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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Radiation portal monitor data file format for comprehensive background radiation monitoring

Radiation portal monitors (RPMs) are widely used at border security checkpoints to detect the presence of radioactive materials in people, vehicles, and cargo. Typically, RPM detection systems consist of two pillars equipped with gamma and neutron detectors. To improve detection efficiency, RPMs employ techniques such as a limited energy window, dynamic alarm thresholds, and lead shielding. However, without continuous monitoring of background radiation, signal interpretation can be compromised, because environmental factors and mechanical failures can cause fluctuations. Here, we introduce a daily file format that logs gamma background and neutron background radiation levels continuously over a 24 h period; this format is different from traditional formats that record data only when the RPM is active or occupied. The approach enables RPM operators and analysts to (1) identify and diagnose malfunctioning components, (2) adjust system settings to account for dynamic environmental factors, and (3) use the recorded data to characterize outer space phenomena. Continuous background reporting is essential for identifying issues such as faulty connections, voltage divider failures, and errors in background updates. Continuous background reporting also enables the detection of external influences, including nearby X-ray scanners, temperature fluctuations, rainfall, cosmic radiation, and lunar phase changes. These data files are designed to be easily evaluated and parsed using common tools, and a quick review by an expert is often sufficient for problem diagnosis. We anticipate that continuous background radiation monitoring and these new strategies will significantly improve the accuracy and reliability of RPM systems, reducing the rate of false alarms and enhancing overall system performance.

Background radiation monitoring↗
DOE OSTI2024

Improving operational performance using machine learning analysis of Radiation Portal Monitor measurements

Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) have been installed worldwide to scan vehicles and cargo for the presence of radiological and nuclear materials. In field operations, the sensitivity of these systems is typically limited by the relatively high rates of nuisance alarms that usually must be followed up with secondary inspections. We have developed a machine-learning based alarm analysis system that has been deployed at numerous locations in the U.S. and internationally. Our Enhanced Radiological Nuclear Inspection and Evaluation (ERNIE) analysis software and its derivatives have demonstrated increased sensitivity to radiological and nuclear material of concern while reducing nuisance alarms by as much as an order of magnitude.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2020

Minimum Detectable Quantity Calculation for Radiation Portal Monitors

The minimum detectable quantity of a radiation portal monitor is the smallest amount of radioactive material that can be detected passing through the monitor (with a specified detection probability). The minimum detectable quantity is a function of many factors, including isotope, velocity, distance between pillars, height of portal and vehicle, source distribution and position, background radiation, background suppression, detector volume and positions, detector efficiency, decision metrics and algorithms, the presence of NORM (naturally occurring radioactive material), and alarm thresholds. Experimentally testing a radiation portal monitor to failure for all combinations of these factors is extremely time-consuming and often cost prohibitive. This document outlines a straightforward method for quickly estimating the minimum detectable quantity for moving sources over a large variety of conditions with a minimal number of static measurements. The document also describes a proof of concept software application that the International Atomic Energy Agency has designed based on the described method that can be used by Member States to estimate a monitor’s minimum detectable quantity.

Blessinger, Christopher S.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Performance of High Stopping Power Bismuth-Loaded Plastic Scintillators for Radiation Portal Monitors

Plastic scintillators are widely used in radiation portal monitors because of their low cost and availability in large sizes. However, due to their low density and low effective atomic number (Z), they offer low intrinsic efficiency and little spectroscopic information. The addition of high-Z constituents to these plastics can greatly increase both their total stopping power and the amount of photoelectric absorption, leading to full-energy deposition and thus useful gamma spectra. Herein, we present the performance of the latest formulation of Bi-loaded plastic scintillators showing their useful spectroscopic information up to relatively high energy (~1 MeV) due to their high stopping power compared to the current commercially available plastics. These Bi-loaded plastics use 20 weight percent (wt%) Bi-pivalate (8 wt% elemental Bi) dissolved in polyvinyltoluene (PVT) matrix and conventional fast fluors (~10 ns decay time). These Bi-loaded plastics achieve up to approximately 6000 photons/MeV and have been produced in sizes up to 17 in 3 . The performance of these Bi-loaded plastics is also demonstrated in the existing portal monitor hardware (Rapiscan Model TSA Trainer 770) showing the possibility to provide improved sensitivity as a drop-in replacement with continued scale-up.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Expectation-propagation for weak radionuclide identification at radiation portal monitors

We propose a sparsity-promoting Bayesian algorithm capable of identifying radionuclide signatures from weak sources in the presence of a high radiation background. The proposed method is relevant to radiation identification for security applications. In such scenarios, the background typically consists of terrestrial, cosmic, and cosmogenic radiation that may cause false positive responses. We evaluate the new Bayesian approach using gamma-ray data and are able to identify weapons-grade plutonium, masked by naturally-occurring radioactive material (NORM), in a measurement time of a few seconds. We demonstrate this identification capability using organic scintillators (stilbene crystals and EJ-309 liquid scintillators), which do not provide direct, high-resolution, source spectroscopic information. Compared to the EJ-309 detector, the stilbene-based detector exhibits a lower identification error, on average, owing to its better energy resolution. Organic scintillators are used within radiation portal monitors to detect gamma rays emitted from conveyances crossing ports of entry. The described method is therefore applicable to radiation portal monitors deployed in the field and could improve their threat discrimination capability by minimizing “nuisance” alarms produced either by NORM-bearing materials found in shipped cargoes, such as ceramics and fertilizers, or radionuclides in recently treated nuclear medicine patients.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2023

