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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2019

Hazards Analysis and Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) of Four Concept Vehicle Propulsion Systems

The primary objective of this research effort is to identify failure modes and hazards associated with the concept vehicles and to perform functional hazard analyses (FHA) and failure modes and effects criticality analyses (FMECA) for each. Boeing also created a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for each of the concept vehicles, as the FTA contains the connectivity between systems and is an accepted, top-down method to analyze the safety of an air-vehicle. Conceptual design of notional powertrain configuration for each of four (4) NASA RVLT (Revolutionary Vertical Lift Technology) Concept Vehicles were developed in as much detail as was necessary to support the reliability and safety analysis for this project. Functional block diagrams from each of the conceptual powertrain configurations were created and used to order the FHA, FMECA, and FTA. Hazards were identified and the severity of each were categorized in the FHA for use in a follow-up FMECA. The FTA took inputs from the FMECA and the functional block diagrams to develop the connectivity and develop a quantitative architecture that could be used to perform sensitivity studies, as related to vehicle safety.Guidelines for reliability targets for both the air vehicle and the operation in the UAM (Urban Air Mobility) mission are discussed. An industry literature search was performed in order to assess gaps in existing government regulations and industry specifications. The industry literature search led to air-vehicle and operational reliability discussions, as related to Distributed Electric/Hybrid-Electric Propulsion (DE/HEP) system operating in the UAM role. A discussion of results and recommendations for future work is also provided.

Hazards Analysis↗
NASA NTRS1966

Procedure for Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)

This document provides guidelines for the accomplishment of Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) on the Apollo program. It is a procedure for analysis of hardware items to determine those items contributing most to system unreliability and crew safety problems.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1996

Meteorological Satellites (METSAT) and Earth Observing System (EOS) Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit-A (AMSU-A) Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL)

This Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is for the Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit-A (AMSU-A) instruments that are being designed and manufactured for the Meteorological Satellites Project (METSAT) and the Earth Observing System (EOS) integrated programs. The FMEA analyzes the design of the METSAT and EOS instruments as they currently exist. This FMEA is intended to identify METSAT and EOS failure modes and their effect on spacecraft-instrument and instrument-component interfaces. The prime objective of this FMEA is to identify potential catastrophic and critical failures so that susceptibility to the failures and their effects can be eliminated from the METSAT/EOS instruments.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1972

Space tug propulsion system failure mode, effects and criticality analysis

For purposes of the study, the propulsion system was considered as consisting of the following: (1) main engine system, (2) auxiliary propulsion system, (3) pneumatic system, (4) hydrogen feed, fill, drain and vent system, (5) oxygen feed, fill, drain and vent system, and (6) helium reentry purge system. Each component was critically examined to identify possible failure modes and the subsequent effect on mission success. Each space tug mission consists of three phases: launch to separation from shuttle, separation to redocking, and redocking to landing. The analysis considered the results of failure of a component during each phase of the mission. After the failure modes of each component were tabulated, those components whose failure would result in possible or certain loss of mission or inability to return the Tug to ground were identified as critical components and a criticality number determined for each. The criticality number of a component denotes the number of mission failures in one million missions due to the loss of that component. A total of 68 components were identified as critical with criticality numbers ranging from 1 to 2990.

Boyd, J. W.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Assessment of Stirling Technology Has Provided Critical Data Leading Toward Flight Readiness of the Stirling Converter

