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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Post-closure Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations for Disposition of Criticality Control Overpacks at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a geological repository in southern New Mexico that provides for disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes from atomic energy defense activities. The Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) Report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addresses nuclear criticality safety based on the projected inventory characteristics for the initial compliance certification application of WIPP in 1996. As the inventory, waste forms, and disposal package designs change, revised or new analyses are necessary to demonstrate acceptability for these configurations within the WIPP safety basis and compliance with 10,000-year post-closure standards of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Saylor and Scaglione evaluated criticality control overpacks (CCOs) in 2017 based on conservative assumptions for post-closure repository structural conditions with resulting effects on containers and container spacing, The Saylor and Scaglione evaluation of CCOs addressed a single waste configuration that represents the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program’s dilute and dispose waste form and composition. This initial CCO study demonstrated that 50 grams of boron carbide (B 4 C) per CCO is sufficient to ensure post-closure criticality safety based on a well-mixed waste composition, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) subsequently determined that this amount of B 4 C does not require constraints on moisture or plastic present as moderator. The Saylor and Scaglione analysis conservatively assumes repository room closure that eliminates all space between fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu masses. The close-packed array was selected based on limited availability of repository salt creep modeling results at that time. In 2019, Brickner provided additional evaluations for pipe overpack containers (POCs), building on the conservative basis provided by Saylor and Scaglione. Brickner’s 2019 analysis made use of new geomechanical data for post-closure spacing that rely on advances in repository modeling as documented in the work by Reedlunn and Bean. This current CCO evaluation for generic waste materials expands on earlier work performed at ORNL and includes evaluation of CCOs across a much broader range of possible waste compositions and geometries. This evaluation is intended to provide input for the required feature, event and process (FEP) screening to determine if post-closure criticality must be included as an event in the 10,000-year regulatory evaluation. As such, the approach to modeling post-closure criticality presented in this report has been coordinated with the Sandia team responsible for FEP screening. The resulting analysis supports disposition of fissile materials in the CCO containing up to 380 FGE 239 Pu and expands conditions acceptable for disposal of fissile material in CCOs. This evaluation builds on the methodology of Saylor and Scaglione and Brickner, using the most recently available geomechanical data for CCO spacing under salt creep compaction scenarios provided by Reedlunn and Bean. The broad range of fissile material configurations analyzed in this report are intended to account for configurations that may occur during the post-closure disposal time period, and it also includes waste configurations that are not physically possible to support analysis of conditions that influence neutron fluence.

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DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

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DOE OSTI2019

Initial Simulations of Empty Room Collapse and Reconsolidation at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a geologic repository for defense-related nuclear waste. If left undisturbed, the virtually impermeable rock salt surrounding the repository will isolate the nuclear waste from the biosphere. If humans accidentally intrude into the repository in the future, then the likelihood of a radionuclide release to the biosphere will depend significantly on the porosity and permeability of the repository itself. Room ceilings and walls at the WIPP tend to collapse over time, causing rubble piles to form on floors of empty rooms. The surrounding rock formation will gradually compact these rubble piles until they eventually become solid salt, but the length of time for a rubble pile to reach a certain porosity and permeability is unknown. This report details the first efforts to build models to predict the porosity and permeability evolution of an empty room as it closes. Conventional geomechanical numerical methods would struggle to model empty room collapse and rubble pile consolidation, so three different meshless methods, the Immersed Isogeometric Analysis Meshfree, Reproducing Kernel Particle Method (RKPM), and the Conformal Reproducing Kernel method, were assessed. First, the meshless methods and the finite element method each simulated gradual room closure, without ceiling or wall collapse. All three methods produced equivalent room closure predictions with comparable computational speed. Second, the Immersed Isogeometric Analysis Meshfree method and RKPM simulated two-dimensional empty room collapse and rubble pile consolidation. Both methods successfully simulated large viscoplastic deformations, fracture, and rubble pile rearrangement to produce qualitatively realistic results. In addition to geomechanical simulations, the flow channels in damaged salt and crushed salt were measured using micro-computed tomography, and input into a computational fluid dynamics simulation to predict the salt's permeability. Although room for improvement exists, the current simulation approaches appear promising.

