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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records

Improving Attack Graph Visualization through Data Reduction and Attack Grouping

Various tools exist to analyze enterprise network systems and to produce attack graphs detailing how attackers might penetrate into the system. These attack graphs, however, are often complex and difficult to comprehend fully, and a human user may find it problematic to reach appropriate configuration decisions. This paper presents methodologies that can 1) automatically identify portions of an attack graph that do not help a user to understand the core security problems and so can be trimmed, and 2) automatically group similar attack steps as virtual nodes in a model of the network topology, to immediately increase the understandability of the data. We believe both methods are important steps toward improving visualization of attack graphs to make them more useful in configuration management for large enterprise networks. We implemented our methods using one of the existing attack-graph toolkits. Initial experimentation shows that the proposed approaches can 1) significantly reduce the complexity of attack graphs by trimming a large portion of the graph that is not needed for a user to understand the security problem, and 2) significantly increase the accessibility and understandability of the data presented in the attack graph by clearly showing, within a generated visualization of the network topology, the number and type of potential attacks to which each host is exposed.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Identifying Vulnerabilities and Hardening Attack Graphs for Networked Systems

We investigate efficient security control methods for protecting against vulnerabilities in networked systems. A large number of interdependent vulnerabilities typically exist in the computing nodes of a cyber-system; as vulnerabilities get exploited, starting from low level ones, they open up the doors to more critical vulnerabilities. These cannot be understood just by a topological analysis of the network, and we use the attack graph abstraction of Dewri et al. to study these problems. In contrast to earlier approaches based on heuristics and evolutionary algorithms, we study rigorous methods for quantifying the inherent vulnerability and hardening cost for the system. We develop algorithms with provable approximation guarantees, and evaluate them for real and synthetic attack graphs.

attack graphs↗

Impact-Driven Sampling Strategies for Hybrid Attack Graphs

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) have a large input space, with discrete and continuous elements across multiple layers. Hybrid Attack Graph (HAG) provide a flexible and efficient approach to generate attack sequences for a CPS. Analysis and testing of large-scale HAGs are prohibitively costly. We propose a dimension reduction via property-preserving multi-layer graph sampling algorithms. Existing property-preserving graph sampling approaches generate a representative subgraph of an original large-sized graph while preserving the key properties, such as node and edge distribution, clustering coefficients, and betweenness. On the other hand, we propose impact-driven sampling strategies to transform the input data to a lower-dimensional representation while retaining key properties of the data.

Subasi, Omer↗

Hybrid Attack Graph Generation with Graph Convolutional Deep-Q Learning

Critical infrastructures such as power grids have become increasingly complex, connected, and vulnerable to adverse scenarios, including cyber and physical attacks and faults. Effective risk mitigation for such cyber-physical energy systems (CPES), requires preemptive knowledge of likely adversarial attack scenarios. Hybrid Attack Graph (HAG) is a structured way to represent an adversarial scenario as an attack sequence using a threat model. However, the scarcity of documented attack sequences hinders analysts and CPES planners’ ability to identify credible attack scenarios for a given CPES. We propose a data-driven Graph Convolutional Deep-Q Network (GCDQ) to address this data challenge through generating HAGs. By leveraging limited real-world observations from the MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base, our GCDQ model synthesizes realistic graphs with the targeted attribute of minimum detectability via reinforcement learning. This generative model is the first step in creating a tool to substantially boost the attack sequence dataset and enhance the performance of CPS defense-related tasks by providing insights into likely attack sequences with given attributes.

deep learning, artificial intelligence↗

Efficient Hybrid Attack Graph Generation for Cyber-Physical System Resilience Experimentation (Final Project Report)

HAGEN project has developed theory, algorithms, and capabilities to assist cyber physical system modelers and operators to perform system and device-level vulnerability assessment, risk assessment, impact assessment, and mitigation planning. The project generates hybrid attack graphs for Cyber-Physical System (CPS) resilience experimentation at desired scale and speed. The project will produce composite attack datasets, algorithms, and demonstrable prototypical tools, and a library of high-impact attack sequences for a given CPS of interest. This report provided overall summary of research and development performed between FY22-24.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Inferring adversarial behaviour in cyber‐physical power systems using a Bayesian attack graph approach

Abstract Highly connected smart power systems are subject to increasing vulnerabilities and adversarial threats. Defenders need to proactively identify and defend new high‐risk access paths of cyber intruders that target grid resilience. However, cyber‐physical risk analysis and defense in power systems often requires making assumptions on adversary behaviour, and these assumptions can be wrong. Thus, this work examines the problem of inferring adversary behaviour in power systems to improve risk‐based defense and detection. To achieve this, a Bayesian approach for inference of the Cyber‐Adversarial Power System (Bayes‐CAPS) is proposed that uses Bayesian networks (BNs) to define and solve the inference problem of adversarial movement in the grid infrastructure towards targets of physical impact. Specifically, BNs are used to compute conditional probabilities to queries, such as the probability of observing an event given a set of alerts. Bayes‐CAPS builds initial Bayesian attack graphs for realistic power system cyber‐physical models. These models are adaptable using collected data from the system under study. Then, Bayes‐CAPS computes the posterior probabilities of the occurrence of a security breach event in power systems. Experiments are conducted that evaluate algorithms based on time complexity, accuracy and impact of evidence for different scales and densities of network. The performance is evaluated and compared for five realistic cyber‐physical power system models of increasing size and complexities ranging from 8 to 300 substations based on computation and accuracy impacts.

