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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Smart manufacturing maturity models and their applicability: a review

The purpose of this paper is to review existing smart manufacturing (SM) maturity models' dimensions and maturity levels to assess their applicability and drawbacks. There are many maturity models available but many of them have not been validated or do not provide a useful guide or tool for applications. This gap creates the need for a review of the existing maturity model's applicability. Nineteen peer-reviewed maturity models related to “Digital Transformation,” “Industry 4.0” or “Smart Manufacturing” were selected based on a systematic literature review and five consulting firm models were selected based on the author's industry knowledge. The chosen models were analyzed to determine 10 categories of dimensions. Then they are assessed on a 1–5 scale for how applicable they are in the 10 categories of dimensions. The five “consulting firm” models have a first-mover advantage, are more widely used in industry and are more applicable, but some require payment, and they lack published details and validation. The 19 “peer reviewed” models are not as widely used, lack awareness in the industry and are not as easy to apply because of no web tool for self-assessment, but they are improving. The categories defined to characterize the models and facilitate comparisons for users include “Information Technology (IT) and Cyber-Physical System (CPS) and Data,” “Strategy and Organization,” “Supply Chain and Logistics,” “Products and Services,” “Culture and Employees,” “Technology and Capabilities,” “Customer and Market,” “Cybersecurity and Risk,” “Leadership and Management” and “Governance and Compliance.” The analyzed maturity models were particularly weak in the areas of cybersecurity, leadership and governance. Researchers and practitioners can use this review with consideration of their specific needs to determine if a maturity model is applicable or if a new model needs to be developed. The review can also aid in the development of maturity models through the discussion of each of the dimension categories. Finally, compared to existing reviews of SM maturity models, this research determines comprehensive dimension categories and focuses on applicability and drawbacks.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

User Guide to the Facility Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (F-C2M2) Assessment

The Facility Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (F-C2M2) assessment was designed to help facilities address their unique cybersecurity challenges. Building upon the foundational principles of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2), the F-C2M2 was explicitly tailored for federal facilities to help evaluate, benchmark, and enhance the cybersecurity capabilities of both their information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) environments. This user guide was developed to facilitate a thorough understanding of the tool. Whether users are familiar with the original C2M2 or are new to the maturity model concept, this guide was designed to offer clarity, direction, and support.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

APPLICATION OF MATURITY MODELS FOR EVALUATING CYBERSECURITY PROGRAMS AT NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL FACILITIES

Maturity models can be used to provide government agencies, industry associations, and organizations operating nuclear facilities with the ability to quickly evaluate the maturity of their cybersecurity programs and identify areas to prioritize for improvement. The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) was developed by the U.S. Department of Energy to allow organizations in the energy sector to evaluate the programmatic capabilities of their cybersecurity programs in a consistent manner, communicate programmatic maturity information, prioritize cybersecurity investments in targeted areas of concern, and track how the maturity of their cybersecurity program evolves over time. The C2M2 is designed for use by any critical infrastructure organization regardless of ownership, structure, or size. The C2M2 can be easily fine-tuned to access the maturity of nuclear cybersecurity programs and their application at individual facilities. Built on a foundation of existing cybersecurity standards, frameworks, programs, and initiatives, the model features 10 security domains. Performance in each security domain is characterized using a structured set of cybersecurity practices that represent activities an organization can perform to improve cybersecurity in their domain. Each practice can be quickly evaluated as being either fully, largely, partially, or not implemented. Once practices are evaluated for each security domain, the model defines four maturity indicator levels that apply independently to each domain in the model. To earn a maturity level in a given domain, an organization must adequately perform all the practices for that maturity level and its predecessor level(s). A small assessment team can conduct a C2M2 assessment in a single day. A screening version of the C2M2 allows an initial look at the maturity of nuclear cybersecurity programs that could be completed in under an hour.