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DOE OSTI2022

White Paper on Lithium-Ion Battery Safety for use in Safety Planning at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is an underground facility designed to safely dispose of radioactive waste. The WIPP uses many heavy vehicles to transport materials and equipment underground. Most of these vehicles are powered by traditional internal combustion engines (ICE) with diesel fuel. Recently, electric vehicles (EVs) powered with batteries have been used at the WIPP. EVs have very low operational and maintenance costs, not considering battery replacements, and they have zero emissions during operation. This absence of emissions makes them ideal for underground facilities with limited ventilation. Even if a facility has robust ventilation normally, ventilation systems can break down leading to restrictions in ICE powered operations. Figure 1 shows a rendering of the WIPP.

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DOE OSTI2020

Development of PFLOTRAN Transport Capability for Use in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Performance Assessment - 20545

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) performance assessment (PA) calculations estimate the probability of radionuclide release from the repository to the land surface and across the land withdrawal boundary for a regulatory period of 10,000 years after facility closure. Simulations of flow and transport in the repository and the surrounding Salado Formation are foundational to the PA. Because proposed additional waste emplacement panels would result in an asymmetric repository layout, the US Department of Energy (DOE) is preparing to transition to use of a three-dimensional (3-D) model domain for simulation of flow and transport instead of the two-dimensional (2-D) flared grid domain currently used. DOE has charged Sandia National Laboratories with developing the capability necessary to simulate processes affecting flow and transport in the WIPP in PFLOTRAN, an open-source massively parallel multi-phase flow and reactive transport code. The new flow and transport capabilities developed in PFLOTRAN incorporate WIPP-specific process models and will replace the 2-D simulators (BRAGFLO and NUTS) that are currently utilized for Salado flow and transport calculations in WIPP PA. The focus of this paper is on the development of a new Nuclear Waste Transport (NWT) mode in PFLOTRAN that has all of the capabilities necessary for Salado transport simulations, including the ability to handle complete dry-out (100% gas saturation) of arbitrary cells in the model domain, radionuclide mass conservation at step changes in porosity associated with borehole intrusion, and the ability to calculate fluxes on a flared grid. The new PFLOTRAN transport capability and a suite of verification tests were designed around a list of functional requirements for WIPP PA calculations. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2023

Improved Compaction Experiments and Modeling of Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Standard, Non-degraded, Waste Containers

A credible simulation of disposal room porosity at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) requires a tenable compaction model for the 55-gallon waste containers within the room. A review of the legacy waste material model, however, revealed several out-of-date and untested assumptions that could affect the model’s compaction behavior. For example, the legacy model predicted non-physical tensile out-of-plane stresses under plane strain compression. (Plane strain compression is similar to waste compaction in the middle of a long drift.) Consequently, a suite of new compaction experiments were performed on containers filled with surrogate, non-degraded, waste. The new experiments involved uniaxial, triaxial, and hydrostatic compaction tests on quarter-scale and full-scale containers. Special effort was made to measure the volume strain during uniaxial and triaxial tests, so that the lateral strain could be inferred from the axial and volume strain. These experimental measurements were then used to calibrate a pressure dependent, viscoplastic, constitutive model for the homogenized compaction behavior of the waste containers. This new waste material model’s predictions agreed far better with the experimental measurements than the legacy model’s predictions, especially under triaxial and hydrostatic conditions. Under plane strain compression, the new model predicted reasonable compressive out-of-plane stresses, instead of tensile stresses. Moreover, the new model’s plane strain behavior was substantially weaker for the same strain, yet substantially stronger for the same porosity, than the legacy model’s behavior. Although room for improvement exists, the new model appears ready for prudent engineering use.

