SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
In this work, we discuss the observed single-event effects in a variety of types of diodes. In addition, we conduct failure analysis on several Schottky diodes that were heavy-ion irradiated. High- and low-magnitude optical microscope images, infrared camera images, and scanning electron microscope images are used to identify and describe the failure locations.
Previous testing of the Enhanced Power Conversion (EPC) eGaN FETs showed sensitivity to destructive single-event effects (SEE) effects to heavy ions. The presence of tungsten plugs in the gate area raises concerns that the device may be vulnerable to SEE from protons. Irradiation of biased and unbiased devices with heavy ion has results in some damage suspected of being due to total non-ionizing dose (TNID). Proton irradiation is a better radiation type to study this effect. This study presents the results of testing device with protons for SEE and TNID. No SEE in the EPC2012 device, the most sensitive device to SEE, were seen with 53 MeV protons at several angles. The devices continued to function after 1.5 Mrad (Si) of proton dose with only a slight shift in parameters. These results suggest that gross TNID will not be a factor in using these devices nor suffer from SEE due to protons. However, the device should be tested at with 500 MeV protons to guarantee to immunity proton SEE.
This presentation contains test results for destructive failures in DC-DC converters. We have shown that Schottky diodes are susceptible to destructive single-event effects. Future work will be completed to identify parameter that determines diode susceptibility.
The LTC6103HMS8#PBF (henceforth abbreviated as LTC6103) current sense amplifier from Linear Technology was tested for both destructive and non-destructive single-event effects (SEE) using the heavy-ion cyclotron accelerator beam at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) Berkeley Accelerator Effects (BASE) facility. During testing, the input voltages and output currents were monitored to detect single event latch-up (SEL) and single-event transients (SETs).
In this summary, we have shown that diodes are susceptible to destructive single-event effects, and that these failures occur along the guard ring. By determining the last passing voltages, a safe operating area can be derived. By derating off of those values, rather than by the rated voltage, like what is currently done with power MOSFETs, we can work to ensure the safety of future missions. However, there are still open questions about these failures. Are they limited to a single manufacturer, a small number, or all of them? Is there a threshold rated voltage that must be exceeded to see these failures? With future work, we hope to answer these questions. In the full paper, laser results will also be presented to verify that failures only occur along the guard ring.
We present destructive single-event effects characterization of a variety of silicon Schottky diodes from different manufacturers. We also discuss suitable derating guidelines.
1A power MOSFET demonstrated destructive Single-Event Effect (SEE) during ion irradiation in a switching circuit. Further investigation showed that the inductive load causing a spike in the drain-to-source voltage (VDS) that exceeded the manufacturer’s rating for several nanoseconds was enough to allow SEB. These results indicate that SEB may occur in a very short window and flyback is critical for disciplined power supply design.
The Analog Devices ADXL354 3-AXIS MEMS accelerometer was tested for single-event effects, both destructive and non-destructive. The device was characterized for single-event upset (SEU) sensitivity and evaluated for any possibility of single-event latchup (SEL), single-event dielectric rupture (SEDR) and single-event functional interrupts (SEFI). Single-event transient (SET) response was also monitored.
Space poses a variety of radiation hazards. These hazards pose different risks for different missions depending on the mission environment, duration and requirements. This presentation presents a brief look at several radiation related hazards, including destructive and nondestructive Single-Event Effect, Total Ionizing Dose, Displacement Damage and Spacecraft Charging. The temporal and spatial characteristics for the environments of concern for each are considered.
