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NASA NTRS2015

Underestimation of Project Costs

Large projects almost always exceed their budgets. Estimating cost is difficult and estimated costs are usually too low. Three different reasons are suggested: bad luck, overoptimism, and deliberate underestimation. Project management can usually point to project difficulty and complexity, technical uncertainty, stakeholder conflicts, scope changes, unforeseen events, and other not really unpredictable bad luck. Project planning is usually over-optimistic, so the likelihood and impact of bad luck is systematically underestimated. Project plans reflect optimism and hope for success in a supposedly unique new effort rather than rational expectations based on historical data. Past project problems are claimed to be irrelevant because "This time it's different." Some bad luck is inevitable and reasonable optimism is understandable, but deliberate deception must be condemned. In a competitive environment, project planners and advocates often deliberately underestimate costs to help gain project approval and funding. Project benefits, cost savings, and probability of success are exaggerated and key risks ignored. Project advocates have incentives to distort information and conceal difficulties from project approvers. One naively suggested cure is more openness, honesty, and group adherence to shared overall goals. A more realistic alternative is threatening overrun projects with cancellation. Neither approach seems to solve the problem. A better method to avoid the delusions of over-optimism and the deceptions of biased advocacy is to base the project cost estimate on the actual costs of a large group of similar projects. Over optimism and deception can continue beyond the planning phase and into project execution. Hard milestones based on verified tests and demonstrations can provide a reality check.

Cost estimation↗
NASA NTRS2019

Space Program Advocacy Can Distort Project Management and Damage Systems Engineering

Over-optimistic project advocacy often causes exaggerated performance claims and underestimated costs and schedules. This can distort project management and damage systems engineering. NASA projects such as the space shuttle and Hubble are extreme examples. NASA's spectacular success in the Apollo moon landings seems to have produced overconfidence and carelessness, but also to have gained tolerance for unrealistic claims and forgiveness when they were proven wrong. Apollo risk analysis predicted many astronaut fatalities. This was believed but was potentially damaging to the Apollo program, so risk analysis was discontinued. The moon landings beat bad odds because Apollo obsessively reduced risk. Its success seemed to confirm that risk analysis was unreasonably pessimistic and that risk could be overcome by good engineering. This understanding caused risk to be increased during space shuttle engineering and led to an unnecessarily dangerous approach. The shuttle design placed a fragile spacecraft next to the fuel tanks and failed to provide crew escape or launch abort. These design decisions directly caused the Challenger and Columbia tragedies. After Challenger, risk analysis was re-established. The current rocket and capsule design does consider risk and the result strongly resembles Apollo. Apollo advocacy led NASA to abandon risk analysis and this was ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies. Excessive advocacy that distorts risk, cost, and schedule could be prevented in an ideal organization that used systems engineering to make rational and fair decisions. However, most real organizations accommodate human and group needs using informal methods often described as "the system." Humans have biases, use innate decision making heuristics, instinctively rely on "gut feel," and establish deviant groups through groupthink. Expecting organizations to become totally rational is impractical, but specific problems such as neglecting risk and underestimating cost and schedule can be directly challenged with some hope of success.

Jones, Harry W.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Chapter 6: Materials for Spacecraft

The general knowledge in this chapter is intended for a broad variety of spacecraft: manned or unmanned, low Earth to geosynchronous orbit, cis-lunar, lunar, planetary, or deep space exploration. Materials for launch vehicles are covered in chapter 7. Materials used in the fabrication of spacecraft hardware should be selected by considering the operational requirements for the particular application and the design engineering properties of the candidate materials. The information provided in this chapter is not intended to replace an in-depth materials study but rather to make the spacecraft designer aware of the challenges for various types of materials and some lessons learned from more than 50 years of spaceflight. This chapter discusses the damaging effects of the space environment on various materials and what has been successfully used in the past or what may be used for a more robust design. The material categories covered are structural, thermal control for on-orbit and re-entry, shielding against radiation and meteoroid/space debris impact, optics, solar arrays, lubricants, seals, and adhesives. Spacecraft components not directly exposed to space must still meet certain requirements, particularly for manned spacecraft where toxicity and flammability are concerns. Requirements such as fracture control and contamination control are examined, with additional suggestions for manufacturability. It is important to remember that the actual hardware must be tested to understand the real, "as-built" performance, as it could vary from the design intent. Early material trades can overestimate benefits and underestimate costs. An example of this was using graphite/epoxy composite in the International Space Station science racks to save weight. By the time the requirements for vibration isolation, Space Shuttle frequencies, and experiment operations were included, the weight savings had evaporated.

