New Developments in Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) Single Event Upsets (SEUs) and Fail-Safe Strategies
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This paper addresses the issues involved in radiation testing of devices and subsystems to obtain the data that are required to predict the performance and survivability of satellite systems for extended missions in space. The problems associated with space environmental simulations, or the lack thereof, in experiments intended to produce information to describe the degradation and behavior of parts and systems are discussed. Several types of radiation effects in semiconductor components are presented, as for example: ionization dose effects, heavy ion and proton induced Single Event Upsets (SEUs), and Single Event Transient Upsets (SETUs). Examples and illustrations of data relating to these ground testing issues are provided. The primary objective of this presentation is to alert the reader to the shortcomings, pitfalls, variabilities, and uncertainties in acquiring information to logically design electronic subsystems for use in satellites or space stations with long mission lifetimes, and to point out the weaknesses and deficiencies in the methods and procedures by which that information is obtained.
This viewgraph presentation provides an overview of Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), what they are, implementations in space missions, and current available technologies. Single Event Upsets (SEUs) and Single Event Transients (SETs) are discussed in relation to their effects on FPGAs. Testing goals, considerations, and data analysis are reviewed.
Commercial digital signal processors (DSPs) for use in high-speed satellite computers are challenged by the damaging effects of space radiation, mainly single event upsets (SEUs) and single event functional interrupts (SEFIs). Innovations have been developed for mitigating the effects of SEUs and SEFIs, enabling the use of very-highspeed commercial DSPs with improved SEU tolerances. Time-triple modular redundancy (TTMR) is a method of applying traditional triple modular redundancy on a single processor, exploiting the VLIW (very long instruction word) class of parallel processors. TTMR improves SEU rates substantially. SEFIs are solved by a SEFI-hardened core circuit, external to the microprocessor. It monitors the health of the processor, and if a SEFI occurs, forces the processor to return to performance through a series of escalating events. TTMR and hardened-core solutions were developed for both DSPs and reconfigurable field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). This includes advancement of TTMR algorithms for DSPs and reconfigurable FPGAs, plus a rad-hard, hardened-core integrated circuit that services both the DSP and FPGA. Additionally, a combined DSP and FPGA board architecture was fully developed into a rad-hard engineering product. This technology enables use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) DSPs in computers for satellite and other space applications, allowing rapid deployment at a much lower cost. Traditional rad-hard space computers are very expensive and typically have long lead times. These computers are either based on traditional rad-hard processors, which have extremely low computational performance, or triple modular redundant (TMR) FPGA arrays, which suffer from power and complexity issues. Even more frustrating is that the TMR arrays of FPGAs require a fixed, external rad-hard voting element, thereby causing them to lose much of their reconfiguration capability and in some cases significant speed reduction. The benefits of COTS high-performance signal processing include significant increase in onboard science data processing, enabling orders of magnitude reduction in required communication bandwidth for science data return, orders of magnitude improvement in onboard mission planning and critical decision making, and the ability to rapidly respond to changing mission environments, thus enabling opportunistic science and orders of magnitude reduction in the cost of mission operations through reduction of required staff. Additional benefits of COTS-based, high-performance signal processing include the ability to leverage considerable commercial and academic investments in advanced computing tools, techniques, and infra structure, and the familiarity of the science and IT community with these computing environments.
This presentation on Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) Devices will include challenges for critical applications and space radiation environments, Single Event Upsets (SEUs) and FPGA configuration, Single Event Upsets (SEUs) and FPGA data paths, and fail-safe strategies for critical applications.
To enable autonomy in space, machine-learning and computer vision applications become invaluable for sensor processing. However, these algorithms are computationally complex and unfeasible for many embedded central processing units (CPUs) and usually require external coprocessors, such as graphics processing units (GPUs) or accelerators specific to the application, including application specific integrated circuits (ASICs). In power-constrained systems, GPUs tend to consume more power than is acceptable (>40W), so lower-power accelerators have shown promise to provide the performance needed under spacecraft constraints. For radiation engineers, developing methodologies that can properly test CPUs, GPUs, and accelerators, and enable comparisons between them remains a necessary complication to solve as the devices become more complex. The methodology in this test aims to be a start in developing a baseline single-event effect (SEE) test for client-device machine learning accelerators. This category of devices do not host their own operating system. This testing campaign is a continuation of a previous 200 MeV proton test performed in January 2024. This report covers two heavy ion tests of the SAKURA-I card: one in April 2024, and one in June 2024. Additional data was needed after the April test due to ion-range issues experienced at higher linear-energy transfers (LETs). These range issues are described in more detail in Section 8. This experiment characterizes SEEs and data error susceptibility of the EdgeCortix SAKURA-I machine-learning accelerator under heavy ions. The device was monitored for single event upsets (SEUs) and single event functional interrupts (SEFIs) at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory’s 88-inch cyclotron. The SAKURA-I board accelerates machine-learning inference applications on a host computer through a PCIex16 connection. For the purposes of devising an end to end automated analysis workflow for this experiment, the YOLO-V5 and SSD300 objection-detection models, and the ResNet-50, EfficientNet, and MobileNetV2 image classification models were used as a representative suite of analytical machine-learning models.
