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At least 19 records

Surplus Plutonium Disposition Sphincter Seal Development & Testing

The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Project (SPD, Project Y744) requested the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to perform a series of leak and durability tests on sphincter seals that were designed to process blend cans and shield cans into an SPD glovebox. Each sphincter seal assembly consisted of a stainless-steel outer sleeve weldment that was bolted onto the test enclosure and an aluminum inner sleeve that housed seven to nine Neoprene seals. All tests were executed to determine long term effects from processing approximately a year’s worth of blend and shield cans through the sphincter seals.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Data Call to Support the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (Final Report)

Based on conclusions of a recent pit disassembly and conversion (PDC) Alternatives Study, the plutonium facility at Los Alamos (TA-55-4, “PF-4”) may be a viable location for converting pits into a feed material for making mixed oxide fuel rods at Savannah River Site (SRS). The alternatives study was separate from the on-going effort to develop a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) for Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD). The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has decided to include the Los Alamos option in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis. An NNSA memorandum “Data Call to Support the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement” received on October 26, 2011 directed Los Alamos to gather data in support of this effort.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Surplus Plutonium Disposition

The Department of Energy is focused on meeting legal obligations to the state of South Carolina. Dilute and Dispose is a technically proven, cost-effective approach that is currently being used to dispose of up to six metric tons of impure plutonium. NNSA proposes to use this process to permanently dispose of additional inventories of surplus plutonium. Savannah River Site, its infrastructure, and critically skilled workforce are key assets central to successful completion of this national security mission.

Source record↗

Automated Inspection of Criticality Control Overpacks for Surplus Plutonium Disposition: Qualification Update – 25313

In an effort to reduce the amount of nuclear waste in South Carolina, the Department of Energy (DOE) tasked the Savannah River Site (SRS) with diluting and disposing of the amount of plutonium in the state. This process involves the movement and shipment of over 100,000 criticality control overpacks (CCOs) throughout the project lifespan, lending itself to the use of automation to reduce worker radiation exposure and more efficiently utilize human capital. Due to the large scope, this overarching process was broken down into several different “automation projects” to be developed. The first opportunity pursued was the receipt and inspection of empty CCO drums coming into SRS, identified as Automation Project 1 (AP1), and is the focus of this paper. AP1 was developed to unpack incoming CCOs and inspect them for unwanted foreign objects and any damage to the drum or its contents. This process is accomplished by the combination of an automated guided vehicle (AGV) that delivers CCOs to a robotic arm which uses a suite of custom tools to disassemble a CCO, inspect the inside and outside of the CCO and its inner criticality control container (CCC), reassemble the CCC and CCO, and apply a tamper indicating device (TID) to the inspected drum. In past years, the robotic work cell had been developed in a small-scale testing facility for proof-of-concept. This year, major improvements were made to the robotic work cell to perform the process, including integration into the final facility where CCOs will be inspected. Other technical improvements include the implementation of sensor feedback and safety relays into the control system to allow the state of the work cell to be better tracked, and additional development of the TID application process to complete the robotic inspection. Further enhancements were made to the robotic vision processes and robot pathing, as well as development on a computer vision inspection process to detect inspection criteria anomalies in CCOs. In addition to developmental improvements, the work cell underwent a six-month testing period to ensure the project requirements were met. Results of this testing period demonstrate the work cell’s capability to meet project throughput goals at an acceptable level, successfully document the status of each CCO inspected, and reduce the toll on technical operations’ human power by two thirds. At the time of this paper, the work cell is capable of autonomously handling up to eight CCOs with an AGV, delivering CCOs to and from the robot work cell, and having a robotic arm perform a full receipt and inspection procedure on each CCO. Moving forward, repeatability will be improved so that these CCOs can be run back-to-back seamlessly, as well as improving the system to handle more significant edge cases and failure modes.

