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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1996

Risk as a Resource: A New Paradigm

In the new NASA, risk management must be developed as a skill to a far greater degree than has existed in the past. Past approaches have produced great successes but at great cost and lengthy schedules. In the future, risk and its component contributors must be re-evaluated. There are three contexts of risk that will be addressed in this paper: risk as a resource, which expands and shifts traditional risk considerations; marginal cost of risk, which addresses the cumulative and time related effects of risk reduction; and an alternative definition or new meaning of success and how it relates to work.

risk management risk success mission risk↗
NASA NTRS2002

Managing Risk for Cassini During Mission Operations and Data Analysis (MOandDA)

A Risk Management Process has been tailored for Cassini that not only satisfies the requirements of NASA and JPL, but also allows the Program to proactively identify and assess risks that threaten mission objectives. Cassini Risk Management is a team effort that involves both management and engineering staff. The process is managed and facilitated by the Mission Assurance Manager (MAM), but requires regular interactions with Program Staff and team members to instill the risk management philosophy into the day to day mission operations. While Risk Management is well defined for projects in the development phase, it is a relatively new concept for Mission Operations. The Cassini team has embraced this process and has begun using it in an effective, proactive manner, to ensure mission success. It is hoped that the Cassini Risk Management Process will form the basis by which risk management is conducted during MO&DA on future projects. proactive in identifying, assessing and mitigating risks before they become problems. Cost ehtiveness is achieved by: Comprehensively identifying risks Rapidly assessing which risks require the expenditure of pruject cewums Taking early actions to mitigate these risks Iterating the process frequently, to be responsive to the dynamic internal and external environments The Cassini Program has successfully implemented a Risk Management Process for mission operations, The initial SRL has been developed and input into he online tool. The Risk Management webbased system has been rolled out for use by the flight team and risk owners we working proactive in identifying, assessing and mitigating risks before they become problems. Cost ehtiveness is achieved by: Comprehensively identifying risks Rapidly assessing which risks require the expenditure of pruject cewums Taking early actions to mitigate these risks Iterating the process frequently, to be responsive to the dynamic internal and external environments The Cassini Program has successfully implemented a Risk Management Process for mission operations, The initial SRL has been developed and input into he online tool. The Risk Management webbased system has been rolled out for use by the flight team and risk owners we working put into place will become visible and will be illusmted in future papers.

risk management↗
NASA NTRS2011

Risk Balance: A Key Tool for Mission Operations Assurance

The Mission Operations Assurance (MOA) discipline actively participates as a project member to achieve their common objective of full mission success while also providing an independent risk assessment to the Project Manager and Office of Safety and Mission Success staff. The cornerstone element of MOA is the independent assessment of the risks the project faces in executing its mission. Especially as the project approaches critical mission events, it becomes imperative to clearly identify and assess the risks the project faces. Quite often there are competing options for the project to select from in deciding how to execute the event. An example includes choices between proven but aging hardware components and unused but unproven components. Timing of the event with respect to visual or telecommunications visibility can be a consideration in the case of Earth reentry or hazardous maneuver events. It is in such situations that MOA is called upon for a risk balance assessment or risk trade study to support their recommendation to the Project Manager for a specific option to select. In the following paragraphs we consider two such assessments, one for the Stardust capsule Earth return and the other for the choice of telecommunications system configuration for the EPOXI flyby of the comet Hartley 2. We discuss the development of the trade space for each project's scenario and characterize the risks of each possible option. The risk characterization we consider includes a determination of the severity or consequence of each risk if realized and the likelihood of its occurrence. We then examine the assessment process to arrive at a MOA recommendation. Finally we review each flight project's decision process and the outcome of their decisions.

operations↗
NASA NTRS2019

Supply Chain Research and Analysis: Illuminating Risks in Complex Systems

Framing the strategic challenge posed by the interconnected, multitiered supply chains of mission projects managed by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center. Discussing conditions and risks which can disrupt or threaten the availability, production and delivery of products and services for complex space systems. Utilizing a holistic analytical framework, business intelligence techniques, an integrated information system platform and analytics to produce insight into suppliers / supply chains and associated risks. Advancing supply chain risk management capabilities to support the successful performance of space missions.

supply chain risk management↗
NASA NTRS2013

Sustaining a Mature Risk Management Process: Ensuring the International Space Station for a Vibrant Future