Bulk silicon substrates are a common characteristic of nearly all commercial, Complementary Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor (CMOS), integrated circuits. These devices operate well on Earth, but are not so well received in the space environment. An alternative to bulk CMOS is the Silicon-On-Insulator (SOI), in which a &electric isolates the device layer from the substrate. SO1 behavior in the space environment has certain inherent advantages over bulk, a primary factor in its long-time appeal to space-flight IC designers. The discussion will investigate the behavior of the Partially-Depleted SO1 (PDSOI) device with respect to some of the more common space radiation effects: Total Ionized Dose (TID), Single-Event Upsets (SEUs), and Single-Event Latchup (SEL). Test and simulation results from the literature, bulk and epitaxial comparisons facilitate reinforcement of PDSOI radiation characteristics.
Motivation for this work is: (1) Accurately characterize digital signal processor (DSP) core single-event effect (SEE) behavior (2) Test DSP cores across a large frequency range and across various input conditions (3) Isolate SEE analysis to DSP cores alone (4) Interpret SEE analysis in terms of single-event upsets (SEUs) and single-event transients (SETs) (5) Provide flight missions with accurate estimate of DSP core error rates and error signatures.
Report describes experimental study of use of microelectronic advanced laser scanner (MEALS) to cause single-event upsets (SEUs) in integrated logic circuits. Basic concepts of SEU testing by use of MEALS described in "Laser Scanner Tests for Single-Event Upsets" (NPO-18216), "Single-Event-Upset Laser Scanner With Optical Bias" (NPO-18217), and "More About Laser Scanner Tests for Single-Event Upsets" (NPO-18494). Study part of continuing effort to study SEU effects of ionizing radiation on such circuits and to use MEALS as relatively inexpensive SEU-prescreening laboratory apparatus serving as alternative to heavy-ion acclerator.
Heavy ion single-event measurements on a variety of high density commercial NAND flash memories are reported. Three single event effect (SEE) phenomena are examined: single effect upsets (SEUs), single event functional interrupts (SEFIs), and catastrophic loss of ability to erase and program the device. Also, radiation results of multilevel flash technology are compared with results from single-level flash technology. These commercial high density memories appear to be much less susceptible to SEE and have better TID response compared to older generations of flash memories. The single-level devices are less sensitive to SEUs than multi-level devices. The charge pump in this study survived up to 600 krads. A new high current phenomenon in high density NAND flash memories is also discussed.
The purpose of this test was to characterize single event effects (SEE) in the LCMXO3D-9400HC-5BG484I, a low power and low density field programmable gate array (FPGA). The SEE concerns for the device that were investigated in this testing are single event upsets (SEUs) in the configuration static random-access memory (SRAM), SEUs in the FPGA fabric, single event latch up (SEL), and single event functional interrupts (SEFIs). Testing was conducted at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) on August 26th, 2024 and August 28th, 2024.
It is shown that single-event-upsets (SEUs) due to cosmic rays are a significant source of single bit error in spacecraft computers. The physical mechanism of SEU, electron hole generation by means of Linear Energy Transfer (LET), it discussed with reference made to the results of a study of the environmental effects on computer systems of the Galileo spacecraft. Techniques for making software more tolerant of cosmic ray effects are considered, including: reducing the number of registers used by the software; continuity testing of variables; redundant execution of major procedures for error detection; and encoding state variables to detect single-bit changes. Attention is also given to design modifications which may reduce the cosmic ray exposure of on-board hardware. These modifications include: shielding components operating in LEO; removing low-power Schottky parts; and the use of CMOS diodes. The SEU parameters of different electronic components are listed in a table.
The Reconfigurable Hardware in Orbit (RHinO) project is focused on creating a set of design tools that facilitate and automate design techniques for reconfigurable computing in space, using SRAM-based field-programmable-gate-array (FPGA) technology. These tools leverage an established FPGA design environment and focus primarily on space effects mitigation and power optimization. The project is creating software to automatically test and evaluate the single-event-upsets (SEUs) sensitivities of an FPGA design and insert mitigation techniques. Extensions into the tool suite will also allow evolvable algorithm techniques to reconfigure around single-event-latchup (SEL) events. In the power domain, tools are being created for dynamic power visualiization and optimization. Thus, this technology seeks to enable the use of Reconfigurable Hardware in Orbit, via an integrated design tool-suite aiming to reduce risk, cost, and design time of multimission reconfigurable space processors using SRAM-based FPGAs.
