SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Overview fact sheet about the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and Schneider Electric Integrated Network Testbed for Energy Grid Research and Technology Experimentation (INTEGRATE) project at the Energy Systems Integration Facility. INTEGRATE is part of the U.S. Department of Energy's Grid Modernization Initiative.
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and Schneider Electric are working with National Renewalbe Energy Laboratory (NREL) staff at the Energy Systems Integration Facility (ESIF) to demonstrate communication technologies for distributed energy resources.
Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) in industrial control systems (ICS) are vulnerable to remote control logic injection attacks. Attackers target the control logic of a PLC to manipulate the behavior of a physical process such as nuclear plants, power grids, and gas pipelines. Control logic attacks have been studied extensively in the literature, including hiding the transfer of a control logic over the network from both packet header-based signatures, and deep packet inspection. For instance, these attacks transfer a control logic code as data, into small fragments (one-byte per packet), that are further padded with noise data. To detect control logic in ICS network traffic, this paper presents Shade, a novel shadow memory technique that observes the network traffic to maintain a local copy of the current state of a PLC memory. To analyze the memory contents, Shade employs a classification algorithm with 42 unique features categorized into five types at different semantic levels of a control logic code, such as number of rungs, number of consecutive decompiled instructions, and n-grams. We then evaluate Shade against control logic injection attacks on two PLCs, Modicon M221 and MicroLogix 1400 from two ICS vendors, Schneider electric and Allen-Bradley, respectively. The evaluation results show that Shade can detect an attack instance (i.e., identifying at least one attack packet during the transfer of a malicious control logic) accurately without any false alarms.
The introduction of Industry 4.0 and Internet-based technologies has enhanced industrial control system operations but have inadvertently increased their vulnerabilities to cyber attacks. When an industrial control system is compromised, security analysts need to identify the root cause quickly to start the recovery process and develop mitigation strategies. Memory forensics is critical in the incident analysis process to ascertain what occurred. Approaches for analyzing the persistent memory in industrial control devices are limited and almost nonexistent for volatile memory. This chapter proposes an automated methodology for programmable logic controller memory dump analysis using computer vision and deep learning techniques. The methodology converts the sequences of bytes in a programmable logic controller memory dump to red-green-blue pixels and employs a deep learning model that learns the underlying patterns and features of pre-labeled forensic artifacts in images and segments them into distinct regions. The trained model is employed to automatically segment new memory images and identify forensic artifacts. Evaluation of the methodology on a Schneider Electric Modicon M221 programmable logic controller under code injection and code modification attacks demonstrates its ability to detect attack artifacts in memory dumps.
A Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) is a microprocessor-based controller that is used to automate physical processes in critical infrastructure and various other industries and manufacturing sectors. Initially, PLCs were completely isolated from the Internet, and cyber security was not incorporated at the time of development. The introduction of industry 4.0 and the evolution of ICS systems to communicate over public IP addresses from the Internet enhanced productivity and efficiency, but Internet connectivity exposed the systems and their vulnerabilities, which led to an increase in cyber attacks. When a system is sabotaged/compromised, security analysts need to get to the root cause of the attack as quickly as possible to recover the system. To do so, memory forensic analysis is critical to provide a unique insight into the run-time memory activities and extract a reliable source of evidence. In this paper, we analyze the memory structure of the Schneider Electric Modicon M221 PLC. To build a memory profile, we reverse engineer the communication protocol and conduct differential analysis to gain knowledge about the structure of the memory and the low-level representation of control logic instructions. We then identify dynamic and static memory regions by modifying different project fields and conducting differential analysis, which allows us to identify boundaries of critical memory structures and extract important forensic artifacts that can be found in the memory. The Python implementation of the memory profile can help reduce the time and effort required for manual analysis in case of cyber incident or system failure.
