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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Factors Impacting Nuclear Energy Share in U.S. Energy Markets

The purpose of this report is to collate information and findings from recent studies conducted by national and international bodies/institutes to identify approaches for maintaining/enhancing the role of nuclear energy in the current and future energy mix of the United States. This report shows how nuclear generation grew quickly to provide 20% of U.S. electricity, sustaining that level for three decades without the benefit of new construction, but is now projected to decline going forward. Nuclear construction costs in the U.S. spiraled out of control, ending construction for two decades and the recent resumption of construction has continued the pattern of schedule delays and cost overruns. However, nuclear operations exhibited strong learning, achieving and sustaining the highest capacity factor of any electricity generation technology and license extensions and uprates have sustained nuclear market share. The share of nuclear energy in the U.S. electricity market is projected to decline by ~1/3rd over the next 30 years The report provides an overview of how the markets work in theory and in practice. It indicates how market deregulation and clean energy policies have created conditions where nuclear plants are being retired for economic rather than technical reasons. The report also shows how many of the markets do not in practice have free competition but instead have outcomes that are being determined more and more by policy instead of market forces. While electricity costs from existing nuclear plants are low, electricity from new builds is projected to be too expensive to be competitive head-to-head with natural gas, even for nth-of-a-kind costs. Wind and solar energy have enjoyed an extended period of sustained subsidy. This protected environment has resulted in a sustained reduction in plant level costs to the point that some of these Variable Renewable Energy (VRE) technologies are becoming competitive even if their direct subsidies are removed. But plant level costs underestimate total VRE costs which include a number of system-level externalities. The incremental system value of additional VRE capacity was shown to decline as market share increases, with solar value declining more quickly than wind. The report closes with examination of a possible future for nuclear generation as part of deep decarbonization of the electricity sector. This approach avoids direct competition with natural gas. The two options for achieving 100% decarbonization are to use only renewables or to use all zero emissions technologies, and the report shows the second approach is much less expensive than the first.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
NASA NTRS2015

Underestimation of Project Costs

Large projects almost always exceed their budgets. Estimating cost is difficult and estimated costs are usually too low. Three different reasons are suggested: bad luck, overoptimism, and deliberate underestimation. Project management can usually point to project difficulty and complexity, technical uncertainty, stakeholder conflicts, scope changes, unforeseen events, and other not really unpredictable bad luck. Project planning is usually over-optimistic, so the likelihood and impact of bad luck is systematically underestimated. Project plans reflect optimism and hope for success in a supposedly unique new effort rather than rational expectations based on historical data. Past project problems are claimed to be irrelevant because "This time it's different." Some bad luck is inevitable and reasonable optimism is understandable, but deliberate deception must be condemned. In a competitive environment, project planners and advocates often deliberately underestimate costs to help gain project approval and funding. Project benefits, cost savings, and probability of success are exaggerated and key risks ignored. Project advocates have incentives to distort information and conceal difficulties from project approvers. One naively suggested cure is more openness, honesty, and group adherence to shared overall goals. A more realistic alternative is threatening overrun projects with cancellation. Neither approach seems to solve the problem. A better method to avoid the delusions of over-optimism and the deceptions of biased advocacy is to base the project cost estimate on the actual costs of a large group of similar projects. Over optimism and deception can continue beyond the planning phase and into project execution. Hard milestones based on verified tests and demonstrations can provide a reality check.

Cost estimation↗
NASA NTRS2019

Space Program Advocacy Can Distort Project Management and Damage Systems Engineering