Cyber security, Nuclear security, maturity model↗
DOE OSTI2020

Electricity Subsector Transmission Resilience Maturity Model (TRMM) User Guide

The electric transmission sector is facing a range of threats to its functionality that are either new, more severe than experienced in earlier years, or more well understood. Such threats include more frequent and more severe extreme weather events, wildfires, droughts, and human-caused physical and cyberattacks. They also include geological, electromagnetic, and biological events. The novelty or increasing severity of these threats creates a significant need for transmission owners to implement programs to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from such incidents. The national and economic security of the United States depends on the reliable functioning of the Nation’s critical infrastructure in the face of such threats, and the transmission networks are essential components of that infrastructure. The Electricity Subsector Transmission Resilience Maturity Model (TRMM) is a tool that a transmission organization can use to objectively evaluate and benchmark its currently established transmission resilience strategies, programs, policies, and investments, in order to target and prioritize enhancements where needed. The TRMM was developed to address the unique characteristics of the transmission system. The model can enable users to: • evaluate and benchmark their organization’s resilience capabilities, effectively and consistently • prioritize actions and investments to improve the resilience of their systems • share transmission-related knowledge, best practices, and relevant references within their organization and with business partners as a means to improve resilience capabilities • contribute to increasing the overall resilience of the Nation’s transmission systems. The TRMM provides descriptive rather than prescriptive industry-focused guidance. The model content is presented at a high level of abstraction so that it can be interpreted by transmission organizations of various types, structures, and sizes. The model is designed to an be easy-to-use, self-assessment tool.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2020

Secure Design and Development Cyber Security Capability Maturity Model” (SD2-CM2)

The "Secure Design and Development Cyber Security Capability Maturity Model" (SD2-CM2) allows electrical system managers to assess the maturity of their cybersecurity systems, including designs reflecting internet of things devices (IOT). The content provides best practices in the field and users can assess the level of their designs. Modules are "Content" and "Infrastructure"

Gourisetti, Sri Nikhil Gupta↗
DOE OSTI2025

Moving Beyond Direct Load Control: A Maturity Model for Realizing the Promise of Demand Flexibility

This report discusses a new maturity model that regulators and utilities can use to guide and expand demand flexibility programs and enable the resources to provide more grid services. The model has six demand flexibility categories: planning and design; customer engagement; program operations; evaluation, measurement and verification; distributed energy resource orchestration; and data infrastructure. Within each category, capabilities are identified and described on a maturity scale that ranges from performing below expectations to improving on best practices.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Predictive Capability Maturity Model Demonstration for Cylindrical Cavity Coupling Using Gemma in the Next Generation Workflow

The predictive capability maturity model (PCMM) uses the expert elicitation process to generate credibility evidence for a particular analysis. To ensure Gemma has the capability to efficiently produce this credibility evidence, next generation workflows (NGW) are created for the solution verification, calibration/validation, and input uncertainty quantification portions of the PCMM assessment. These workflows are then used on the Higgins cylinder problem, which is representative of applications involving external-to-internal electromagnetic field coupling through a slot. The uncertainties calculated using these workflows are then used to calculate the validation comparison error and the validation uncertainty for the model following the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) verification and validation (V&V) 20 standard. These workflows will enable analysts to iterate each element of PCMM more efficiently than if completed without using a NGW workflow. An example of this iterative process is shown in Section 7.2.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Interoperability Maturity Model

This document presents the relevant concepts for specifying criteria that support a grid modernization strategic vision for interoperability. It focuses on the ways to assess levels of interoperability. The assessment of interoperability needs to clearly show the relationship to interoperability and provide the necessary data to create a roadmap for how to improve interoperability. A key point to understand is that interoperability has several crucial elements, any of which may have areas for improvement. To measure interoperability, it is helpful to focus on specific areas based on the objectives of the stakeholders that are initiating the desired interoperability advancement. The measurement tool for interoperability allows the measurement tool and the area to which it is being applied to be segmented and applied in various ways. The measurement tool is based on, and developed from, the GridWise® Architecture Council’s (GWAC’s) Beta release of its Interoperability Maturity Model (GWAC 2011). As such, it represents an evolution of that approach, so the working name used in this document is IMM.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Insights into the mechanism of SARS-CoV-2 main protease autocatalytic maturation from model precursors

A critical step for SARS-CoV-2 assembly and maturation involves the autoactivation of the main protease (MPro WT ) from precursor polyproteins. Upon expression, a model precursor of MPro WT mediates its own release at its termini rapidly to yield a mature dimer. A construct with an E290A mutation within MPro exhibits time dependent autoprocessing of the accumulated precursor at the N-terminal nsp4/nsp5 site followed by the C-terminal nsp5/nsp6 cleavage. In contrast, a precursor containing E290A and R298A mutations (MPro M ) displays cleavage only at the nsp4/nsp5 site to yield an intermediate monomeric product, which is cleaved at the nsp5/nsp6 site only by MPro WT . MPro M and the catalytic domain (MPro 1-199 ) fused to the truncated nsp4 region also show time-dependent conversion in vitro to produce MPro M and MPro 1-199 , respectively. The reactions follow first-order kinetics indicating that the nsp4/nsp5 cleavage occurs via an intramolecular mechanism. These results support a mechanism involving an N-terminal intramolecular cleavage leading to an increase in the dimer population and followed by an intermolecular cleavage at the C-terminus. Thus, targeting the predominantly monomeric MPro precursor for inhibition may lead to the identification of potent drugs for treatment.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Achieving Higher Fidelity Pulsed-Power Simulations Using Advanced Gap Closure Modeling

