SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
This slide presentation reviews the importance of Risk Informed Design (RID) as an important feature of the systems engineering process. RID is based on the principle that risk is a design commodity such as mass, volume, cost or power. It also reviews Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) as it is used in the product life cycle in the development of NASA's Constellation Program.
NASA Engineering requested a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to compare the difference in the risk of Loss of Crew (LOC) and Loss of Mission (LOM) between different designs of a fluid assembly. They were concerned that the configuration favored by the design team was more susceptible to leakage than a second proposed design, but realized that a quantitative analysis to compare the risks between the two designs might strengthen their argument. The analysis showed that while the second design did help improve the probability of LOC, it did not help from a probability of LOM perspective. This drove the analysis team to propose a minor design change that would drive the probability of LOM down considerably. The analysis also demonstrated that there was another major risk driver that was not immediately obvious from a typical engineering study of the design and was therefore unexpected. None of the proposed alternatives were addressing this risk. This type of trade study demonstrates the importance of performing a PRA in order to completely understand a system's design. It allows managers to use risk as another one of the commodities (e.g., mass, cost, schedule, fault tolerance) that can be traded early in the design of a new system.
As a foundational element of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Campaign, the Gateway is an incrementally built cislunar spacecraft that will serve as a platform for deep space human exploration, science, and technology demonstration. The Gateway will be a unifying catalyst for international partners around the world to establish sustained deep space scientific investigations, lunar surface access, and missions to Mars. As human exploration moves farther away from Earth, spacecraft designs must prioritize and optimize mass and volume allocations, while minimizing human and spacecraft risk. To accomplish this objective, the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance functions develop, implement, and ensure compliance with requirements, in concert with the accurate characterization and transparent communication of residual hazard risks, for integrated safety, reliability and maintainability and quality assurance. Safety and Mission Assurance was a key contributor during Gateway program pre-formulation and formulation activities where safety and reliability analysis was embedded in the Gateway Systems Engineering and Integration team. During these early program stages, a preliminary Gateway Integrated Hazard Analysis and Preliminary Gateway Probabilistic Risk Assessment assisted in Gateway architectural and operational definition as part of a risk-informed design process. As the deep space architecture has matured, the integrated Safety and Mission Assurance analyses have matured, new safety review processes have been developed, and requirements have been refined to ensure compliance with integrated safety and mission assurance objectives. The Gateway Program is currently concluding the preliminary design review informed milestone, where the primary objectives included: - Ensured completeness and consistency of the preliminary design, including the meeting of all requirements within appropriate margins and acceptable risk posture. - Identification of any major issues moving forward to the Critical Design phase. At this milestone, Safety and Mission Assurance provided numerous products, including Gateway Top Risks and Risk Mitigation Plans, updated integrated hazard analyses, updated probabilistic risk assessment, Crew Survival Analysis Report, and updated Safety and Mission Assurance Requirements and Plans. These products provide a many-faceted perspective on the inherent risk and available mitigations involved in flying the current proposed vehicle design and anticipated stack configurations. In addition, Safety and Mission Assurance identified top technical, process and workforce concerns to be addressed as the program progresses toward the critical design phase. This paper will detail the evolution of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance integration functions, provide its current status and lessons learned for future human spaceflight programs. Throughout this paper the key tenets of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance will be discussed: - Application of a risk-informed approach to identify and mitigate areas of highest risk. - Leverage of valuable processes and lessons learned from earlier spaceflight programs. - Development of Safety and Mission Assurance products to inform design risk trades. - Utilization of common Safety and Mission Assurance practices to identify safety risks for multiple perspectives: top-down, bottom-up, and across lines of integration. - Approval of safety hazards at the appropriate level of authority, keeping most deliberation closest to design expertise and elevating risks of greatest concern for program-level consideration. - Championing of Safety and Mission Assurance processes and forums to foster a pervasive safety culture that is transparent, inclusive, and collaborative between all partners. These tenets have allowed the Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance function to play a key role in optimized vehicle design evolution, and early identification and mitigation of Gateway program and Artemis mission risk.