Finckenor, Miria M.↗
NASA NTRS2022

The Importance of Internal Climate Variability in Climate Impact Projections

Uncertainty in climate projections is driven by three components: scenario uncertainty, intermodel uncertainty, and internal variability. Although socioeconomic climate impact studies increasingly take into account the first two components, little attention has been paid to the role of internal variability, although underestimating this uncertainty may lead to underestimating the socioeconomic costs of climate change. Using large ensembles from seven coupled general circulation models with a total of 414 model runs, we partition the climate uncertainty in classic dose–response models relating county-level corn yield, mortality, and per-capita gross domestic product to temperature in the continental United States. The partitioning of uncertainty depends on the time frame of projection, the impact model, and the geographic region. Internal variability represents more than 50% of the total climate uncertainty in certain projections, including mortality projections for the early 21st century, although its relative influence decreases over time. We recommend including uncertainty due to internal variability for many projections of temperature-driven impacts, including early-century and midcentury projections, projections in regions with high internal variability such as the Upper Midwest United States, and impacts driven by nonlinear relationships.

climate impacts↗
NASA NTRS2011

Lessons Learned for Planning and Estimating Operations Support Requirements

Operations (phase E) costs are typically small compared to the spacecraft development and test costs. This, combined with the long lead time for realizing operations costs, can lead projects to focus on hardware development schedules and costs, de-emphasizing estimation of operations support requirements during proposal, early design, and replan cost exercises. The Discovery and New Frontiers (D&NF) programs comprise small, cost-capped missions supporting scientific exploration of the solar system. Even moderate yearly underestimates of the operations costs can present significant LCC impacts for deep space missions with long operational durations, and any LCC growth can directly impact the programs ability to fund new missions. The D&NF Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center recently studied cost overruns for 7 D&NF missions related to phase C/D development of operational capabilities and phase E mission operations. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential operations risks and controlling the associated impacts to operations development and execution costs. The study found that the drivers behind these overruns include overly optimistic assumptions regarding the savings resulting from the use of heritage technology, late development of operations requirements, inadequate planning for sustaining engineering and the special requirements of long duration missions (e.g., knowledge retention and hardware/software refresh), and delayed completion of ground system development work. This presentation summarizes the study and the results, providing a set of lessons NASA can use to improve early estimation and validation of operations costs.

Newhouse, Marilyn↗
NASA NTRS1977

A life cycle cost economics model for projects with uniformly varying operating costs

A mathematical model is developed for calculating the life cycle costs for a project where the operating costs increase or decrease in a linear manner with time. The life cycle cost is shown to be a function of the investment costs, initial operating costs, operating cost gradient, project life time, interest rate for capital and salvage value. The results show that the life cycle cost for a project can be grossly underestimated (or overestimated) if the operating costs increase (or decrease) uniformly over time rather than being constant as is often assumed in project economic evaluations. The following range of variables is examined: (1) project life from 2 to 30 years; (2) interest rate from 0 to 15 percent per year; and (3) operating cost gradient from 5 to 90 percent of the initial operating costs. A numerical example plus tables and graphs is given to help calculate project life cycle costs over a wide range of variables.

Remer, D. S.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Planning and Estimation of Operations Support Requirements

Life Cycle Cost (LCC) estimates during the proposal and early design phases, as well as project replans during the development phase, are heavily focused on hardware development schedules and costs. Operations (phase E) costs are typically small compared to the spacecraft development and test costs. This, combined with the long lead time for realizing operations costs, can lead to de-emphasizing estimation of operations support requirements during proposal, early design, and replan cost exercises. The Discovery and New Frontiers (D&NF) programs comprise small, cost-capped missions supporting scientific exploration of the solar system. Any LCC growth can directly impact the programs' ability to fund new missions, and even moderate yearly underestimates of the operations costs can present significant LCC impacts for deep space missions with long operational durations. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) D&NF Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that 4 out of the 5 missions studied had significant overruns at or after launch due to underestimation of the complexity and supporting requirements for operations activities; the fifth mission had not launched at the time of the mission. The drivers behind these overruns include overly optimistic assumptions regarding the savings resulting from the use of heritage technology, late development of operations requirements, inadequate planning for sustaining engineering and the special requirements of long duration missions (e.g., knowledge retention and hardware/software refresh), and delayed completion of ground system development work. This paper updates the D&NF LCC study, looking at the operations (phase E) cost drivers in more detail and extending the study to include 2 additional missions and identifies areas for increased emphasis by project management in order to improve the fidelity of operations estimates.