Spivey, Nicholas↗

Development of Automation Technologies for Glovebox Processing, Part 2

Topics • Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Overview • Robotic Arm Development for Glovebox Operations • Automatic Sphincter Loading System (ASLS) Update Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Overview • Application Background • Development Scope • Improvement Goals • Limitations

Krementz, Daniel↗

Custom Equipment Development for Processing of Surplus Plutonium

The Strategic Laboratory Assessment (SLA), a collaborative team of SRNL and ORNL personnel, has been established to advance the objectives of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Project, by identifying and developing technologies to accelerate disposition, reduce life cycle costs, minimize worker radiation exposure, improve worker safety, and minimize Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program risks. [1] The SLA team has identified can cutting and plutonium (Pu) oxide size reduction as two glovebox processes where technology enhancements would be valuable. The DOESTD-3013 package currently in use for Pu downblending requires cutting two nested cans before the inner convenience can that holds the Pu oxide may be accessed for further processing. A rotary tubing-style cutter is used for opening the 3013 packages within the glovebox. Collet changeouts are required between cutting of the outer and inner cans. The SLA team is currently developing and testing an adjustable-clamp can cutter design that eliminates collet changeouts and allows cutting of the outer and inner can at the same time, resulting in significant reduction of radiological dose and process time, as well as improved ergonomics. To meet the Pu oxide particle size requirement, size reduction of Pu oxide agglomerations must be performed within the process gloveboxes. The SLA team has identified jaw crushing technology as an alternative to the currently employed rotary mill. Jaw crusher advantages include reduced dust within the glovebox, increased batch sizes, and easier integration with other glovebox processes due to the flow-through nature of jaw crushing. Commercially manufactured jaw crushers are either too large and/or too heavy for implementation in the SPD gloveboxes, so the SLA team is developing and testing a custom jaw crusher to meet the needs of the SPD Project.

Krementz, Daniel [Savannah River National Laborato↗

SELECTION OF SURPLUS PLUTONIUM MATERIALS FOR DISPOSITION TO WIPP

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is preparing a Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS). Included in the evaluation are up to 6 metric tons (MT) of plutonium in the form of impure oxides and metals for which a disposition plan has not been decided, among options that include preparation as feed for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility; disposing to high-level waste through the Savannah River Site (SRS) HB Line and H Canyon; can-in-canister disposal using the SRS Defense Waste Processing Facility; and preparation for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). DOE and SRS have identified at least 0.5 MT of plutonium that, because of high levels of chemical and isotopic impurities, is impractical for disposition by methods other than the WIPP pathway. Characteristics of these items and the disposition strategy are discussed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

ESTIMATING IMPURITIES IN SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FOR DISPOSITION

The United States holds at least 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) operates a Feed Characterization program for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition of the National Nuclear Security Administration and the DOE Office of Environmental Management. Many of the items that require disposition are only partially characterized, and SRNL uses a variety of techniques to predict the isotopic and chemical properties that are important for processing through the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility and alternative disposition paths. Recent advances in laboratory tools, including Prompt Gamma Analysis and Peroxide Fusion treatment, provide data on the existing inventories that will enable disposition without additional, costly sampling and destructive analysis.

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Pit Disassembly and Processing/Oxidation Capacity (PDP) for Disposition of Surplus Plutonium at Los Alamos (FY2021 Workshop 1) [Slides]

This workshop will establish NNSA/LANL consensus on the planning basis for: updating the 2017 Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) pre-conceptual estimate by identifying the specific scope elements that will be included; identifying the specific scope elements that will be included in the Line Item project; and identifying the preliminary agenda items for the next PDP workshop.

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3D Source Reconstruction Using Coded Aperture Gamma-Ray Imaging

Recent measurements with coded-aperture imagers demonstrate material mass determination in a holdup setting to an accuracy within a few percent. This capability is of particular interest to the Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) project, which aims to dilute and dispose of surplus plutonium oxide. Gamma-ray imagers can be used to determine holdup without interrupting normal operations. In this work, we examine techniques for 3D source localization and mass determination using gamma-ray imagers. Coded-aperture imagers provide excellent source localization within the 2D image plane; however, multiple imagers operating in tandem are necessary to identify source location in 3D space. A Maximum Likelihood Expectation-Maximization (MLEM) method for fitting detector mappings is a powerful tool for accomplishing this task. MLEM allows 3D source localization to be simultaneously constrained using multiple gamma-ray imagers by constructing the basis for the MLEM fit using detector mappings from different detector locations stitched together. Each of these basis points represents a singular response from a source in 3D space and is generated using Monte Carlo simulations of sources placed individually at different locations throughout the imager’s field of view. Additionally, implementing knowledge of the physical equipment in the simulations of the glovebox used for the SPD project incorporates attenuation effects that are needed to calculate material holdup.