Over-optimistic project advocacy often causes exaggerated performance claims and underestimated costs and schedules. This can distort project management and damage systems engineering. NASA projects such as the space shuttle and Hubble are extreme examples. NASA's spectacular success in the Apollo moon landings seems to have produced overconfidence and carelessness, but also to have gained tolerance for unrealistic claims and forgiveness when they were proven wrong. Apollo risk analysis predicted many astronaut fatalities. This was believed but was potentially damaging to the Apollo program, so risk analysis was discontinued. The moon landings beat bad odds because Apollo obsessively reduced risk. Its success seemed to confirm that risk analysis was unreasonably pessimistic and that risk could be overcome by good engineering. This understanding caused risk to be increased during space shuttle engineering and led to an unnecessarily dangerous approach. The shuttle design placed a fragile spacecraft next to the fuel tanks and failed to provide crew escape or launch abort. These design decisions directly caused the Challenger and Columbia tragedies. After Challenger, risk analysis was re-established. The current rocket and capsule design does consider risk and the result strongly resembles Apollo. Apollo advocacy led NASA to abandon risk analysis and this was ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies. Excessive advocacy that distorts risk, cost, and schedule could be prevented in an ideal organization that used systems engineering to make rational and fair decisions. However, most real organizations accommodate human and group needs using informal methods often described as "the system." Humans have biases, use innate decision making heuristics, instinctively rely on "gut feel," and establish deviant groups through groupthink. Expecting organizations to become totally rational is impractical, but specific problems such as neglecting risk and underestimating cost and schedule can be directly challenged with some hope of success.

Jones, Harry W.↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Critical Role Of Conversion Cost And Comparative Advantage In Modeling Agricultural Land Use Change

The difference in land use modeling approaches is an important uncertain factor in evaluating future climate scenarios in global economic models. We compare five widely used land use modeling approaches: constrained optimization, constant elasticity of transformation (CET), the additive form of constant elasticity of transformation (ACET), logit, and Ricardian. We demonstrate that the approaches differ not only by the extent of parameter uses but also by the definition of conversion cost and the consideration of comparative advantage implied by land heterogeneity. We develop a generalized hybrid approach that incorporates ACET/logit and Ricardian to account for both conversion cost and comparative advantage. We use this hybrid approach to estimate future climate impacts on agriculture. We find a welfare loss of about 0.38–0.46% of the global GDP. We demonstrate that ignoring land heterogeneity or land conversion costs underestimates climate impacts on agricultural production and welfare.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS2018

Chapter 6: Materials for Spacecraft

The general knowledge in this chapter is intended for a broad variety of spacecraft: manned or unmanned, low Earth to geosynchronous orbit, cis-lunar, lunar, planetary, or deep space exploration. Materials for launch vehicles are covered in chapter 7. Materials used in the fabrication of spacecraft hardware should be selected by considering the operational requirements for the particular application and the design engineering properties of the candidate materials. The information provided in this chapter is not intended to replace an in-depth materials study but rather to make the spacecraft designer aware of the challenges for various types of materials and some lessons learned from more than 50 years of spaceflight. This chapter discusses the damaging effects of the space environment on various materials and what has been successfully used in the past or what may be used for a more robust design. The material categories covered are structural, thermal control for on-orbit and re-entry, shielding against radiation and meteoroid/space debris impact, optics, solar arrays, lubricants, seals, and adhesives. Spacecraft components not directly exposed to space must still meet certain requirements, particularly for manned spacecraft where toxicity and flammability are concerns. Requirements such as fracture control and contamination control are examined, with additional suggestions for manufacturability. It is important to remember that the actual hardware must be tested to understand the real, "as-built" performance, as it could vary from the design intent. Early material trades can overestimate benefits and underestimate costs. An example of this was using graphite/epoxy composite in the International Space Station science racks to save weight. By the time the requirements for vibration isolation, Space Shuttle frequencies, and experiment operations were included, the weight savings had evaporated.

Finckenor, Miria M.↗
DOE OSTI2026

A System-Level Cost Modeling Framework for Design for Remanufacturing: A Case Study of an Agricultural Machine Transmission

Remanufacturing offers significant environmental and economic benefits by restoring end-of-life products to as-new conditions. Although extensive research has been conducted on the topic, the adoption of remanufacturing practices remains limited across various industries. A primary barrier to broader implementation is the substantial upfront investment required, which necessitates reliable cost modeling to justify potential future savings. Most existing models treat components independently and ignore inter-component dependencies. We develop a probabilistic, system-level cost modeling framework that integrates reliability, reusability, and a dependency matrix to capture cascading effects across components over multiple life cycles. Our model identifies those critical components that maximize remanufacturing benefits across a product's many lives. A toy example and an industry case study (John Deere PowrQuad transmission subassembly) illustrate how design alternatives affect cumulative cost. Using a Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) to perform life cycle cost analysis on the system with different design changes, we show the normalized average cost savings after three remanufacturing cycles. Accounting for dependencies meaningfully alters cost projections and ignoring them underestimates accumulated cost by up to 20% in our examples. Furthermore, the results of our study confirm that accounting for component interdependencies is necessary to produce cost estimates that meet industry standards.