The International Space Station (ISS) risk management methodology is an example of a mature and sustainable process. Risk management is a systematic approach used to proactively identify, analyze, plan, track, control, communicate, and document risks to help management make risk-informed decisions that increase the likelihood of achieving program objectives. The ISS has been operating in space for over 14 years and permanently crewed for over 12 years. It is the longest surviving habitable vehicle in low Earth orbit history. Without a mature and proven risk management plan, it would be increasingly difficult to achieve mission success throughout the life of the ISS Program. A successful risk management process must be able to adapt to a dynamic program. As ISS program-level decision processes have evolved, so too has the ISS risk management process continued to innovate, improve, and adapt. Constant adaptation of risk management tools and an ever-improving process is essential to the continued success of the ISS Program. Above all, sustained support from program management is vital to risk management continued effectiveness. Risk management is valued and stressed as an important process by the ISS Program.

Raftery, Michael↗
NASA NTRS2011

Safety and Mission Assurance: A NASA Perspective

Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) consists of the safety, reliability, maintainability, software assurance and quality disciplines, which are applied to reduce the probability of mishaps and ensure mission success. NASA uses a risk management process which requires various organizations to identify, analyze and mitigate/control risks associated with operations and decision making processes.

Higginbotham, Scott Alan↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Artemis Missions Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) & Reliability Assessment Overview

To show how NASA’s Moon-to-Mars (M2M) program can use hardware reliability assessments and comprehensive Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) to estimate risk of future missions and manage risk via safety and mission success requirements from the top down, so that this risk can be balanced with other program metrics like cost and schedule. These PRAs and reliability assessments can be used during the concept, design, and operational phases of development. This presentation also provides some thoughts on how the NASA process can be utilized for a lunar surface power grid development.

PRA↗
NASA NTRS2004

Integrated Risk Management Within NASA Programs/Projects

As NASA Project Risk Management activities continue to evolve, the need to successfully integrate risk management processes across the life cycle, between functional disciplines, stakeholders, various management policies, and within cost, schedule and performance requirements/constraints become more evident and important. Today's programs and projects are complex undertakings that include a myriad of processes, tools, techniques, management arrangements and other variables all of which must function together in order to achieve mission success. The perception and impact of risk may vary significantly among stakeholders and may influence decisions that may have unintended consequences on the project during a future phase of the life cycle. In these cases, risks may be unintentionally and/or arbitrarily transferred to others without the benefit of a comprehensive systemic risk assessment. Integrating risk across people, processes, and project requirements/constraints serves to enhance decisions, strengthen communication pathways, and reinforce the ability of the project team to identify and manage risks across the broad spectrum of project management responsibilities. The ability to identify risks in all areas of project management increases the likelihood a project will identify significant issues before they become problems and allows projects to make effective and efficient use of shrinking resources. By getting a total team integrated risk effort, applying a disciplined and rigorous process, along with understanding project requirements/constraints provides the opportunity for more effective risk management. Applying an integrated approach to risk management makes it possible to do a better job at balancing safety, cost, schedule, operational performance and other elements of risk. This paper will examine how people, processes, and project requirements/constraints can be integrated across the project lifecycle for better risk management and ultimately improve the chances for mission success.

Connley, Warren↗
NASA NTRS2012

Does Commercial Space Really Need MOA?

The Mission Operations Assurance (MOA) discipline actively participates as a project member to achieve their common objective of full mission success while also providing an independent risk assessment to the Project Manager. The cornerstone element of MOA is the independent assessment of the risks the project faces in executing its mission. Especially as the project approaches critical mission events, it becomes imperative to clearly identify and assess the risks the project faces. This has been the paradigm for robotic space exploration missions, but does the same apply to commercial space operations? This is the question which is the driver for this year's MOA track at the 18th Annual Improving Space Operations workshop in April at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and the question we examine in this paper. Corollaries to this driving question are why shouldn't MOA apply and are there factors beyond mission success with acceptable risk which apply to commercial space operations that are not present in government scientific missions? To address these questions, areas we focus on include risk (both mission and profit) management for commercial space operations and the practical extension of robotic mission MOA to commercial space operations. Another key area to look at is command file errors which are a major concern for deep space robotic missions, but can we worry about them less with manned missions or unmanned supply mission? Further, with the growing concern about space debris, we delve into the role of MOA relative to End-of-Mission activities. This paper examines these topics and in particular the perspectives presented at the workshop to begin charting the appropriate course for MOA in the emerging sector of Commercial Space Operations.

