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At least 19 records

Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 5: Nuclear System safety guidelines. Part 1: Space base nuclear safety

The design and operations guidelines and requirements developed in the study of space base nuclear system safety are presented. Guidelines and requirements are presented for the space base subsystems, nuclear hardware (reactor, isotope sources, dynamic generator equipment), experiments, interfacing vehicles, ground support systems, range safety and facilities. Cross indices and references are provided which relate guidelines to each other, and to substantiating data in other volumes. The guidelines are intended for the implementation of nuclear safety related design and operational considerations in future space programs.

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Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Voluem 5: Nuclear system safety guidelines. Part 2: Space shuttle/nuclear payloads safety

The design and operations guidelines and requirements developed in the study of space shuttle nuclear system transportation are presented. Guidelines and requirements are presented for the shuttle, nuclear payloads (reactor, isotope-Brayton and small isotope sources), ground support systems and facilities. Cross indices and references are provided which relate guidelines to each other, and to substantiating data in other volumes. The guidelines are intended for the implementation of nuclear safety related design and operational considerations in future space programs.

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Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 3: Reactor system preliminary nuclear safety analysis. Part 1: Reference Design Document (RDD)

The Reference Design Document, of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) - Reactor System provides the basic design and operations data used in the nuclear safety analysis of the Rector Power Module as applied to a Space Base program. A description of the power module systems, facilities, launch vehicle and mission operations, as defined in NASA Phase A Space Base studies is included. Each of two Zirconium Hydride Reactor Brayton power modules provides 50 kWe for the nominal 50 man Space Base. The INT-21 is the prime launch vehicle. Resupply to the 500 km orbit over the ten year mission is provided by the Space Shuttle. At the end of the power module lifetime (nominally five years), a reactor disposal system is deployed for boost into a 990 km high altitude (long decay time) earth orbit.

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Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 3: Reactor system preliminary nuclear safety analysis. Part 2: Accident Model Document (AMD)

The Accident Model Document is one of three documents of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) - Reactor System as applied to a Space Base Program. Potential terrestrial nuclear hazards involving the zirconium hydride reactor-Brayton power module are identified for all phases of the Space Base program. The accidents/events that give rise to the hazards are defined and abort sequence trees are developed to determine the sequence of events leading to the hazard and the associated probabilities of occurence. Source terms are calculated to determine the magnitude of the hazards. The above data is used in the mission accident analysis to determine the most probable and significant accidents/events in each mission phase. The only significant hazards during the prelaunch and launch ascent phases of the mission are those which arise form criticality accidents. Fission product inventories during this time period were found to be very low due to very limited low power acceptance testing.

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Upgraded NERVA systems: Enabler nuclear system

The NERVA/Rover Enabler technology enables to go on a low risk, short-term program to meet the requirements of the Mars mission and maybe some lunar missions. The following subject areas are covered: NERVA technology - the foundation for tomorrow's space missions; NERVA/Rover reactor system test sequence; NERVA engine development program; nuclear thermal reactor capability based on many related Westinghouse technology programs; investment in Rover/Nerva technology; synergistic applications of NERVA technology; flow schematic of the NDR engine; the NERVA nuclear subsystem; and technology evolution.

Farbman, Gerry↗

Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 3: Reactor system preliminary nuclear safety analysis. Part 2A: Accident model document, appendix

The detailed abort sequence trees for the reference zirconium hydride (ZrH) reactor power module that have been generated for each phase of the reference Space Base program mission are presented. The trees are graphical representations of causal sequences. Each tree begins with the phase identification and the dichotomy between success and failure. The success branch shows the mission phase objective as being achieved. The failure branch is subdivided, as conditions require, into various primary initiating abort conditions.

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Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 3: Reactor system preliminary nuclear safety analysis. Part 3: Nuclear Safety Analysis Document (NSAD)

Nuclear safety analysis as applied to a space base mission is presented. The nuclear safety analysis document summarizes the mission and the credible accidents/events which may lead to nuclear hazards to the general public. The radiological effects and associated consequences of the hazards are discussed in detail. The probability of occurrence is combined with the potential number of individuals exposed to or above guideline values to provide a measure of accident and total mission risk. The overall mission risk has been determined to be low with the potential exposure to or above 25 rem limited to less than 4 individuals per every 1000 missions performed. No radiological risk to the general public occurs during the prelaunch phase at KSC. The most significant risks occur from prolonged exposure to reactor debris following land impact generally associated with the disposal phase of the mission where fission product inventories can be high.