Life Cycle Analysis and Design↗
DOE OSTI2026

Increasing Power Generation at the Patua Nevada Geothermal Field through Targeted and Adaptive EGS

In 2020, Patua Acquisition Company LLC, submitted the proposal “Increasing Power Generation at the Patua Nevada Geothermal Field through Targeted and Adaptive EGS”, in response to the DOE’s Geothermal Wells of Opportunity Funding Opportunity Announcement. The primary goal of the project was to convert an idle well, Patua 16-29, to an active producer and generate at least an additional 5 MWe at the Patua plant. The project was intended to provide an example of a reproducible methodology for well stimulation in Enhanced Geothermal Systems The project was proposed to be performed in three phases over a period of performance of four years. A first project go/no-go decision was made at the end of Phase 1 based on feasibility of the wellbore, site, and ability to realize a 5 MWe benefit from the project. Several factors were recognized that led to a no-go decision at this phase: • Electrical needs for placing the stimulated well on production were not considered in the initial scoping. Costs of pipeline costs were also underestimated in the original cost share. Easements and rights-of-way to establish a geothermal pipeline underneath or across an interstate highway were also found to be intractable on the time scale of the project. • The plant is injection limited, and no design or cost estimate was in place to handle the additional production needed to realize a 5 Mwe benefit. A new injection well would need to be drilled in addition to the other facility improvements to bring in the stimulated well. Patau Acquisition Company attempted to locate additional wells of opportunity that could realize the SOPOs goals, but was unsuccessful. As a result, this project is being terminated at the end of Phase 1.

15 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Carbon Capture and Storage for Small-to-Medium Biorefineries: Promising Carbon Removal Solution with Economic Challenges

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) integrated with biomass-based fuel production can provide cost-effective biomass carbon removal and storage (BiCRS) and produce high-value bioproducts, such as sustainable aviation fuels. To accelerate BiCRS deployment, it is crucial to quantify the costs of CCS integration, particularly for small- and medium-scale biorefineries that are representative of early-stage deployment. Existing studies tend to focus on plant sizes that are orders-of-magnitude larger than early-stage installations, possibly underestimating CCS costs for small-to-medium biorefineries. We show that the capture, transport, and storage costs to maximize CO 2 removal from a 526 dry tonne per day (tpd) biomass gasification plant (largest existing size) could be 13–47% higher than costs for a typical modeled plant size (2000 dry tpd). The higher cost estimates are driven by less favorable economies of scale and realistic assumptions about the availability of affordable CO 2 transport infrastructure with both drivers broadly applicable to other BiCRS technologies. Compliance and voluntary carbon markets could incentivize biorefinery CCS, but both carry a high degree of uncertainty. In conclusion, these findings highlight that sufficient and reliable financial mechanisms would be essential to unlocking the full CO 2 removal potential of biorefineries and facilitating BiCRS scale-up.

Biological transport↗
DOE OSTI2021

Modeling the Metabolic Costs of Heavy Military Backpacking

Existing predictive equations underestimate the metabolic costs of heavy military load carriage. Metabolic costs are specific to each type of military equipment, and backpack loads often impose the most sustained burden on the dismounted warfighter. This study aimed to develop and validate an equation for estimating metabolic rates during heavy backpacking for the US Army Load Carriage Decision Aid (LCDA), an integrated software mission planning tool. Thirty healthy, active military-age adults (3 women, 27 men; age, 25 ± 7 yr; height, 1.74 ± 0.07 m; body mass, 77 ± 15 kg) walked for 6–21 min while carrying backpacks loaded up to 66% body mass at speeds between 0.45 and 1.97 m·s -1 . A new predictive model, the LCDA backpacking equation, was developed on metabolic rate data calculated from indirect calorimetry. Model estimation performance was evaluated internally by k-fold cross-validation and externally against seven historical reference data sets. We tested if the 90% confidence interval of the mean paired difference was within equivalence limits equal to 10% of the measured metabolic rate. Estimation accuracy and level of agreement were also evaluated by the bias and concordance correlation coefficient (CCC), respectively. Estimates from the LCDA backpacking equation were statistically equivalent ( P < 0.01) to metabolic rates measured in the current study (bias, -0.01 ± 0.62 W·kg -1 ; CCC, 0.965) and from the seven independent data sets (bias, -0.08 ± 0.59 W·kg -1 ; CCC, 0.926). The newly derived LCDA backpacking equation provides close estimates of steady-state metabolic energy expenditure during heavy load carriage. These advances enable further optimization of thermal-work strain monitoring, sports nutrition, and hydration strategies.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Life cycle greenhouse gas emissions and carbon intensity of U.S. fuel use and projection for the next 10 years-based on built capacity and expansion plans