commercial space↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Building Supply Chain Visibility for Risk Management: Illuminating the COVID-19 Pandemic Impact Upon NASA Suppliers

NASA mission projects rely upon global supply chains subject to an array of risks that threaten to disrupt or deny the timely, affordable provision of products and services as required for mission success. Visibility into these supply chains is key to the management of risks, such as those stemming from the coronavirus pandemic and its associated effects upon suppliers. Accordingly, the Supplier Research and Analysis (SRA) Program within Goddard Space Flight Center’s Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Directorate produced the COVID-19 pandemic/NASA suppliers dashboard as part of the NASA Meta Information System. The dashboard provides visibility and situational awareness to aid risk assessment, planning and decision-making over the course of the pandemic recovery phase. The approach of integrating data and information into visual dashboard displays has also been employed by the SRA Program to focus on specific risks pertaining to foreign-based suppliers. This webinar is presented by the NASA Office of SMA and its Supply Chain Risk Management Program, in collaboration with the NASA Safety Center and Goddard’s SMA Directorate.

supplier research and analysis, supply chain risk ↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

Risk Posture↗
DOE OSTI2024

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS2011

Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners (Second Edition)

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a comprehensive, structured, and logical analysis method aimed at identifying and assessing risks in complex technological systems for the purpose of cost-effectively improving their safety and performance. NASA's objective is to better understand and effectively manage risk, and thus more effectively ensure mission and programmatic success, and to achieve and maintain high safety standards at NASA. NASA intends to use risk assessment in its programs and projects to support optimal management decision making for the improvement of safety and program performance. In addition to using quantitative/probabilistic risk assessment to improve safety and enhance the safety decision process, NASA has incorporated quantitative risk assessment into its system safety assessment process, which until now has relied primarily on a qualitative representation of risk. Also, NASA has recently adopted the Risk-Informed Decision Making (RIDM) process [1-1] as a valuable addition to supplement existing deterministic and experience-based engineering methods and tools. Over the years, NASA has been a leader in most of the technologies it has employed in its programs. One would think that PRA should be no exception. In fact, it would be natural for NASA to be a leader in PRA because, as a technology pioneer, NASA uses risk assessment and management implicitly or explicitly on a daily basis. NASA has probabilistic safety requirements (thresholds and goals) for crew transportation system missions to the International Space Station (ISS) [1-2]. NASA intends to have probabilistic requirements for any new human spaceflight transportation system acquisition. Methods to perform risk and reliability assessment in the early 1960s originated in U.S. aerospace and missile programs. Fault tree analysis (FTA) is an example. It would have been a reasonable extrapolation to expect that NASA would also become the world leader in the application of PRA. That was, however, not to happen. Early in the Apollo program, estimates of the probability for a successful roundtrip human mission to the moon yielded disappointingly low (and suspect) values and NASA became discouraged from further performing quantitative risk analyses until some two decades later when the methods were more refined, rigorous, and repeatable. Instead, NASA decided to rely primarily on the Hazard Analysis (HA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) methods for system safety assessment.

Stamatelatos,Michael↗
NASA NTRS2005

Taking the Risk Out of Risk Assessment

The ability to understand risks and have the right strategies in place when risky events occur is essential in the workplace. More and more organizations are being confronted with concerns over how to measure their risks or what kind of risks they can take when certain events transpire that could have a negative impact. NASA is one organization that faces these challenges on a daily basis, as effective risk management is critical to the success of its missions especially the Space Shuttle missions. On July 29, 1996, former NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin charged NASA s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance with developing a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) tool to support decisions on the funding of Space Shuttle upgrades. When issuing the directive, Goldin said, "Since I came to NASA [in 1992], we've spent billions of dollars on Shuttle upgrades without knowing how much they improve safety. I want a tool to help base upgrade decisions on risk." Work on the PRA tool began immediately. The resulting prototype, the Quantitative Risk Assessment System (QRAS) Version 1.0, was jointly developed by NASA s Marshall Space Flight Center, its Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, and researchers at the University of Maryland. QRAS software automatically expands the reliability logic models of systems to evaluate the probability of highly detrimental outcomes occurring in complex systems that are subject to potential accident scenarios. Even in its earliest forms, QRAS was used to begin PRA modeling of the Space Shuttle. In parallel, the development of QRAS continued, with the goal of making it a world-class tool, one that was especially suited to NASA s unique needs. From the beginning, an important conceptual goal in the development of QRAS was for it to help bridge the gap between the professional risk analyst and the design engineer. In the past, only the professional risk analyst could perform, modify, use, and perhaps even adequately understand PRA. NASA wanted to change this by developing a PRA tool that would be friendlier, more understandable, and more useful to the broader engineering community. This concept ultimately led to the look, feel, and functionality that QRAS has today.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2001