The Integrated Distribution Management System (IDMS) project was initiated to demonstrate the interactive operation of microgrid systems and the distribution systems with which they interconnect. The key technologies for this are the microgrid management system and the utility distribution management system. The IDMS project successfully demonstrated that a utility’s advanced distribution management system/distributed energy resources management system (ADMS/DERMS) could effectively manage microgrids to provide visibility and control functionalities as well as use the microgrid as a dispatchable resource to support the utility grid. The DERMS accomplishes this by determining active and reactive power needs at the point of common coupling (PCC) using advanced applications like volt/VAR watt optimization (VVWO) and load relief (LR) with the underlying core applications state estimation (SE) and load flow (LF). The ADMS/DERMS can use the microgrid as a resource to resolve and prevent violations in the grid and to optimize the operational working state of the grid. The IDMS project demonstrated that a utility-operated ADMS with embedded DERMS functionality can flexibly manage a variety of microgrids and other aggregated distributed energy resources (DER) in concert with the wider distribution grid. Microgrids can provide grid services in any number of different ways to meet the operational needs of the distribution utility. The manner of aggregation — microgrid or virtual power plant — is not necessarily relevant to the utility as long as the grid services from the aggregated DER are available and can be managed by its ADMS/DERMS for the stability and reliability of the grid. The IDMS project demonstrated this integrated ADMS concept by combining hardware/software-in-the-loop testing with commercial products from different vendors and a utility’s network model. The project integrated the Schneider Electric EcoStruxure™ ADMS with DERMS with the Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories (SEL) POWERMAX ® Microgrid Control System, and the simulated resources with energy company PECO’s model of a utility-owned microgrid, establishing an operational relationship in which the utility manages the operational functionality of a microgrid at the PCC and that provides the utility with the capability to control the comprehensive power system, inclusive of the macrogrid and microgrid.
Cyber Testing for Resilient Industrial Control Systems™ (CyTRICS™) is the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) program for cybersecurity vulnerability testing, digital subcomponent enumeration, and forensic assessment. CyTRICS leverages best-in-class test facilities and analytic capabilities at six DOE National Laboratories and strategic partnerships with key stakeholders including technology developers, manufacturers, asset owners and operators, and interagency partners. During the program’s development, CyTRICS established a unique methodology for prioritizing digital components within operational technology (OT) and industrial control systems (ICS) in the Energy Sector Industrial Base (ESIB) for cyber vulnerability testing. The CyTRICS Prioritization Process leverages multiple characteristics of systems, components, and their contextual deployment to calculate a quantification of individual digital components for CyTRICS testing. The initial version of the CyTRICS Prioritization Process was premised largely upon the impact which could result to an industrial control system if the digital component under testing was compromised, either through malicious means, faulty engineering, or other modes. The worldwide compromise of the SolarWinds Orion platform, first reported in December 2020, through malicious interference with the digital patching cycle was a watershed event in cyber supply chain security. The SolarWinds compromised demonstrated the strategic importance of certain types of ubiquitous software, and the ability to generate widespread cybersecurity effects. To address this challenge and as a part of the Department of Energy’s response to the SolarWinds compromise, DOE’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) directed the National Laboratories to evolve the CyTRICS Prioritization Process methodology to encompass additional factors related to the strategic importance of digital components. CESER directed CyTRICS researchers to identify, characterize, and append strategic factors to the CyTRICS Prioritization Process to provide additional weight to these characteristics. National Laboratory expert researchers identified functionality, distribution, and platform characteristics for digital components in ICS and OT that they assessed would be likely targeted in strategic initial-access cyber attack. CyTRICS has termed these factors “ICS Beachhead Systems,” leveraging a definition first advanced by Schneider Electric, which is intended as a blanket term to encompass digital components, products, and systems in OT. This paper describes the ICS Beachhead Systems identified and the rationale for inclusion. As a next step in the research and refinement process, the National Laboratories will validate this initial set of characteristics against digital components evaluated by the CyTRICS program and current implementation of the CyTRICS Prioritization Process. After validation, CyTRICS researchers will then develop a scoring methodology to generate a quantitative score to assess the degree to which a digital component is characterized as an ICS Beachhead System. Finally, the National Laboratories will append this scoring to the existing CyTRICS Prioritization Process algorithm.
