Most of the planned activities are general in nature and should have little impact on accelerator operations or LAMP activities as currently envisioned. However, close coordination with between AOT, LFO, and LAMP would be prudent. A next step should be to develop an actionable plan to address the high-risk systems. Potential criteria for developing such a plan could include: (1) Evaluating the global impact of the system (operations, program, safety, etc.), (2) Ranking by impact (ranked now by risk), (3) Estimating cost to implement the corrective actions (Is there already a plan or not?), and (4) Estimating the time required for corrective actions. An alternative could include integration of the assessment data into both the Asset Management System and the Maintenance Analytics Risk Register.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Facilitating Data Collection of Maintenance Events to Populate the Hydrogen Component Reliability Database (HyCReD)

The Hydrogen Component Reliability Database (HyCReD) is a collaborative project between the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, the University of Maryland, and hydrogen stakeholders to improve safety and reliability for hydrogen facilities by implementing component reliability data taxonomies that support hydrogen infrastructure failure rate analysis. The project aims to quantify failure rates of hydrogen components through high-quality data collection and analysis on root causes and maintenance needed. HyCReD provides a common database for cataloging hydrogen component failures which exists for reliability research in many other mature industries [2]. The database fills a gap for the hydrogen community by providing a scientifically rigorous approach to quantitative risk assessment (QRA), prognostic health management (PHM), and reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) analysis. High level results will be aggregated and anonymized to protect company sensitive information; detailed results will be used to help address issues of hydrogen components. These advanced analytics will support accelerated deployment of hydrogen infrastructure by enabling better: design and safety of projects (safety codes and standards development), infrastructure reliability and cost (component failure rates, maintenance protocols), and component R&D needs (robust supply chain). A key to a successful HyCReD implementation is facilitating the ease of reporting and data quality in the database that can be used for analysis. Maintenance data was a previously identified gap in initial efforts to populate and validate the database taxonomies [3]. Collection of maintenance data will be instrumental in identifying failure modes and rates, identifying incipient component failures or reduced performance, cataloging best practices for maintenance routines and methods for prognostic health management, and quantifying the risk and effect of different failure modes. Several key priorities are identified for streamlined data collection to achieve quality and detailed failure data: Applicability, Ease of Use, Accessibility, and Information Security. The HyCReD team has now begun deployment of the database to several companies and groups that have signed non-disclosure agreements to facilitate the data collection of failures in industry hydrogen refueling station infrastructure. This paper will provide an update into the process of HyCReD deployment including the development of a coding guide for facility personnel to reference and ensure data quality and consistency from one station to another as well as implementation of contextually dependent data fields of system taxonomy and formatted entries to provide ease of use. The goal is to communicate the lessons learned from the roll-out to technicians and engineers in the field, and the addition of need for high level of security to protect all stakeholders.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Reducing Risk With ASHRAE Standard 241

ASHRAE Standard 241’s requirements can make indoor spaces more resilient to the spread of airborne infectious diseases. Buildings that comply with ASHRAE Standard 241-2023, Control of Infectious Aerosols,1 will have the capacity to respond during times of elevated risk with systems that provide the necessary equivalent clean airflow for infection control (VECAi). To reduce risk effectively, these systems need to operate properly. This column explores Standard 241’s requirements for operations and maintenance in high-risk times (infection risk management mode or IRMM) and the importance of creating a Building Readiness Plan.