The NASA Glenn Research Center is supporting the development of a Stirling converter with the Department of Energy (DOE, Germantown, Maryland) for an advanced Stirling Radioisotope Power System (SRPS) to provide spacecraft onboard electric power for NASA space science missions. A key technology assessment completed by Glenn and DOE has led to the SRPS being identified as a high-efficiency power source for such deep space missions as the Europa Orbiter and the Solar Probe. In addition, the Stirling system is now being considered for unmanned Mars rovers, especially where mission profiles may exclude the use of photovoltaic power systems, such as exploration at high Martian latitudes or for missions of long duration. The SRPS efficiency of over 20 percent will reduce the required amount of radioisotope by more than a factor of 3 in comparison to current radioisotope thermoelectric generators. This significantly reduces radioisotope cost, radiological inventory, and system cost, and it provides efficient use of scarce radioisotope resources. In support of this technology assessment, Glenn conducted a series of independent evaluations and tests to determine the technology readiness of a 55-We Stirling converter developed by Stirling Technology Company (Kennewick, Washington) and DOE. Key areas evaluated by Glenn included: 1) Radiation tolerance of materials; 2) Random vibration testing of the Stirling converter in Glenn's Structural Dynamics Lab to simulate operation in the launch environment; 3) Electromagnetic interference and compatibility (EMI/EMC) of the converter operating in Glenn's EMI lab; Independent failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis, and life and reliability 4. Independent failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis, and life and reliability assessment; and 5) SRPS cost estimate. The data from these evaluations were presented to NASA Headquarters and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory mission office by a joint industry/Government team consisting of DOE, Glenn, and Lockheed Martin Astronautics. This team concluded that there are no technical reasons that would rule out using the Stirling converter for deep space missions. As a direct result of the successful testing at Glenn, the DOE/Stirling Technology Company 55-We Stirling converter has been baselined for the SRPS. Glenn is now continuing an in-house project to assist in developing the Stirling converter for readiness for space qualification and mission implementation. As part of this effort, the Stirling converter will be further characterized under launch environment random vibration testing, methods to reduce converter EMI will be developed, and an independent performance verification will be completed. Converter life assessment and permanent magnet aging characterization tasks are also underway. Substitute organic materials for the linear alternator and piston bearing coatings for use in a high-radiation environment have been identified and have now been incorporated in Stirling converters built by Stirling Technology Company for Glenn. Electromagnetic and thermal finite element analyses for the alternator are also being conducted.

Thieme, Lanny G.↗
NASA NTRS2002

A Framework for Creating a Function-based Design Tool for Failure Mode Identification

Knowledge of potential failure modes during design is critical for prevention of failures. Currently industries use procedures such as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree analysis, or Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality analysis (FMECA), as well as knowledge and experience, to determine potential failure modes. When new products are being developed there is often a lack of sufficient knowledge of potential failure mode and/or a lack of sufficient experience to identify all failure modes. This gives rise to a situation in which engineers are unable to extract maximum benefits from the above procedures. This work describes a function-based failure identification methodology, which would act as a storehouse of information and experience, providing useful information about the potential failure modes for the design under consideration, as well as enhancing the usefulness of procedures like FMEA. As an example, the method is applied to fifteen products and the benefits are illustrated.

Arunajadai, Srikesh G.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Failure Mode Identification Through Clustering Analysis

Research has shown that nearly 80% of the costs and problems are created in product development and that cost and quality are essentially designed into products in the conceptual stage. Currently, failure identification procedures (such as FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis), FMECA (Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis) and FTA (Fault Tree Analysis)) and design of experiments are being used for quality control and for the detection of potential failure modes during the detail design stage or post-product launch. Though all of these methods have their own advantages, they do not give information as to what are the predominant failures that a designer should focus on while designing a product. This work uses a functional approach to identify failure modes, which hypothesizes that similarities exist between different failure modes based on the functionality of the product/component. In this paper, a statistical clustering procedure is proposed to retrieve information on the set of predominant failures that a function experiences. The various stages of the methodology are illustrated using a hypothetical design example.

Arunajadai, Srikesh G.↗
NASA NTRS1972

Reliability analysis based on operational success criteria

Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis Model disregards failures of insignificant components. Assumptions used to establish baselines for reliability prediction and analytical method are listed. Techniques are applicable to any commercial design and can be extended into software or management systems.

Esmond, F. G.↗
DOE OSTI2023

2023 Risk Management Plan and Register for Low-Power WEC for Non-Grid Applications

This is an updated risk management plan and risk register for the design, build and test of a novel, remote, low-power wave energy converter (WEC) for non-grid applications. This Columbia Power Technologies project seeks to develop a prototype low-power WEC that lowers the total cost of ownership and provides robust, new capabilities for customers in the maritime environment. The testing location for this prototype is the U.S. Navy Wave Energy Test Site (WETS) in Kaneohe Bay, O'ahu, Hawai'i. Detailed in the Risk Management Plan document is a Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMEC) that systematically identifies all potential failure modes and their effects on the system. Risk registers for major subsystems were completed according to the methodology described in the Risk Management Plan and are also included here.

