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DOE OSTI2024

Optimizing Transmission of Acoustic Signals to Monitor Internal Conditions of Canisters for Dry Storage of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel

Safe storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is critical to the nuclear fuel cycle and the future of nuclear energy. In the United States, SNF is stored primarily via two methods regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission: wet storage in SNF pools and dry storage in dry cask storage systems (DCSSs). After about five years of cooling in spent fuel pools, the fuel assemblies are transferred into DCSSs, and the systems are filled with helium and sealed by welding. Deterioration of conditions inside of a DCSS is reflected in changes in the internal gas properties; this motivates the development of acoustic techniques to monitor internal gas properties, over extended storage periods, using sensors mounted on the exterior of the storage packages. However, a major challenge in collecting acoustic signals is the impedance mismatch between the steel canister shell and the gas. Only a small fraction of the ultrasonic signal can be transmitted through the gas medium. This paper documents experimental studies conducted on a full-scale canister mock-up to capture the gas-borne signals. Damping materials were pasted on the outside, and blocking and unblocking tests were conducted to identify the gas-borne signal. The results show that the excitation frequency plays an important role in maximizing the gas-borne signals. The gas-borne signal was successfully detected at around the theoretical time-of-flight. A high signal-to-noise ratio was achieved in the measurements. Next, the acoustic impedance matching layers were introduced, and the gas signal was drastically improved compared with that using no AIM layers.

Spent nuclear fuel (SNF), Canisters, Internal cond↗

DOE OSTI2024

Impurity gas detection for SNF canisters using probabilistic deep learning and acoustic sensing *

Abstract Monitoring impurity gases in spent nuclear fuel (SNF) canisters is a novel structural health monitoring approach for SNF in dry storage. The SNF canisters are sealed containers that do not facilitate visual access to the inside. Acoustic sensing can be deployed by taking advantage of the pathways unobstructed by internal hardware. Although the ultrasonic time-of-flight measurement can provide valuable information, it is limited in its ability to discern the concentration of only one impurity gas. As such, deep learning algorithms, particularly convolutional neural networks (CNNs), offer a promising solution. In this study, CNN-based probabilistic deep learning models were implemented to detect and quantify multiple impurity gases in helium. An experimental platform was established to simulate canister conditions, and ultrasonic test data were collected. The presence of argon and air in helium at concentrations ranging from 0% to 1.2% at increments of 0.05% was considered. The multi-layer perceptron, decision tree, and logistic regression classifiers achieved high accuracies when distinguishing pure helium from helium with impurities. CNN with dropout layers and CNN using maximum likelihood estimation showed a similar performance, indicating their ability to capture uncertainties. The ensemble CNN model exhibited improved predictions and the ability to balance individual gas concentration by integrating 1D- and 2D-CNN models. These findings contribute probabilistic deep learning solutions for impurity gas detection and analysis within SNF canisters, thus ensuring safe storage and management of SNFs.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

DOE OSTI2023

Drying of Spent Nuclear Fuel: Considerations and Examples

A recently revised American Society for Testing and Materials consensus standard guide for drying of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) provides considerations and guidance for preparing SNF for its safe storage in a sealed dry storage system. The standard discusses (1) needs for drying, (2) techniques to dry, and (3) demonstration of adequate dryness. No specific approach is prescribed since the effective techniques and needs for drying depend on the specifics of the fuel and dry storage system. Here, this paper discusses these topics using examples for both Zr-alloy-clad commercial SNF and for aluminum-alloy-clad research reactor SNF. Residual water can include free water (liquid and/or vapor), physisorbed water bound to internal surfaces, and chemisorbed water incorporated into surface films, such as (oxy)hydroxides. The potential impacts of these residual waters are corrosion/oxidation, radiolytic breakdown into gaseous and/or reactive species, and canister pressurization. For commercial SNF, inadvertent free water, even up to large amounts (e.g., 10+ mol), is not predicted to cause adverse corrosion degradation, except possible fuel oxidation for breached SNF. For aluminum-clad SNF, the production of radiolytic hydrogen with contribution from the chemisorbed water in its hydrated oxides is a primary consideration. For both SNF systems, canister pressurization is predicted to be well within the canister design, and flammability would not pose a safety concern using an oxygen limit of 5 vol % criterion. (Flammability control can be achieved by limiting either hydrogen or oxygen, and an oxygen limit is expected to be easier to meet in the presence of radiolytic H 2 generation.) The two primary technologies for SNF drying, vacuum drying and forced-gas dehydration, are described herein, and drying tests and campaigns using these methods are cited. Dryness criteria and the methods used to detect and measure residual (free) water are also discussed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2026