Laminack, Alex↗

Dilute and Dispose Cost Estimate for Equipment Installation per the LCCE

As directed in the Consolidation Appropriations Act, 2016, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) initiated the preconceptual design and development of a Lifecycle Cost Estimate for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Dilute and Dispose Program. Based on August 2016 Program Requirements Document and subsequent supplemental guidance, LANL prepared the Lifecycle Cost Estimate under key assumptions that meet the program’s requirements. For Dilute and Dispose, the program would disposition surplus Pu by diluting oxide produced at LANL with inhibitor materials, packaging the materials in containers, and shipping the containers to a deep geologic repository for permanent disposal. The base assumption is that LANL would disassemble pits, convert the Pu metal to oxide, and characterize and package the material for shipment to SRS, where it would be diluted prior to geologic disposal at the WIPP site in New Mexico. Another major assumption for the Dilute and Dispose option is that LANL would increase the current oxide production rate (or throughput) to 1500 kg/year, 5 times higher than the maximum annual production of ~300 Kgs executed by the ARIES Oxide Production Program at LANL. Analysis based on the ARIES program’s throughput model revealed that 15 pieces of equipment would need to be installed within PF-4 and certain facility improvements would need to be accomplished in order to meet the desired throughput levels. The additional equipment would be essentially identical to equipment already used within PF-4 for existing operations.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Post-closure Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations for Disposition of Criticality Control Overpacks at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a geological repository in southern New Mexico that provides for disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes from atomic energy defense activities. The Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) Report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addresses nuclear criticality safety based on the projected inventory characteristics for the initial compliance certification application of WIPP in 1996. As the inventory, waste forms, and disposal package designs change, revised or new analyses are necessary to demonstrate acceptability for these configurations within the WIPP safety basis and compliance with 10,000-year post-closure standards of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Saylor and Scaglione evaluated criticality control overpacks (CCOs) in 2017 based on conservative assumptions for post-closure repository structural conditions with resulting effects on containers and container spacing, The Saylor and Scaglione evaluation of CCOs addressed a single waste configuration that represents the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program’s dilute and dispose waste form and composition. This initial CCO study demonstrated that 50 grams of boron carbide (B 4 C) per CCO is sufficient to ensure post-closure criticality safety based on a well-mixed waste composition, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) subsequently determined that this amount of B 4 C does not require constraints on moisture or plastic present as moderator. The Saylor and Scaglione analysis conservatively assumes repository room closure that eliminates all space between fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu masses. The close-packed array was selected based on limited availability of repository salt creep modeling results at that time. In 2019, Brickner provided additional evaluations for pipe overpack containers (POCs), building on the conservative basis provided by Saylor and Scaglione. Brickner’s 2019 analysis made use of new geomechanical data for post-closure spacing that rely on advances in repository modeling as documented in the work by Reedlunn and Bean. This current CCO evaluation for generic waste materials expands on earlier work performed at ORNL and includes evaluation of CCOs across a much broader range of possible waste compositions and geometries. This evaluation is intended to provide input for the required feature, event and process (FEP) screening to determine if post-closure criticality must be included as an event in the 10,000-year regulatory evaluation. As such, the approach to modeling post-closure criticality presented in this report has been coordinated with the Sandia team responsible for FEP screening. The resulting analysis supports disposition of fissile materials in the CCO containing up to 380 FGE 239 Pu and expands conditions acceptable for disposal of fissile material in CCOs. This evaluation builds on the methodology of Saylor and Scaglione and Brickner, using the most recently available geomechanical data for CCO spacing under salt creep compaction scenarios provided by Reedlunn and Bean. The broad range of fissile material configurations analyzed in this report are intended to account for configurations that may occur during the post-closure disposal time period, and it also includes waste configurations that are not physically possible to support analysis of conditions that influence neutron fluence.