Intel® and its partners, Schneider Electric and LiveData Utilities, were tasked by Department of Energy to explore solutions in two areas of grid security. One, secure the existing communication network and the legacy devices with minimal disruption to the infrastructure, and second, to develop capabilities in semiconductor chips such that they come with built-in security to order to provide secure communication and protection from cyberattacks with minimal effort from operation technology (OT) application developers.
With support from the U.S. Department of Energy Solar Energy Technologies Office, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) partnered with Xcel Energy, Schneider Electric, Varentec, and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) to meet the goals of the Enabling Extreme Real-Time Grid Integration of Solar Energy (ENERGISE) program. This project developed and validated an innovative data-enhanced hierarchical control architecture that enables the efficient, reliable, resilient, and secure operation of future distribution systems with a high penetration of distributed energy resources like solar energy. The architecture enables a hybrid control approach where a centralized control layer is complemented by distributed control algorithms for solar inverters and autonomous control of grid edge devices. It is fully interoperable and includes all the cybersecurity aspects necessary for reliable and secure system operation. The hybrid approach can seamlessly integrate multiple voltage-regulation technologies, both at central and grid-edge levels, which enables reliable and efficient system operation in the face of unpredictable conditions. The overarching goal of the Eco-Idea project is to develop, validate, and deploy a unique and innovative Data-Enhanced Hierarchical Control (DEHC) architecture that comprehensively addresses the formidable challenges associated with proliferation of high penetration of distributed PV such as reverse power flows, transients from variability of PV systems, feeder load balancing, and voltage stability. These issues are exposing the weaknesses of existing grid operations and controls - including, but not limited to, lack of grid situational awareness, heuristic and slow-acting control actions, latency of control for emergency situations, and points of failure in communications. The proposed architecture will comprehensively resolve the deficiencies of current operational settings - where monitoring and control solutions proposed across industry and academia may not be interoperable and may not coexist in the same system - and will enable an efficient, reliable, resilient, and secure operation of future distribution systems with penetration of solar energy well beyond current limits. The DEHC architecture was developed and validated rigorously through hardware-in-loop simulations in the laboratory environment and deployed on the field.
In industrial control systems (ICS), programmable logic controllers (PLCs) directly monitor and control a physical process such as nuclear power plants, gas pipelines, and water treatment. They are equipped with a control logic written in IEC-61131 languages (e.g., ladder logic and structured text) that defines how a PLC should control a physical process. A PLC's control logic is a usual target of a cyberattack to sabotage a physical process. For instance, Stuxnet targets a control logic of a Siemens S7-300 PLC to damage a nuclear facility's centrifuges. The existing attacks in the literature generally focus only on injecting malicious control logic into a PLC. This paper presents a new dimension of control logic attacks that target the control logic engine (responsible for running a control logic) of a PLC. It demonstrates that a cyberattack can disable the control logic engine successfully by exploiting inherent PLC features such as program mode and starting/stopping engine. We develop two novel case studies on control logic engine attacks by employing the MITRE ATT\&CK knowledge base on the real-world PLCs used in industry settings, i.e., 1) Schweitzer Engineering Laboratory (SEL)'s Real-Time Automation Controller (SEL-3505 RTAC) equipped with security features such as encrypted traffic and device-level access control, and 2) traditional PLCs, i.e., Schneider Electric's Modicon M221, Allen-Bradley's MicroLogix 1400 and 1100 that do not have security features. The case studies present the internals of the logic engine attacks and facilitate the ICS research community and industry to understand the attack vectors on the control logic engine. We evaluate the effectiveness of the control engine attacks on a power substation, a 4-floor elevator, and a conveyor belt to demonstrate their real-world impact of halting a physical process.