Spent Nuclear Fuel and Reprocessing Waste Inventory

This report provides information on the inventory of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in the United States located at Nuclear Power Reactor (NPR) and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) sites, as well as SNF and reprocessing waste located at U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites and other research and development (R&D) centers as of the end of calendar year 2024. Actual quantitative values for current inventories are provided along with inventory forecasts derived from examining different future nuclear power generation scenarios, based on information available and assumptions made at the time the scenarios were developed. The report also includes select information on the characteristics associated with the wastes examined (e.g., type, packaging, heat generation rate, decay curves).

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Improved Creep Testing Approach for Bentonite EBS

In the United States, the nuclear reactor contributes 18.7 percent of the nation’s total electricity generation and produces a significant amount of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level waste. Because SNF is being stored for longer periods than initially envisioned, the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy, Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology is assessing the technical performance of the SNF storage systems after extended durations. The concept of a sustainable geologic repository for SNF disposal relies heavily on the safety provided by multiple barriers, such as repository host rock, overlying rock formation, and human-made engineered barrier systems (EBS). One of the major components of EBS is bentonite-based buffer materials that isolate the nuclear-waste canisters from the host rock and fill the void left in the horizontally drilled boreholes. The resaturated bentonite has a swelling characteristic, which is useful for self-sealing the microcracks in the host rock and supporting the canister’s heavy weight. However, factors such as nonuniformity in the saturation, swelling pressure of bentonite, and the high temperature at the canister-bentonite interface may lead to instability of the waste canister inside the borehole. Therefore, evaluating the long-term deformation of bentonite-based material is necessary. RESPEC Company, LLC recently completed a preliminary study for the U.S. Department of Energy (DE SC0022804) that is attempting to understand the time-dependent deformation in the consolidated sand/bentonite (SB) specimens through triaxial creep experiments and improve the understanding of EBS performance under anticipated repository conditions. The project included developing a standard testing procedure for preparing the consolidated core specimen from a mixture of sand and bentonite in a 50:50 ratio by weight, fabricating a new pressure vessel in-house, modifying existing creep equipment to perform triaxial creep experiments on consolidated SB specimens, and performing six long-term triaxial creep experiments under low-deviatoric stress at two different temperature conditions, which is representative of hypothetical conditions that might be encountered in a geologic repository within a reasonable rate of success in completing creep experiments. The consolidated SB specimen was prepared using the novel specimen preparation procedure and had physical characteristics (e.g., moisture content and bulk density) reasonably comparable with the properties of bentonite-based buffer, which is proposed to be used in the EBS in the Swedish KBS-3H design and the Swiss design of SNF disposal in the horizontal drifts. The newly fabricated pressure vessel could withstand the confining pressure of up to 15 megapascals (MPa) while maintaining the test temperature of up to 90 degrees Celsius (°C) for long-term creep experiments. The preliminary results from the triaxial creep experiments suggested that the consolidated SB specimen may experience time-dependent deformation at a low-deviatoric stress state and room temperature condition. Based on the deformation recorded in the SB specimen from axial and radial linear variable differential transformers (LVDTs) and physical characteristic changes, it is apparent that the time-dependent deformation is a combination of consolidation and creep, which is influenced by the level of deviatoric stresses and temperature. The systematic creep testing of bentonite-based specimens helped develop a standard testing procedure applicable for analyzing the similar characteristics of shale or clay-like materials in different geologic conditions outside repository science, including in civil engineering and infrastructure projects, underground and open pit mining, and deep drilling.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2023

