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DOE OSTI2025

Knowledge Transfer Program for International Nuclear Safeguards

Nuclear safeguards were first announced in 1945 by the U.S., Canadian and British governments as a means to exchange scientific information about peaceful uses of atomic energy and prevent the use of nuclear material for weapons. International nuclear safeguards, now under the provision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), serves to hold accountable the 140 member countries (States) that have entered into treaties and agreements against the spread of nuclear weapons. Most notably, the IAEA acts as a nuclear materials inspectorate under the global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, brought about in 1968, that specifies commitments member States make to the world?s non-proliferation regime. The Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (OINS) is part of the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy. Within OINS, the Human Capital Development program recognizes the need to build workforce capacity and safeguards expertise. This includes supporting the education and training of younger generations working in international nuclear safeguards. One of the program?s main concerns is core competencies being lost to retirement or attrition and building knowledge retention pipelines from senior to new professionals. One identified core competency is knowledge gained by individuals who have completed IAEA assignments such as missions to member States to conduct safeguards inspections. Such individuals possess unique knowledge, and efforts are being put forth to effectively capture this knowledge within the national laboratories complex. To this end, we report findings from a one-year mentor-mentee knowledge retention program in which an international safeguards subject matter expert imparted knowledge and skills to a willing professional mentee. The knowledge and skills stem from the mentor?s multi-year assignment at the IAEA in Vienna, Austria.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
DOE OSTI2021

Fork Experiments in the Hot Cell Using Spent Fuel Rods for International Nuclear Safeguards

This work leveraged the rare availability of 25 full-length pressurized water reactor spent fuel rods and 1 irradiated mixed-oxide rod at an Oak Ridge National Laboratory hot cell. This was done to collect measurement data with two Fork detectors to assess the detectors’ capability of verifying operator declaration data and detecting partial defects in spent fuel, which are the two primary goals of international safeguards on spent nuclear fuel. The data can also be used to benchmark the ORIGEN module, which has been adopted in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s)/European Atomic Energy Community’s (Euratom’s) Integrated Review and Analysis Program to predict the Fork detector count rates in real time. In this project, the authors first calibrated two Fork detectors—a standard one and a modified one—by using known strong neutron and gamma sources. Then, the authors measured all 26 fuel rods at multiple locations along the length. The fuel rods were then assembled into three arrays—2 × 2, 3 × 3, and 5 × 5—by using specially designed support grids to mimic fuel assemblies and measure the arrays with both detectors. For the 5 × 5 array, 4 and 8 fuel rods of the array were replaced in two separate cases with short stainless-steel rods to mimic two partial defect scenarios, and the arrays were measured before and after the replacements. Polyethylene blocks were used in this experiment to mimic water. The results show that the Fork detectors were able to verify operator declarations and detect partial defects in spent fuel, and the authors were the first to demonstrate this through experiments. A discovery was also made that determined the root cause of the nonlinear response to gamma dose in the ion chambers used in IAEA and Euratom’s Fork detectors. After the experiments, both detectors were retrieved from the hot cell for future use. The data collected in this project will be used in a parallel International Nuclear Safeguards Engagement Program (INSEP) project to enhance the safeguards in the Finnish spent fuel encapsulation plant, and the data will be useful to other projects in the future given the increased safeguards needs due to spent fuel transfer and disposal activities worldwide.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Data Validation Experiments with a Computer-Generated Imagery Dataset for International Nuclear Safeguards

Computer vision models have great potential as tools for international nuclear safeguards verification activities, but off-the-shelf models require fine-tuning through transfer learning to detect relevant objects. Because open-source examples of safeguards-relevant objects are rare, and to evaluate the potential of synthetic training data for computer vision, we present the Limbo dataset. Limbo includes both real and computer-generated images of uranium hexafluoride containers for training computer vision models. Here, we generated these images iteratively based on results from data validation experiments that are detailed here. The findings from these experiments are applicable both for the safeguards community and the broader community of computer vision research using synthetic data.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Learning Management System User Requirements for the National Nuclear Security Administration's International Nuclear Safeguards Engagement Program

The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) International Nuclear Safeguards Engagement Program (INSEP) is considering investing in new tools that would allow the program to support its partner states from a distance. At the same time, the program is considering approaches that would allow several organizations, including NNSA, IAEA, national laboratories and contractor staff, to collaborate in the development and maintenance of instructional content. Software systems known as Learning Management Systems (LMSs) might represent a mechanism through which INSEP could accomplish these goals (collaborative development and remote support). To assess the usefulness of an LMS, INSEP has specified its needs for delivering online training and compared those needs to the capability of a range of LMSs. This comparison will allow INSEP to determine whether an LMS would be a useful tool and may set the stage for a "make-buy" decision in the future. The study team concluded that INSEP's content development and delivery needs align well with the capabilities of the leading LMSs on the market today and that that INSEP performance requirements allow for a customized approach using existing training portals that are already available to NNSA. Additional work would be required to specify the desired processes for developing online training and outreach materials, structuring the databases, specifying the data that should be collected, and detailing the desired system reports and documentation.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Remote Monitoring Systems/Remote Data Transmission for International Nuclear Safeguards.

The use of remotely transmitted data from a nuclear facility under international nuclear safeguards to an inspectorate headquarters has been rapidly growing since inception as its value in reducing inspection effort and cost is demonstrated. There are opportunities for further growth moving forward including (1) the number of spent fuel casks in dry interim storage are increasing, leading to strain on inspection resources and potentially increased radiation exposure to inspectors, (2) the frequency of encapsulating spent nuclear fuel for final disposal in geological repositories occurs at a rate that may lead to the need for on-site inspectors unless systems can be developed to remotely transmit data, and (3) new facility types such as small modular reactors may rely heavily on remotely transmitted data due in part to remote locations of operation and mobility. Challenges need to be addressed too and include (1) hesitancy to implement remote data transmission by states, (2) data collection, transmission, security, and analysis, and (3) reliable power and communications. This report examines the evolution, equipment deployed, status, and opportunities/challenges of remote data transmission moving forward.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Design Considerations for the Field Use of International Nuclear Safeguards Technology

The process of developing and deploying safeguards technology should be carried out in such a way that it supports the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) international safeguards verification mission, while also being efficient in terms of both cost and time. This process, however, may be hindered by a general lack of nuclear facility operating experience among the scientists or engineers designing safeguards technology, or the inability to interact with the IAEA inspector end user. As a result, equipment designers may have difficulty understanding inspector needs and the limitations of using safeguards technology in the field, often leading to inefficiencies (in the form of increased cost and time spent) in the safeguards technology design process. Here, to mitigate this knowledge gap, the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, has developed design considerations that should be incorporated into safeguards technologies, focusing on non-destructive assay equipment. Timelines for integration of these considerations into the design process are also discussed.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