The introduction of Industry 4.0 and the evolution of industrial control systems (ICS) to adopt Internet-based technologies enhanced productivity, but have inadvertently increased their vulnerability to cyber-based malicious attacks. When an ICS system is compromised, security analysts need to identify the root cause quickly to start the recovery process and develop mitigation strategies to safeguard against future instances. Memory forensics is critical in the analysis process to ascertain what occurred. To date, approaches to analyze the persistent memory in ICS devices are limited, and almost nonexistent for volatile memory. This paper proposes an automated methodology, COMA, for PLC memory dump analysis using computer vision and deep learning techniques. Specifically, COMA converts the sequences of bytes in a PLC memory dump to RGB pixels and creates a deep learning model that learns the underlying patterns and features of pre-labeled forensic artifacts in images and segments them into distinct regions. COMA then uses the trained model to automatically segment new memory images and extract forensic artifacts. We evaluate COMA on a Schneider Electric Modicon M221 PLC involving two cyber-based attack scenarios: (i) code injection and (ii) code modification. The empirical results show that COMA can successfully detect attack artifacts in memory dumps in both scenarios.
Volatility in grid spot prices is expected to rise with climate change-driven demand pressures and the intermittency of renewable generation. This volatility poses financial risks for green hydrogen-based steel production. The Direct Reduced Iron− Electric Arc Furnace (H 2 -DRI-EAF) is a promising pathway to decarbonize steel, which accounts for ∼8% of global GHG emissions. This study assesses how increased grid spot price volatility influences the optimal sizing and operation of H2-DRIEAF plants under three operational scenarios: grid-connected, fully behind-the-meter (islanded), and mixed-mode (semi-islanded). Our analysis identifies the semi-islanded configuration as the most cost-effective solution, achieving a Levelized Cost of Steel (LCOS) 10−35% lower than sourcing energy solely from the grid. Modeling also shows hydrogen storage or selective electricity purchases at high prices (>$1000/MWh) generally outperform battery storage, except under extreme volatility. Additionally, the study explores cost reduction strategies to strengthen the economic viability and sustainability of green steel production.
Modern electric power systems operate using large generating units managed with a centralized control structure. The current systems are the result of over a hundred years of technological development and consolidation to leverage economies of scale. While the existing systems have proven cost effective and reliable, modern systems are experiencing a wide range of operational challenges that are causing a reexamination of the centralized control structure. Despite the nearly universal adoption of centralized control, electric power systems are fractal in their operational requirements. Specifically, the fundamental operational requirements are the same, regardless of the system size. While past technologies have not allowed for exploitation of this fractal behavior, emerging technologies are making it possible; these technologies include grid-forming inverters, modern telecommunications systems, and distributed control architectures. Here we show emerging technologies that allow the fractal operational requirements of electric power systems to be exploited as networked microgrids to increase the resiliency of the world’s critical electrical infrastructure.
Changes in technology, customer expectations, and business and regulatory environments are rapidly evolving causing fundamental changes in the nation’s electrical infrastructure. Nowhere is this more apparent that at the “grid edge”, where there is an increasing number of new devices and systems, as well as complex new interactions between them. This is leading to the traditional relationship between the end-use customers and their utilities being expanded by an increasing number of stakeholders, each with their own operational and financial objectives, governed by regulatory policy. While there are concerns about the rapidly increasing complexity negatively impacting reliable and resilience of the electrical infrastructure, these changes are also bringing new resources and opportunities that hold great potential if they can be properly coordinated. This white paper outlines the considerations for the coordination of multi-stakeholder objectives with electric utility requirements using the concept of grid services. Describing a framework that enables new stakeholders to achieve their local technical and economic objectives, while simultaneously delivering operational benefits to the electrical infrastructure. The concepts of grid architecture are presented as a tool to evaluate how stakeholders might participate in, and benefit from, services, and how utilities can make decision on the reliance on services to ensure reliability and resilience, translating abstract concepts into actionable information for utilities and grid edge stakeholders. The end result of proper coordination, informed by grid architecture, will be a range of new devices and systems, operated by new stakeholders, achieving their local objectives while also increasing the reliability, resilience, security, and affordability of the nation’s critical electrical infrastructure.
