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Motor Qualification for Long-Duration Mars Missions
Qualification of motors for deep space under extreme thermal environments to be encountered during the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) mission is required to verify the reliability and validate mission assurance requirements. The motor assembly must survive all ground operations, plus the nominal 670 Martian-day (or sol) mission that includes summer and winter seasons of the Mars environment. The motor assembly was tested and characterized under extreme temperature conditions with reference to hardware requirements. The motor assembly has been proved to be remarkably robust and displayed no sign of degradation due to the 3 X (three times per JPL design principles) thermal environmental exposure to the punishing Mars surface operations cycles. The motor characteristics obtained before, during, and post-test comparisons for the surface operations cycles are within measurement error of one another. The motors withstood/survived 2,010 extreme temperature cycles with a Delta T of 190 C deep temperature cycles, representing three times the expected thermal cycling exposure during the MSL surface operations. The qualification test hardware elements (A200 motor assembly, encoders, and resolver) have not shown any signs of degradation due to the PQV (Package Qualification and Verification) testing. The test hardware has demonstrated sufficient life to survive the deep thermal cycles associated with MSL mission surface operations for three lives.
Standards Roadmapping for Mission Assurance in Commercial Spaceflight
This paper explores the application of established roadmapping approaches in standards planning and roadmap development to support mission assurance objectives. Mission assurance requires proactive planning across multiple domains including technical, schedule, cost, organizational, and policy. The intersection of these domains happens at the enterprise level, and enterprise systems engineering processes can systematically guide mission assurance activities, including development of standards roadmaps. Standards planning and development is a critical contributor to an effective mission assurance strategy, although standards are often developed and adopted reactively. Technology and standards planning is a key Enterprise Process Management activity, as identified by the Systems Engineering Body of Knowledge, and technology and standards roadmaps are strategic tools used to enable that process. Technology roadmapping has proven effective in guiding enterprise architecture and concept design, and standards planning supports enterprise requirements definition and management. However, there are limited methodologies to guide such standards planning activities. The application of technology roadmapping principles to standards planning formalizes the process and establishes a repeatable framework for standards development and integration. The framework development described in this paper fills a methodological gap by adapting proven roadmapping techniques to standards planning. Through a comparison of roadmapping methodologies and a case study analysis, this approach outlines a systematic process for anticipating and planning standards needs. In the case of developing a standards integration roadmap for NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA), technology roadmapping principles were adapted to develop a roadmap framework to allow NASA and OSMA to define an agency-wide standards integration plan for commercial and industry safety and mission assurance standards. The outcome highlights key adaptations required for roadmapping in a standards context and describes the process steps to formalize a standards planning activity. The roadmapping framework adapted for standards development and integration enables more strategic, forward-looking standards planning and allows for better alignment between evolving capabilities and mission assurance requirements. Beyond its application to mission assurance, this methodology can be transferred to other domains requiring standards development, providing a systematic approach that integrates systems engineering principles into policy strategy and decision-making processes.
A New Approach to Mission Classification and Risk Management for NASA Space Flight Missions
The NASA risk classification system is meant to uide space mission development from formulation through completion of implementation. It is also meant to be the basis on which program and project managers develop and implement appropriate mission assurance and risk management strategies for the mission. In order to be useful, the risk classification system needs to provide consistent and reproducible classification results so that missions may be designed with the appropriate components, subsystems, and testing philosophy, all of which impacts mission schedule and cost. In a cost-constrained environment, a clear, robust, and reproducible approach to mission implementation becomes more critical than ever before. Once a project's risk classification level is established, the managers can define the appropriate management controls, systems engineering processes, mission assurance requirements, safety, and testing for that mission. The current NASA mission classification system will be reviewed before a new system is proposed.NASA manages space flight missions according to a four-tiered classification which assumes increasing levels of risk. We argue that risk does not change between classes. What changes are the means available to reduce risk. In performance-driven missions, the project will spend money in order to maintain performance without reducing margins. In cost-constrained missions, performance will be reduced in order to stay within budget or to maintain schedule: measurement requirements may be traded, design life may be reduced, or both. We then propose a new approach to the classification of NASA space flight missions, based on an assessment of how flexible the requirements, how exquisite the measurements, how long the lifetime, and how rigid the budget.Our proposed approach makes possible a clearer differentiation between classification levels and more effective guidance to program and project managers.
