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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2014

Risk Classification and Risk-based Safety and Mission Assurance

Recent activities to revamp and emphasize the need to streamline processes and activities for Class D missions across the agency have led to various interpretations of Class D, including the lumping of a variety of low-cost projects into Class D. Sometimes terms such as Class D minus are used. In this presentation, mission risk classifications will be traced to official requirements and definitions as a measure to ensure that projects and programs align with the guidance and requirements that are commensurate for their defined risk posture. As part of this, the full suite of risk classifications, formal and informal will be defined, followed by an introduction to the new GPR 8705.4 that is currently under review.GPR 8705.4 lays out guidance for the mission success activities performed at the Classes A-D for NPR 7120.5 projects as well as for projects not under NPR 7120.5. Furthermore, the trends in stepping from Class A into higher risk posture classifications will be discussed. The talk will conclude with a discussion about risk-based safety and mission assuranceat GSFC.

Risk Management↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Risk Classification Modernization

NASA’s risk classification system dates back to an era when every new NASA space mission was a one-of-a-kind build, and the only way to obtain reliability was as a by-product through a combination of reliability analyses, extensive and stringent quality requirements, and extensive testing. Originally, there were very limited commercial capabilities to develop systems to work reliably in space, so NASA considered its own homegrown approach the only recipe for success. This approach involved very detailed and prescriptive piece-part controls and no reliance on (and to some extent a rejection of) any type of commercial practices. Often risk was considered to be the lowest when NASA had the maximum amount of control and prescription, and the highest when commercial practices were largely employed, and these principles drove risk classification in the agency. Over time, however, commercial capabilities grew, and many products became standardized and commercialized, while the agency maintained its tried-and-true approach, paying little attention to the evolution of the commercial sector. This presentation introduces GSFC’s new approach at risk classification, which includes classification of components and full spacecraft, as well as of constellations of spacecraft.

risk↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Risk Classification Modernization

NASA’s risk classification system dates back to an era when every new NASA space mission was a one-of-a-kind build, and the only way to obtain reliability was as a by-product through a combination of reliability analyses, extensive and stringent quality requirements, and extensive testing. Originally, there were very limited commercial capabilities to develop systems to work reliably in space, so NASA considered its own homegrown approach the only recipe for success. This approach involved very detailed and prescriptive piece-part controls and no reliance on (and to some extent a rejection of) any type of commercial practices. Often risk was considered to be the lowest when NASA had the maximum amount of control and prescription, and the highest when commercial practices were largely employed, and these principles drove risk classification in the agency. Over time, however, commercial capabilities grew, and many products became standardized and commercialized, while the agency maintained its tried-and-true approach, paying little attention to the evolution of the commercial sector. This presentation introduces GSFC’s new approach at risk classification, which includes classification of components and full spacecraft, as well as of constellations of spacecraft.

risk↗
NASA NTRS2022

Modernizing NASA's Risk Classification System

NASA's risk classification system dates back to an era when every new NASA space mission was a one-of-a-kind build, and the only way to obtain reliability was as a by-product through a combination of reliability analyses, extensive and stringent quality requirements, and extensive testing. Originally, there were very limited commercial capabilities to develop systems to work reliably in space, so NASA considered its own homegrown approach the only recipe for success. This approach involved very detailed and prescriptive piece-part controls and no reliance on (and to some extent a rejection of) any type of commercial practices. Often risk was considered to be the lowest when NASA had the maximum amount of control and prescription, and the highest when commercial practices were largely employed, and these principles drove risk classification in the agency. Over time, however, commercial capabilities grew, and many products became standardized and commercialized, while the agency maintained its tried-and-true approach, paying little attention to the evolution of the commercial sector. In fact, the commercial sector was developing systems that have direct, proven reliability, established over time, while NASA still maintained the approach to ignore the reality of the commercialized aspects of standard products, label them as high risk, and attempt to change them to align with the agency's piece-part control practices. A table of mission classification vs lifetime for missions launched after 2000 indicates no correlation between lifetime and classification, with the few exceptions involving missions that have very limited objectives and no valid purpose to continue after they were met. This paper steps through some of the key historical elements in risk classification and NASA's overall approach to assurance, and presents some elements being brought forward to modernize the approach and take advantage of the growing capability in the commercial sector.

risk↗
DOE OSTI2019

Falls Risk Classification of Older Adults Using Deep Neural Networks and Transfer Learning

Prior research in falls risk classification using inertial sensors has relied on the use of engineered features, which has concluded in a feature space containing hundreds of features that are likely redundant and possibly irrelevant. In this paper, we propose using fully convolutional neural networks (FCNNs) to classify older adults at low or high risk of falling using inertial sensor data collected from a smartphone. Due to the limited nature of older adult inertial gait data sets, we first pre-train the FCNN models using a publicly available data set for pedestrian activity recognition. Then via transfer learning, we train the network for falls risk classification. We reveal that via transfer learning, our falls risk classifier obtains an area under the receiver operating characteristic curve of 93.3%, which is 10.6% higher than the equivalent model trained without the use of transfer learning. Moreover, we show that our method outperforms other standard machine learning classifiers trained on features developed in prior research.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2019