Comparison of Supervised and Un-Supervised Machine Learning Algorithms for Threat Detection and Scintillator Performance for Radiation Portal Monitoring

Following the events of September 11, 2001, international border crossing have been equipped with radiation portal monitors (RPMs) to identify illicit radioactive material. Polyvinyl toluene (PVT) scintillators are commonly used due to their low cost and reasonable maintainability, however they offer low spectral resolution. Despite the fact that over twenty years has transpired since this event, radioisotopes are still typically identified by hand-crafted classification algorithms, e.g., total counts or energy windowing, and exhibit relatively poor performance in detecting threats at the low false alarm rates required to support the stream of commerce. While some improvement to performance has been realized via the use of supervised machine learning, these classification algorithms typically utilize simulations in lieu of real data due to the sparsity of data for one or more classes. Accordingly, the performance of these algorithms is somewhat less than optimal when examining experiments or simulations with model mismatch. Consequently, in this work, we examine the application of a number of unsupervised machine learning, anomaly detection based algorithms, to circumvent the inverse crime when analyzing spectroscopy data for RPMs. We also compare anomaly detection results with those obtained via the use of supervised classification detection ML algorithms when model mismatch is introduced between the simulated threat items utilized for training/testing. Finally, we compared the performance of the PVT scintillators to those obtained with higher resolution detectors using both anomaly detection and supervised classification algorithms.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Operational Guidelines for Use of Radiation Portal Monitors in Nuclear Facilities

This article provides guidelines (not requirements) for the testing, operation, and maintenance of radiation portal monitors used to scan pedestrian and vehicular traffic entering or exiting nuclear facilities to prevent unauthorized removal of nuclear material. The intended audience is facility managers, supervisors, and operators who are responsible for establishing and maintaining radiation detection systems, who are likely well acquainted with physical security procedures, but may not have a familiarity with the operation of radiation detection.

Enders, Alexander [Oak Ridge National Laboratory (↗
DOE OSTI2023

Operational Focused Data Analytics for Optimizing Radiation Portal Monitor-Based Nuclear Smuggling Detection Systems at Global Ports of Entry

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence has deployed a fleet of radiation portal monitors (RPMs) across the world at global ports of entry including seaports, airports, and land border crossings. These RPMs are integrated into radiation detection systems (RDS) that also include fixed cameras, optical character recognition (OCR) systems, primary scanning systems (e.g., X-ray or gamma-ray), and secondary scanning systems (e.g., spectroscopic radiation portal monitors, portable radiation detection systems). The data from these sensing technologies is collected at the Central Alarm Station (CAS) where servers and computers reside to control and operate the system. Operators utilize the data collected by the CAS and declared cargo information to make decisions on how to respond to an alarm.This work explores the use of CAS-located data, looking at both the sensor data streams and operator inputs, to perform analysis which supports customs and border protection agencies to improve training capability and operational effectiveness. We focus on analyzing site level effectiveness and behavior by rolling up CAS-located data collected from individual occurrences. To-date, more than 15 sites (e.g., seaports, airports, border crossings) have been analyzed in this manner with the goal of understanding system operations to verify effectiveness and recommend potential improvements. This work first aims to provide background information on relevant CAS-located data sources and our current operational system analytics process including example results. After summarizing our current analytic techniques, we discuss how the future data analytics systems can provide key benefits to improving operational performance while minimizing the burden these detection systems place on operators.

Kuhn, Michael↗
DOE OSTI2021

Effect of natural gamma background radiation on portal monitor radioisotope unmixing

It is well known that national security relies on several layers of protection. One of the most important is the traffic control at borders and ports that exploits Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) to detect and deter potential smuggling attempts. Most portal monitors rely on plastic scintillators to detect gamma rays. Despite their poor energy resolution, their cost effectiveness and the possibility of growing them in large sizes make them the gamma-ray detector of choice in RPMs. Unmixing algorithms applied to organic scintillator spectra can be used to reliably identify the bare and unshielded radionuclides that triggered an alarm, even with fewer than 1000 detected counts and in the presence of two or three nuclides at the same time. In this work, we experimentally studied the robustness of a state-of-the-art unmixing algorithm to different radiation background spectra, due to varying atmospheric conditions, in the 16 °C to 28 °C temperature range. In the presence of background, the algorithm is able to identify the nuclides present in unknown radionuclide mixtures of three nuclides, when at least 1000 counts from the sources are detected. With fewer counts available, we found larger differences of approximately 35.9% between estimated nuclide fractions and actual ones. In these low count rate regimes, the uncertainty associated by our algorithm with the identified fractions could be an additional valuable tool to determine whether the identification is reliable or a longer measurement to increase the signal-to-noise ratio is needed. Moreover, the algorithm identification performances are consistent throughout different data sets, with negligible differences in the presence of background types of different intensity and spectral shape.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