Instructions for Plastic Encapsulated Microcircuit(PEM) Selection, Screening and Qualification.
The use of Plastic Encapsulated Microcircuits (PEMs) is permitted on NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) spaceflight applications, provided each use is thoroughly evaluated for thermal, mechanical, and radiation implications of the specific application and found to meet mission requirements. PEMs shall be selected for their functional advantage and availability, not for cost saving; the steps necessary to ensure reliability usually negate any initial apparent cost advantage. A PEM shall not be substituted for a form, fit and functional equivalent, high reliability, hermetic device in spaceflight applications. Due to the rapid change in wafer-level designs typical of commercial parts and the unknown traceability between packaging lots and wafer lots, lot specific testing is required for PEMs, unless specifically excepted by the Mission Assurance Requirements (MAR) for the project. Lot specific qualification, screening, radiation hardness assurance analysis and/or testing, shall be consistent with the required reliability level as defined in the MAR. Developers proposing to use PEMs shall address the following items in their Performance Assurance Implementation Plan: source selection (manufacturers and distributors), storage conditions for all stages of use, packing, shipping and handling, electrostatic discharge (ESD), screening and qualification testing, derating, radiation hardness assurance, test house selection and control, data collection and retention.
SMD Class D standard MAR
Overview presentation for a streamlined Class D mission assurance requirements document developed by an Agency-wide team for NASA Science Mission Directorate
S&MA Requirements Tool (SMART)
In FY03 QS10 began building an S&MA web based data management tool,"Safety & Mission Assurance Requirements Tool" (SMART) that identifies S&MA requirements, tailors requirements to IAW project/program categories, tracks implementation, and provides a template for developing requirements and tracking waivers. This report provides a SMART process flow, typical application, typical data requirement deliverables, progress in 03, and FY04 activities.
The Importance of Multilateral Safety Requirements for Human Spaceflight
The International Space Station (ISS) Program initially implemented safety requirements in a series of bilateral agreements between NASA and each International Partner. As the program matured and multilateral processes began to be developed, the differences between these bilaterally agreed requirement sets became more significant. Efforts to develop multilateral safety requirements were hampered for many reasons including assessment of national standards used in the bilateral agreements, requirements baselines for existing contracts, and resource limitations to address requirements changes late in the development and operations phases. To avoid similar requirements issues in the future, international safety requirements need to be developed for human spaceflight. This paper will provide the background of the ISS bilateral Safety and Mission Assurance requirements and processes, describe the activities to develop multilateral safety requirements and processes, and give examples of issues that were encountered. Further, the paper will make recommendations regarding the development of international safety requirements for human spaceflight and the safety topics to be addressed.
Improved Verification for Aerospace Systems
Aerospace systems are subject to many stringent performance requirements to be verified with low risk. This report investigates verification planning using conditional approaches vice the standard classical statistical methods, and usage of historical surrogate data for requirement validation and in verification planning. The example used in this report to illustrate the results of these investigations is a proposed mission assurance requirement with the concomitant maximum acceptable verification risk for the NASA Constellation Program Orion Launch Abort System (LAS). This report demonstrates the following improvements: 1) verification planning using conditional approaches vice classical statistical methods results in plans that are more achievable and feasible; 2) historical surrogate data can be used to bound validation of performance requirements; and, 3) incorporation of historical surrogate data in verification planning using conditional approaches produces even less costly and more reasonable verification plans. The procedures presented in this report may produce similar improvements and cost savings in verification for any stringent performance requirement for an aerospace system.