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DOE OSTI2023

Improved Modeling of Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Disposal Room Porosity

Disposal rooms at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) contain waste and gas, and their porosity evolves over time. This report presents several improvements to the disposal room porosity model and presents new porosity predictions for use in future WIPP Performance Assessment activities. The improvements pertain to three sub-models: the geomechanical model, the waste compaction model, and the gas pressurization model. The impacts of each major improvement were quantified and the new porosity predictions were shown to be both mesh and domain size converged. Also, sensitivity studies on the disposal room horizon, clay seam friction coefficients, and homogenized waste representation were performed to support assumptions in the disposal room porosity model. To compare the legacy and new porosity predictions, the simulation results were plotted as a response surface, where gas pressure and time are inputs and porosity is the output. The new porosity response surface is insensitive to pressures beneath lithostatic pressure and highly sensitive to pressures above lithostatic pressure. The legacy porosity response surface, on the other hand, has moderate porosity gradients over all pressures. The new porosity response surface has a stronger scientific foundation than the legacy surface and may now be used for Compliance Decision Analyses.

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DOE OSTI2021

Biomass and salt-dependent effects of Bacillus spores on radionuclide migration from the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Spores of a Bacillus sp., isolated from radioactive waste, were tested for their ability to influence the fate and transport of neodymium (Nd3+) under high salt conditions expected at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) nuclear waste repository. Spores were suspended in neodymium-spiked saline solutions up to 4 M NaCl, and concentrations of Nd and the complexing agent dipicolinic acid (DPA), a component of spores, were monitored along with optical densities and spore numbers. Overall, results support neodymium bioassociation that is dependent upon biomass, with more apparent adsorption occurring at higher spore concentrations. However, probable spore lysis in 2 and 4 M NaCl solutions and possible germination at 0.15 M NaCl appear to drive the release of DPA and subsequent return of Nd to solution. The implications of this work for the WIPP will depend on actual biomass levels and the ionic strength of the repository brines.

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DOE OSTI2025

An Assessment of the Error Due to Computing Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Porosity Using the Porosity Response Surface Approach

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Performance Assessment (WIPP PA) must predict the likelihood that radionuclides will escape into the biosphere via mechanisms that depend on geohydraulic flow. Ideally, one would predict the geohydraulic flow using coupled geohydraulic and geomechanical simulations, but such coupled simulations are not computationally tractable. Instead, Sandia has historically used a look-up table of porosities for a given fluid pressure and time, called the porosity response surface, but this approach can introduce porosity errors because it largely ignores the porosity’s dependence on the past fluid pressure history. This report discusses efforts to quantify these porosity errors for both the legacy and new porosity response surfaces. Six hundred different fluid pressure histories were fed through the legacy/new geomechanical model and the legacy/new porosity response surface to generate six hundred porosity error histories. The error associated with the legacy porosity surface was substantial, while the error associated with the new porosity surface was typically small, except when fluid pressures exceeded the lithostatic pressure at the repository. In response to the errors at high pressures, a preliminary study of the WIPP PA’s sensitivity to these porosity errors was conducted. The study found that reducing the porosity errors at high pressures negligibly affected predictions of radionuclide releases. Finally, an initial machine-learned model for porosity was developed. This ML model significantly reduced the porosity error at high pressures, but sizable errors remained, so more development is necessary before coupling an ML model to the geohydraulic model.

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DOE OSTI2026

Improbability of Post-Closure Criticality in Compacted Criticality Control Overpacks after Room Closure at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

As part of its periodic re-certification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), an operating repository in bedded salt for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from atomic energy defense activities, the United States Environmental Protection Agency expects a re-evaluation of features, events, and processes, such as post-closure nuclear criticality. Although salt creep beneficially encapsulates the TRU waste in the closed WIPP repository, the spacing between an array of waste packages is disrupted as the salt creep closes disposal rooms and containers lose structural integrity. For most TRU waste, the possibility of post-closure criticality is exceedingly small either because the salt neutronically isolates TRU waste canisters or because closure of a disposal room from salt creep does not sufficiently compact the low mass of fissile material. The criticality evaluation was updated, however, because of the introduction of criticality control overpack (CCO) containers, which may dispose up to 380 fissile gram equivalent plutonium-239 in each container. The criticality potential is evaluated through high-fidelity geomechanical modeling of a disposal room filled with CCO containers during two representative conditions: (1) large salt block fall, and (2) gradual disposal room closure from salt creep. Geomechanical models of roof fall demonstrate three tiers of CCO containers are not greatly disrupted. Geomechanical models of gradual room closure from salt creep (without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation to permit maximum room closure) were used to predict irregular arrays of closely packed CCOs after 1000 years, when room closure has asymptotically approached maximum compaction. Models of spheres or cylinders with 380 fissile gram equivalent of plutonium (as oxide) at the predicted irregular compacted spacing demonstrate that an array of CCO containers is not critical when surrounded by salt and magnesium oxide, provided the mass of hydrogenous material shipped in CCO containers (usually plastics) is controlled or boron carbide (a neutron poison) is mixed with the fissile contents.