Changes in technology, customer expectations, and business and regulatory environments are rapidly evolving causing fundamental changes in the nation’s electrical infrastructure. Nowhere is this more apparent that at the “grid edge”, where there is an increasing number of new devices and systems, as well as complex new interactions between them. This is leading to the traditional relationship between the end-use customers and their utilities being expanded by an increasing number of stakeholders, each with their own operational and financial objectives, governed by regulatory policy. While there are concerns about the rapidly increasing complexity negatively impacting reliable and resilience of the electrical infrastructure, these changes are also bringing new resources and opportunities that hold great potential if they can be properly coordinated. This white paper outlines the considerations for the coordination of multi-stakeholder objectives with electric utility requirements using the concept of grid services. Describing a framework that enables new stakeholders to achieve their local technical and economic objectives, while simultaneously delivering operational benefits to the electrical infrastructure. The concepts of grid architecture are presented as a tool to evaluate how stakeholders might participate in, and benefit from, services, and how utilities can make decision on the reliance on services to ensure reliability and resilience, translating abstract concepts into actionable information for utilities and grid edge stakeholders. The end result of proper coordination, informed by grid architecture, will be a range of new devices and systems, operated by new stakeholders, achieving their local objectives while also increasing the reliability, resilience, security, and affordability of the nation’s critical electrical infrastructure.
The development of a beam-leaded low power, high performance metal-oxide-semiconductor (MOS), 256-bit random access memory (RAM) was reported. Previous success with the aluminum-gate current-sense version and a silicon-gate voltage-sense version led to the present effort to make a beam-leaded silicon-gate RAM. Some problems unique to the silicon-on-sapphire beam-lead process development are presented. Beam-leaded SOS TA5388 devices using a Si3N4 passivation layer were shown to have good electrical parameters.
The host–guest system TCNQ@Cu 3 BTC 2 (TCNQ = 7,7,8,8-tetracyanoquinodimethane, BTC = 1,3,5-benzenetricarboxylate) is a striking example of how semiconductivity can be introduced by guest incorporation in an otherwise insulating parent material. Exhibiting both microporosity and semiconducting behavior such materials offer exciting opportunities as next-generation sensor materials. Here, we apply a solvent-free vapor phase loading under rigorous exclusion of moisture, obtaining a series of the general formula x TCNQ@Cu 3 BTC 2 (0 ≤ x ≤ 1.0). By using powder X-ray diffraction, infrared and X-ray absorption spectroscopy together with scanning electron microscopy and porosimetry, we provide the first structural evidence for a systematic preferential arrangement of TCNQ along the (111) lattice plane and the bridging coordination motif to two neighbouring Cu-paddlewheels, as was predicted by theory. For 1.0TCNQ@Cu 3 BTC 2 we find a specific electrical conductivity of up to 1.5 × 10 -4 S cm -1 whilst maintaining a high BET surface area of 573.7 m 2 g -1 . These values are unmatched by MOFs with equally high electrical conductivity, making the material attractive for applications such as super capacitors and chemiresistors. Our results represent the crucial missing link needed to firmly establish the structure–property relationship revealed in TCNQ@Cu 3 BTC 2 , thereby creating a sound basis for using this as a design principle for electrically conducting MOFs.
Rural electric utilities, many of which operate with a co-op management approach, have unique operational challenges not shared with their municipal or IOU counterparts. Rural electric utilities typically have fewer customers per feeder mile, and are generally less able to afford the costs, or provide robust support for today’s Advanced Distribution Management System (ADMS) offerings. Additionally, co-ops typically do not need the full suite of ADMS offerings but would benefit from a subset of applications such as OMS, Unbalanced Power-Flow, Volt-VAR optimization and FLISR (Fault Location Isolation and Service Restoration). Their needs, even within these applications, are simpler and more standardized. Lastly, due to their size, their IT capabilities and resources are commonly limited; hence hardware and software needs to be standards-based and easy to maintain with only most expansions of current capabilities. GridAPPS-D™ is an open-source, application development environment that’s part of the Department of Energy’s Grid Modernization Efforts, being led by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. The GridAPPS-D project is developing a reference architecture and implementation with the goal of reducing the time and cost to integrate distribution applications for both planning and operations through the use of standardized interfaces and data models. In this paper, we present a view of the reference architecture for GridAPPS-D and highlight its applicability to the rural electric utilities’ needs, including descriptions of applications being developed using this platform, and how they can be applied to other rural electric utilities.