A Comparison of As-loaded Dose Calculations to Measured Dose Rates

Demonstrating that the radiation dose fields surrounding spent nuclear fuel (SNF) storage and transportation systems meet the applicable limits set forth in 10 CFR 72 for storage and 10 CFR 71 for transportation is essential for the safe handling of radioactive material. The Used Nuclear Fuel-Storage, Transportation, and Disposal Analysis Resource and Data System (UNF-ST&DARDS) [2] is used to provide realistic estimates of SNF-related safety margins. The UNF-ST&DARDS dose rate analysis approach differs from that used in typical licensing approaches, which use design-basis assemblies with bounding source term characteristics to demonstrate the packaging design complies with the regulations. These bounding licensing approaches can increase the time needed to qualify fuel for loading into dry storage and the time a loaded system must wait prior to transportation. UNF-ST&DARDS dose rate assessments allow quantification of realistic, uncredited safety margins associated with actual fuel loading compared with the regulatory limits. While realistic estimation of the dose field surrounding SNF systems may allow for additional flexibility in operations, it is essential to understand how these predictions compare to measured doses. The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Integrated Waste Management and the Prairie Island Indian Community conducted a transportation dose assessment to estimate the site-specific incident-free radiation doses from shipping SNF by rail from the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) through the Prairie Island Indian Community Reservation and Trust Land [5,6]. For that effort, the dose rates were obtained for 50 TN-40 and TN-40HT systems in storage configurations. This work compares the predicted dose rates from UNF-ST&DARDS as-loaded calculations with dose rates measured from 50 SNF storage systems at PINGP. The remainder of this paper discusses the data obtained for the evaluation, the modeling methods, and the results of the calculations.

spent nuclear fuel (SNF), UNF-ST&DARDS, Validation↗

DOE OSTI2024

Remaining Life Prediction of SNF Storage Canisters Exposed to CISCC Environments

• DOE Standardized SNF Storage Canisters o DOE designed standard spent nuclear fuel (SNF) storage canisters for storage of DOE SNF. o DOE canisters are significantly different from commercial MultiPurpose Canisters (MPC) in size. o MPC canisters are large, a height = 15.8 ft, OD = 68”, WT = 0.5”. o DOE canisters are small with 18” / 24” diameter, 10’ / 15’ length. • Integrity Evaluation of DOE versus MPC Canisters o Many investigations have been performed for MPC canisters. o Limit investigations were performed for DOE standard canisters. Most were done at Idaho National Lab (INL). o DOE has sponsored integrity studies to evaluate weld integrity using drop tests and FEA simulations. o No evaluation on CISCC/service life of DOE canister in literature. o MPC canister: 4 axial welds, 1 center girth weld, 2 closing welds.

ZHU, Xiankui↗

DOE OSTI2025

Non-destructive evaluation and machine learning methods for inspection of spent nuclear fuel canisters: A state-of-the-art review

Nuclear energy is among the cleanest and most efficient energy sources currently available. The operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs) produces large amounts of high-level radioactive waste known as spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Currently, large amounts of SNF is stored in dry cask storage systems (DCSSs) for extended interim storage until a permanent disposal solution becomes available. During the extended interim storage, the DCSS, particularly the SNF canisters, may degrade and abnormal conditions may occur. Therefore, non-destructive evaluation (NDE) and machine learning (ML) approaches are necessary for inspection of SNF canisters. This paper presents a state-of-the-art review of literature by summarizing recent progress made on the applications of NDE and ML for inspection of SNF canisters. Sixteen NDE methods are examined and compared: visual inspection, ultrasonic guided waves (UGWs), laser-based approaches, acoustic emission (AE), eddy current testing (ECT), non-invasive acoustic sensing, dynamic modal testing, cosmic ray muons tomography, neutron imaging, gamma rays detection, fiber optical sensors, through-wall communications, X-ray computed tomography (CT), vibrothermography, monoenergetic photon sources, and surface acoustic wave (SAW) sensors. The technology readiness level (TRL) for each method is assessed and compared. Recent publications on ML-enhanced visual inspection, AE, non-invasive acoustic sensing, dynamic modal testing, and neutron imaging for SNF canisters are summarized and future research needs are identified. In conclusion, this review article provides a convenient reference on the state-of-the-art applications of NDE and ML methods for inspection of SNF canisters.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2024

Acoustic sensing and autoencoder approach for abnormal gas detection in a spent nuclear fuel canister mock-up