Space radiation in space systems present unique failure modes and considerations for reliability engineers. Radiation effects is not a one size fits all field. Threat conditions that must be addressed for a given mission depend on the mission orbital profile, the technologies of parts used in critical functions and on application considerations, such as supply voltages, temperature, duty cycle, and redundancy. In general, the threats that must be addressed are of two types-the cumulative degradation mechanisms of total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage (DD). and the prompt responses of components to ionizing particles (protons and heavy ions) falling under the heading of single-event effects. Generally degradation mechanisms behave like wear-out mechanisms on any active components in a system: Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Displacement Damage: (1) TID affects all active devices over time. Devices can fail either because of parametric shifts that prevent the device from fulfilling its application or due to device failures where the device stops functioning altogether. Since this failure mode varies from part to part and lot to lot, lot qualification testing with sufficient statistics is vital. Displacement damage failures are caused by the displacement of semiconductor atoms from their lattice positions. As with TID, failures can be either parametric or catastrophic, although parametric degradation is more common for displacement damage. Lot testing is critical not just to assure proper device fi.mctionality throughout the mission. It can also suggest remediation strategies when a device fails. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. (2) On the NEAR mission a functional failure was traced to a PIN diode failure caused by TID induced high leakage currents. NEAR was able to recover from the failure by reversing the current of a nearby Thermal Electric Cooler (turning the TEC into a heater). The elevated temperature caused the PIN diode to anneal and the device to recover. It was by lot qualification testing that NEAR knew the diode would recover when annealed. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. Single Event Effects (SEE): (1) In contrast to TID and displacement damage, Single Event Effects (SEE) resemble random failures. SEE modes can range from changes in device logic (single-event upset, or SEU). temporary disturbances (single-event transient) to catastrophic effects such as the destructive SEE modes, single-event latchup (SEL). single-event gate rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB) (2) The consequences of nondestructive SEE modes such as SEU and SET depend critically on their application--and may range from trivial nuisance errors to catastrophic loss of mission. It is critical not just to ensure that potentially susceptible devices are well characterized for their susceptibility, but also to work with design engineers to understand the implications of each error mode. -For destructive SEE, the predominant risk mitigation strategy is to avoid susceptible parts, or if that is not possible. to avoid conditions under which the part may be susceptible. Destructive SEE mechanisms are often not well understood, and testing is slow and expensive, making rate prediction very challenging. (3) Because the consequences of radiation failure and degradation modes depend so critically on the application as well as the component technology, it is essential that radiation, component. design and system engineers work togetherpreferably starting early in the program to ensure critical applications are addressed in time to optimize the probability of mission success.
Recent testing of Enhanced Power Conversion (EPC) eGaN FET devices design for power use has shown that the devices are susceptible to Single-Event Effects (SEE) that degrade or destroy the device. The exact mechanism of the SEE is not known. The testing so far has been in the static condition, in the fully off condition, and with minimal load conditions. These conditions may not be worst case. This report presents the results of a study that tests some of the load conditions for SEE. The EPC2012 and EPC1012 were chosen for the test. The tests were performed the TAMU radiation effects facility in May and June of 2013.
Proton-induced fission of high-Z (Atomic Number) materials can produce high fluxes of high-LET (Linear Energy Transfer) ions in microelectronics. We develop methods to evaluate risks for a range of destructive and nondestructive SEE (Single-Event Effects) modes caused by this threat.
Recent testing of the EPC1000 series eGaN FETs has shown sensitivity to Single Event Effects (SEE) that are destructive. These effects are most likely the failure of the very thin gate structure in HEMT architecture. EPC has recently changed the doping of the substrate to improve the performance and the SEE response. This testing compares the SEE response of both devices.
The purpose of this testing was to examine the potential for destructive single event effects (SEE) in Broadcom’s ACPL-785E optocoupler in support of a NASA GSFC flight program. SEE testing was conducted NASA Space Radiation Laboratory (NSRL) at Brookhaven National Laboratory where devices with unmodified packaging were irradiated with high energy ions that have sufficient range to pass through the packaging of the device.
Destructive SEE pose serious challenges for the reliable use of COTS devices in space systems. We used system-level modeling to determine SEL rates that would likely compromise system reliability, resilience and capabilities. We then assembled a representative dataset of COTS CMOS parts and used nonparametric statistical techniques to assess the threat posed to redundant systems by destructive SEE.
Destructive SEE pose serious challenges for the reliable use of COTS devices in space systems. We use system-level modeling and non-parametric statistics to assess the threat posed to redundant systems by destructive SEE.
This paper presents the results of reliability life testing performed on commercial electronic devices that experienced non-destructive single-event latch-up (SEL) during heavy-ion testing.
Total ionizing dose (TID) and single-event effect (SEE) room-temperature radiation test results are presented for developmental prototype 4H-SiC junction field effect transistor (JFET) semiconductor integrated circuits (ICs) that have demonstrated prolonged operation in extremely high-temperature (500 °C) environments. The devices tested demonstrated over 7 Mrad(Si) TID tolerance and no destructive SEE susceptibility.