Implementation of risk-informed design allows the design team to thoroughly explore the risks of a system while iterating the operations concept, design, and requirements until the system meets mission objects and is achievable within constraints. To arrive at a space system design that is likely to meet all constraints placed upon mass, cost, performance and risk, the system requirements must be understood and traded against each other as early as the conceptual design phase. Depending on the project phase and the goals of the risk analysis, various PRA methodologies could be used to produce quantitative risk estimates to enable such a process. In order to better understand the applicability, advantages, and limitations of various PRA methodologies, a comparative analysis of three bottom-up, component-based PRA approaches was performed. The three methods examined are a traditional static fault tree, a fault tree hybrid, and a dynamic Monte Carlo simulation. Each approach was used to assess a generic reaction control system (RCS) thruster pod and mission. The methods are assessed in terms of the process of modeling a system, the actionable information produced for the design team, and the overall fidelity of the quantitative risk evaluation generated. The paper also discusses the applicability of each methodology to the different phases of system development.
This paper presents an integrated reliability and physics-based risk modeling approach for assessing human spaceflight systems. The approach is demonstrated using an example, end-to-end risk assessment of a generic-crewed space transportation system during a reference mission to the International Space Station. The behavior of the system is modeled using analysis techniques from multiple disciplines in order to properly capture the dynamic time- and state- dependent consequences of failures encountered in different mission phases. We discuss how to combine traditional reliability analyses with Monte Carlo simulation methods and physics-based engineering models to produce loss-of- mission and loss-of-crew risk estimates supporting risk-based decision-making and requirement verification. This approach facilitates risk-informed design by providing more realistic representation of system failures and interactions; identifying key risk-driving sensitivities, dependencies, and assumptions; and tracking multiple figures of merit within a single, responsive assessment framework that can readily incorporate evolving design information throughout system development.
Employing integrated energy systems (IESs) with nuclear power plants (NPPs) can improve NPP utilization by leveraging dedicated thermal and electric power delivery, but it may also increase operational safety risks. This paper presents a framework to identify and quantify hazards and risks for such IESs. The framework combines accidentology to review past industrial accidents with failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) to identify potential future incidents. Hydrogen explosion and toxic chemical release hazards are of particular concern. Explosion consequences are quantified using the Bauwens-Dorofeev (Bauwens) and trinitrotoluene equivalent mass (TNT-EM) methods, while chemical release consequences are computed using the Gaussian atmospheric dispersion method. Operational disturbances from direct electrical and thermal integration that may affect NPP safety are modeled using probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). Hazards and risks are then evaluated for regulatory compliance. The framework is applied to IESs comprising pressurized or boiling water reactors supplying three levels of thermal and electrical power to industrial customers. Case studies include high-temperature steam electrolysis hydrogen plants of varying capacities and a synthetic fuel production plant. Sensitivity analysis examines piping component failures in the PRA model as a precursor to cost estimation for thermal extraction line design. Additionally, Fussel-Vessely (FV) and risk increase importance (RII) measures identify risk-informed design improvements for the thermal extraction system. FMEA highlights hazards such as loss of offsite power, prompt loss of electrical load, loss of thermal output, and immediate steam diversion, in addition to hydrogen explosions and toxic chemical releases. Both Bauwens and TNT-EM methods suggest maintaining several hundred meters of separation between the NPP and hydrogen facility to mitigate explosion risks. PRA results show a maximum initiating event frequency increase of 1.15% and an overall risk increase of 0.28%. Importance measure analysis identifies upstream pipe leak isolation components as critical. Evaluating the results against safety regulations, it is concluded that hazards and risks can be managed to comply with regulations through risk-informed thermal and electrical connection designs, component selection, maintenance programs, and safe separation distances between NPPs and integrated industrial facilities.
Reliable digital instrumentation and control systems (DI&C) are integral for sustaining the continued operation of nuclear power plants. These systems ensure that nuclear reactors operate safely, efficiently, and within regulatory requirements. Yet, the cost of designing and licensing new nuclear DI&C can be prohibitively expensive. Under the U.S. Department of Energy Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program, Idaho National Laboratory has developed a framework for supporting the risk-informed design of DI&C systems by offering methods to support the identification, quantification, and evaluation of risks for various DI&C design architectures. The framework indicates potential software failure modes and provides pathways for quantifying the potential for these software failures, including common cause failures. Using the framework’s systematic approach, challenges for assessing risks within new and existing nuclear DI&C systems can be reduced. Nevertheless, the current framework can be further improved using the convenience of automation. This paper introduces the development of Software for the Hazard Identification and Evaluation of Digital Systems (SHIELDS). SHIELDS is an engineering software package that enables the identification, elimination, and mitigation of potential risks and reduces the burden of deploying reliable DI&C systems. This work introduces plans and techniques to digitize and improve the manual risk assessment modules of the framework. These improvements will save time and increase the repeatability and usability of the framework, making it more accessible to a wider range of users. Ultimately, this introduces SHIELDS and how its modules support efficient development of safe and reliable DI&C systems.