A proposed computer architecture would exploit the capabilities of commercially available field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) to enable computers to detect and recover from bit errors. The main purpose of the proposed architecture is to enable fault-tolerant computing in the presence of single-event upsets (SEUs). [An SEU is a spurious bit flip (also called a soft error) caused by a single impact of ionizing radiation.] The architecture would also enable recovery from some soft errors caused by electrical transients and, to some extent, from intermittent and permanent (hard) errors caused by aging of electronic components. A typical FPGA of the current generation contains one or more complete processor cores, memories, and highspeed serial input/output (I/O) channels, making it possible to shrink a board-level processor node to a single integrated-circuit chip. Custom, highly efficient microcontrollers, general-purpose computers, custom I/O processors, and signal processors can be rapidly and efficiently implemented by use of FPGAs. Unfortunately, FPGAs are susceptible to SEUs. Prior efforts to mitigate the effects of SEUs have yielded solutions that degrade performance of the system and require support from external hardware and software. In comparison with other fault-tolerant- computing architectures (e.g., triple modular redundancy), the proposed architecture could be implemented with less circuitry and lower power demand. Moreover, the fault-tolerant computing functions would require only minimal support from circuitry outside the central processing units (CPUs) of computers, would not require any software support, and would be largely transparent to software and to other computer hardware. There would be two types of modules: a self-checking processor module and a memory system (see figure). The self-checking processor module would be implemented on a single FPGA and would be capable of detecting its own internal errors. It would contain two CPUs executing identical programs in lock step, with comparison of their outputs to detect errors. It would also contain various cache local memory circuits, communication circuits, and configurable special-purpose processors that would use self-checking checkers. (The basic principle of the self-checking checker method is to utilize logic circuitry that generates error signals whenever there is an error in either the checker or the circuit being checked.) The memory system would comprise a main memory and a hardware-controlled check-pointing system (CPS) based on a buffer memory denoted the recovery cache. The main memory would contain random-access memory (RAM) chips and FPGAs that would, in addition to everything else, implement double-error-detecting and single-error-correcting memory functions to enable recovery from single-bit errors.
The SEU/SRAM is a 4-kbit Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) designed to detect Single-Event Upsets (SEUs) produced by high energy particles. This device was used to determine the distribution in the memory cell spontaneous flip potential.
One of the goals of the Remote Exploration and Experimentation (REE) project at JPL is to determine how vulnerable applications are to single event upsets (SEUs) when run in low radiation space environments using commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components.
The description of single event upsets (SEUs) in the spacecraft Anomalies Handbook is reviewed. The basic mechanism involved in SEUs is summarized and discussed in terms of circuit analysis. Calculation of SEU rate is analytically described and discussed. Departures from single step function dependence in the SEU rate is addressed.
Fault Tolerance Middleware (FTM) provides a framework to run on a dedicated core of a multi-core system and handles detection of single-event upsets (SEUs), and the responses to those SEUs, occurring in an application running on multiple cores of the processor. This software was written expressly for a multi-core system and can support different kinds of fault strategies, such as introspection, algorithm-based fault tolerance (ABFT), and triple modular redundancy (TMR). It focuses on providing fault tolerance for the application code, and represents the first step in a plan to eventually include fault tolerance in message passing and the FTM itself. In the multi-core system, the FTM resides on a single, dedicated core, separate from the cores used by the application. This is done in order to isolate the FTM from application faults and to allow it to swap out any application core for a substitute. The structure of the FTM consists of an interface to a fault tolerant strategy module, a responder module, a fault manager module, an error factory, and an error mapper that determines the severity of the error. In the present reference implementation, the only fault tolerant strategy implemented is introspection. The introspection code waits for an application node to send an error notification to it. It then uses the error factory to create an error object, and at this time, a severity level is assigned to the error. The introspection code uses its built-in knowledge base to generate a recommended response to the error. Responses might include ignoring the error, logging it, rolling back the application to a previously saved checkpoint, swapping in a new node to replace a bad one, or restarting the application. The original error and recommended response are passed to the top-level fault manager module, which invokes the response. The responder module also notifies the introspection module of the generated response. This provides additional information to the introspection module that it can use in generating its next response. For example, if the responder triggers an application rollback and errors are still occurring, the introspection module may decide to recommend an application restart.