Currently, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from commercial nuclear power plants is stored in stainless-steel canisters for interim dry storage. To provide an inert environment, these canisters are backfilled with helium after vacuum drying. However, the helium environment may be contaminated during extended storage because of the material degradation. For example, the heavier fission gas xenon may be released from the fuel rods into the canister cavity should the fuel cladding be breached. Other gases such as air and water vapor may also be present as a result of leakage caused by chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking on the canister walls or by insufficient vacuum drying. Therefore, monitoring the gas composition can provide critical information about the health of SNF canisters. In this study, noninvasive testing was conducted on a 2/3-scaled SNF canister mock-up using acoustic sensing. Ultrasonic transducers were placed on the exterior surface of the canister to probe the gas composition. A dataset was collected by sealing the canister mock-up and introducing up to 1.53% argon or 1.29% air into the helium background gas. Three methods were used to detect changes in the gas composition: the time-of-flight (TOF) method, the differential method, and the autoencoder method. Results showed that the TOF method had sufficient resolution to detect abnormal gas concentrations of less than 1.0%. The differential method demonstrated a periodic in-phase and out-of-phase behavior between the benchmark (i.e., pure helium) and abnormal (i.e., with argon or air) state signals. The variational autoencoder (VAE) and the Wasserstein autoencoder (WAE) were trained on the benchmark data and were applied directly to the abnormal state data. It was found that both the unsupervised VAE and the WAE were able to distinguish the benchmark and abnormal states of the canister mock-up based on the reconstruction error.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Preliminary Analysis of Advanced Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage, Transportation, and Disposal

Due to increased interest in advanced reactor deployment and their associated potential new fuel cycles, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) program has begun to evaluate the possible implications of long term management and final disposition of the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) generated. Safely managing and dispositioning this SNF, along with any other associated radioactive waste, is the primary focus of this initial preliminary assessment. This paper summarizes efforts to evaluate the characteristics and packaging options for three types of advanced reactor SNF forms: (1) tristructural isotropic (TRISO), (2) metallic, and (3) irradiated fuel salt presented in the report titled “Storage, Transportation, and Disposal of Advanced Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste”. TRISO and metallic SNF and their associated waste streams were emphasized because of the near-term anticipated demonstrations of X-energy’s Xe-100 and TerraPower and GE Hitachi’s Natrium advanced reactors. Preliminary information on spent fuel salts discharged from molten-salt reactors (MSRs) was also examined to provide a baseline for future efforts. All calculations and assumptions were based on publicly available information. This paper identifies several different reactors that produce either TRISO or metallic SNF as well as a few of the reactor and fuel characteristics used for the assessments. Based on these characteristics, calculations were performed to determine the applicability of packaging SNF into existing canister designs. The evaluations included geometric (e.g., dimension, volume) and mass/weight considerations, known operational approaches and loading procedures, physical and chemical considerations/conditions for storage environments, and as-loaded radiation, thermal, and criticality analyses to identify constraints on storage, transportation, and disposal. Gaps in publicly available data pertaining to reactor operation and/or fuel composition provide increased uncertainty in some evaluations. Additionally, uncertainty in packaging and SNF management operations provide additional uncertainty. However, preliminary conclusions can still be assessed through this work and are presented in this paper.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Preliminary Analysis of Advanced Reactors Storage, Transportation, and Disposal

Based on the higher interest in Advanced Reactor (AR) deployment (e.g., ARDP[1]) for potential new fuel cycles, the Spent Fuel & Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Program has begun to evaluate the possible implications of long-term management and final disposition of potential Advance Reactor spent nuclear fuels (SNF) that would be generated in potential advanced reactors. Safely managing and dispositioning the potential future AR SNF, and any other associated radioactive wastes, is the primary focus of this initial preliminary assessment of those. This paper summarizes the efforts by the Spent Fuel & Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) in evaluating characteristics and packaging options for advanced reactor spent nuclear fuel forms. The fuel forms were categorized into three types: (1) tristructural isotropic (TRISO), (2) metallic, and (3) fuel salt. This work emphasized TRISO and metallic SNF and waste streams because of the near-term anticipated operation of the Xe-100 and the Natrium reactors as advanced-reactor demonstrations. Preliminary information for the spent-fuel salts discharged from molten-salt reactors (MSRs) is also examined to provide a baseline for future efforts. All calculations and assumptions used publicly available information. The following characteristics are calculated or estimated for use in the preliminary assessments: SNF volume and mass, radiation/activity levels through time, thermal conditions through time, potential radionuclide source terms, chemical interactions and evolutions, disposal inventories, and waste-form lifetime. Using those characteristics, calculations to determine the applicability of existing canister designs were performed. These evaluations included geometric (e.g., dimension, volume) and mass/weight considerations, known operational approaches and loading procedures, physical and chemical considerations/conditions for storage environments, as-loaded radiation, thermal, and criticality analyses to identify constraints for storage, transportation, and disposal. The paper also includes a literature review and analysis on the storage, transportation, and disposal evaluations and experiences from reactors with similar fuel forms. Advanced-reactor vendors cite past experiences with Fort St. Vrain for TRISO and the Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II) for metallics that have major influences on fuel design. Finally, the paper includes preliminary concepts of operation for advanced-reactor SNF. This encompasses storage, transportation, potential treatment, and disposal activities from both a per-canister and systems-integration perspective.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Considerations for Managing DOE Standard Canisters within an Over-canister as Part of an Integrated Waste Management System PPT

