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Understand the function and performance of the different barriers to radionuclide release in HTGRs, how these are incorporated into reactor design and safety analyses, and approaches to estimate radionuclide release under specific reactor conditions.
Ceramic waste forms are designed to immobilize radionuclides for permanent disposal in geological repositories. One of the principal criteria for the effective incorporation of waste elements is their compatibility with the host material. In terms of performance under environmental conditions, the resistance of the waste forms to degradation over long periods of time is a critical concern when they are exposed to natural environments. Due to their unique crystallographic features and behavior in nature environment as exemplified by their natural analogues, ceramic waste forms are capable of incorporating problematic nuclear waste elements while showing promising chemical durability in aqueous environments. Recent studies of apatite- and hollandite-structured waste forms demonstrated an approach that can predict the compositions of ceramic waste forms and their long-term dissolution rate by a combination of computational techniques including machine learning, first-principles thermodynamics calculations, and modeling using kinetic rate equations based on critical laboratory experiments. By integrating the predictions of elemental incorporation and degradation kinetics in a holistic framework, the approach could be promising for the design of advanced ceramic waste forms with optimized incorporation capacity and environmental degradation performance. Such an approach could provide a path for accelerated ceramic waste form development and performance prediction for problematic nuclear waste elements.
Battelle–Pacific Northwest Division operates numerous research and development laboratories in Washington State. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contracts to Battelle at Richland facilities on both the DOE Hanford Site and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) Richland campus. These facilities have the potential for radionuclide air emissions. The PNNL contract with DOE also includes operations at the PNNL-Sequim campus in Sequim, where there is also the potential for radionuclide air emissions. This document is a periodic update that describes current PNNL facility emission units and sampling systems. The National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP [40 Code of Federal Regulations 61, Subpart H]) requires an assessment of all emission units that have the potential for radionuclide air emissions. Emission units are registered with the State of Washington. Potential emissions from emission units are assessed annually by PNNL staff. Sampling, monitoring, and other regulatory compliance requirements are designated based on the potential to-emit dose criteria, a graded approach to facility-identified potential impact categories, and regulatory requirements. The purpose of this document is to describe the facility radionuclide air emission sampling program and provide current and historical facility emission unit system performance, operation, and design information. For sampled emission units, the building, exhaust unit, control technologies, and sample extraction details are provided. Additionally, applicable configuration drawings, figures, and photographs are included. For non-sampled emission units, emission estimation and radionuclide source details are provided. Site-wide permits for the lowest potential impact category are described. Deregistered/transitioned emission unit details are also provided as necessary for at least 5 years post-closure/transition. Currently, five emission units are sampled continuously for particulate radionuclides at PNNL managed facilities on the PNNL-Richland campus (3 of the 5) and on the Hanford Site (2 of the 5). Four of these units have sampling systems that comply with the American National Standards Institute/Health Physics Society (ANSI/HPS) N13.1–2011 standard for sampling from stacks and ducts of nuclear facilities, and the fifth is grandfathered and compliant with the older ANSI N13.1–1969 standard. In addition, the PNNL-managed Hanford Site 325 Building EP 325-01-S stack is sampled continuously for emissions of tritium. No emissions sampling is required for the single licensed emission unit on the PNNL-Sequim campus.