The U.S. Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 supports biofuel production expansion through the 45Z clean fuel production tax credit, replacing previous 40A and 40B credits. This follows on the Renewable Fuel Standard from the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and its expansion in 2007. States like California, Oregon, and Washington also offer clean fuel credits. Meanwhile, federal agencies, including the U.S. Department of Energy, have advanced alternative fuel technologies through research and development funding. The surging interest in the biofuel industry has spurred the demand for biofuel supplies in the markets, although achieving profitability for advanced biofuels and low-carbon e-fuels remains challenging. This study aims to track U.S. alternative fuel production capacity expansion plans over the next 10 years and estimate impacts on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. By tracking built capacity and industry announcements of planned expansion, this study complements other studies which use models to predict changes in energy technologies and the associated GHG implications. Modeled projections of future technologies are often criticized for over or underestimating the cost and potential role of new technologies. The study focuses on sustainable aviation fuel, renewable diesel, ethanol, biodiesel, and renewable natural gas. Using facility-level data, we conducted a bottom-up analysis linking biofuel production pathways with corresponding pathways and parameterizations in the Argonne R&D GREET model. Results indicate that biofuel capacity could reach 3.8 exajoules in 2035, potentially reducing U.S. GHG emissions by 179 million tonnes, including the full life cycle. This corresponds to a 20% reduction in transportation and 5% in industry sector emissions by 2035, or a 3.6% reduction in economy-wide emissions. Overall, this study shows that while biofuel production capacity in the U.S. is expanding, the capacities remain limited compared to fuel demand. Uncertainty regarding the durability and extension of incentives may be dampening the pace of growth. Meanwhile, demonstrating the commercial potential for alternative fuels and climbing the learning curve for new technologies could lead to an increased pace of expansion in later years. This study offers insights for bioenergy stakeholders, highlighting biofuel technologies' contribution to U.S. energy system and emissions reduction over time based on producers' plans.

Biofuel Producers↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Bilevel Approach for Identifying the Worst Contingencies for Nonconvex Alternating Current Power Systems

We address the bilevel optimization problem of identifying the most critical attacks to an alternating current (AC) power flow network. The upper-level binary maximization problem consists of choosing an attack that is treated as a parameter in the lower-level defender minimization problem. Instances of the lower-level global minimization problem by themselves are NP-hard due to the nonconvex AC power flow constraints, and bilevel solution approaches commonly apply a convex relaxation or approximation to allow for tractable bilevel reformulations at the cost of underestimating some power system vulnerabilities. Our main contribution is to provide an alternative branch-and-bound algorithm whose upper bounding mechanism (in a maximization context) is based on a reformulation that avoids relaxation of the AC power flow constraints in the lower-level defender problem. Lower bounding is provided with semidefinite programming (SDP) relaxed solutions to the lower-level problem. We establish finite termination with guarantees of either a globally optimal solution to the original bilevel problem, or a globally optimal solution to the SDP-relaxed bilevel problem which is included in a vetted list of upper-level attack solutions, at least one of which is a globally optimal solution to the bilevel problem. We demonstrate through computational experiments applied to IEEE case instances both the relevance of our contribution, and the effectiveness of our contributed algorithm for identifying power system vulnerabilities without resorting to convex relaxations of the lower-level problem. We conclude with a discussion of future extensions and improvements.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Excavation Volume Growth Factors at Environmental Remediation Sites - 20318