Sahu, Abhijeet↗

GPLADD: Quantifying Trust in Government and Commercial Systems A Game-Theoretic Approach

Trust in a microelectronics-based system can be characterized as the level of confidence that a system is free of subversive alterations made during system development, or that the development process of a system has not been manipulated by a malicious adversary. Trust in systems has become an increasing concern over the past decade. This report introduces a novel game-theoretic framework, called GPLADD (Graph-based Probabilistic Learning Attacker and Dynamic Defender), for analyzing and quantifying system trustworthiness at the end of the development process, through the analysis of risk of development-time system manipulation. GPLADD represents attacks and attacker-defender contests over time. Here, time is an explicit constraint and allows incorporating the informational asymmetries between the attacker and defender into analysis. GPLADD includes an explicit representation of attack steps via multi-step attack graphs, attacker and defender strategies, and player actions at different times. GPLADD allows quantifying the attack success probability over time and the attacker and defender costs based on their capabilities and strategies. This ability to quantify different attacks provides an input for evaluation of trust in the development process. We demonstrate GPLADD on an example attack and its variants. We develop a method for representing success probability for arbitrary attacks and derive an explicit analytic characterization of success probability for a specific attack. We present a numeric Monte Carlo study of a small set of attacks, quantify attack success probabilities, attacker and defender costs, and illustrate the options the defender has for limiting the attack success and improving trust in the development process.

37 attack↗

Cyber Security Analysis for Nuclear Reactor Control Systems (Final Technical Report)

This project investigated the cyber-security impacts of moving from an all analog, point-to-point, instrumentation and control (I&C) system to a digital I&C system based on Modbus and a shared communication medium. A formalism called a hybrid attack graph was expanded to support the nuclear research reactor system. The hybrid attack graph allows one to check a system for vulnerabilities, in this case cyber-security vulnerabilities, and to document the attack vectors (scenarios) causing those vulnerabilities. In parallel, a simulation of the system was developed to model both the physical reactor parameters and operations, as well as the network interconnects and communications. This simulation platform was modeled on the nuclear research reactor located at Washington State University. The simulation platform provided a sandbox to evaluate and quantify the impact of identified and proposed vulnerabilities in the system and to determine the effectiveness of countermeasures at stopping these attacks. The simulation and hybrid attack graph tools were integrated to provide a streamlined process of generating attack scenarios, playing those scenarios out in the simulation, and then analyzing the results to correlate system state to states in the hybrid attack graph. This process was used to (1) quantify the impact of attack scenarios and (2) to determine if the system moved through the hybrid attack graph as anticipated. The hybrid attack graph tool was extended and customized to produce a tool to automatically identify critical assets (CAs) and critical digital assets (CDAs) as defined by NRC Regulatory Guide 5.71. This tool was verified using the nuclear research reactor at Washington State University. Finally, a series of educational modules covering the findings of the different aspects of this research have been created.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Risk-Averse Bi-Level Stochastic Network Interdiction Model for Cyber-Security Risk Management

Security of cyber networks is crucial; recent severe cyber-attacks have had a devastating effect on many large organizations. The attack graph, which maps the potential attack paths of a cyber network, is a popular tool for analyzing cyber system vulnerability. In this study, we propose a bi-level stochastic network interdiction model on an attack graph to enable a risk-averse, resource constrained cyber network defender to optimally deploy security countermeasures that protect against attackers with an uncertain budget. This risk- averse conditional-value-at-risk (CVaR) model minimizes a weighted sum of the expected maximum loss over all scenarios and the expected maximum loss from the most damaging attack scenarios. We develop a customized constraint and column generation algorithm to solve our model as well as several acceleration techniques to improve the computational efficiency. Numerical experiments demonstrate that the acceleration techniques enable the solution of relatively large problems within a reasonable amount of time: applying all the acceleration techniques also reduces the average computation time of the basic algorithm by 71% for 100-node graphs. Using metrics called mean-risk value of stochastic solution and value of risk-aversion, computational results suggest that our stochastic risk-averse model significantly outperforms deterministic and risk-neutral models when 1) the distribution of attacker budget is heavy-right-tailed and 2) the defender is highly risk-averse.