The current legal framework in Belgium foresees the progressive phase out of nuclear power between October 2022 (Doel 3) and December 2025 (Doel 2). Upon its definitive shutdown, each unit of the Tihange and Doel sites will enter a Post-Operational Phase (POP) and be prepared for its Decontamination and Decommissioning (D and D). Prior to obtaining the D and D license, the Operator Electrabel is legally required to remove any non-fissile irradiated core items stored in the deactivation pools. The non-fissile irradiated core items consist essentially of control rods, poison rods and source thimbles as well as thimble plugs and foreign materials irradiated during operation: - Their significant content in highly radiant radionuclides (up to 6 TBq of Co-60 per kg of irradiated material) renders all existing operational waste management processes inadequate due to insufficient biological shielding; - Their high concentrations in long-lived radionuclides call for their disposal in a geological repository for which no final design nor waste acceptance criteria are expected prior to 2050. Uncertainties in the Belgian energy supply and security, however, require the Operator to be prepared for a partial nuclear phase out, where one or more units would benefit from lifetime extension while the remaining units would undergo decommissioning. The present paper aims at presenting how Electrabel, in partnership with Tractebel, addressed this challenge by maximizing the use of synergies within the respective sites as well as between both sites themselves, all the while accounting for site specificities. The most recent results and state of progress of the project will be detailed and the first lessons learned will be shared. The project has been split in multiple tasks and phased as follows: - An inventory phase aimed at mapping the contents, origin, composition and history of the non-fissile irradiated core items; - A pre-characterization phase based on neutron activation models; - A waste sorting phase aimed at separating waste forms for which an evacuation route exists from those for which such route does not exist; - A feasibility phase aimed at exploring all possible scenarios for the management of non-fissile irradiated core items and identifying the optimal feasible solution for each site; - A preparation phase (currently ongoing), developing further the optimal solution and ensuring that back-up solutions are available for any foreseeable change of context (licensing issue, modification in the nuclear phase-out program, etc.) and initiating early contacts with potential subcontractors for segmentation works and cask manufacturers, as well as the Belgian regulatory body and waste management agency. This phase also foresees the investigation of destructive and non-destructive radiological measurements to support the detailed characterization of the waste forms; - A realization phase (future work). (authors)
Burnable absorbers can benefit nuclear reactors of virtually any design by providing reactivity control for extended fuel cycles, tritium production, burning of long-lived radionuclides, and reactor safety. When selecting the ideal burnable absorber type and its design, one must consider the resulting impact on the reactor’s fuel cycle design and cost, reactivity, thermal hydraulics, manufacturing, and radiation response. These selection criteria, as well as neutronic and thermophysical material property requirements, may be vastly different depending on whether the burnable absorber is intended for use in a commercial water-cooled reactor, a research reactor, or a next-generation advanced reactor system. A recent integration, synthesis, description of past and present technologies, and identification of existing gaps and areas of future research is lacking on these important topics. Here, this paper includes a fundamental description of the use of burnable absorbers and their impacts on reactivity, absorber depletion, self-shielding, basic thermophysical properties, and the use of burnable absorbers in next-generation nuclear applications..
DOE O 435.1 and DOE M 435.1-1 require that a determination of continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA) (CP-60089), composite analysis (CA), and disposal authorization statement (DAS) be made on an annual basis, and that the determination must consider the results of data collection and analysis from research, field studies, and monitoring as well as the need to update any Radioactive Waste Management Basis (RWMB) documents. Beginning in 1996, the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF) started accepting low-level radioactive, hazardous, and mixed wastes that were generated during cleanup activities at the Hanford Site. ERDF is composed of a series of cells or disposal areas and can accommodate future design expansions as needed. Currently, there are eight cells and two supercells in ERDF. Each supercell is the equivalent of two cells. During this reporting period (fiscal year 2022, extending from October 1, 2021, through September 30, 2022), approximately 8.52E+04 metric tons (9.39E+04 U.S. tons) of waste was disposed at ERDF. From ERDF inception through September 30, 2022, approximately 17.0 million metric tons (18.7 million U.S. tons) of waste has been disposed at ERDF, which equates to consumption of approximately 89.1% of the currently constructed disposal volume. According to the design of ERDF, the facility has the ability to be expanded as needed. As a condition of the DAS, disposal operations within ERDF must be in accordance with the waste acceptance criteria (ERDF-00011) that provide specific radionuclide disposal limits, waste form restrictions, and descriptions of acceptable waste packages in compliance with the requirements of DOE M 435-1.1. The ERDF waste acceptance criteria stipulate that waste destined for disposal at ERDF be controlled based on source, physical form, and contaminant concentration and activity levels. There have been no changes to the physical configuration of ERDF or to the waste forms (source, physical form, etc.). No new unreviewed disposal question screenings or evaluations have been generated in this reporting period. Therefore, there are no noted impacts to the PA, CA, DAS, or RWMB resulting from the evaluations and screenings. Sum-of-fractions analysis shows that the disposed inventory meets both the concentration and inventory threshold requirements. A sum-of-fractions value is computed for ERDF sensitive radionuclides contributing to the groundwater pathways and the air pathway inventory limits. Computed values were 5.50E-04 and 3.30E-03, respectively. The disposed waste inventory remained well under the PA imposed limits, as shown in Table 4 and Table 5 in the main text of this report. Required monitoring was satisfactorily completed during the fiscal year reporting period. Compliance with performance objectives were met as each of the reported values were well below the established limit. Overall, there are no substantive changes to primary PA assumptions or changes to the PA analysis conclusion; therefore, compliance with DOE O 435.1 and the DAS is maintained.