Newhouse, Marilyn E.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Spacecraft Complexity Subfactors and Implications on Future Cost Growth

During the last ten years the Jet Propulsion Laboratory has used a set of cost-risk subfactors to independently estimate the magnitude of development risks that may not be covered in the high level cost models employed during early concept development. Within the last several years the Laboratory has also developed a scale of Concept Maturity Levels with associated criteria to quantitatively assess a concept's maturity. This latter effort has been helpful in determining whether a concept is mature enough for accurate costing but it does not provide any quantitative estimate of cost risk. Unfortunately today's missions are significantly more complex than when the original cost-risk subfactors were first formulated. Risks associated with complex missions are not being adequately evaluated and future cost growth is being underestimated. The risk subfactor process needed to be updated.

Mission Design↗
NASA NTRS2016

Sampling for Soil Carbon Stock Assessment in Rocky Agricultural Soils

Coring methods commonly employed in soil organic C (SOC) stock assessment may not accurately capture soil rock fragment (RF) content or soil bulk density (rho (sub b)) in rocky agricultural soils, potentially biasing SOC stock estimates. Quantitative pits are considered less biased than coring methods but are invasive and often cost-prohibitive. We compared fixed-depth and mass-based estimates of SOC stocks (0.3-meters depth) for hammer, hydraulic push, and rotary coring methods relative to quantitative pits at four agricultural sites ranging in RF content from less than 0.01 to 0.24 cubic meters per cubic meter. Sampling costs were also compared. Coring methods significantly underestimated RF content at all rocky sites, but significant differences (p is less than 0.05) in SOC stocks between pits and corers were only found with the hammer method using the fixed-depth approach at the less than 0.01 cubic meters per cubic meter RF site (pit, 5.80 kilograms C per square meter; hammer, 4.74 kilograms C per square meter) and at the 0.14 cubic meters per cubic meter RF site (pit, 8.81 kilograms C per square meter; hammer, 6.71 kilograms C per square meter). The hammer corer also underestimated rho (sub b) at all sites as did the hydraulic push corer at the 0.21 cubic meters per cubic meter RF site. No significant differences in mass-based SOC stock estimates were observed between pits and corers. Our results indicate that (i) calculating SOC stocks on a mass basis can overcome biases in RF and rho (sub b) estimates introduced by sampling equipment and (ii) a quantitative pit is the optimal sampling method for establishing reference soil masses, followed by rotary and then hydraulic push corers.

hammer method↗
NASA NTRS2010

NASA Spacecraft Fault Management Workshop Results

Fault Management is a critical aspect of deep-space missions. For the purposes of this paper, fault management is defined as the ability of a system to detect, isolate, and mitigate events that impact, or have the potential to impact, nominal mission operations. The fault management capabilities are commonly distributed across flight and ground subsystems, impacting hardware, software, and mission operations designs. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that 4 out of the 5 missions studied had significant overruns due to underestimating the complexity and support requirements for fault management. As a result of this and other recent experiences, the NASA Science Mission Directorate (SMD) Planetary Science Division (PSD) commissioned a workshop to bring together invited participants across government, industry, academia to assess the state of the art in fault management practice and research, identify current and potential issues, and make recommendations for addressing these issues. The workshop was held in New Orleans in April of 2008. The workshop concluded that fault management is not being limited by technology, but rather by a lack of emphasis and discipline in both the engineering and programmatic dimensions. Some of the areas cited in the findings include different, conflicting, and changing institutional goals and risk postures; unclear ownership of end-to-end fault management engineering; inadequate understanding of the impact of mission-level requirements on fault management complexity; and practices, processes, and tools that have not kept pace with the increasing complexity of mission requirements and spacecraft systems. This paper summarizes the findings and recommendations from that workshop, as well as opportunities identified for future investment in tools, processes, and products to facilitate the development of space flight fault management capabilities.