Bhuiyan, Tanveer H.↗

Cyber Attack Sequences Generation for Electric Power Grid

Security assessment of cyber-physical energy systems (CPESs) such as the electric power grid is a critical operation to maintain availability, reliability, and quality of service in the presence of persistent threats from malicious cyber actors. Existing security assessment approaches such as penetration testing and red teaming rely on subject matter expert experience and forensic cyber analysis of historical events to perform realistic, threat-informed assessments of CPES defense. CPESs have a large attack surface because of the heterogeneity and complexity of underlying topology, devices, measurements, and vulnerabilities. The aforementioned approaches lead to partial coverage of the attack surface with a large set of unknown but possible exploits. There is a need to automate the CPES attack surface discovery and contextualize it for relevant, highly probable, real-world attack scenarios. We propose a methodology and framework to facilitate the discovery of the CPES attack surface. We present a multilayer attack graph with ranked attack sequences to describe CPES failure scenarios. We present a work-in-progress framework that lists key components to automate the attack modeling and sequence generation. We demonstrate the published National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization Resource CPES failure scenario to highlight the trustworthiness of generated attack sequences.

Dutta, Ashutosh↗

Risk-informed autonomous adaptive cyber controllers

Technology related to risk-informed autonomous adaptive cyber controllers is disclosed. In one example of the disclosed technology, a method includes generating probabilities of a cyber-attack occurring along an attack surface of a network. The probabilities can be generated using sensor and operational data of a network as inputs to an attack graph. The risk scores can be determined using a plurality of fault trees and the generated probabilities from the attack graph. The respective risk scores can correspond to respective nodes of an event tree. The event tree and the determined risk scores can be used to determine risk estimates for a plurality of configurations of the network. The risk estimates for the plurality of configurations of the network can be used to reconfigure the network to reduce a risk from the cyber-attack.

Veeramany, Arun↗

A Survey on Privacy in Graph Neural Networks: Attacks, Preservation, and Applications

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have gained significant attention owing to their ability to handle graph-structured data and the improvement in practical applications. However, many of these models prioritize high utility performance, such as accuracy, with a lack of privacy consideration, which is a major concern in modern society where privacy attacks are rampant. To address this issue, researchers have started to develop privacy-preserving GNNs. Despite this progress, there is a lack of a comprehensive overview of the attacks and the techniques for preserving privacy in the graph domain. In this survey, we aim to address this gap by summarizing the attacks on graph data according to the targeted information, categorizing the privacy preservation techniques in GNNs, and reviewing the datasets and applications that could be used for analyzing/solving privacy issues in GNNs. We also outline potential directions for future research in order to build better privacy-preserving GNNs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A Novel Centrality Measure for Network-wide Cyber Vulnerability Assessment

In this work we propose a novel formulation that models the attack and compromise on a cyber network as a combination of two parts - direct compromise of a host and the compromise occurring through the spread of the attack on the network from a compromised host. The model parameters for the nodes are a concise representation of the host profiles that can include the risky behaviors of the associated human users while the model parameters for the edges are based on the existence of vulnerabilities between each pair of connected hosts. The edge models relate to the summary representations of the corresponding attack-graphs. This results in a formulation based on Random Walk with Restart (RWR) and the resulting centrality metric can be solved for in an efficient manner through the use of sparse linear solvers. Thus the formulation goes beyond mere topological considerations in centrality computations by summarizing the host profiles and the attack graphs into the model parameters. The computational efficiency of the method also allows us to also quantify the uncertainty in the centrality measure through Monte Carlo analysis.

Centrality↗

Temporal Cyber Attack Detection.

Rigorous characterization of the performance and generalization ability of cyber defense systems is extremely difficult, making it hard to gauge uncertainty, and thus, confidence. This difficulty largely stems from a lack of labeled attack data that fully explores the potential adversarial space. Currently, performance of cyber defense systems is typically evaluated in a qualitative manner by manually inspecting the results of the system on live data and adjusting as needed. Additionally, machine learning has shown promise in deriving models that automatically learn indicators of compromise that are more robust than analyst-derived detectors. However, to generate these models, most algorithms require large amounts of labeled data (i.e., examples of attacks). Algorithms that do not require annotated data to derive models are similarly at a disadvantage, because labeled data is still necessary when evaluating performance. In this work, we explore the use of temporal generative models to learn cyber attack graph representations and automatically generate data for experimentation and evaluation. Training and evaluating cyber systems and machine learning models requires significant, annotated data, which is typically collected and labeled by hand for one-off experiments. Automatically generating such data helps derive/evaluate detection models and ensures reproducibility of results. Experimentally, we demonstrate the efficacy of generative sequence analysis techniques on learning the structure of attack graphs, based on a realistic example. These derived models can then be used to generate more data. Additionally, we provide a roadmap for future research efforts in this area.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Attack detection and strategy optimization in game-theoretic trust models

Trust in a microelectronics-based systems can be characterized as the level of confidence that the system is free of subversive alterations inserted by a malicious adversary during system development. Outkin et al. recently developed GPLADD, a game-theoretic framework that enables trust analysis through a set of mathematical models that represent multi-step attack graphs and contention between system attackers and defenders. This paper extends GPLADD to include detection of attacks on development processes and defender decision processes that occur in response to detection events. The paper provides mathematical details for implementing attack detection and demonstrates the models on an example system. The authors further demonstrate how optimal defender strategies vary when solution concepts and objective functions are modified.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