DOE O 435.1 and DOE M 435.1-1 require that a determination of continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA) (CP-60089), composite analysis (CA), and disposal authorization statement (DAS) be made on an annual basis, and that the determination must consider the results of data collection and analysis from research, field studies, and monitoring as well as the need to update any Radioactive Waste Management Basis (RWMB) documents. Beginning in 1996, the Environmental Disposal Facility (ERDF) started accepting low-level radioactive, hazardous, and mixed wastes that were generated during cleanup activities at the Hanford Site. ERDF is composed of a series of cells or disposal areas and can accommodate future design expansions as needed. Currently, there are eight cells and two supercells in ERDF. Each supercell is the equivalent of two cells. During this reporting period (fiscal year 2021, extending from October 1, 2020, through September 30, 2021), approximately 9.14E+04 metric tons (1.01E+05 U.S. tons) of waste was disposed at ERDF. From ERDF inception through September 30, 2021, approximately 16.9 million metric tons (18.9 U.S. tons) of waste has been disposed of at ERDF, which equates to consumption of approximately 88.7% of the currently constructed disposal volume. According to the design of ERDF, the facility has the ability to be expanded as needed. As a condition of the DAS, disposal operation within ERDF must be in accordance with the waste acceptance criteria (ERDF-00011) that provide specific radionuclide disposal limits, waste form restrictions, and descriptions of acceptable waste packages in compliance with the requirements of DOE M 435-1.1. The ERDF waste acceptance criteria stipulate that waste destined for disposal at ERDF be controlled based on source, physical form, and contaminant concentration and activity levels. There have been no changes to the physical configuration of ERDF or to the waste forms (source, physical form, etc.). No new unreviewed disposal question screenings or evaluations have been generated in this reporting period. Therefore, there are no noted impacts to the PA, CA, DAS, or RWMB resulting from the evaluations and screenings. Sum-of-fractions analysis shows that the disposed inventory meets both the concentration and inventory threshold requirements. A sum-of-fractions value is computed for ERDF sensitive radionuclides contributing to the all pathways and the air pathway inventory limits. Computed values were 7.63E-03 and 1.49E-03, respectively. The disposed waste inventory remained well under the PA imposed limits, as shown in Table 4 and Table 5 in the main text of this report. Required monitoring was satisfactorily completed during the fiscal year reporting period. Compliance with performance objectives were met as each of the reported values were well below the established limit. Overall, there are no substantive changes to primary PA assumptions or changes to the PA analysis conclusion; therefore, compliance with DOE O 435.1 and the DAS is maintained.
The application of ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) principles to the design of new radiological facilities at Argonne National Laboratory provides a consistent radiation safety basis for future facility operations. The Department of Energy Rule 10 CFR 835 specifies design objectives to be adopted during the design of new facilities for controlling personal radiation exposure. One is to keep exposure levels below 20% of the applicable standards in 10 CFR 835.202. For a radiation worker 20% of the standard corresponds to 5 µSv hr -1 for a 2,000 hour work year. For a member of the public the DOE design objective corresponds to 0.2 mSv in a calendar year. For a new facility worst case radionuclides and their source strengths are chosen. Local shielding is specified to reduce exposure rates to less than 50 µSv hr -1 at 30 cm from the shielding. The current version MCNP6 of the Los Alamos radiation shielding computer program MCNP is then used to calculate the exposure rates elsewhere. Design modifications are made to meet the criteria. The calculations and resulting facility design modifications are discussed for two new radiological facilities.