Newhouse, Marilyn↗
NASA NTRS2010

Results from the NASA Spacecraft Fault Management Workshop: Cost Drivers for Deep Space Missions

Fault Management, the detection of and response to in-flight anomalies, is a critical aspect of deep-space missions. Fault management capabilities are commonly distributed across flight and ground subsystems, impacting hardware, software, and mission operations designs. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for five missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that four out of the five missions studied had significant overruns due to underestimating the complexity and support requirements for fault management. As a result of this and other recent experiences, the NASA Science Mission Directorate (SMD) Planetary Science Division (PSD) commissioned a workshop to bring together invited participants across government, industry, and academia to assess the state of the art in fault management practice and research, identify current and potential issues, and make recommendations for addressing these issues. The workshop was held in New Orleans in April of 2008. The workshop concluded that fault management is not being limited by technology, but rather by a lack of emphasis and discipline in both the engineering and programmatic dimensions. Some of the areas cited in the findings include different, conflicting, and changing institutional goals and risk postures; unclear ownership of end-to-end fault management engineering; inadequate understanding of the impact of mission-level requirements on fault management complexity; and practices, processes, and tools that have not kept pace with the increasing complexity of mission requirements and spacecraft systems. This paper summarizes the findings and recommendations from that workshop, particularly as fault management development issues affect operations and the development of operations capabilities.

Newhouse, Marilyn E.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Space and Atmospheric Environments: From Low Earth Orbits to Deep Space

Natural space and atmospheric environments pose a difficult challenge for designers of technological systems in space. The deleterious effects of environment interactions with the systems include degradation of materials, thermal changes, contamination, excitation, spacecraft glow, charging, radiation damage, and induced background interference. Design accommodations must be realistic with minimum impact on performance while maintaining a balance between cost and risk. The goal of applied research in space environments and effects is to limit environmental impacts at low cost relative to spacecraft cost and to infuse enabling and commercial off-the-shelf technologies into space programs. The need to perform applied research to understand the space environment in a practical sense and to develop methods to mitigate these environment effects is frequently underestimated by space agencies and industry. Applied science research in this area is critical because the complexity of spacecraft systems is increasing, and they are exposed simultaneously to a multitude of space environments.

Barth, Janet L.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Initial clinical experience of real-time three-dimensional echocardiography in patients with ischemic and idiopathic dilated cardiomyopathy

The geometry of the left ventricle in patients with cardiomyopathy is often sub-optimal for 2-dimensional ultrasound when assessing left ventricular (LV) function and localized abnormalities such as a ventricular aneurysm. The aim of this study was to report the initial experience of real-time 3-D echocardiography for evaluating patients with cardiomyopathy. A total of 34 patients were evaluated with the real-time 3D method in the operating room (n = 15) and in the echocardiographic laboratory (n = 19). Thirteen of 28 patients with cardiomyopathy and 6 other subjects with normal LV function were evaluated by both real-time 3-D echocardiography and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) for obtaining LV volumes and ejection fractions for comparison. There were close relations and agreements for LV volumes (r = 0.98, p <0.0001, mean difference = -15 +/- 81 ml) and ejection fractions (r = 0.97, p <0.0001, mean difference = 0.001 +/- 0.04) between the real-time 3D method and MRI when 3 cardiomyopathy cases with marked LV dilatation (LV end-diastolic volume >450 ml by MRI) were excluded. In these 3 patients, 3D echocardiography significantly underestimated the LV volumes due to difficulties with imaging the entire LV in a 60 degrees x 60 degrees pyramidal volume. The new real-time 3D echocardiography is feasible in patients with cardiomyopathy and may provide a faster and lower cost alternative to MRI for evaluating cardiac function in patients.

NASA Discipline Cardiopulmonary↗
NASA NTRS2011

Evaluation of the New Version of the Laser-Optical Disdrometer, Parsivel

Disdrometer based hydrometeor size distribution measurements have a wide range of application in radar meteorology among other disciplines. The low-cost laser optical disdrometer which became commercially available in 2005 opened a new era to study the variability of the hydrometeor size distribution. The pixel and footprint scale variability of the ground and spaceborne radar remote sensing of precipitation, respectively, has been investigated through a network of Parsivel disdrometers. At the same timE, the cross comparison of impact-type, two-dimensional video and laser-optical disdrometers highlighted the relative strengths and weaknesses of each type of disdrometer. The Parsivel instrument tended to underestimate the number of small drops less than 0.8 mm in diameter quite severely, while the size of drops larger than 2.0 mm in diameter were overestimated at heavy rain quite frequently. Through a close collaboration with the manufacturer, these shortcomings were attributed to the inexpensive laser device. The manufacturer has just released a beta version of Parsivel2. The preliminary comparisons with old and new versions of Parsivel, impact type disdrometer and rain gauges showed a noticeable improvement of the Parsivel at both small and large drop end. This presentation will demonstrate the evaluation of the new unit and its potential impact on radar rainfall relations, including polarimetric and high frequency radar rainfall.