ashrae standard 241, Operations and Maintenance, b↗

Risk Management of Jettisoned Objects in LEO

The construction and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS) has led to the release of many objects into its orbital plane, usually during the course of an extra-vehicular activity (EVA). Such releases are often unintentional, but in a growing number of cases, the jettison has been intentional, conducted after a careful assessment of the net risk to the partnership and to other objects in space. Since its launch in 1998 the ISS has contributed on average at least one additional debris object that is simultaneously in orbit with the station, although the number varies widely from zero to eight at any one moment. All of these objects present potential risks to other objects in orbit. Whether it comes from known and tracked orbiting objects or from unknown or untrackable objects, collision with orbital debris can have disastrous consequences. Objects greater than 10cm are generally well documented and tracked, allowing orbiting spacecraft or satellites opportunities to perform evasive maneuvers (commonly known as Debris Avoidance Maneuvers, or DAMs) in the event that imminent collision is predicted. The issue with smaller debris; however, is that it is too numerous to be tracked effectively and yet still poses disastrous consequences if it intercepts a larger object. Due to the immense kinetic energy of any item in orbit, collision with debris as small as 1cm can have catastrophic consequences for many orbiting satellites or spacecraft. Faced with the growing orbital debris threat and the potentially catastrophic consequences of a collision-generated debris shower originating in an orbit crossing the ISS altitude band, in 2007 the ISS program manger asked program specialists to coordinate a multilateral jettison policy amongst the ISS partners. This policy would define the acceptable risk trade rationale for intentional release of a debris object, and other mandatory constraints on such jettisons to minimize the residual risks whenever a jettison was accepted. Although ISS-related debris often presents untenable risks to the EVA crew, IVA crew, or to a departing cargo vehicle for a controlled disposal, such released objects also present a ballistic nuisance to the visiting vehicle traffic, and a potential fragmentation threat to the hundreds of other functional and debris objects whose perigees lie below the ISS orbital altitude. Thus, every such jettison decision is a conscious risk trade.

Bacon, John B.↗

A Guide for Creating a Building-Level Action Plan to Manage Refrigerants in Buildings

The Guide for Creating a Building-Level Action Plan to Manage Refrigerants in Buildings has been developed in response to stakeholder feedback and interest received during the Better Buildings Managing Refrigerants Working Group. This guide includes best practices and a step-by-step guide to create a plan to manage their organization's refrigerants. Stakeholders were interested in guidance for refrigerant management to help reduce costs and protect efficiency of equipment, to mitigate risk related to increased maintenance and operational budgets, and to manage costs of using legacy refrigerants.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Systematic Enterprise Risk Management by Integrating the RISMC Toolkit and Cost-Benefit Analysis (Final Report)

The goal of this research is to theorize and quantify the relationships between safety and the financial performance of nuclear power plants (NPPs). The Socio-Technical Risk Analysis (SoTeRiA) theoretical framework, which connects the social aspects (e.g., safety culture) and structural features (e.g., safety practices) of an organization with organizational safety and financial risks, is used to theorize the direct and indirect relationships between safety and the financial performance of NPPs. An Integrated Enterprise Risk Management (I-ERM) methodological framework is developed to operationalize SoTeRiA to quantify NPP safety and financial performance in a unified platform where their underlying physical degradation mechanisms, coupled with maintenance performance (considering human and organizational factors), are explicitly incorporated to depict the interconnections and dependencies between safety and financial performance. In this study, NPP safety refers to both occupational safety and system safety (estimated from Probabilistic Risk Assessment, PRA), and financial performance refers to the monetary values associated with NPP operation and maintenance (O&M) strategies. This report covers a case study demonstrating the feasibility of the I-ERM methodological framework. More detailed development of one of the I-ERM modules, i.e., Probabilistic Physics-of-Failure (PPoF) analysis, and its connection with other I-ERM modules is demonstrated in a second case study. The outcome of this research will help NPP decision-makers create cost-saving maintenance strategies while maintaining safety by providing cost- and risk-informed recommendations regarding maintenance work processes and operational strategies.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