The Role of Space Medicine in Management of Risk in Spaceflight

The purpose of Space Medicine is to ensure mission success by providing quality and comprehensive health care throughout all mission phases to optimize crew health and performance and to prevent negative long-term health consequences. Space flight presents additional hazards and associated risks to crew health, performance, and safety. With an extended human presence in space it is expected that illness and injury will occur on orbit, which may present a significant threat to crew health and performance and to mission success. Maintaining crew health, safety and performance and preventing illness and injury are high priorities necessary for mission success and agency goals. Space flight health care should meet the standards of practice of evidence based clinical medicine. The function of Space Medicine is expected to meet the agency goals as stated in the 1998 NASA Strategic Plan and the priorities established by the Critical Path Roadmap Project. The Critical Path Roadmap Project is an integrated NASA cross-disciplinary strategy to assess, understand, mitigate, and manage the risks associated with long-term exposure to the space flight environment. The evidence based approach to space medicine should be standardized, objective process yielding expected results and establishing clinical practice standards while balancing individual risk with mission (programmatic) risk. The ability to methodically apply available knowledge and expertise to individual and mission health issues will ensure appropriate priorities are assigned and resources are allocated. NASA Space Medicine risk management process is a combined clinical and engineering approach. Competition for weight, power, volume, cost, and crew time must be balanced in making decisions about the care of individual crew with competing agency resources.

Clark, Jonathan B.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Bisphosphonate Treatment: Risk Management in Long Duration Spaceflight

Bisphosphonates are a class of pharmaceuticals used to treat diverse bone disorders such as osteoporosis, Paget's disease, and multiple myeloma. They constitute a class of drugs which adhere to bony surfaces and interfere with the resorptive activity of osteoclasts. They also represent a potential countermeasure towards the loss of bone mass experienced by astronauts during spaceflight. Recently, the medical literature has revealed cases of osteonecrosis of the jaw in individuals receiving intravenous bisphosphonate therapy with a smaller number of cases occurring in individuals receiving the oral form of the medication. Risk management for long duration missions requires consideration of mission success and lifetime health care of astronauts. We performed MEDLINE and PubMed searches (1966 December 2006) using the following keywords: osteonecrosis, jaw, bisphosphonates. Additional references were obtained from the citations of the retrieved articles. Injectable bisphosphonates such as pamidronate and zoledronic acid have been highlighted recently in the literature due to a possible link with osteonecrosis of the jaw. The mechanism of action remains unclear but may be linked to physiologic microdamage in the jawbones resulting from suppression of bone metabolism. The most predisposing factors appear to be the type and dose of bisphosphonate used, a history of dental surgery, trauma, and/or dental infection. In addition, patients diagnosed with a malignancy such as breast cancer or multiple myeloma, who have been on intravenous bisphosphonate therapy for several months seem to be at increased risk. The use of oral bisphosphonates appears to place patients more at risk from acute events such as gastrointestinal tract injury or perforation. Although some studies report little to no increase in GI events compared to placebo, we must remember that in microgravity, astronauts may be unable to comply with medication instructions. They may have difficulty remaining upright for the required 30-45 minutes post-ingestion. We are currently unaware if this inability to comply with instructions on the package insert may lead to an increased risk for GI events. There is a potential long-term complication that resides with both forms of bisphosphonate therapy. In order to repair normally occurring physiologic microdamage to bone, both osteoclastic resorption and osteoblastic bone deposition must be functional. Controversy exists in the literature regarding whether prolonged use of bisphosphonates may lead to the suppression of bone turnover and accumulation of microdamage. Bisphosphonates are a powerful class of drugs that suppress bone turnover, but may cause serious adverse clinical events such as gastrointestinal tract injury or osteonecrosis of the jaw. Unfortunately, little to no data exists currently which may help us provide answers regarding the risks of their use in a healthy astronaut cohort. While controversy exists in the literature regarding their mechanism and long-term consequences, the potential mission impact or lifetime health care impact of an adverse clinical event resulting from bisphosphonate therapy must be considered.

Fogarty, Jennifer A.↗