Gastrointestinal stromal tumor risk classification: spectral CT quantitative parameters

Purpose: To examine the value of spectral CT quantitative parameters in gastrointestinal stromal tumor (GIST) risk classification. Materials and methods: This retrospective study was approved by the institutional review board. The requirement for informed consent was signed. The authors evaluated 86 patients (30 high risk, 22 medium risk, 28 low risk, and 6 very low risk; mean age: 59 years [range 19–83 years]) with pathologically confirmed GIST who underwent plain and triple-phase contrast-enhanced CT with spectral CT imaging mode from March 2015 through September 2017, with manual follow-up. Quantitative parameters including the CT value of 70 keV monochromatic images, the slope of spectral curves, and the normalized iodine concentration (NIC) and water (iodine) concentrations were measured and calculated, and conducted a power analysis of the above data. Results: (1) The CT values at 70 keV of the high-risk group were higher than the intermediate and low groups in each of the enhanced phases (P ≤ 0.001), no significant differences in the intermediate-risk and low-risk groups were noted (P = 0.874, 0.871, 0.831, respectively). (2) The slope of the spectral curve of the high-risk group was higher than those of the intermediate and low groups in each of the enhanced phases (P ≤ 0.001), and there were no significant differences between the intermediate- and low-risk groups (P = 0.069, 0.466, 0.840, respectively). (3) The NIC of the high-risk group significantly differed from the lower risk groups (P ≤ 0.001). There was also no significant difference observed between the intermediate- and low-risk groups (P = 0.671, 0.457, 0.833, respectively). (4) The power analysis results show that only the low-risk group with delay period is 0.530, the rest groups are all greater than 0.999. Conclusion: Dual-energy spectral CT with quantitative analysis may help to increase the accuracy in differentiating the pathological risk classification of GIST between high risk and non-high risk, preoperatively. There were limitations for distinguishing the intermediate- and low-risk groups.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Risk-Based SMA and Modernizing Risk Classification at GSFC

In 2014, in response to a large volume of feedback from industry, the science community, and internal to Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), GSFC’s Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Directorate began a transition to a risk-based implementation of SMA, departing from its longstanding practice of being primarily driven by a mostly static set of Mission Assurance Requirements. The transition started out with a pilot project involving risk-based acceptance of bare-printed circuit boards that was enormously successful, continued through a complete organizational transformation in 2015, and culminated with the baselining of formal Risk-Based SMA policy in 2016. In this presentation we will describe the risk-based SMA concept, segue into how it shapes a modernization of risk classification that GSFC has rolled out, and provide results from the original pilot project for risk-based SMA, involving the printed circuit board assurance process.

Jesse Leitner↗
NASA NTRS2018

A New Approach to Mission Classification and Risk Management for NASA Space Flight Missions

The NASA risk classification system is meant to uide space mission development from formulation through completion of implementation. It is also meant to be the basis on which program and project managers develop and implement appropriate mission assurance and risk management strategies for the mission. In order to be useful, the risk classification system needs to provide consistent and reproducible classification results so that missions may be designed with the appropriate components, subsystems, and testing philosophy, all of which impacts mission schedule and cost. In a cost-constrained environment, a clear, robust, and reproducible approach to mission implementation becomes more critical than ever before. Once a project's risk classification level is established, the managers can define the appropriate management controls, systems engineering processes, mission assurance requirements, safety, and testing for that mission. The current NASA mission classification system will be reviewed before a new system is proposed.NASA manages space flight missions according to a four-tiered classification which assumes increasing levels of risk. We argue that risk does not change between classes. What changes are the means available to reduce risk. In performance-driven missions, the project will spend money in order to maintain performance without reducing margins. In cost-constrained missions, performance will be reduced in order to stay within budget or to maintain schedule: measurement requirements may be traded, design life may be reduced, or both. We then propose a new approach to the classification of NASA space flight missions, based on an assessment of how flexible the requirements, how exquisite the measurements, how long the lifetime, and how rigid the budget.Our proposed approach makes possible a clearer differentiation between classification levels and more effective guidance to program and project managers.

