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Baldez, Phoenix

Publications and source records attributed to Baldez, Phoenix.

Electropotential Verification for Nuclear Safeguards

The international safeguards regime desires methods to efficiently verify that facilities are only performing declared activities. Electropotential verification (EPV) is a newly proposed technique that was tested for its feasibility to perform facility design information verification (DIV) and verification of spent nuclear fuel while in a cooling pool. EPV works by passing a constant, low voltage current through a conductive system (facility infrastructure of nuclear fuel assembly) and measuring the resulting voltage at various places throughout the infrastructure in order to establish a baseline. Changes made to the system affect these voltage readings, which will deviate from the baseline and indicate that a change to the system was made. For facility DIV, it appears feasible that changes in configuration of the system’s grounding can be detected in real-time, and the location of the change can be inferred from the measured intensity of the change in voltage. Determination of whether or not spent fuel was present in a fuel rod, as well as the presence/absence of a fuel rod from an assembly using EPV, proved unsuccessful with the sensitivity of instrumentation used in this study.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Electropotential Verification for Nuclear Safeguards

The international safeguards regime desires methods to efficiently verify that facilities are only performing declared activities. Electropotential verification (EPV) is a newly proposed technique that was tested for its feasibility to perform facility design information verification (DIV). EPV works by passing a constant, low voltage current through a conductive system (facility infrastructure of nuclear fuel assembly) and measuring the resulting voltage at various places throughout the infrastructure in order to establish a baseline. Changes made to the system affect these voltage readings, which will deviate from the baseline and indicate that a change to the system was made. For large scale infrastructure such as a nuclear facility DIV, it appears feasible that changes in configuration of the system’s grounding can be detected in real-time, and the location of the change can be inferred from the measured intensity of the change in voltage.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Development of a lithium fluoride zinc sulfide based neutron multiplicity counter

Past 3He shortages led to investigations into replacement options for neutron detectors in systems that previously used 3He-based technologies. The goal of this research was to investigate the feasibility of a full-scale lithium fluoride with silver activated zinc sulfide (LiF/ZnS) based neutron multiplicity counter. The LiF/ZnS based neutron multiplicity counter (LiNMC) was developed based on an iterative process between modeling and experimental measurements. Each active region of the LiNMC contains five sheets of LiF/ZnS sandwiched between six sheets of wavelength shifting plastic to form neutron detection stacks. The wavelength shifted scintillation light was collected by photomultiplier tubes located on each end of the stacks. Twelve such detector stacks were placed around a sample chamber in a square arrangement with lithiated high density polyethylene blocks in the corners to reflect high energy neutrons and capture low energy neutrons. Preliminary calibration with a 252Cf neutron source showed that the LiNMC was able to achieve 36% neutron detection efficiency (ε) and an 11.7 μs neutron die-away time (τ) for a doubles Figure-of-merit (ε2/ τ) of 109. This is the highest doubles Figure-of-merit performance measured to-date for a 3He-free neutron multiplicity counter system. By the end of this project, the LiNMC’s basic components were integrated into a single laboratory scale system capable of proof-of-concept measurements.

3He-free↗