16 TIDAL AND WAVE POWER↗
DOE OSTI2023

PacWave South SeaRAY k2 Risk Registers

The SeaRAY is a deployable power system for maritime sensors, monitoring equipment, communications, unmanned underwater vehicles, and other similar payloads. This project is to design, deliver, and test a prototype low-power WEC that lowers the total cost of ownership and provides robust, new capabilities for customers in the maritime environment. Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is conducted to systematically identify all potential failure modes and their effects on the system, and to analyze the criticality of each risk based on the likelihood of the event and the severity of the impact. Actions may then be recommended to mitigate the criticality of a risk, either by reducing the likelihood of the risk or the severity of its impact. Risk assessment is executed iteratively as an integral part of the design process. By incorporating risk assessment early in the development cycle, mitigation of risk can be achieved cost effectively. The actions recommended to mitigate risk may be subsequently executed, and as the design progresses the risk assessment is reviewed and revised. Review of the risk assessment is integrated into structured design reviews, ensuring that critical risks are comprehended and that the Project will not progress to e.g. fabrication while intolerable risks remain. The risk assessment process results in the population and maintenance of Risk Registers (RRs). Each major system (and as needed, subsystem) will have a distinct RR. This allows each system or subsystem to be assessed individually, rendering the RRs to a manageable size for review.

16 TIDAL AND WAVE POWER↗
NASA NTRS2018

Failure Analysis and Products in a Model-Based Environment

The work presented in this paper describes an approach, including a methodology and tools, which allows system engineers to capture failure-related information in a model and generate automatically key failure analysis products: the Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). The work has been developed by Tietronix Software, Inc. and the NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), and the resulting auto-generated artifacts shown in this paper demonstrate the ability to obtain powerful reliability and fault management products in a model-based environment.

Castet, Jean-Francois↗
NASA NTRS1972

Failure modes, effects and criticality analyses.

Failure mode, effects and criticality analyses were developed by NASA as a means of assuring that hardware built for space applications has the desired reliability characteristics. The failure mode and effects analysis is a qualitative reliability technique for systematically analyzing each possible failure mode within a hardware system, and identifying the resulting effect on that system, the mission and personnel. The criticality analysis is a quantitative procedure which ranks the critical failure modes according to their probability of occurrence. This paper describes the failure modes, effects analysis and the criticality analysis. It employs a simple hardware system, not related to the aerospace field, to illustrate the method. It encourages application of this type of analysis to industrial development programs outside the aerospace and defense complex.

Jordan, W. E.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Failure Assessment

Three questions to which software developers want accurate, precise answers are "How can the software system fail?", "mat bad things will happen if the software fails?t', and "How many failures will the software experience?". Numerous techniques have been devised to answer these questions; three of the best known are: 1) Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) 2) Software Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (SFMECA 3) Software Fault/Failure Modeling. SFTA and SFMECA have been successfully used to analyze the flight software for a number of robotic planetary exploration missions, including Galileo, Cassini, and Deep Space 1. Given the increasing interest in reusing software components from mission to mission, one of us has developed techniques for reusing the corresponding portions of the SFTA and SFMECA, reducing the effort required to conduct these analyses. SFTA has also been shown to be effective in analyzing the security aspects of software systems; intrusion mechanisms and effects can easily be modeled using these techniques. The Bi- Directional Safety Analysis (BDSA) method combines a forward search (similar to SFMECA) from potential failure modes to their effects, with a backward search (similar to SFTA) from feasible hazards to the contributing causes of each hazard. BDSA offers an efficient way to identify latent failures. Recent work has extended BDSA to product-line applications such as flight-instrumentation displays and developed tool support for the reuse of the failure-analysis artifacts within a product line. BDSA has also been streamlined to support those projects having tight cost and/or schedule constraints for their failure analysis efforts. We discuss lessons learned from practice, describe available tools, and identi@ some future directions for the topic. A substantial amount of research has been devoted to estimating the number of failures that a software system will experience during test and operations, as well as the number of faults that have been inserted into that system during its development. One of us has found that the amount of structural change to a system during its development is strongly related to the number of faults inserted into it. Using techniques requiring no additional effort on the part of the development organization, the required measurements of structural evolution can be easily obtained from a development effort's configuration management system and readily transformed into an estimate of fault content. So far, structure-fault relationships have been identified for source code; current work seeks to examine artifacts available earlier in the lifecycle to determine if similar relationships between structure and fault content can be found. In particular, relationships between requirements change requests and the number of faults inserted into the implemented system would provide a significant improvement in our ability to control software quality during the early development phases.