DOE O 435.1 and DOE M 435.1-1 require that a determination of continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA) (CP-60089), composite analysis, and disposal authorization statement (DAS) be made annually, and these guidelines must be used to consider the results of data collection and analysis from research, field studies, and monitoring as well as provide the need to update any radioactive waste management basis documents. Beginning in 1996, the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF) started accepting low-level radioactive, hazardous, and mixed wastes generated during cleanup activities at the Hanford Site. ERDF is composed of a series of cells or disposal areas and can accommodate future design expansions as needed. Currently, there are 10 cells. During this reporting period (fiscal year 2020, which extended from October 1, 2019, through September 30, 2020), approximately 3.39E+04 U.S. tons (3.07E+04 metric tons) of waste was disposed at ERDF. From ERDF inception through September 30, 2020, approximately 18.5 million U.S. tons of waste has been disposed at ERDF, which equates to the consumption of approximately 88% of the disposal volume. As a condition of the DAS, disposal operations within ERDF must be in accordance with the waste acceptance criteria (ERDF-00011) that provide specific radionuclide disposal limits, waste form restrictions, and descriptions of acceptable waste packages in compliance with DOE M 435.1-1 requirements. The ERDF waste acceptance criteria stipulate that waste destined for disposal at ERDF be controlled based on source, physical form, and contaminant concentration and activity levels. There have been no changes to the physical configuration of ERDF or to the waste forms (source, physical form, etc.). No new Unreviewed Disposal Question Screenings or Evaluations have been generated during this reporting period. Therefore, there are no noted impacts to the PA, composite analysis, DAS, or radioactive waste management basis documents resulting from the evaluations and screenings. Sum of fraction analysis shows that the disposed inventory meets both the concentration and inventory threshold requirements. A sum of fractions value is computed for ERDF sensitive radionuclides contributing to the all pathways and air pathway inventory limits. Computed values were 8.85E-02 and 1.78E-01, respectively. The disposed waste inventory remained well under the PA imposed limits. Required monitoring was satisfactorily completed during the fiscal year reporting period (fiscal year 2020). Compliance with performance objectives were met as each of the reported values were well below the established limit. Overall, there are no substantive changes to primary PA assumptions nor changes to the PA analysis conclusion; therefore, compliance with DOE O 435.1 and the DAS is maintained.
Current nuclear facility emergency planning zones (EPZs) are based on outdated distance-based criteria, predating comprehensive dose and risk-informed frameworks. Recent advancements in simulation tools have permitted the development of site-specific, dose, and risk-based consequence-driven assessment frameworks. This study investigated the computation of advanced reactor (AR) EPZs using two atmospheric dispersion models: a straight-line Gaussian plume model (GPM) and a semi-Lagrangian Particle in Cell (PIC). Two case studies were conducted: (1) benchmarking the NRC SOARCA study for the Peach Bottom Nuclear Generating Station and (2) analyzing an advanced INL Heat Pipe Design A microreactor's end-of-cycle inventory. The dose criteria for both cases were 10 mSv at mean weather conditions and 50 mSv at 95th percentile weather conditions at 96 h post-release. Results demonstrated that GPM and PIC estimated similar mean peak dose levels for large boiling water reactors in the farfield case, placing EPZ limits beyond current regulations. For ARs with source terms remaining in the nearfield, PIC modeling without specific nearfield considerations could result in excessively high doses and inaccurate EPZ designations. PIC dispersion demonstrated an order of magnitude higher estimate of nearfield inhalation dose contribution when compared to GPM results. Furthermore, both models significantly reduced EPZ sizing within the nearfield. Thus, reductions in the AR source term may eliminate the need for a separate EPZ.