INTEGRATION OF DATA ANALYTICS WITH SYSTEM HEALTH PROGRAMS

Industry equipment reliability and asset management programs are essential elements that help ensure the safe and economical operation of nuclear power plants. The effectiveness of these programs is addressed in several industry developed and regulatory programs. However, these programs have proven to be labor intensive and expensive. There is an opportunity to significantly enhance the collection, analysis, and use of this information to provide more cost-effective plant operation. Additionally, there is an acute industry need to leverage advanced technology to reduce costs and improve operational effectiveness. The goal of this paper is to provide effective and efficient analytical methods and tools to support risk-informed decisions for the equipment reliability and asset management programs at nuclear power plants. This is accomplished by creating a direct bridge between component health/lifecycle data and decision making (e.g., maintenance scheduling and project prioritization). Here we are supporting typical system engineer decisions regarding maintenance activity scheduling and component ageing management. This is performed in a risk-informed context where herein the term “risk” is broadly constructed to include both plant reliability and economics. This framework combines data analytics tools to analyze equipment reliability data with risk-informed methods designed to support system engineer decisions (e.g., maintenance and replacement schedules, optimal maintenance posture) in a customizable workflow. A challenge is that the structure of this workflow strongly depends on the decision that needs to be made, the type of data available, and the constraints that need to be considered. Current methods are designed to provide specific answers to specific problems; however, these methods might prove to be inadequate even when problem settings slightly change (e.g., different types of requirements, additional dependencies between system reliability and economics). We tackled this challenge by designing framework in a flexible and modular fashion such that the user can assemble and customize his/her own workflow that integrates SSC economic lifecycle models (e.g., maintenance and replacement costs), system reliability models, and optimization methods.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Earned Value Management Systems for Operations Activities

An earned value management system (EVMS), which monitors contractor performance, is a requirement for program and project management for all major acquisitions by the United States Federal Government with development effort: (i.e., an asset requiring management attention because of its importance to an agency’s mission; high development, operating, or maintenance costs; high risk and/or high return). As an area less explored in earned value management (EVM) practices, this paper will survey the application of an EVMS for operations activities defined as: (1) Non-capital asset activities that are projects (or project - like) with definable start and end dates, with discrete scopes of work, and measurable accomplishments; as well as (2) Routine or recurring facility or environmental operations. This paper will examine the use of an EVMS to evaluate performance of operations and maintenance activities required once construction of a capital asset is complete and being used as intended. Such activities include upgrades and maintenance in order for capital assets to meet their mission function over a life-cycle (through repair, replacement, etc.). This paper will provide background on this topic from the perspective of the Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Program. In addition, it will provide material from a panel discussion provided by a group of experts from the October 2019 Office of Environmental Management Project Management Workshop, as well as material from subsequent research on this topic.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Integrated Planning: Consolidating Annual Facility Planning - More Time for Execution

Previously, annual planning for Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) was fragmented, disconnected, circular, and occurred constantly throughout the fiscal year (FY) comprising 9 of the 12 months, reducing the focus on implementation and execution. This required constant “looking back” instead of “looking forward.” In FY 2009, annual planning was consolidated into one comprehensive integrated plan (IP) for each facility/project, which comprised annual task planning/outyear budgeting, AMPs, and investment planning (i.e., TYIP). In FY 2010, the Risk Management Plans were added to the IPs. The integrated planning process achieved the following: 1) Eliminated fragmented, circular, planning and moved the plan to be more forward-looking; 2) Achieved a 90% reduction in schedule planning timeframe from 40 weeks (9 months) to 6 weeks; 3) Achieved an 80% reduction in cost from just under $1.0M to just over $200K, for a cost savings of nearly $800K (reduced combined effort from over 200 person-weeks to less than 40); 4) Reduced the number of plans generated from 21 plans (1 per facility per plan) per year to 8 plans per year (1 per facility plus 1 program-level IP); 5) Eliminated redundancy in common content between plans and improved consistency and overall quality; 6) Reduced the preparation time and cost of the FY 2010 SEP by 50% due to information provided in the IP; 7) Met the requirements for annual task planning, annual maintenance planning, ten-year investment planning, and risk management plans.

Nelson, J. G.↗

Methodology Development for Passive Component Reliability Modeling in a Multi-Physics Simulation Environment

Reduction in safety margin can be expected as passive structures and components undergo degradation with time. Limitations in the traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology constrain its value as an effective tool to address the impact of aging effects on risk and for quantifying the impact of aging management strategies in maintaining safety margins. A methodology has been developed to address multiple aging mechanisms involving large numbers of components (with possibly statistically dependent failures) within the PRA framework in a computationally feasible manner when the sequencing of events is conditioned on the physical conditions predicted in a simulation environment, such as the New Generation System Code (NGSC) concept. Both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties can be accounted for within the same phenomenological framework and maintenance can be accounted for in a coherent fashion. The framework accommodates the prospective impacts of various intervention strategies such as testing, maintenance, and refurbishment. The methodology is illustrated with several examples.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