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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records

DRAINING HAZARDOUS FLUIDS DURING BUILDING 221-1F DEACTIVATION AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE

Several years ago, SRS completed a four year mission to decommission {approx}250 excess facilities. As part of that effort, SRS deactivated multiple facilities (e.g. Building 247-F, Naval Fuels Facility, and Building 211-F, Outside Facilities for F-Canyon) that contained extensive piping systems filled with hazardous material (e.g. nitric acid). Draining of hazardous materials from piping was successfully completed in all facilities without incident. In early 2009, the decommissioning program at SRS was restarted as a result of funding made available by the American Recovery & Reinvestment Act (ARRA). Under ARRA, draining of piping containing hazardous material was initiated in multiple facilities including Building 221-1F (or A-Line). This paper describes and reviews the draining of piping containing hazardous materials at A-Line, with emphasis on an incident involving the draining of nitric acid. The paper is intended to be a resource for engineers, planners, and project managers, who face similar draining challenges.

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Air Dispersion Modeling for Building 3026C/D Demolition

This report presents estimates of dispersion coefficients and effective dose for potential air dispersion scenarios of uncontrolled releases from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) buildings 3026C, 3026D, and 3140 prior to or during the demolition of the 3026 Complex. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) AERMOD system1-6 was used to compute these estimates. AERMOD stands for AERMIC Model, where AERMIC is the American Meteorological Society-EPA Regulatory Model Improvement Committee. Five source locations (three in building 3026D and one each in building 3026C and the filter house 3140) and associated source characteristics were determined with the customer. In addition, the area of study was determined and building footprints and intake locations of air-handling systems were obtained. In addition to the air intakes, receptor sites consisting of ground level locations on four polar grids (50 m, 100 m, 200 m, and 500 m) and two intersecting lines of points (50 m separation), corresponding to sidewalks along Central Avenue and Fifth Street. Three years of meteorological data (2006 2008) were used each consisting of three datasets: 1) National Weather Service data; 2) upper air data for the Knoxville-Oak Ridge area; and 3) local weather data from Tower C (10 m, 30 m and 100 m) on the ORNL reservation. Annual average air concentration, highest 1 h average and highest 3 h average air concentrations were computed using AERMOD for the five source locations for the three years of meteorological data. The highest 1 h average air concentrations were converted to dispersion coefficients to characterize the atmospheric dispersion as the customer was interested in the most significant response and the highest 1 h average data reflects the best time-averaged values available from the AERMOD code. Results are presented in tabular and graphical form. The results for dose were obtained using radionuclide activities for each of the buildings provided by the customer.7 Radiation dose was calculated assuming complete release of the building inventory as information was lacking regarding the portion of the building inventory expected to be released. Thus the results are derived using an extremely conservative release as documented in the Preliminary Hazard Screening report.7 To more closely approximate the result of a release, one must estimate the fraction of the total inventory released and multiply the results described above by that fraction. An example of how this calculation is accomplished is provided. Should an actual uncontrolled release occur, the results of this modeling effort could only be used to establish a rough order-of-magnitude for the event.

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RADBALL TECHNOLOGY TESTING FOR HOT CELL CHARACTERIZATION

Operations at various U.S. Department of Energy sites have resulted in substantial radiological contamination of tools, equipment, and facilities. It is essential to use remote technologies for characterization and decommissioning to keep worker exposures as low as reasonably achievable in these highly contaminated environments. A significant initial step in planning and implementing D&D of contaminated facilities involves the development of an accurate assessment of the radiological, chemical, and structural conditions inside of the facilities. Collected information describing facility conditions using remote technologies could reduce the conservatism associated with planning initial worker entry (and associated cost).