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Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 1: base nuclear system safety

The mission and terrestrial nuclear safety aspects of future long duration manned space missions in low earth orbit are discussed. Nuclear hazards of a typical low earth orbit Space Base mission (from natural sources and on-board nuclear hardware) have been identified and evaluated. Some of the principal nuclear safety design and procedural considerations involved in launch, orbital, and end of mission operations are presented. Areas of investigation include radiation interactions with the crew, subsystems, facilities, experiments, film, interfacing vehicles, nuclear hardware and the terrestrial populace. Results of the analysis indicate: (1) the natural space environment can be the dominant radiation source in a low earth orbit where reactors are effectively shielded, (2) with implementation of safety guidelines the reactor can present a low risk to the crew, support personnel, the terrestrial populace, flight hardware and the mission, (3) ten year missions are feasible without exceeding integrated radiation limits assigned to flight hardware, and (4) crew stay-times up to one year are feasible without storm shelter provisions.

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Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 6: Space base nuclear system safety plan

A qualitative identification of the steps required to assure the incorporation of radiological system safety principles and objectives into all phases of a manned space base program are presented. Specific areas of emphasis include: (1) radiological program management, (2) nuclear system safety plan implementation, (3) impact on program, and (4) summary of the key operation and design guidelines and requirements. The plan clearly indicates the necessity of considering and implementing radiological system safety recommendations as early as possible in the development cycle to assure maximum safety and minimize the impact on design and mission plans.

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Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 4: Space shuttle nuclear system transportation. Part 1: Space shuttle nuclear safety

An analysis of the nuclear safety aspects (design and operational considerations) in the transport of nuclear payloads to and from earth orbit by the space shuttle is presented. Three representative nuclear payloads used in the study were: (1) the zirconium hydride reactor Brayton power module, (2) the large isotope Brayton power system and (3) small isotopic heat sources which can be a part of an upper stage or part of a logistics module. Reference data on the space shuttle and nuclear payloads are presented in an appendix. Safety oriented design and operational requirements were identified to integrate the nuclear payloads in the shuttle mission. Contingency situations were discussed and operations and design features were recommended to minimize the nuclear hazards. The study indicates the safety, design and operational advantages in the use of a nuclear payload transfer module. The transfer module can provide many of the safety related support functions (blast and fragmentation protection, environmental control, payload ejection) minimizing the direct impact on the shuttle.

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Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 1: Executive summary. Part 2: Space shuttle nuclear system safety

The nuclear safety integration and operational aspects of transporting nuclear payloads to and from an earth orbiting space base by space shuttle are discussed. The representative payloads considered were: (1) zirconium hydride-Brayton power module, (2) isotope-Brayton power module, and (3) small isotope power systems or heat sources. Areas of investigation also include nuclear safety related integration and packaging as well as operational requirements for the shuttle and payload systems for all phases of the mission.

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Affordable Development Strategy for NEP Nuclear Systems

One nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) reactor systems under consideration is a hydride moderated thermal spectrum reactor fueled by high assay low enriched uranium (HALEU). While such a reactor is expected to yield the lightest HALEU reactor design, its development challenges grow exponentially with increasing mission demands, most notably power output, specific weight of the overall system (which may require operation at temperatures exceeding 1200 K), service lifetime, and human-rated reliability. Two of the greatest cost drivers are full-powered nuclear demonstrations and extensive material development campaigns, so it is important to consider options that can minimize the need for or complexity of such tasks. This paper discusses a structured framework being developed for assessing how NEP design choices, such as materials selection, neutronic features, and heat-removal technologies, can translate into project risk and how project performance goals can be traded with development cost.Reactors operating at high temperatures often require cutting-edge heat transfer technologies and creep-resistant materials. Use of new materials in high temperature reactors brings additional complication beyond those common to any new space materials development campaign. For example, such materials may not possess necessary neutronic cross-sectional or neutronic irradiation data. Similarly, use of new materials may significantly influence core neutronics; in some extreme cases, neutronic reactivity feed-back of certain new materials can vary during their service life as radiation damage impacts the scattering cross-section. In an affordable development approach, high fidelity modeling and simulation tools are used to identify and characterize potential ‘knees-in-the-curves’ in the relationship that exists between the mission characteristics and the project risk. Of particular significance is use of modern uncertainty management and variance reduction methods to perform gap analyses that feed into phenomena identification and ranking tables (PIRT) commonly used to communicate nuclear readiness levels. Model-based measurements techniques are used to design sub-scale experiments as a substitute to minimize orcompletely eliminate the need for nuclear demonstrations.This paper will describe the approach and present preliminary results. It will lay the groundwork for developing a set of metrics that can be broadly characterized as system nuclear readiness levels and advancement degree of difficulty for nuclear systems. Equally importantly, a goal of this paper is to initiate a dialogue among stakeholders on what is the sufficient level of maturity that is required for launching a demonstration unit.