Sealed radioactive sources (SRS) are being used worldwide in the field of medicine, agriculture, industry and research. They can be found in mobile as well as stationary devices. SRS contains radioactive material that is (a) permanently sealed in a capsule or (b) closely bounded and in a solid form. The capsule or material of an SRS should be strong enough to maintain leak tightness under the conditions of use and purpose for which the source was designed, also in case of accidents. In this case only emitted radiation is utilized. Firstly, the hazard from external radiation has to be considered, but the possibility of contamination due to fracture of the capsule should not be disregarded. The radioactive sources are composed of the radiating isotope contained in the filling medium, the single or double isotope holder that partially or totally surrounds the filling medium, the outer cover that contains the parts mentioned above and the capsule closed airtightly by welding or using some other method. The capsule must be tested for leakage periodically. If the SRS is no longer needed (e.g. replaced by a different technique) or it becomes useless for the intended application (e.g. the activity becomes too weak, the equipment containing the source works poorly or becomes obsolete, the source is damaged or leaking) it is considered disused. Disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRS) are typically conditioned and disposed if a facility is available. If the disposal option is not available, conditioned DSRS should be stored under proper conditions. In some cases, the radionuclide(s) in DSRS can be recovered/recycled or the DSRS can be repurposed for other applications. Conditioning of DSRS ensures containment of the radioactive material, provides confinement for leaking sources, provides sufficient radiation shielding, reduces storage/disposal volume by allowing consolidation of multiple sources into a single storage/disposal container, facilitates transport operations and contributes to safety and security as well. Typically, conditioning technologies are deployed either as permanently installed stationary systems in centralized or mobile on-site waste processing facilities, or in a mobile configuration. Centralized stationary facilities provide a single processing location for multiple users that requires transport of the waste to the facility. On the other hand, mobile systems may be provided for the selection and application of the optimum technology for a specific waste stream (such as DSRS) by bringing the process to the point where the waste is generated. In addition, mobile systems could offer additional flexibility by sharing equipment among multiple waste generating sites for processing campaigns that vary in duration, from very short periods to several years. The term 'mobile processing system' refers to any radioactive waste processing system or component which is designed to be transportable and which is not considered permanently installed. Two mobile system for conditioning of disused sealed radioactive sources are developed in the Public Company Nuclear Facilities of Serbia. Development of these mobile systems was supported by SRB9005 national project via Technical Cooperation of the IAEA. The first mobile system, built inside the 20 feet ISO container, will be used for conditioning of DSRS category 3 to 5. The second mobile system, built inside the 7 m long vehicle (Iveco Daily Van), will be used for dismantling of ionizing smoke detectors mostly with Am-241 sources. Designs of the mobile systems were defined in cooperation with two companies from Belgium (Belgoprocess and Leniko) and a Croatian company Ekoteh as well as with the support of the IAEA experts. The generic safety assessment and operational procedures for the mobile systems are developed. Based on safety assessment the acceptance criteria and operational limits and conditions are established. Operational procedures include: (a) equipment and material requirements, (b) assembling procedure of the mobile unit, (c) procedure for acceptance of devices for dismantling and conditioning, (d) dismantling procedure for devices to recover the DSRS, (e) characterization of DSRS, (f) encapsulation procedure of DSRS, (g) disassembling procedure of the mobile unit, and (h) keeping records, identification and traceability. In addition, radiation safety, health safety, security and emergency preparedness plans are prepared. The generic safety assessment and operational procedures could be updated with site specific requirements, DSRS inventory, and different needs for future customers. Developed mobile systems could be used in all situations when it is feasible to perform conditioning of DSRS on the spot in the county and worldwide. Development of these mobile units was just the first step to create the Reference Center for Radioactive Waste Treatment and Disused Radioactive Sources Conditioning for Small Facilities which can become a regional training center in the future, and/or as a tool for comprehensive national search and secure programmes. In the next phases development of e-learning platforms and blended learning packages as well as application for the IAEA Qualified Technical Centre (QTC) for the management of DSRS is foreseen. (authors)