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DOE OSTI2026

Improbability of Post-Closure Criticality in Array of Transuranic Waste Containers after Compaction by Salt Creep at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Based on the rationale presented, post-closure nuclear criticality is improbable when room closure compacts containers disposing transuranic (TRU) waste emplaced at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), an operating repository in bedded salt in southeastern New Mexico. As described in the original WIPP certification, a qualitative estimate of the probability of post-closure criticality in TRU waste produced from atomic energy defense activities has been low either because remote-handled TRU waste canisters are neutronically isolated by the bedded salt or because the low fissile mass in an array of contact-handled TRU waste drums cannot be compacted sufficiently by room closure from salt creep. These situations are still valid for the majority of TRU waste that is disposed at WIPP without any disposal constraints, as updated herein. This report also qualitatively evaluates the probability of criticality after disposal of TRU waste in pipe overpack containers (POC) where every POC in a shipment may have the maximum 200 fissile gram equivalent of 239Pu content. The probability of criticality for a disposal room filled with POCs is estimated during four representative phases of repository evolution: (1) a large salt block falls onto POCs in the first 20 years, (2) salt creep closes a disposal room in the first 1000 years without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation, which permits maximum compaction, (3) some brine seepage occurs into the closed room, which initiates consumption of the fiberboard (cellulose) impact absorber in the POC in the second 1000 years, and (4) full brine inundation of a room and consumption of all fiberboard thereafter. Salt-block fall in the first phase does not greatly disrupt three tiers of POCs. The compacted spacing of POCs in the later three repository conditions is calculated through high-fidelity, geomechanical modeling. Criticality evaluation of compacted 200-g 239 Pu spheres at the compacted spacing shows that neither 12-inch nor 6-inch POCs are critical after the first 1000 years, the second 1000 years, or thereafter as the sea of reflector material changes to represent the three repository conditions. Specifically, fiberboard and iron isolates 239 Pu while dry, and brine reduces the reactivity when a room is partially and fully inundated. Because POC behavior bounds behavior of other standard TRU waste containers, post-closure criticality caused by room closure compacting containers is omitted in the performance assessments for the 2019 and 2026 WIPP compliance re-certification applications to the US Environmental Protection Agency.

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DOE OSTI2022

Improbability of Nuclear Criticality in Compacted Criticality Control Overpacks after Room Closure by Salt Creep at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Based on the rationale presented, nuclear criticality is improbable after salt creep causes compaction of criticality control overpacks (CCOs) disposed at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, an operating repository in bedded salt for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from atomic energy defense activities. For most TRU waste, the possibility of post-closure criticality is exceedingly small either because the salt neutronically isolates TRU waste canisters or because closure of a disposal room from salt creep does not sufficiently compact the low mass of fissile material. The criticality potential has been updated here because of the introduction of CCOs, which may dispose up to 380 fissile gram equivalent plutonium-239 in each container. The criticality potential is evaluated through high-fidelity geomechanical modeling of a disposal room filled with CCOs during two representative conditions: (1) large salt block fall, and (2) gradual salt compaction (without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation to permit maximum room closure). Geomechanical models of rock fall demonstrate three tiers of CCOs are not greatly disrupted. Geomechanical models of gradual room closure from salt creep predict irregular arrays of closely packed CCOs after 1000 years, when room closure has asymptotically approached maximum compaction. Criticality models of spheres and cylinders of 380 fissile gram equivalent of plutonium (as oxide) at the predicted irregular spacing demonstrate that an array of CCOs is not critical when surrounded by salt and magnesium oxide, provided the amount of hydrogenous material shipped in the CCO (usually water and plastics) is controlled or boron carbide (a neutron poison) is mixed with the fissile contents.