fault tree↗
DOE OSTI2026

Managing Marine Energy Risks for Project Success

This presentation reviews recommended practices for marine energy risk management based on NLR's recent risk management framework publication (https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy24osti/90212.pdf). This presentation will include a demonstration of risk management processes and techniques that everyone in the marine energy industry can use to successfully meet their project objectives. This presentation will include a description of methods to identify and manage risks that are specific to marine energy, while demonstrating this through tools such as risk registers, failure modes effects and criticality analysis (FMECA), and more tools that are currently being developed. The goal of this presentation is for the participants to have knowledge and access to tools to help them manage the risks specific to their marine energy projects.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
NASA NTRS2005

On Automating Failure Mode Analysis and Enforcing its Integrity

This paper reports our experience on the development of a design-for-safety (DFS) workbench called Risk Assessment and Management Environment (RAME) for microelectronic avionics systems. Our objective is to transform DFS practice from an ad-hoc, inefficient, error-prone approach to a stringent engineering process such that DFS can keep up with the rapidly growing complexity of avionics systems. In particular, RAME is built upon an information infrastructure that comprises a fault model, a knowledge base, and a failure reporting/tracking system. This infrastructure permits systematic learning from prior projects and enables the automation of failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA). Among other unique features, the most important advantage of RAME is its capability of directly accepting design source code in hardware description languages (HDLs) for automated failure mode analysis, which enables RAME to be compatible and to evolve with most electronic-computer-aided-design systems. Through an initial experimental evaluation of the RAME prototype, we show that our approach to FMECA automation improves failure mode analysis turn-around-time, completeness, and accuracy.

design for safety↗
NASA NTRS2019

Model Based Engineering for Software Assurance

NASA's successful development of next generation space vehicles, habitats, and robotic systems will require reliable hardware and software systems. The aim of this initiative is to develop modeling methodology and tools to support Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) for software assurance and reliability analysis. This effort expands the Unified Modeling Language (UML) software design models to include fault data for the extraction of Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for software. We explored different modeling approaches to integrate the UML software design models with the Systems Modeling Language (SysML) system models to generate an integrated model and reliability tools that take into account software and hardware interfaces.The benefits of this concept directly affect the safety community with quick turnarounds to produce software assurance and reliability analysis artifacts and the ability to visualize failure effects, both hardware and software. The result is enhanced system design integrity and early identification of system risks. This initiative will enable software assurance activities early in the system design lifecycle, facilitating the discovery of design weaknesses and enhancing the capability to produce safe, hazard-free systems

Wang, Lui↗
DOE OSTI2024

CalWave - Reports and Plans for xWave Device Demonstration at PacWave South Site

CalWave has developed a submerged pressure differential type Wave Energy Converter (WEC) architecture called xWave. The single body device oscillates submerged, is positively buoyant, and taut moored to the sea floor and integrates novel features such as absorber submergence depth control. Since participation in the US Wave Energy Prize, CalWave has evolved the design and successfully concluded a scaled 10-month open ocean pilot. CalWave recently concluded the final design phase of a scaled up WEC version for PacWave and started component order/build of the WEC towards the grid-connected demonstration at PacWave. Documentation and data here includes: a system certification plan, a risk registry in the form of an FMECA (Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis) table, an updated LCOE content model, a report on performance metrics, and a risk management plan.

16 TIDAL AND WAVE POWER↗