Environmental Conditions for Space Flight Hardware: A Survey
Interest in generalization of the physical environment experienced by NASA hardware from the natural Earth environment (on the launch pad), man-made environment on Earth (storage acceptance an d qualification testing), the launch environment, and the space environment, is ed to find commonality among our hardware in an effort to reduce cost and complexity. NASA is entering a period of increase in its number of planetary missions and it is important to understand how our qualification requirements will evolve with and track these new environments. Environmental conditions are described for NASA projects in several ways for the different periods of the mission life cycle. At the beginning, the mission manager defines survivability requirements based on the mission length, orbit, launch date, launch vehicle, and other factors . such as the use of reactor engines. Margins are then applied to these values (temperature extremes, vibration extremes, radiation tolerances, etc,) and a new set of conditions is generalized for design requirements. Mission assurance documents will then assign an additional margin for reliability, and a third set of values is provided for during testing. A fourth set of environmental condition values may evolve intermittently from heritage hardware that has been tested to a level beyond the actual mission requirement. These various sets of environment figures can make it quite confusing and difficult to capture common hardware environmental requirements. Environmental requirement information can be found in a wide variety of places. The most obvious is with the individual projects. We can easily get answers to questions about temperature extremes being used and radiation tolerance goals, but it is more difficult to map the answers to the process that created these requirements: for design, for qualification, and for actual environment with no margin applied. Not everyone assigned to a NASA project may have that kind of insight, as many have only the environmental requirement numbers needed to do their jobs but do not necessarily have a programmatic-level understanding of how all of the environmental requirements fit together.
Real-Time Protocol Engineering with the B Language
It is an invariant that critical cyberphysical systems should not fail. Mission assurance requires systems to behave with predictability, especially in their ability to satisfy real-time constraints. The NIST standard for Engineering Trustworthy Secure Systems, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-160v1r1 states that formal methods are the highest level for meeting assurance requirements. There is a tension between the formal method software development process (Figure 1), which does not introduce time specificity until the latter stages of the development process (concrete model), and the need to gain confidence that time constraints will be satisfied. This paper formalizes the practical application of temporal entities e.g. Propositional Temporal Logic (PTL), Temporal Logic of Actions Plus (TLA+), etc. to critical systems.
Reliability Practice at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center
This paper describes in brief the Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) Programs performed directly by the reliability branch at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). The mission assurance requirements flow down is explained. GSFC practices for PRA, reliability prediction/fault tree analysis/reliability block diagram, FMEA, part stress and derating analysis, worst case analysis, trend analysis, limit life items are presented. Lessons learned are summarized and recommendations on improvement are identified.
GSFC Safety and Mission Assurance Organization
This viewgraph presentation reviews NASA Goddard Space Flight Center's approach to safety and mission assurance. The contents include: 1) NASA GSFC Background; 2) Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate; 3) The Role of SMA-D and the Technical Authority; 4) GSFC Mission assurance Requirements; 5) GSFC Systems Review Office (SRO); 6) GSFC Supply Chain Management Program; and 7) GSFC ISO9001/AS9100 Status Brief.
James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) Integrated Science Instruments Module (ISIM) Electronics Compartment (IEC) Conformal Shields Composite Bond Structure Qualification Test Method
The JWST IEC conformal shields are mounted onto a composite frame structure that must undergo qualification testing to satisfy mission assurance requirements. The composite frame segments are bonded together at the joints using epoxy, EA 9394. The development of a test method to verify the integrity of the bonded structure at its operating environment introduces challenges in terms of requirements definition and the attainment of success criteria. Even though protoflight thermal requirements were not achieved, the first attempt in exposing the structure to cryogenic operating conditions in a thermal vacuum environment resulted in approximately 1 bonded joints failure during mechanical pull tests performed at 1.25 times the flight loads. Failure analysis concluded that the failure mode was due to adhesive cracks that formed and propagated along stress concentrated fillets as a result of poor bond squeeze-out control during fabrication. Bond repairs were made and the structures successfully re-tested with an improved LN2 immersion test method to achieve protoflight thermal requirements.
