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Project cost risk is the uncertainty in final project cost, contingent on initial budget, requirements and schedule. For a proposed mission, a dynamic simulation model relying for some of its input on a simple risk elicitation is used to identify and quantify systemic cost risk.
Successful projects require an integrated approach to managing cost, schedule, and risk. This is especially true for complex, multi-year projects involving multiple organizations. To explore solutions and leverage valuable lessons learned, NASA's Virtual Project Management Challenge will kick off a three-part series examining some of the challenges faced by project and program managers when it comes to managing these important elements. In this first session of the series, we will look at cost management, with an emphasis on the critical roles of cost estimating and cost reporting. By taking a proactive approach to both of these activities, project managers can better control life cycle costs, maintain stakeholder confidence, and protect other current and future projects in the organization's portfolio. Speakers will be Doug Comstock, Director of NASA's Cost Analysis Division, Kristin Van Wychen, Senior Analyst in the GAO Acquisition and Sourcing Management Team, and Mary Beth Zimmerman, Branch Chief for NASA's Portfolio Analysis Branch, Strategic Investments Division. Moderator Ramien Pierre is from NASA's Academy for Program/Project and Engineering Leadership (APPEL).
Current space project cost models attempt to predict space flight project cost via regression equations, which relate the cost of projects to technical performance metrics (e.g. weight, thrust, power, pointing accuracy, etc.). This paper examines the introduction of engineering management parameters to the set of explanatory variables. A number of specific engineering management variables are considered and exploratory regression analysis is performed to determine if there is statistical evidence for cost effects apart from technical aspects of the projects. It is concluded that there are other non-technical effects at work and that further research is warranted to determine if it can be shown that these cost effects are definitely related to engineering management.
Systems engineers often make use of cost Rules ofThumb in order to estimate cost during early phases of projectformulation. These Rules of Thumb typically take the form ofa sequence of percentages over which a total cost is allocatedacross NASA WBS elements. Rules of Thumb can then be usedto extrapolate cost from one or more known WBS elements tothe remaining unknown WBS elements, assisting early projectformulation architecture studies (such as those in JPL’s Team Xand A Team).A number of issues can arise when generating and using costRules of Thumb. For example, many records of project costsconsist of incomplete data. Typical methods of dealing withincomplete cost allocation data include (a) ignoring missionswith incomplete data, or (b) taking averages of the non-zero percentagesacross missions, but both of these methods can result inbiased estimates if the existence of incomplete data correlateswith total mission cost or any particular WBS element. Anothercommon example is cost reported in one or more incorrect WBSelements. This is especially prevalent in smaller missions whereit is more common for engineers to perform tasks that fall underthe purview of multiple WBS elements.Furthermore, a Rule of Thumb estimate is typically reported asa point estimate; there is no reported uncertainty around thepercentages used to generate an allocation. Even in the rarecase in which confidence intervals around mean percentages areprovided, there may be positive or negative correlations betweenWBS elements which can skew estimates.Here we attempt to address these problems by formulatingprobabilistic Rules of Thumb in which a distribution of allocationschemes, rather than a single allocation scheme, is generated.We use a bootstrap imputation method to simultaneouslyaccount for uncertainty in the missing data while using allavailable information contained in the dataset. The imputeddatasets are then input into a multivariate Bayesian modelwhich accounts for correlations between WBS elements andproperly accounts for uncertainty in the final Rule of Thumbpercentages and predictions. We describe the mathematicalmodel and provides snippets of R code utilizing the brms(Bayesian Regression Models using Stan) package. To illustratethis model, we generate a Bayesian Level 2 WBS Cost Rule ofThumb for MIDEX (Medium-Class Explorers) missions withdata extracted from NASA’s CADRe. We then compare thismethod’s performance with the classical Rule of Thumb method.
The laser atmospheric wind sounder (LAWS) cost modeling activities were initiated in phase 1 to establish the ground rules and cost model that would apply to both phase 1 and phase 2 cost analyses. The primary emphasis in phase 1 was development of a cost model for a LAWS instrument for the Japanese Polar Orbiting Platform (JPOP). However, the Space Station application was also addressed in this model, and elements were included, where necessary, to account for Space Station unique items. The cost model presented in the following sections defines the framework for all LAWS cost modeling. The model is consistent with currently available detail, and can be extended to account for greater detail as the project definition progresses.