This research evaluates a cost reduction investigation through adoption of a functional containment approach on the microreactor system and structure. Trade-offs between microreactor system designs, fuels and reactor module sizes are evaluated based on performance-based and risk-informed design procedures. Cost savings are evaluated against trade-offs in the reliability of passive heat removal systems, reactivity control, and radioactive material containment. Results can inform the Microreactor Program and reactor designs on “sweet spots” for microreactors that are cost-efficient while meeting required safety limits.
Loss of Crew (LOC) and Loss of Mission (LOM) are two key requirements the Constellation Program (CxP) measure against. To date, one of the top risk drivers for both LOC and LOM has been Orion's Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Parachute Assembly System (CPAS). Even though the Orion CPAS is one of the top risk drivers of CxP, it has been very difficult to obtain any relevant data to accurately quantify the risk. At first glance, it would seem that a parachute system would be very reliable given the track record of Apollo and Soyuz. Given the success of those two programs, the amount of data is considered to be statistically insignificant. However, due to CxP having LOC/LOM as key design requirements, it was necessary for Orion to generate a valid prior to begin the Risk Informed Design process. To do so, the Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) Space Shuttle & Exploration Analysis Section generated an initial failure probability for Orion to use in preparation for the Orion Systems Requirements Review (SRR).
As a critical part of the NASA Constellation Program lunar transportation architecture, the Altair lunar lander will return humans to the moon and enable a sustained program of lunar exploration. The Altair is to deliver up to four crew to the surface of the moon and return them to low lunar orbit at the completion of their mission. Altair will also be used to deliver large cargo elements to the lunar surface, enabling the buildup of an outpost. The Altair Project initialized its design using a minimum functionality approach that identified critical functionality required to meet a minimum set of Altair requirements. The Altair team then performed several analysis cycles using risk-informed design to selectively add back components and functionality to increase the vehicles safety and reliability. The analysis cycle results were captured in a reference Altair design. This design was reviewed at the Constellation Lunar Capabilities Concept Review, a Mission Concept Review, where key driving requirements were confirmed and the Altair Project was given authorization to begin Phase A project formulation. A key objective of Phase A is to revisit the Altair vehicle configuration, to better optimize it to complete its broad range of crew and cargo delivery missions. Industry was invited to partner with NASA early in the design to provide their insights regarding Altair configuration and key engineering challenges. A blended NASA-industry team will continue to refine the lander configuration and mature the vehicle design over the next few years. This paper will update the international community on the status of the Altair Project as it addresses the challenges of project formulation, including optimizing a vehicle configuration based on the work of the NASA Altair Project team, industry inputs and the plans going forward in designing the Altair lunar lander.
As a critical part of the NASA Constellation Program lunar transportation architecture, the Altair lunar lander will return humans to the moon and enable a sustained program of lunar exploration. The Altair is to deliver up to four crew to the surface of the moon and return them to low lunar orbit at the completion of their mission. Altair will also be used to deliver large cargo elements to the lunar surface, enabling the buildup of an outpost. The Altair Project initialized its design using a "minimum functionality" approach that identified critical functionality required to meet a minimum set of Altair requirements. The Altair team then performed several analysis cycles using risk-informed design to selectively add back components and functionality to increase the vehicle's safety and reliability. The analysis cycle results were captured in a reference Altair design. This design was reviewed at the Constellation Lunar Capabilities Concept Review, a Mission Concept Review, where key driving requirements were confirmed and the Altair Project was given authorization to began Phase A project formulation. A key objective of Phase A is to revisit the Altair vehicle configuration, to better optimize it to complete its broad range of crew and cargo delivery missions. Industry was invited to partner with NASA early in the design to provide their insights regarding Altair configuration and key engineering challenges. NASA intends to continue to seek industry involvement in project formulation activities. This paper will update the international coimmunity on the status of the Altair Project as it addresses the challenges of project formulation, including optinuzing a vehicle configuration based on the work of the NASA Altair Project team, industry inputs and the plans going forward in designing the Altair lunar lander.