Risk-Based SMA and Modernizing Risk Classification at GSFC
In 2014, in response to a large volume of feedback from industry, the science community, and internal to Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), GSFC’s Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Directorate began a transition to a risk-based implementation of SMA, departing from its longstanding practice of being primarily driven by a mostly static set of Mission Assurance Requirements. The transition started out with a pilot project involving risk-based acceptance of bare-printed circuit boards that was enormously successful, continued through a complete organizational transformation in 2015, and culminated with the baselining of formal Risk-Based SMA policy in 2016. In this presentation we will describe the risk-based SMA concept, segue into how it shapes a modernization of risk classification that GSFC has rolled out, and provide results from the original pilot project for risk-based SMA, involving the printed circuit board assurance process.
Preparing to Assure Mission Success
Space flight missions are inherently risky. The mission operations assurance discipline grew out of strategies to control error and evolved into what today is an independent technical authority dedicated to achieving mission success. After the Mars Climate Orbiter loss, NASA made a set of recommendations for missions. Two of those recommendations led to the creation of today’s Mission Operations Assurance Manager role: (1) require an independent Mission Assurance representative during the operational phase of every flight project, and (2) require all flight projects to report and track post-launch anomalies. Since then, the MOAM role has been continually refined by lessons learned from its practice on more than 20 concurrent missions. The MOAM role requires significant operations experience as well as an additional set of skills. In the interests of developing a cadre of potential MOAMs, the MOAM training program was developed. It is a 14-unit set of presentations/discussions covering the 11 categories of MOAM tasks. It is offered to new MOAMs and interested systems engineers with an eye to preparing both types of personnel for present and future assignments, as well as building relationships among personnel of different organizations. MOAM training sessions include presentations on the various tools and processes employed by MOAMs, interspersed with mindset lessons illustrated via “war story” discussions of previous missions.
Mission Assurance Modeling and Simulation: A Cyber Security Roadmap
This paper proposes a cyber security modeling and simulation roadmap to enhance mission assurance governance and establish risk reduction processes within constrained budgets. The term mission assurance stems from risk management work by Carnegie Mellon's Software Engineering Institute in the late 19905. By 2010, the Defense Information Systems Agency revised its cyber strategy and established the Program Executive Officer-Mission Assurance. This highlights a shift from simply protecting data to balancing risk and begins a necessary dialogue to establish a cyber security roadmap. The Military Operations Research Society has recommended a cyber community of practice, recognizing there are too few professionals having both cyber and analytic experience. The authors characterize the limited body of knowledge in this symbiotic relationship. This paper identifies operational and research requirements for mission assurance M&S supporting defense and homeland security. M&S techniques are needed for enterprise oversight of cyber investments, test and evaluation, policy, training, and analysis.
Orbital transfer vehicle propulsion issues
The development of a reusable and space-based orbital transfer vehicle (OTV) necessitates an integral approach toward structural and propulsion subsystems design. A single engine installation necessitates moving the engine further aft and/or relocation of the engine gimbal point to accommodate vehicle control requirements. Penalties associated with gimbal point relocation without increasing stage length or modifying typical advanced engine concepts, as well as a method for minimizing such penalties, are presented for a single engine toroidal tank OTV configuration. Alternative integrated vehicle structure/engine concepts are also presented for multi-engine configurations. Features of these potential concepts are given which indicate the need for substantial additional study of feedline gimbal alternatives before firmly establishing advanced engine design. The issue of vehicle/engine integration is addressed in three areas: interfaces (physical and functional), installation requirements, and reliability apportionment (i.e., number of engines required to assure mission completion).