No abstract available
Large projects almost always exceed their budgets. Estimating cost is difficult and estimated costs are usually too low. Three different reasons are suggested: bad luck, overoptimism, and deliberate underestimation. Project management can usually point to project difficulty and complexity, technical uncertainty, stakeholder conflicts, scope changes, unforeseen events, and other not really unpredictable bad luck. Project planning is usually over-optimistic, so the likelihood and impact of bad luck is systematically underestimated. Project plans reflect optimism and hope for success in a supposedly unique new effort rather than rational expectations based on historical data. Past project problems are claimed to be irrelevant because "This time it's different." Some bad luck is inevitable and reasonable optimism is understandable, but deliberate deception must be condemned. In a competitive environment, project planners and advocates often deliberately underestimate costs to help gain project approval and funding. Project benefits, cost savings, and probability of success are exaggerated and key risks ignored. Project advocates have incentives to distort information and conceal difficulties from project approvers. One naively suggested cure is more openness, honesty, and group adherence to shared overall goals. A more realistic alternative is threatening overrun projects with cancellation. Neither approach seems to solve the problem. A better method to avoid the delusions of over-optimism and the deceptions of biased advocacy is to base the project cost estimate on the actual costs of a large group of similar projects. Over optimism and deception can continue beyond the planning phase and into project execution. Hard milestones based on verified tests and demonstrations can provide a reality check.
Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs)are a contractual mechanism that allow a federal agency to procure energy savings and facility improvements without upfront capital costs to reduce costs and resiliency. ESPCs are covered under FAR Part 23.2, and 42 USC § 8287. Section 8287(a)(2)(A) of Title 42 of the U.S. Code requires that each energy savings performance contract (ESPC) undergo an annual energy audit, resulting in a separate audit report for every project. The objective of the present report is to compile and analyze all annual ESPC audit reports issued between October 1, 2023, and September 30, 2024, for projects awarded under Generations 1, 2, and 3 of DOE’s ESPC IDIQ contracts. During this period, 205 measurement and verification (M&V) reports were produced for 200 projects; the total number of reports exceeds the number of projects because some projects generated more than one report(for example, a few projects measure savings twice per year and produce two audit reports annually, each covering a different six-month period). By aggregating the results from these individual audits, the report determines the portfolio-wide realization rate of energy and cost savings for all active ESPC projects awarded under DOE’s IDIQ program. For all 205audit reports, sufficient information was available to compare project-level estimated, reported, and guaranteed cost savings. Reported cost savings accounted for ESCO verified savings per each project’s M&V plan. The total reported cost savings for the period addressed were $\$$647.8million,compared with the total guaranteed cost savings of $\$$601.6million. On average across the reported projects: •ESPC contractors guaranteed 92.8% of the estimated cost savings• projects reported achieving 100.0% of the estimated cost savings• projects reported achieving 107.7% of the guaranteed cost savings. The M&V performed for the period indicated adjustments for government operations and maintenance impacts to savings amount to$\$$43.9millionandcould be restored with the original operational parameters for impacted projects. Accounting for this potential cost savings impact, these projects still realized 100.4% of the guaranteed cost savings. The information on estimated and reported energy savings was collected and compared for all 205of the reports examined. Based on site energy, estimated savings totaled 14.88million MMBtu, and reported savings were 15.33million MMBtu; 3.1% greater than the estimated energy savings. All of the reports examined contained sufficient information to calculate source energy savings. Based on site-adjusted source energy, total estimated energy savings were 20.90 million MMBtu, and reported savings were 21.22million MMBtu, 101.5% of the estimated energy savings. For water savings, the estimated savings were 11,539,055 kGal and the reported savings were 13,315,930 kGal. This means 1,776,875 kGal more water was saved than estimated, which is about 15% higher than the estimate. These results indicate that, overall, the reported energy savings slightly exceeded the estimated values, while estimated water savings significantly exceeded estimated values, suggesting that the projects achieved greater cost savings than originally projected. The total annual expense for the ESCOs to perform annual M&V audits and reporting was $\$$10.02million. Through this effort, $\$$647.8 million in annual cost savings was verified. The M&V results indicated that $\$$43.9 million of these verified savings reflected adjustments due to government operations A-6and maintenance impacts, which could be restored under the original operational parameters for the affected projects. These findings show the value of M&V that only costs 1.7%of the guaranteed cost savings to ensure guarantees are met.
No abstract available
One method of evaluating the potential of emerging solar cell and array technologies is to compare their projected capabilities in space flight applications to those of established Si solar cells and arrays. Such an application-oriented comparison provides an integrated view of the elemental comparisons of efficiency, radiation resistance, temperature sensitivity, size, mass, and cost in combination. In addition, the assumptions necessary to make the comparisons provide insights helpful toward determining necessary areas of development or evaluation. Finally, as developments and evaluations progress, the results can be used in more precisely defining the overall potential of the new technologies in comparison to existing technologies. The projected capabilities of Si, InP, and GaAs cells and arrays are compared.
This presentation focuses on renewable energy project development and planning and highlights common project costs at each stage of a project's lifecycle. The presentation was produced as part of a series of trainings for awardees of the Energizing Rural Communities prize.