Bordi, Francesco↗
NASA NTRS2013

Class D Management Implementation Approach of the First Orbital Mission of the Earth Venture Series

A key element of the National Research Council's Earth Science and Applications Decadal Survey called for the creation of the Venture Class line of low-cost research and application missions within NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration). One key component of the architecture chosen by NASA within the Earth Venture line is a series of self-contained stand-alone spaceflight science missions called "EV-Mission". The first mission chosen for this competitively selected, cost and schedule capped, Principal Investigator-led opportunity is the CYclone Global Navigation Satellite System (CYGNSS). As specified in the defining Announcement of Opportunity, the Principal Investigator is held responsible for successfully achieving the science objectives of the selected mission and the management approach that he/she chooses to obtain those results has a significant amount of freedom as long as it meets the intent of key NASA guidance like NPR 7120.5 and 7123. CYGNSS is classified under NPR 7120.5E guidance as a Category 3 (low priority, low cost) mission and carries a Class D risk classification (low priority, high risk) per NPR 8705.4. As defined in the NPR guidance, Class D risk classification allows for a relatively broad range of implementation strategies. The management approach that will be utilized on CYGNSS is a streamlined implementation that starts with a higher risk tolerance posture at NASA and that philosophy flows all the way down to the individual part level.

Wells, James E.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Toward a Safety Risk-Based Classification of Unmanned Aircraft

There is a trend of growing interest and demand for greater access of unmanned aircraft (UA) to the National Airspace System (NAS) as the ongoing development of UA technology has created the potential for significant economic benefits. However, the lack of a comprehensive and efficient UA regulatory framework has constrained the number and kinds of UA operations that can be performed. This report presents initial results of a study aimed at defining a safety-risk-based UA classification as a plausible basis for a regulatory framework for UA operating in the NAS. Much of the study up to this point has been at a conceptual high level. The report includes a survey of contextual topics, analysis of safety risk considerations, and initial recommendations for a risk-based approach to safe UA operations in the NAS. The next phase of the study will develop and leverage deeper clarity and insight into practical engineering and regulatory considerations for ensuring that UA operations have an acceptable level of safety.

Torres-Pomales, Wilfredo↗
NASA NTRS2003

Risk-based Classification of Incidents

As the penetration of software into safety-critical systems progresses, accidents and incidents involving software will inevitably become more frequent. Identifying lessons from these occurrences and applying them to existing and future systems is essential if recurrences are to be prevented. Unfortunately, investigative agencies do not have the resources to fully investigate every incident under their jurisdictions and domains of expertise and thus must prioritize certain occurrences when allocating investigative resources. In the aviation community, most investigative agencies prioritize occurrences based on the severity of their associated losses, allocating more resources to accidents resulting in injury to passengers or extensive aircraft damage. We argue that this scheme is inappropriate because it undervalues incidents whose recurrence could have a high potential for loss while overvaluing fairly straightforward accidents involving accepted risks. We then suggest a new strategy for prioritizing occurrences based on the risk arising from incident recurrence.

Greenwell, William S.↗
NASA NTRS2019

A NASA GSFC Perspective on Class D

This presentation provides an overview of the mission risk classification "D" for NASA from the perspective of Goddard Space Flight Center, as viewed from developers and stakeholders.

Risk Classification↗
NASA NTRS2024

Alignment of NASA’s Human System Risks with Technological Capability Gaps to Enable Integrated Research and Technology Development Strategic Planning

BACKGROUND: Radiation, reduced gravity, distance from earth, isolation and confinement, and habitation within artificially created and controlled life support environments are hazards that present risk to human space explorers. NASA’s Human System Risk Board (HSRB) maintains a set of twenty-nine different Human System Risks with subject matter experts from across the agency providing regular updates to the estimated likelihood and consequence associated with each risk. The Human Research Program (HRP) has historically used these risk classifications as a primary basis for identifying and prioritizing human research investments aimed at characterizing and/or mitigating the respective human system risks. In many cases, technology development is required to mature and validate risk mitigation strategies, however, NASA’s primary technology development programs have not typically used Human System Risks as a basis for strategic planning. A primary function of the Environmental Control and Life Support Systems (ECLSS) – Crew Health and Performance (CHP) System Capability Leadership Team (SCLT) is to continually identify, review, and update technological capability gaps and to establish and oversee multiyear strategic roadmaps aimed at guiding NASA’s technology development priorities in these areas. These roadmaps are intended to be agency-wide and independent of any program, directorate, or other organization within NASA. DESCRIPTION: The SCLT and HRP collaborated to establish a set of Human System Capability Gaps, which establish a formal linkage between the capability gaps used to prioritize investments across much of NASA, and the Human System Risks that are primarily used to inform and prioritize human research. This set of twenty-eight gaps was developed by subject matter experts, and each gap mapped to the primary associated Human System Risks. The gaps and risk mapping were then reviewed and approved via the HSRB, thereby formally aligning the research-focused Human System Risks with the technology-focused capability gaps. DISCUSSION: This effort has enabled development of integrated roadmaps and budget coordination with research and technology development activities that are formally linked to agency-recognized capability gaps and Human System Risks. Close and ongoing coordination between the SCLT, HRP, Mars Campaign Office, and the Health & Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) is essential to ensure alignment and prioritization of CHP-related research and technology development to enable NASA’s future exploration missions.

Andrew F J Abercromby↗