Altair, the lunar lander element of NASA's Constellation program, was conducted in a different design environment than many other NASA projects of similar scope. Because of this relatively unique approach, there are a number of significant success stories that should be considered during the development of any future lunar landers or human spacecraft. This paper is divided into two separate themes; the first is the approach used during the conceptual design studies, including the systematic analysis cycles and the decision making process associated with each: and the second is a summary of the resulting lessons learned that were compiled after looking back at the lifetime of the Project. Altair was terminated before entering Phase B of its design, and was often criticized for being a very heavy and very large vehicle. While there was specific rationale for all of the decisions that led up to that configuration, future design cycles were specifically planned to re-address the mass challenge. Had the project continued, the deliberate, stepwise design process would have converged on an optimized lander design that balanced mass, risk, cost and capabilities. Some of the specific items that will be addressed in this paper include project development strategy, organizational approach and team dynamics, risk-informed design process, mission architecture constraints, mission key driving requirements, model-based systems engineering process, configuration studies, contingency considerations, subsystem overviews and key trade studies. The paper will conclude with a summary of the lessons identified during the Altair project and make suggestions for application to future studies.
System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.
To assist both the advanced reactor industry and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the pursuit of reactor design and licensing, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) program has established a mechanistic source term (MST) research project under the auspices of the Multiphysics Applications technical area. MST analysis is central to the reactor licensing process and a focus of the NRC regarding their mission to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety and environment. The MST research project is a collaboration between Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) with a high-level objective to coordinate the development of comprehensive advanced reactor MST mod/sim capabilities to support risk-informed design and licensing decisions.
To assist both the advanced reactor industry and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the pursuit of reactor design and licensing, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) program has established a mechanistic source term (MST) research project under the auspices of the Multiphysics Applications technical area. MST analysis is central to the reactor licensing process and a focus of the NRC regarding their mission to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety and environment. The MST research project is a collaboration between Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) with a high-level objective to coordinate the development of comprehensive advanced reactor MST mod/sim capabilities to support risk-informed design and licensing decisions. As part of this effort, an MST mod/sim development pathway was developed in FY21, which outlines the high-level objectives and near-term tasks necessary to achieve the project objectives. Since publication of the development pathway, Argonne and SNL have focused initial efforts on addressing the “near-term tasks” outlined in the report, and the current work provides a status update of the progress achieved in FY22. This report is a progress update on 6 tasks supporting molten salt reactor (MSR) and sodium fast reactor (SFR) MST analyses which were initiated in FY22 as recommended high priority near-term tasks. These tasks were continued into FY23 as they also support previously recommended long-term development objectives to advance MST analyses for these advanced reactors.
Presentation at the 17th International Conference on Greenhouse Gas Control Technologies GHGT-17 held in Calgary, Canada, October 20-24, 2024. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a way to play a critical role in the global transition to a low-emission economy. Current progress is hampered by a number of factors, among which the lack of risk-informed design tools and decision support frameworks is seen as a major roadblock. Significant interest exists in using artificial intelligence to accelerate CCS site feasibility studies, as well as to facilitate the permit application process. Existing works commonly train a single deep learning model. This work investigates the feasibility of using a conventional ensemble learning (committee machine) technique to further improve prediction accuracy. Ensemble-based algorithms generally improve over individual base learners in terms of robustness and accuracy. Deep ensembles, however, are time-consuming to create and train. A pragmatic question is whether small-sized ensembles may lead to prediction improvement. Here we evaluated the efficacy of an ensemble learning technique using the latent spectral model (LSM), an efficient deep neural operator algorithm, as base learners. Preliminary results, obtained using the Illinois Basin-Decatur Project (IBDP) carbon sequestration data/model, show that small-sized ensembles can improve prediction over the base learners, achieving prediction accuracy of ~1.6 psi root mean square error (RMSE) on pressure (relative the average reservoir pressure of 3150 psi), and less than 1.3% for saturation.
Reliability, safety, and performance are vital aspects of any nuclear operation. Fusion technology continues to grow in public, private, and research interest, and coupled with rapidly growing energy needs, fusion technology research is poised for fast progress. The development of a Fusion Nuclear Science Facility (FNSF) is seen as stepping stone for demonstrating long-cycle fusion. Naturally, such operation requires systems that are available, reliable, and safe. This work provides a novel demonstration of systems theory coupled with traditional hazard analysis to provide insights into the risk priority of components and systems found within the FNSF. The results of this work are a set of identified hazards that should be considered for the risk-informed design and development of the FNSF.