Tokay, Ali↗
NASA NTRS1999

When is Testing Sufficient

The Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center has been investigating how projects can determine when sufficient testing has been completed. For most projects, schedules are underestimated, and the last phase of the software development, testing, must be decreased. Two questions are frequently asked: "To what extent is the software error-free? " and "How much time and effort is required to detect and remove the remaining errors? " Clearly, neither question can be answered with absolute certainty. Nonetheless, the ability to answer these questions with some acceptable level of confidence is highly desirable. First, knowing the extent to which a product is error-free, we can judge when it is time to terminate testing. Secondly, if errors are judged to be present, we can perform a cost/benefit trade-off analysis to estimate when the software will be ready for use and at what cost. This paper explains the efforts of the SATC to help projects determine what is sufficient testing and when is the most cost-effective time to stop testing.

Rosenberg, Linda H.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Investigation of HZETRN 2010 as a Tool for Single Event Effect Qualification of Avionics Systems

NASA's future missions are focused on long-duration deep space missions for human exploration which offers no options for a quick emergency return to Earth. The combination of long mission duration with no quick emergency return option leads to unprecedented spacecraft system safety and reliability requirements. It is important that spacecraft avionics systems for human deep space missions are not susceptible to Single Event Effect (SEE) failures caused by space radiation (primarily the continuous galactic cosmic ray background and the occasional solar particle event) interactions with electronic components and systems. SEE effects are typically managed during the design, development, and test (DD&T) phase of spacecraft development by using heritage hardware (if possible) and through extensive component level testing, followed by system level failure analysis tasks that are both time consuming and costly. The ultimate product of the SEE DD&T program is a prediction of spacecraft avionics reliability in the flight environment produced using various nuclear reaction and transport codes in combination with the component and subsystem level radiation test data. Previous work by Koontz, et al.1 utilized FLUKA, a Monte Carlo nuclear reaction and transport code, to calculate SEE and single event upset (SEU) rates. This code was then validated against in-flight data for a variety of spacecraft and space flight environments. However, FLUKA has a long run-time (on the order of days). CREME962, an easy to use deterministic code offering short run times, was also compared with FLUKA predictions and in-flight data. CREME96, though fast and easy to use, has not been updated in several years and underestimates secondary particle shower effects in spacecraft structural shielding mass. Thus, this paper will investigate the use of HZETRN 20103, a fast and easy to use deterministic transport code, similar to CREME96, that was developed at NASA Langley Research Center primarily for flight crew ionizing radiation dose assessments. HZETRN 2010 includes updates to address secondary particle shower effects more accurately, and might be used as another tool to verify spacecraft avionics system reliability in space flight SEE environments.

Rojdev, Kristina↗
NASA NTRS1999

ACTS Ka-band Propagation Research in a Spatially Diversified Network with Two USAT Ground Stations

Congestion in the radio spectrum below 18 GHz is stimulating greater interest in the Ka (20/30 GHz) frequency band. Transmission at these shorter wavelengths is greatly influenced by rain resulting in signal attenuation and decreased link availability. The size and projected cost of Ultra Small Aperture Terminals (USATS) make site diversity methodology attractive for rain fade compensation. Separation distances between terminals must be small to be of interest commercially. This study measures diversity gain at a separation distance <5 km and investigates utilization of S-band weather radar reflectivity in predicting diversity gain. Two USAT ground stations, separated by 2.43 km for spatial diversity, received a continuous Ka-band tone sent from NASA Glenn Research Center via the Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS) steerable antenna beam. Received signal power and rainfall were measured, and Weather Surveillance Radar-1998 Doppler (WSR-88D) data were obtained as a measure of precipitation along the USAT-to-ACTS slant path. Signal attenuation was compared for the two sites, and diversity gain was calculated for fades measured on eleven days. Correlation of WSR-88D S-band reflectivity with measured Ka-band attenuation consisted of locating radar volume elements along each slant path, converting reflectivity to Ka-band attenuation with rain rate calculation as an intermediate step. Specific attenuation for each associated path segment was summed, resulting in total attenuation along the slant path. Derived Ka-band attenuation did not correlate closely with empirical data (r = 0.239), but a measured signal fade could be matched with an increase in radar reflectivity in all fade events. Applying a low pass filter to radar reflectivity prior to deriving Ka-band attenuation improved the correlation between measured and derived signal attenuation (r = 0.733). Results indicate that site diversity at small separation distances is a viable means of rain fade compensation, and that existing models underestimate diversity gain for a subtropical climate such as Florida. Also, filtered WSR-88D reflectivity can be used for optimizing diversity terminal placement by comparing derived Ka- band attenuation between the diversity sites.

Kalu, Alex↗