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DOE OSTI2023

Simulations of Criticality Control Overpack Container Compaction at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Criticality Control Overpack (CCO) containers are being considered for the disposal of defense-related nuclear waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). At WIPP, these containers would be placed in underground disposal rooms, which will naturally close and compact the containers closer to one another over several centuries. This report details simulations to predict the final container configuration as an input to nuclear criticality assessments. Each container was discretely modeled, including the plywood and stainless steel pipe inside the 55-gallon drum, in order to capture its complex mechanical behavior. Although these high-fidelity simulations were computationally intensive, several different material models were considered in an attempt to reasonably bound the horizontal and vertical compaction percentages. When exceptionally strong materials were used for the containers, the horizontal and vertical closure respectively stabilized at 43:9 % and 93:7 %. At the other extreme, when the containers completely degraded and the clay seams between the salt layers were glued, the horizontal and vertical closure reached respective final values of 48:6 % and 100 %.

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DOE OSTI2020

Update to Transportation Analysis for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The goal of this transportation analysis (TA) is to update the 2008 TA in order to evaluate the impacts associated with the transportation of transuranic (TRU) waste from waste generator sites to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility and from waste generator sites to the Idaho National Laboratory (INL).

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DOE OSTI2023

Geochemical Modeling Using OLI Systems Mixed Solvent Electrolyte Model in Support of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Aqueous electrolyte thermodynamic models were developed for synthetic Salado (GWB) and Castile (ERDA-6) brines to inform the experimental design and to facilitate laboratory data interpretation in geochemical studies supporting disposal in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The thermodynamic models, which include the relevant vapor-liquid-solid equilibria for the oxidation-reduction conditions of interest, enable computation of system parameters such as activity-based pH, E h [vs. standard hydrogen electrode (SHE)], ionic strength, total dissolved solids, and solution density; the chemical speciation of all phases; saturation tendencies for thermodynamically feasible solids; and changes in brine chemistry because of the addition of H 2 (g), argon, MgO, Fe(0), and other waste form components. The impacts of oxidation-reduction potential (ORP) and pH on aqueous speciation and dominant solid phases were also assessed with the aid of real-solution Pourbaix diagrams for key elements of interest. In addition to the OLI modeling results, limited measurement data for pH and ORP standards are provided, analyzed, and discussed.

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DOE OSTI2021

Reconstruction of the Room D, B, G, and Q Closure Histories at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Experimental measurements of room closure in salt repositories are valuable for understanding the evolution of the underground and for validating geomechanical models. Room closure was measured during a number of experiments at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) during the 1980's and 1990's. Most rooms were excavated using a multi-pass mining sequence, where each pass necessarily destroyed some of the mining sequence closure measurement points. These destroyed points were promptly reinstalled to capture the closure after the mining pass. After the room was complete, the mining sequence closure measurement stations were supplemented with remotely read closure measurement stations. Although many aspects of these experiments were thoroughly documented, the digital copies of the closure data were inadvertently destroyed, the non-trivial process of zeroing and shifting the raw closure measurements after each mining pass was not precisely described, the various closure measurements within a given room were not directly compared on the same plot, and the measurements were collected for several years longer than previously reported. Consequently, the hand-written mining sequence closure measurements for Rooms D, B, G, and Q were located in the WIPP archives, digitized, and reanalyzed for this report. The process of reconstructing the mining sequence closure histories was documented in detail and the raw data can be found in the appendices. Within the mid-section of a given room, the reconstructed closure histories were largely consistent with other mining sequence and remotely read closure histories, which builds confidence in the experiments and suggests that plane strain is an appropriate modeling assumption. The reconstructed closure histories were also reasonably consistent with previously published results, except in one notable case: the reconstructed Room Q closure histories 30 days after excavation were about 45 % less than the corresponding closures reported in Munson's 1997 capstone paper.

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