42 ENGINEERING↗

Air Dispersion Modeling of Radioactive Releases During Proposed PFP Complex Demolition Activities

This report is part of the planning process for the demolition of the 234-5Z, 236-Z, 242-Z, and 291-Z-1 structures at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) on the Hanford Site. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) supports the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) demolition planning effort by making engineering estimates of potential releases for various potential demolition alternatives. This report documents an analysis considering open-air demolition using standard techniques. It does not document any decisions about the decommissioning approaches; it is expected that this report will be revisited as the final details of the demolition are developed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Characterization of Representative Materials in Support of Safe, Long Term Storage of Surplus Plutonium in DOE-STD-3013 Containers

The Surveillance and Monitoring Program is a joint Los Alamos National Laboratory/Savannah River Site effort funded by the Department of Energy-Environmental Management to provide the technical basis for the safe, long-term storage (up to 50 years) of over 6 metric tons of plutonium stored in over 5,000 DOE-STD-3013 containers at various facilities around the DOE complex. The majority of this material is plutonium that is surplus to the nuclear weapons program, and much of it is destined for conversion to mixed oxide fuel for use in US nuclear power plants. The form of the plutonium ranges from relatively pure metal and oxide to very impure oxide. The performance of the 3013 containers has been shown to depend on moisture content and on the levels, types and chemical forms of the impurities. The oxide materials that present the greatest challenge to the storage container are those that contain chloride salts. Other common impurities include oxides and other compounds of calcium, magnesium, iron, and nickel. Over the past 15 years the program has collected a large body of experimental data on 54 samples of plutonium, with 53 chosen to represent the broader population of materials in storage. This paper summarizes the characterization data, moisture analysis, particle size, surface area, density, wattage, actinide composition, trace element impurity analysis, and shelf life surveillance data and includes origin and process history information. Limited characterization data on fourteen nonrepresentative samples is also presented.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Surplus Plutonium Disposition Sphincter Seal Development & Testing

The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Project (SPD, Project Y744) requested the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to perform a series of leak and durability tests on sphincter seals that were designed to process blend cans and shield cans into an SPD glovebox. Each sphincter seal assembly consisted of a stainless-steel outer sleeve weldment that was bolted onto the test enclosure and an aluminum inner sleeve that housed seven to nine Neoprene seals. All tests were executed to determine long term effects from processing approximately a year’s worth of blend and shield cans through the sphincter seals.

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ESTIMATING IMPURITIES IN SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FOR DISPOSITION

The United States holds at least 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) operates a Feed Characterization program for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition of the National Nuclear Security Administration and the DOE Office of Environmental Management. Many of the items that require disposition are only partially characterized, and SRNL uses a variety of techniques to predict the isotopic and chemical properties that are important for processing through the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility and alternative disposition paths. Recent advances in laboratory tools, including Prompt Gamma Analysis and Peroxide Fusion treatment, provide data on the existing inventories that will enable disposition without additional, costly sampling and destructive analysis.

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Characterizing surplus US plutonium for disposition

The United States (US) has identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) operates a Feed Characterization program for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM). SRNL manages a broad program of item tracking through process history, laboratory analysis, and non-destructive assay. A combination of analytical techniques allows SRNL to predict the isotopic and chemical properties that qualify materials for disposition through the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). The research also defines properties that are important for other disposition paths, including disposal to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) as transuranic waste (TRUW) or to high-level waste (HLW) systems.

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Characterizing Surplus US Plutonium for Disposition - 13199

The United States (US) has identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) operates a Feed Characterization program for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM). SRNL manages a broad program of item tracking through process history, laboratory analysis, and non-destructive assay. A combination of analytical techniques allows SRNL to predict the isotopic and chemical properties that qualify materials for disposition through the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). The research also defines properties that are important for other disposition paths, including disposal to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) as transuranic waste (TRUW) or to high-level waste (HLW) systems. (authors)

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NNSA B-Roll: MOX Facility

In 1999, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) signed a contract with a consortium, now called Shaw AREVA MOX Services, LLC to design, build, and operate a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility. This facility will be a major component in the United States program to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. The facility will take surplus weapon-grade plutonium, remove impurities, and mix it with uranium oxide to form MOX fuel pellets for reactor fuel assemblies. These assemblies will be irradiated in commercial nuclear power reactors.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Savannah River Site nuclear materials management plan FY 2017-2031