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Your Role as a Program Manager in Pit Production Mission Integration (PPMI-DO)

PPMI is responsible for integrating the planning, execution, and reporting for LANL’s Pit Manufacturing efforts, surplus plutonium disposition activities, the Material Recycle and Recovery (MR&R) program, and other programs of national significance. Our programmatic sponsors rely on PPMI to capitalize on the unique capabilities and expertise in PF-4 (the only Security Cat I/Haz Cat II Pu processing facility in the Nation) and other vital facilities across the laboratory to deliver on mission critical products in support of National Security.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Potential safety impacts associated with production of gaseous PuF 6 due to reactions between 3013-compliant PuO 2 with Novec TM 1230 at temperature

A part of the NNSA/SRNS Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) project is a planned expansion of an existing facility with capabilities to handle, process, package, and characterize large amounts of plutonium oxide materials for permanent disposition at WIPP. The facility design for this future processing capability will include glovebox operations, HEPA filters, and exhaust/ventilation systems. An NNSA review of the facility support systems included comments on the potential residual reactivity of previously-stabilized PuO 2 , and on the possibility of chemical interactions between stabilized PuO 2 and a new fire suppressant (Novec TM 1230), a replacement for chlorinated/brominated compounds such as HALON TM , to be employed in the event of a room/glovebox fire where PuO 2 will be processed.

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Development of Automated Material Handling System with Alternate Gripper Designs for the Purpose of Increased Performance & Worker Safety

Savannah River National Laboratory’s (SRNL) Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Program leads the development and transition of automated unit operations for the processing of Plutonium oxide. A mixing can is opened, filled with material, mixed, set inside of a die can, and finally punched into compressed material. Replication of the process is constructed in A-area, where the mixing can weighs 1.6 kg (3.5 lbs.) and the compressed material weighs 4 kg (8.8 lbs.). Due to the constant process of Plutonium disposition, the fatigue on workers and worker dose accumulates quickly over time. SPD aims to automate this process by using a robotic arm to replace the hands-on worker. Automation will: Reduce worker radiation dose; Increase process throughout; Reduce costs for the disposition of Plutonium oxide.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Overview of SRNS NNSA Projects in the Eyes of Criticality Safet

Overview of NNSA Projects (Criticality Safety) – Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility – Surplus Plutonium Disposition Project – Tritium Finishing Facility – Progress of Criticality Safety Analysis – Processes requiring CAAS

Stephens, Una D.↗

Adaptable Technology Integration for Enhanced Worker Safety and Efficiency within the SPD Gloveboxes [Slides]

Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Overview: (1) Application Background – Location: Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina – High backlog of plutonium material to process – Parallel lines of gloveboxes – Highly manual operations requiring full PPE and reader/worker steps; (2) Development Scope – Development of automated processes and opportunities to provide robust engineering design alternatives for baseline design that would meet process improvement goals.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Implementation of a System of Gamma Imagers for Measuring Plutonium Holdup

The Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) project is an effort to dilute and dispose of many tonsof weapons grade plutonium. This work will take place in a shielded glovebox to protect workers fromradiological dose. Accurate measurements of the holdup, or material left behind, in the gloveboxes is im-portant for Nuclear Material Control and Accountancy, worker dose minimization, criticality safety, andprocess monitoring. Shielding around the gloveboxes presents an obstacle for the traditional GeneralizedGamma Holdup (GGH) method. The uncertainties associated with that method, at around 28%, arealso detrimental since the amount of holdup must be kept below an established limit with a high level ofconfidence.Passive gamma-ray imaging provides a more complete depiction of the distribution of radioactivematerials. Recent refinement of the method has demonstrated that quantitative information can beextracted from the images with a well-characterized system. A permanently installed system of gamma-ray imagers is currently being developed to measure plutonium holdup in the SPD gloveboxes. Thispaper will report on progress with the development of this system.This application requires that the features of current commercially available instruments from H3Dand PHDS, optimized for measurement performance in a mobile application, be translated into theconstraints of the operational environment with fixed installations. The interaction between facilityconstraints and measurement capabilities will be addressed.A series of measurements with plutonium sources in a mocked-up glovebox geometry with imagersmounted above the ceiling of the glovebox have been taken. Imager performance with respect to angularresolution, minimum measurement time for quantification, and signal-to-noise ratio with a multitudeof sources will be evaluated for those measurements. A series of prototypes of user interfaces will bepresented for display of the data to its various consumers for the purposes of Nuclear Material Controland Accountancy, worker dose minimization, criticality safety, and process monitoring.

Schmitt, Kyle↗