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) manages numerous environmental remediation projects in accordance with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, otherwise known as CERCLA. These include projects for the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). Utilizing the CERCLA framework to address these projects requires detailed cost estimates and a significant portion of costs are associated with the volume of material to be excavated and that material's final disposition. Accordingly, understanding the expected volumes and uncertainty associated with those volumes is vital to project cost estimating. These estimates are completed at various stages of the CERCLA process, thus the project team has varying degrees of information available from which to develop these estimates depending on how far along the project is. Understanding the factors contributing to volume growth (increase in volume of material from that originally estimated) is a crucial element to determining volume and cost uncertainty. This paper presents a case study of a FUSRAP site which involves excavation and offsite disposal of contaminated soils from complex commercial, industrial, and residential properties. Original volume estimates were compared to post excavation volumes on a property by property basis. Reasons for differences are determined along with magnitude of impacts to cost estimating. For both residential and commercial property types, volume estimating factors, uncertainty considerations, and methods to account for each are discussed with emphasis on volume growth considerations. Cost estimating model input considerations are discussed with specific emphasis on accounting for volume uncertainty at the Feasibility Study (FS) phase of CERCLA. Underestimating or overestimating costs at the FS phase has repercussions under CERCLA that may impact project close out or completion schedule. Discussions presented will be helpful to both reviewers and preparers of cost estimates involving excavations. Additionally, project planners may be able to use the information to plan for volume growth contingencies. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS2022

The Importance of Internal Climate Variability in Climate Impact Projections

Uncertainty in climate projections is driven by three components: scenario uncertainty, intermodel uncertainty, and internal variability. Although socioeconomic climate impact studies increasingly take into account the first two components, little attention has been paid to the role of internal variability, although underestimating this uncertainty may lead to underestimating the socioeconomic costs of climate change. Using large ensembles from seven coupled general circulation models with a total of 414 model runs, we partition the climate uncertainty in classic dose–response models relating county-level corn yield, mortality, and per-capita gross domestic product to temperature in the continental United States. The partitioning of uncertainty depends on the time frame of projection, the impact model, and the geographic region. Internal variability represents more than 50% of the total climate uncertainty in certain projections, including mortality projections for the early 21st century, although its relative influence decreases over time. We recommend including uncertainty due to internal variability for many projections of temperature-driven impacts, including early-century and midcentury projections, projections in regions with high internal variability such as the Upper Midwest United States, and impacts driven by nonlinear relationships.

climate impacts↗
NASA NTRS2011

Lessons Learned for Planning and Estimating Operations Support Requirements

Operations (phase E) costs are typically small compared to the spacecraft development and test costs. This, combined with the long lead time for realizing operations costs, can lead projects to focus on hardware development schedules and costs, de-emphasizing estimation of operations support requirements during proposal, early design, and replan cost exercises. The Discovery and New Frontiers (D&NF) programs comprise small, cost-capped missions supporting scientific exploration of the solar system. Even moderate yearly underestimates of the operations costs can present significant LCC impacts for deep space missions with long operational durations, and any LCC growth can directly impact the programs ability to fund new missions. The D&NF Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center recently studied cost overruns for 7 D&NF missions related to phase C/D development of operational capabilities and phase E mission operations. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential operations risks and controlling the associated impacts to operations development and execution costs. The study found that the drivers behind these overruns include overly optimistic assumptions regarding the savings resulting from the use of heritage technology, late development of operations requirements, inadequate planning for sustaining engineering and the special requirements of long duration missions (e.g., knowledge retention and hardware/software refresh), and delayed completion of ground system development work. This presentation summarizes the study and the results, providing a set of lessons NASA can use to improve early estimation and validation of operations costs.

Newhouse, Marilyn↗
NASA NTRS1977

A life cycle cost economics model for projects with uniformly varying operating costs

A mathematical model is developed for calculating the life cycle costs for a project where the operating costs increase or decrease in a linear manner with time. The life cycle cost is shown to be a function of the investment costs, initial operating costs, operating cost gradient, project life time, interest rate for capital and salvage value. The results show that the life cycle cost for a project can be grossly underestimated (or overestimated) if the operating costs increase (or decrease) uniformly over time rather than being constant as is often assumed in project economic evaluations. The following range of variables is examined: (1) project life from 2 to 30 years; (2) interest rate from 0 to 15 percent per year; and (3) operating cost gradient from 5 to 90 percent of the initial operating costs. A numerical example plus tables and graphs is given to help calculate project life cycle costs over a wide range of variables.