This project has progressed several physics models in the EMPIRE plasma simulation code to achieve higher fidelity simulations of high-current diode operation in pulsed-power accelerators. In this report, we present details for the following major work products: (1) a set of verification problems covering all key processes involved in gap closure physics has been designed; this suite has facilitated feature vetting and overall model maturation, (2) a new EMPIRE exemplar has been developed: the Radiographic Integrated Test Stand 6 (RITS-6) diode, and (3) An exemplar for the Saturn accelerator exemplar was enabled by the models matured under this work to self-consistently simulate further into the diode pulse than previously possible (bipolar flow regime). These developments have lead to the highest confidence EMPIRE power flow predictions of the Saturn accelerator to date. Additionally, three modeling approaches for simulating electrode plasmas have been investigated. We report on these results and provide recommendations.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Preparing For Advanced Air Mobility: A System-Level Framework For Infrastructure, Investment, and Deployment

Advanced air mobility (AAM) is moving from demonstration toward early deployment, supported by a growing national strategy that outlines how these systems may evolve across airspace, infrastructure, and operations. As this transition takes shape, a more practical question comes into focus: what does it mean to be ready? This paper introduces a Capability Maturity Model (CMM) as a structured way to think about that challenge. Rather than treating readiness as a fixed condition, it frames it as a progression - one that develops across multiple, interdependent domains over time.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2020

Cybersecurity Vulnerability Mitigation Framework through Empirical Paradigm: Enhanced Prioritized Gap Analysis

Existing cybersecurity vulnerability assessment tools were designed based on the policies and standards defined by organizations such as the U.S. Department of Energy and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Frameworks such as the cybersecurity capability maturity model (C2M2) and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) are often used by the critical infrastructure owners and operators to determine the cybersecurity maturity of their facility. Although these frameworks are exceptional at performing qualitative cybersecurity analysis and identifying vulnerabilities, they do not provide a means to perform prioritized mitigation of those vulnerabilities in order to achieve a desired cybersecurity maturity. To address that challenge, we developed a framework and software application called the cybersecurity vulnerability mitigation framework through empirical paradigm (CyFEr). This paper presents the detailed architecture of CyFEr’s enhanced prioritized gap analysis (EPGA) methodology and its application to CSF. The efficacy of the presented framework is demonstrated by comparing against existing similar models and testing against the cyber injects from a real-world cyber-attack that targeted industrial control systems (ICS) in critical infrastructures.

Gourisetti, Sri Nikhil G.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Zero Trust Strategies for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Detection Systems: D.1 Cyber Scenarios

The evolving landscape of cybersecurity necessitates a paradigm shift to a Zero Trust (ZT) model, which assumes breaches and continuously verifies trust. This approach reshapes how trust boundaries are established, focusing on identities, devices, networks, applications, and data, rather than solely relying on perimeter defenses such as firewalls. Central to this transformation is the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) Special Publication 800-207, outlining the Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA), along with Executive Order 14028, which mandates federal agencies to adopt ZT principles. Complementary to these efforts, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) developed the Zero Trust Maturity Model (ZTMM), providing a framework with five pillars and three cross-cutting capabilities to guide agencies toward enhanced cybersecurity maturity. In support of these initiatives, the DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) is applying ZT principles to secure Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) detection systems. Recognizing the diverse deployment models and network connectivity of these systems—from stationary, non-networked units to mobile, cloud-connected devices—the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing cybersecurity scenarios specifically for CBRN environments. These scenarios examine various configurations and technological capabilities, offering insights into the application of ZTMM pillars in enhancing the security postures of CBRN devices. The cybersecurity scenarios presented by PNNL are hypothetical, crafted to explore theoretical situations and stimulate discussion on the potential use or compromise of CBRN detection systems in varied contexts. These narratives are illustrative and do not reference any real events or actual networks. Instead, they employ generalized reference models to highlight concepts and potential issues within CBRN security, focusing on how Zero Trust strategies can be adapted to address these challenges effectively.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