Dasari V Rao↗

Daejeon16 interaction with contact-term corrections for heavy nuclear systems

The Daejeon16 two-nucleon interaction is employed in many-body approaches based on the mean-field approximation. The perturbative character of Daejeon16 is verified by comparing results for 16 O from the Hartree–Fock (HF) approximation and from the no-core shell model and by examining the magnitude of perturbative corrections to the HF energy in light and heavy nuclei. Here, in order to approximately describe energies and radii across the nuclear chart, a phenomenological correction in the form of a two-plus-three-nucleon contact interaction is introduced. With fitted parameters we achieve a very good description of medium-mass nuclei in terms of energy and size and also in terms of the centroid energy of the giant monopole resonance and the dipole polarizability calculated within the random-phase approximation. Our results provide further justification for the use of Daejeon16 augmented with phenomenological corrections as an effective interaction of perturbative character in a variety of applications.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Nuclear Systems Kilopower Overview

The Nuclear Systems Kilopower Project was initiated by NASAs Space Technology Mission Directorate Game Changing Development Program in fiscal year 2015 to demonstrate subsystem-level technology readiness of small space fission power in a relevant environment (Technology Readiness Level 5) for space science and human exploration power needs. The Nuclear Systems Kilopower Project consists of two elements. The primary element is the Kilopower Prototype Test, also called the Kilopower Reactor Using Stirling Technology(KRUSTY) Test. This element consists of the development and testing of a fission ground technology demonstrator of a 1 kWe fission power system. A 1 kWe system matches requirements for some robotic precursor exploration systems and future potential deep space science missions, and also allows a nuclear ground technology demonstration in existing nuclear test facilities at low cost. The second element, the Mars Kilopower Scalability Study, consists of the analysis and design of a scaled-up version of the 1 kWe reference concept to 10 kWe for Mars surface power projected requirements, and validation of the applicability of the KRUSTY experiment to key technology challenges for a 10 kWe system. If successful, these two elements will lead to initiation of planning for a technology demonstration of a 10 kWe fission power capability for Mars surface outpost power.

Space Nuclear Power↗

Many-body expansion for light nuclear systems

Here we extend the many-body expansion (MBE), previously applied to hydrogen bonded and molecular systems, to the light nuclear systems 3 H and 3 He by considering the nucleonic degrees of freedom as fundamental in the expansion. The analysis is based on the Pauli nucleonic dynamics (PND) model, a simple antisymmetrized dynamical code, inspired by the sophisticated constrained molecular dynamics (CoMD) model. The total energy of the 2 H nucleus is calculated with this model at -2.312 MeV, which is within 4% of the experimental value of -2.225 MeV. The application of the MBE yields results for the three-body term in the 3 H nucleus that is comparable with previous estimates, while it is reported for the first time for the nucleus of 3 He . The energies of 3 H and 3 He that include the sum of the one- and two-body terms with the model are - 6.97 ± 0.21 MeV and - 6.19 ± 0.21 MeV and the three-body terms, estimated from the difference of the sum of the one- and two-body terms from the experimentally measured energies, are -1.51 ± 0.21 MeV and -1.53 ± 0.21 MeV, respectively. The MBE for the 3 H and 3 He nuclei is qualitatively similar to the one previously reported for the water trimer: the two- and three-body terms are negative with the latter amounting to ~3% of the former. Additionally, the three-body terms correspond to about 16–23% of the total energy of the bound systems, a percentage that is also comparable to the one in the water trimer (17%). In this manner, the MBE analysis can be applied to light nuclear systems following the same protocol as the one that has been previously extensively used for hydrogen bonded molecular systems.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Reexamining the variational two-particle reduced density matrix for nuclear systems

We report that in most nuclear many-body methods, observables are calculated using many-body wave functions explicitly. The variational two-particle reduced density matrix method is one of the few exceptions to the rule. Ground-state energies of both closed-shell and open-shell nuclear systems can indeed be evaluated by minimizing a constrained linear functional of the two-particle reduced density matrix. However, it has virtually never been used in nuclear theory, because nuclear ground states were found to be well overbound, contrary to those of atoms and molecules. Consequently, we introduced new constraints in the nuclear variational two-particle reduced density matrix method, developed recently for atomic and molecular systems. Our calculations then show that this approach can provide a proper description of nuclear systems where only valence neutrons are included. For the nuclear systems where both neutrons and protons are active, however, the energies obtained with the variational two-particle reduced density matrix method are still overbound. The possible reasons for the noticed discrepancies and solutions to this problem will be discussed.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