Remer, D. S.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Planning and Estimation of Operations Support Requirements

Life Cycle Cost (LCC) estimates during the proposal and early design phases, as well as project replans during the development phase, are heavily focused on hardware development schedules and costs. Operations (phase E) costs are typically small compared to the spacecraft development and test costs. This, combined with the long lead time for realizing operations costs, can lead to de-emphasizing estimation of operations support requirements during proposal, early design, and replan cost exercises. The Discovery and New Frontiers (D&NF) programs comprise small, cost-capped missions supporting scientific exploration of the solar system. Any LCC growth can directly impact the programs' ability to fund new missions, and even moderate yearly underestimates of the operations costs can present significant LCC impacts for deep space missions with long operational durations. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) D&NF Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that 4 out of the 5 missions studied had significant overruns at or after launch due to underestimation of the complexity and supporting requirements for operations activities; the fifth mission had not launched at the time of the mission. The drivers behind these overruns include overly optimistic assumptions regarding the savings resulting from the use of heritage technology, late development of operations requirements, inadequate planning for sustaining engineering and the special requirements of long duration missions (e.g., knowledge retention and hardware/software refresh), and delayed completion of ground system development work. This paper updates the D&NF LCC study, looking at the operations (phase E) cost drivers in more detail and extending the study to include 2 additional missions and identifies areas for increased emphasis by project management in order to improve the fidelity of operations estimates.

Newhouse, Marilyn E.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Spacecraft Complexity Subfactors and Implications on Future Cost Growth

During the last ten years the Jet Propulsion Laboratory has used a set of cost-risk subfactors to independently estimate the magnitude of development risks that may not be covered in the high level cost models employed during early concept development. Within the last several years the Laboratory has also developed a scale of Concept Maturity Levels with associated criteria to quantitatively assess a concept's maturity. This latter effort has been helpful in determining whether a concept is mature enough for accurate costing but it does not provide any quantitative estimate of cost risk. Unfortunately today's missions are significantly more complex than when the original cost-risk subfactors were first formulated. Risks associated with complex missions are not being adequately evaluated and future cost growth is being underestimated. The risk subfactor process needed to be updated.

Mission Design↗
NASA NTRS2016

Sampling for Soil Carbon Stock Assessment in Rocky Agricultural Soils

Coring methods commonly employed in soil organic C (SOC) stock assessment may not accurately capture soil rock fragment (RF) content or soil bulk density (rho (sub b)) in rocky agricultural soils, potentially biasing SOC stock estimates. Quantitative pits are considered less biased than coring methods but are invasive and often cost-prohibitive. We compared fixed-depth and mass-based estimates of SOC stocks (0.3-meters depth) for hammer, hydraulic push, and rotary coring methods relative to quantitative pits at four agricultural sites ranging in RF content from less than 0.01 to 0.24 cubic meters per cubic meter. Sampling costs were also compared. Coring methods significantly underestimated RF content at all rocky sites, but significant differences (p is less than 0.05) in SOC stocks between pits and corers were only found with the hammer method using the fixed-depth approach at the less than 0.01 cubic meters per cubic meter RF site (pit, 5.80 kilograms C per square meter; hammer, 4.74 kilograms C per square meter) and at the 0.14 cubic meters per cubic meter RF site (pit, 8.81 kilograms C per square meter; hammer, 6.71 kilograms C per square meter). The hammer corer also underestimated rho (sub b) at all sites as did the hydraulic push corer at the 0.21 cubic meters per cubic meter RF site. No significant differences in mass-based SOC stock estimates were observed between pits and corers. Our results indicate that (i) calculating SOC stocks on a mass basis can overcome biases in RF and rho (sub b) estimates introduced by sampling equipment and (ii) a quantitative pit is the optimal sampling method for establishing reference soil masses, followed by rotary and then hydraulic push corers.

hammer method↗