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It is very difficult for project managers to develop accurate cost and schedule estimates for large, complex software development projects. None of the approaches or tools available today can estimate the true cost of software with any high degree of accuracy early in a project. This paper provides an approach that utilizes a software development process simulation model that considers and conveys the level of uncertainty that exists when developing an initial estimate. A NASA project will be analyzed using simulation and data from the Software Engineering Laboratory to show the benefits of such an approach.
The primary objective of Low Carbon Intensity Formic Acid Chemical Synthesis from Direct Air Captured CO 2 Utilizing Chemical Plant Waste Heat (ChemFADAC) is to execute and complete a FEED study for an integrated direct air capture (DAC) and carbon conversion system (together, the DACUS system) co-located at a Nutrien nitric acid production facility in Kennewick, WA capable of capturing and converting a minimum of 5,000 MT/year net atmospheric CO 2 to low carbon intensity formic acid (FA) using industrial waste heat and renewable electricity. The goal will be achieved through the completion of four objectives using a collaborative approach with community stakeholders. Objective 1. Conduct a FEED study and Class 3 project cost estimate for the proposed DACUS system that maximizes use of thermal energy from the Nutrien KFO host site to produce low carbon intensity FA from atmospheric CO 2 . Objective 2. Perform a cradle-to-gate life-cycle analysis of the DACUS system to determine the environmental sustainability and carbon intensity (CI) of the proposed project and product from the results of the FEED study. Objective 3. Perform a business case analysis from results of the LCA, FEED study and cost estimate to justify investment to build the DACUS project at the Nutrien KFO site. Objective 4. Quantify how deployment of the proposed technology will promote and prepare a ready workforce for clean energy and manufacturing jobs and coordinate with community stakeholders to perform an environmental justice and a preliminary economic revitalization and job creation outcomes analysis.
Within two years of being chartered in 1958 as an independent agency to conduct civilian pursuits in aeronautics and space, NASA absorbed either wholly or partially the people, facilities, and equipment of several existing organizations. These included the laboratories of the National Advisory Committee of Aeronautics (NACA) at Langley Research Center in Virginia, Ames Research Center in California, and Lewis Research Center in Ohio; the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) at Redstone Arsenal Alabama, for which the team of Wernher von Braun worked; and the Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) and their ongoing work on big boosters. These were especially valuable resources to jump start the new agency in light of the shocking success of the Soviet space probe Sputnik in the autumn of the previous year and the corresponding pressure from an impatient American public to produce some response. Along with these inheritances, there came some existing systems engineering and management practices, including project cost estimating methodologies. This paper will briefly trace the origins of those methods and how they evolved within the agency over the past three decades.
For the high-luminosity upgrade to the LHC (HL-LHC), the ATLAS detector at CERN requires an all-new inner detector, the Inner Tracker (ITk). The ITk Strip subdetector is made up of silicon modules, which include three types of radiation-hard ASICs. One of these is the Autonomous Monitor and Control (AMAC). The AMAC is manufactured by Global Foundries using 130 nm CMOS8RF DM technology and is approximately 3 by 5 mm in size. This ASIC autonomously monitors the temperatures, voltages, and currents in the module components while controlling critical values in order to prevent these quantities from reaching dangerous levels. The final design, AMACStar, was verified, tested, and ensured to perform all necessary functions. A quality control procedure using an in-house probe station set-up was developed in order to ensure that every individual chip on each wafer of AMACStars required by the ITk Strip project met performance requirements. The average per wafer yield of usable AMACStars is 92.33%, exceeding the design-specific 90% yield estimated for project costing. This estimate was based on actual yields for similar designs in this process.
This final report, which is for DOE Award Number DE-FE0032160 (Direct Air Capture Combined with dedicated Long-Term Carbon Storage, Coupled to Existing Low-Carbon Energy), covers the Nuclear Direct Air Capture with Carbon Storage (NuDACCS) project period of performance from 03/31/2022 to 12/27/2024. Battelle Memorial Institute (Battelle) partnered with Aircapture LLC (Aircapture), Southern Company (Southern), Carbonvert, the University of Alabama, and Sargent & Lundy (S&L) to develop a front end engineering design (FEED) study for a direct air capture (DAC) system co-located with Southern Company's Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant (Plant Farley) in Columbia, Alabama. The DAC system was designed to capture at least 5,000 net tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) per year from ambient air in a form suitable for long duration carbon storage (e.g., geologic storage). To complement and support the FEED study, additional analyses were completed, including a Technology Maturation Plan (TMP); Workforce Readiness Plan; Project Cost Estimate; Business Case Analysis (BCA); Life Cycle Analysis (LCA); Environmental Health and Safety (EH&S) Assessment; and Environmental Justice (EJ) Analysis and Economic Revitalization and Job Creation Outcomes Analysis.