The purpose of the Nuclear Materials Management Plan (herein referred to as “this Plan”) is to integrate and document the activities required to disposition the legacy and/or surplus Enriched Uranium (EU) and Plutonium (Pu) and other nuclear materials already stored or anticipated to be received by facilities at the Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS) as well as the activities to support the DOE Tritium mission. It establishes a planning basis for EU and Pu processing operations in Environmental Management Operations (EMO) facilities through the end of their program missions and for the tritium through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Defense Programs (DP) facilities. Its development is a joint effort among the Department of Energy - Savannah River (DOE-SR), DOE – Environmental Management (EM), NNSA Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3), NNSA Savannah River Field Office (SRFO), and the Management and Operations (M&O) contractor, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC (SRNS). Life-cycle program planning for Nuclear Materials Stabilization and Disposition and the Tritium Enterprise may use this Plan as a basis for the development of the nuclear materials disposition scope and schedule. This Plan assumes full funding to accomplish the required project and operations activities. It is recognized that some aspects of this Plan are pre decisional with regard to National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); in such cases new NEPA actions will be required.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

SRS K-AREA MATERIAL STORAGE - EXPANDING CAPABILITIES

In support of the Department of Energy’s continued plans to de-inventory and reduce the footprint of Cold War era weapons’ material production sites, the K-Area Material Storage (KAMS) facility, located in the K-Area Complex (KAC) at the Savannah River Site reservation, has expanded since its startup authorization in 2000 to accommodate DOE’s material consolidation mission. During the facility’s growth and expansion, KAMS will have expanded its authorization capability of material types and storage containers to allow up to 8200 total shipping containers once the current expansion effort completes in 2014. Recognizing the need to safely and cost effectively manage other surplus material across the DOE Complex, KAC is constantly evaluating the storage of different material types within K area. When modifying storage areas in KAC, the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) must undergo extensive calculations and reviews; however, without an extensive and proven security posture the possibility for expansion would not be possible. The KAC maintains the strictest adherence to safety and security requirements for all the SNM it handles. Disciplined Conduct of Operations and Conduct of Projects are demonstrated throughout this historical overview highlighting various improvements in capability, capacity, demonstrated cost effectiveness and utilization of the KAC as the DOE Center of Excellence for safe and secure storage of surplus SNM.

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ARIES team achieves major milestone in support of nonproliferation

The Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) Program is a great example of LANL’s Weapons and Global Security programs working together to achieve important nuclear security mission goals. Executed at PF-4, a facility better known for its pit production mission, the ARIES Program is helping the nation meet its nonproliferation commitments by preparing surplus weapons-grade plutonium for final disposition. ARIES recently met a major milestone of producing 1 metric ton of plutonium oxide from material removed from surplus pits. The milestone was celebrated in an awards ceremony at LANL on January 28.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Low-Level Waste Minimization and Management Planning at the Western Waste Management Facility, Ontario Power Generation - 19235

The purpose of this study was to examine the strategies intended to mitigate the temporary storage restrictions for Low-Level radioactive waste at the Western Waste Management Facility to enable continued accommodation of waste generation rates, and to recover storage capacity from 2018-2023 to optimize long-term sustainability for radioactive waste management. The management options considered were based on existing waste processing technologies and programs available at the Western Waste Management Facility, in combination with third party volume-reduction services. Completed analysis measured the consumption of Low-Level Waste storage space as influenced by the projected volumes from nuclear generating stations, and the various processing scenarios developed; such as reducing the volume of surplus processable waste on-site, and the reduction of specific waste streams previously considered to be non-processable. Results from the quantitative analysis indicated which strategies will be most effective for minimizing waste volumes for long-term storage and for recovering low-level storage space at the Western Waste Management Facility. The strategic path forward is presented in short- to long-term management objectives. Results from this study will contribute to the waste stream planning and management of major reactor refurbishment projects and to the technological advancements and innovation of radioactive waste processing and minimization. With further understanding of the refurbishment-specific waste types and volumes, it is expected that Nuclear Waste Management and the nuclear generating stations will achieve increasingly improved minimization results with the progression of each refurbished reactor. (author)

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Opportunities to Reuse and Recycle Redundant Radioisotopes - 16023