To better enable informed decision making regarding the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, the Integrated Waste Management Program within the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) has been sponsoring research into a comprehensive integrated waste management system (IWMS) that considers all major back-end aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., transportation, storage, and disposal). An important aspect of the IWMS is DOE-managed Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF). DOE and its predecessor agencies have generated, transported, received, stored, and reprocessed SNF at DOE facilities nationwide, and DOE is responsible for managing the SNF currently in its possession. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types that employ various cladding materials, fuel materials, and enrichments. To enable interim, road-ready dry storage (RRDS) of the wide variety of SNF types found in the DOE inventory, a standardized canister system (i.e., the DOE Standard Canister) was proposed for the packaging demonstration. This robust, welded canister system is designed to confine radionuclides, prevent criticality by precluding content moderation, and satisfy other requirements as part of a larger storage, transportation, and disposal system. While SNF has yet to be loaded into a DOE Standard Canister, DOE Standard Canister designs were included in past storage facility and disposal facility design licensing endeavors. In a renewed effort to evaluate packaging SNF at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in a RRDS configuration, researchers are planning the RRDS Packaging Demonstration. This demonstration is supplemented by analytical structural, criticality, and material compatibility evaluations that support management of SNF in DOE Standard Canisters, taking advantage of past analysis work to the extent possible. One of the largest differences between the current Packaging Demonstration and past analytical evaluations is the inclusion of an over-canister containing multiple DOE Standard Canisters. For the Packaging Demonstration, DOE Standard Canisters loaded with SNF are planned to be placed in a larger diameter over-canister. The sealed over-canister could then be placed in a storage overpack for onsite storage, or in a transportation overpack for shipment to an offsite storage location or disposal site once one becomes available. This paper examines the relevant considerations and provides a preliminary evaluation of integrating the over-canister configuration into the storage, transportation, and disposal processes of the overall waste management system. For storage and transportation, the over-canister can be considered analogous to a multi-purpose canister (MPC) for commercial SNF. For disposal, the DOE Standard Canisters could be removed from the over-canister and placed in a co-disposal waste package with canisters containing vitrified high-level radioactive waste (HLW) similar to configurations examined previously, or the sealed over-canisters might be capable of direct disposal in a waste package.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2023

A Historical Review of the Safe Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel

This report meets the requirements of M3 milestone M3SF-21OR020302066 for the Office of Integrated Waste Management (IWM) and is a revision to M3 milestone M3FT-16OR090402028 for the former Nuclear Fuels Storage and Transportation Planning Project (NFST), “Safety Record of SNF Shipments.” The US Department of Energy (DOE) has since established the IWM, which builds on the work begun by NFST, to develop an integrated waste management system for spent nuclear fuel (SNF), including the development of a large-scale transportation system for the safe transport of SNF to storage or disposal facilities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Reference Fuel Development for Non-Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel Management

The Savannah River Site (SRS) L Area Facility provides for the safe receipt, storage, handling, and shipping of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and has received more than 47,000 SNF assemblies since 1964. In order to consolidate receipt and storage analysis, L Area criticality safety has historically used several aluminum-clad “reference fuels” to establish bounding storage, handling, and cask loading limits and then applied a reactivity comparison approach to demonstrate that candidate fuels may be processed under the reference fuel limits. Currently, only aluminum-clad SNF from off-site research reactors are transferred on-site. The Accelerated Basin De-Inventory (ABD) program will begin the removal of bundled Non-Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel (NASNF) from the L Area disassembly basin for dissolution and disposition, which has driven the need for a non-aluminum reference fuel. This paper discusses the process and results of creating a new fictional homogenous NASNF highly enriched uranium reference fuel, “MITZ,” to be used in nuclear criticality safety evaluations for upcoming SNF disposition operations. Data demonstrating the relationship between neutron multiplication behavior and fuel spacing is generated for the new reference fuel MITZ as well as existing reference fuels representing several types of SNF assemblies.