The capture and subsequent immobilization of regulated volatile radionuclides from the off-gas streams of a used nuclear fuel (UNF) reprocessing facility has been a topic of substantial research interest for the US Department of Energy and its international counterparts. Removal of specific radionuclides from the plant effluent streams before discharge to the environment is required to meet regulations set forth by the US Environmental Protection Agency. Upon removal, the radionuclides, as well as associated sorbents that cannot be regenerated in a cost-effective manner, are destined for conversion to a waste form. Research in separation and capture methodologies has included a wide range of technology types, and studies of waste forms are correspondingly diverse. In considering the future development and implementation of both sorbents and waste forms, it is necessary to identify benchmark measures of performance to objectively evaluate each sorbent system or waste form. Sets of performance criteria and associated metrics have been developed for sorbent and waste form evaluation. These criteria address physical, radiological, and chemical characteristics, technical practicality, technical maturity, cost, and, for sorbents, system performance. The criteria and metrics appear to be robust and should be applicable despite the eventual waste classification (as either high- or low-level waste). They are flexible enough to address both aqueous reprocessing and electrochemical reprocessing of UNF. These criteria sets can serve as tools to evaluate performance at multiple stages within the development process, and in this revision (Revision 1) they have been used to assess technologies relating to krypton/xenon separations and iodine capture from off-gas streams arising from UNF reprocessing. Assessment of krypton/xenon separations using engineered forms of two zeolite minerals (silver mordenite and hydrogen mordenite in a polyacrylonitrile-based binder [AgZ-PAN/HZ-PAN]) found that the zeolite-based separation is relatively advanced in its development, but several key issues require resolution. First, desorption processes for both krypton and xenon require refinement to provide an understanding of the product purity that can be achieved. Second, adsorption rate data is needed in order to calculate the bed depth required for effective separation. Finally, it is strongly recommended that a technical review of krypton/xenon separation by AgZ-PAN/HZ-PAN be performed to synergize available data and assess the cost savings and operational benefits that may be realized from implementation of this technology. Assessment of metal organic frameworks (MOFs) for their use in the separation of krypton/xenon found that the ideal separation would be performed using a single-column system with a MOF selective for krypton over xenon. A robust research effort should work to identify a krypton-selective MOF designed to operate at temperatures of approximately 0°C or higher, which could be preferred over cryogenic krypton/xenon capture for used fuel reprocessing off-gas streams. In the case of the CaSDB-MOF (the most well-understood xenon sorbent to date), two issues are judged of high importance. First, xenon breakthrough capacity for the CaSDB-MOF in prototypical conditions should be determined. Preliminary research indicates that breakthrough may be near immediate, presenting a substantial obstacle in separative system design. Second, development of desorption methodology should be performed to determine regeneration time, energy requirements, and the product stream composition. Silver-based sorbents (AgZ and AgAero) for use in iodine capture from the dissolver off-gas were evaluated against the established criteria. These sorbents are significantly better understood for this application as a result of research efforts over the past decade. The potential implementation of AgAero at a large scale is hindered by its physical degradation by components of the dissolver off-gas stream. Less is known about the adsorption of iodine by these sorbents from other off-gas streams in the plant. Initial experimental efforts have been closely coordinated in an effort to understand organic iodine (such as would be found in the vessel off-gas) adsorption by AgZ and AgAero. Future work should expand this experimental program, and analysis of other reprocessing facility off-gas streams such as the vitrification off-gas stream should be conducted to better understand other potential applications for iodine sorbents. A review of iodine waste form development shows that this area is diverse and that multiple promising waste forms have been identified for the immobilization of radioactive iodine. Efforts related to the direct conversion of iodine sorbents (including AgZ and AgAero) should be continued because of the advantages of direct conversion in a waste management strategy and other sorbents should continue to be advanced as merited.