Sixty plus years of nuclear research and operation in the UK has produced significant quantities of nuclear material. To those involved in decommissioning a site or facility, this material represents a liability that needs to be managed and eventually disposed of. However to those in the wider nuclear industry and supply chain, the radioisotopes represent a potential resource of valuable, and in some cases irreplaceable material for future work. There is therefore an opportunity to create a win-win by identifying material that could be recycled or reused, removing it from being a liability and creating value from what is considered a waste. The UK is currently focused on the clean up of nuclear sites and the safe disposal of legacy nuclear material. Whilst the bulk of legacy material on these sites is mixed wastes in various solid and liquid forms, some of it consists of material produced for research purposes in the form of radioisotopes or exotic fuels. This has resulted in a plethora of unirradiated and irradiated materials in store across the UK including: Depleted and natural Uranium, Enriched Uranium, Mixed U/Pu oxides, Uranium carbide and mixed U/Pu carbides, Thorium as metal and oxides, Research radioisotopes. The material exists in almost every conceivable state from pure metal and oxides to solutions. Some material is well characterised and free from extraneous debris, other material is poorly characterised and contaminated with chemicals, experimental residues and sweepings. In addition, to reduce the risk and potential hazard across the UK there has also been a period of consolidation of obsolete radioactive sources from a wide variety of industrial or medical facilities to secure storage within a licensed site. The waste hierarchy is an established principle for the management of wastes, radioactive or otherwise. Its principles are set out and it gives top priority to prevention in the first place. Where waste is produced, it gives priority to preparation for re-use, then recycling before consideration for disposal as a last resort. The term wastes may only be applicable to the owner of the material where they may view the material as unwanted, unusable, or a by-product. It does not necessarily follow that the material is a waste to all potential owners. Therefore it is important to consider the potential value of material before it is considered for disposal since there is a significant and growing market for radioisotopes across the world. This paper will outline some of the opportunities in the UK for the recycle of surplus radioisotopes and orphan material. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Savannah River Site Composite Analysis (FY2019 Annual Review)

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a Department of Energy (DOE) site encompassing approximately 310 square miles in South Carolina. It is bounded on the southwest by the Savannah River (SR) and is situated approximately 12 miles south of Aiken, South Carolina, and 15 miles southeast of Augusta, Georgia. Construction of and subsequent operations at the SRS began in 1951 under the direction of the Atomic Energy Commission. The primary mission of the SRS was to produce tritium and plutonium for the national nuclear weapons complex. Between 1953 and 1955, SRS brought five reactors and various support facilities into operation in support of its primary mission. Support facilities included two chemical separations plants, a heavy water extraction plant, a nuclear fuel and target fabrication facility, a tritium extraction facility and waste management facilities. With the declining need for a large nuclear weapons stockpile since the end of the Cold War, many SRS facilities no longer produce or process nuclear materials. All reactors were shut down by 1993. However, the SRS Tritium Extraction Facility continues to supply DOE with tritium. Additionally, operations at the K-Area Complex currently provide interim safe storage for much of DOE’s excess plutonium (Pu) and high enriched uranium, in a building which formerly housed K Reactor. As the SRS mission has changed, many surplus facilities are being dispositioned safely and economically. SRS has completed extensive decommissioning activities in D-Area, M-Area, P-Area, R-Area, and T-Area, with groundwater (GW) remediation ongoing. High-level waste tanks continue to be emptied and closed.

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Plutonium Pit Production - Savannah River Site (Plutonium Pit Production Mission)

The Savannah River Site (SRS) has been providing strategic materials to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent for 70 years. Establishing plutonium pit production capabilities at SRS will leverage existing infrastructure at the site and optimize use of the talented workforce in the region to meet validated national security requirements. This new mission will require a large skilled workforce for decades to come. Savannah River Nuclear Solutions LLC, the management and operating (M&O) partner at SRS, has established teams for both the transition of the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility and the development of the proposed Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF). In addition, NNSA remains committed to safely and securely removing surplus plutonium from South Carolina in a timely and cost-effective manner by using the dilute and dispose method.

Source record↗

Data Call to Support the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (Final Report)

Based on conclusions of a recent pit disassembly and conversion (PDC) Alternatives Study, the plutonium facility at Los Alamos (TA-55-4, “PF-4”) may be a viable location for converting pits into a feed material for making mixed oxide fuel rods at Savannah River Site (SRS). The alternatives study was separate from the on-going effort to develop a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) for Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD). The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has decided to include the Los Alamos option in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis. An NNSA memorandum “Data Call to Support the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement” received on October 26, 2011 directed Los Alamos to gather data in support of this effort.

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