Reference Fuel↗

DOE OSTI2025

Reference Fuel Development for Non-Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel Management

Reference Fuel↗

DOE OSTI2026

Flaw Tolerance Assessment for DOE Standard SNF Dry Storage Canisters - 26550

The U.S. DOE has designed four spent nuclear fuel (SNF) dry storage canisters for storing DOE standardized SNFs. The DOE standard canisters are cylindrical shells with a diameter of 24 inches (610 m) or 18 inches (457 m), a wall thickness of 0.5 inches (12.7 m) or 0.375 inches (9.53 m), and a length of 15 feet (4.57 m) or 10 feet (3.05 m). These DOE canister geometries are completely different from commercial canisters. The latter may experience chloride-induced stress cracking corrosion (CI-SCC) because they are stored near coastal regions. The former may not experience CI-SCC but face different challenges because they are stored in the SNF storage facilities. Because of large residual stresses, mechanical flaws may occur in the DOE canisters during long-distance transportation or lifting handling. To date, only limited structural integrity analyses were carried out through drop tests on the DOE canisters, but a more general flaw tolerance assessment has not been performed. Therefore, the failure assessment diagram (FAD)-based fracture mechanics method, as codified by the latest API 579-1/ASME FFS-1-2021 Edition, is adopted in this work to assess surface flaw tolerance for DOE canisters under operation loading and welding residual stresses (WRS), where the new code-recommended WRS distributions are used. To more adequately consider the transverse distribution of WRS, an equivalent WRS distribution is proposed to account for the WRS reduction with distance from the weld centerline. Moreover, the closed-form solutions of stress intensity factor K, which serves as the crack driving force during subcritical crack growth, are developed from the tabular data of the K factors provided in API 579-1/ASME FFS-1 and used to determine more accurate flaw sizes at flaw instability. Subsequently, the Level 2 assessment procedures with 12 assessment steps, as codified and detailed in API 579-1 and ASME FFS-1, are followed to assess the flaw tolerance for the surface flaws in the DOE standard canisters with consideration of normal or accident operation loads combined with WRS. The assessment results show that the four designs of DOE standard canisters can tolerate all surface flaws that meet the code permitted maximum sizes of a flaw length of 8 inches (i.e., 200 mm) and a flaw depth of 80% wall thickness. This demonstrates that all designs of DOE standard canisters are robust and reliable.

DOE standard canister↗

DOE OSTI2023

FY23 Status Report: SNF Interim Storage Canister Corrosion and Surface Environment Investigations

Work evaluating spent nuclear fuel (SNF) dry storage canister surface environments and canister corrosion progressed significantly in FY23, with the goal of developing a scientific understanding of the processes controlling initiation and growth of stress corrosion cracking (SCC) cracks in stainless steel canisters in relevant storage environments. The results of the work performed at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) will guide future work and will contribute to the development of better tools for predicting potential canister penetration by SCC.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2025

An approach for spent nuclear fuel containment integrity verification using gas tagging

Verification of containment integrity is required for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) managed by the commercial nuclear industry and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), especially after extended storage. Certain SNF storage systems, such as the DOE road-ready dry storage system, hold several packaged containments within a welded over-canister. These packaged containments are called Department of Energy Standard Canisters (DOESCs). DOESC leakage identification is challenging because their containment boundary cannot be accessed for testing and their contents (i.e., SNF and fill gas) are often similar. There are concerns that this could result in costly characterization and repackaging operations of DOE road-ready dry storage systems if compromised DOESCs are suspected. Here, to address these concerns, this paper presents an approach for applying a gas tagging process using xenon to uniquely identify compromised inaccessible containments following extended storage. The containments considered for this application are seven DOESCs, each packaged within a single over-canister. Two different SNF loading configurations from the Advanced Test Reactor and Fort Saint Vrain nuclear power plant are considered. These configurations are used to represent research reactor aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) and TRi-structural ISOtropic (TRISO) SNF types. Results for this application show that for ASNF and TRISO type fuels for which the selected fuels are representative, the volume of taggant required at loading is determined primarily by the lower detection limit and leak rate of taggant from a compromised DOESC, rather than the amount of fission-generated xenon in the loaded fuel. While the application presented is suited for larger leaks, smaller leaks could be detected by modifying certain design parameters. This gas tagging approach can also be applied to other DOE containments and advanced reactor SNF storage systems.

07 - ISOTOPES AND RADIATION SOURCES↗