Search NASA⌕ Search

Engineering topics

Bland, Jesse John

Publications and source records attributed to Bland, Jesse John.

At least 19 records

Understanding Radiotropism in Filamentous Fungi

Melanized species of filamentous fungi isolated from high radiation environments have been reported to exhibit radiotropism, defined as the directed growth toward a source of ionizing radiation. Inconsistencies in the experimental approaches and results have impeded our understanding of the key factors involved in radiotropism. In the present study, we assessed radiotropism in four isolates of fungi: Aspergillus niger, A. calidoustus JC-1043, Paecilomyces variotii SNL-1, and P. variotii IMV-00236. Of these fungi, only P. variotii IMV-00236 had been previously reported to exhibit radiotropic behavior. Plates of each fungus were placed in equivalent proximity to a 137 Cs source, with a primary gamma emission of 662 keV, and differences in the rate and direction of mycelia growth were measured over a seven-day period. Significant differences were not observed in the rate or direction of growth of the different fungi based on exposure to gamma radiation, which suggested a lack of measurable radiotropism in these experiments. Additional studies varying parameters such gamma emission rates and energies, as well as other types of ionizing radiation (e.g., alpha and beta particles, neutrons) are necessary to gain further insights to the factors critical to the expression of radiotropic behavior in filamentous fungi.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Technical Basis for Proposed Changes to DOE-STD-1194-2019, Nuclear Material Attractiveness Determination and Categorization

The Department of Energy (DOE)’s Technical Standard DOE-STD-1194-2019 (dated September 2019), Nuclear Materials Control and Accountability, provides key guidance for the determination of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) attractiveness levels. Attractiveness levels are a key component in the security categorization of SNM processed, used, and stored at DOE facilities. Upon review, the writing team identified specific components relating to the determination of attractiveness levels that could be modified to improve clarity, reduce burden on sites, and/or better align with the graded safeguards principle that is central to the DOE’s nuclear security program. The report outlines the original verbiage, issues with implementation of that verbiage, proposed new verbiage, and the expected benefits thus serving as the technical basis for the proposed changes.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Electropotential Verification for Nuclear Safeguards

The international safeguards regime desires methods to efficiently verify that facilities are only performing declared activities. Electropotential verification (EPV) is a newly proposed technique that was tested for its feasibility to perform facility design information verification (DIV) and verification of spent nuclear fuel while in a cooling pool. EPV works by passing a constant, low voltage current through a conductive system (facility infrastructure of nuclear fuel assembly) and measuring the resulting voltage at various places throughout the infrastructure in order to establish a baseline. Changes made to the system affect these voltage readings, which will deviate from the baseline and indicate that a change to the system was made. For facility DIV, it appears feasible that changes in configuration of the system’s grounding can be detected in real-time, and the location of the change can be inferred from the measured intensity of the change in voltage. Determination of whether or not spent fuel was present in a fuel rod, as well as the presence/absence of a fuel rod from an assembly using EPV, proved unsuccessful with the sensitivity of instrumentation used in this study.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Electropotential Verification for Nuclear Safeguards

The international safeguards regime desires methods to efficiently verify that facilities are only performing declared activities. Electropotential verification (EPV) is a newly proposed technique that was tested for its feasibility to perform facility design information verification (DIV). EPV works by passing a constant, low voltage current through a conductive system (facility infrastructure of nuclear fuel assembly) and measuring the resulting voltage at various places throughout the infrastructure in order to establish a baseline. Changes made to the system affect these voltage readings, which will deviate from the baseline and indicate that a change to the system was made. For large scale infrastructure such as a nuclear facility DIV, it appears feasible that changes in configuration of the system’s grounding can be detected in real-time, and the location of the change can be inferred from the measured intensity of the change in voltage.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

High-Level Considerations for Access and Access Controls by Design

The design and construction of a nuclear power plant must include robust structures and a security boundary that is difficult to penetrate. For security considerations, the reactors would ideally be sited underground, beneath a massive solid block, which would be too thick to be penetrated by tools or explosives. Additionally, all communications and power transfer lines would also be located underground and would be fortified against any possible design basis threats. Limiting access with difficult-to-penetrate physical barriers is a key aspect for determining response and staffing requirements. Considerations considered in a graded approach to physical protection are described.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

High-Level Considerations for Access and Access Controls by Design

Nuclear power plants must be, by design and construction, robust structures and difficult to penetrate. Ideally, for security, the reactors would be sited underground, beneath a massive solid block, too thick to be penetrated by tools or explosives with all communications and power transfer lines also underground and fortified. Limiting access with difficult-to-penetrate physical barriers is going to be key for determining response and staffing requirements.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Technical Basis for the International Export of Handheld Spectroscopy Detectors

The international export of handheld spectroscopy detectors by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to partner states will provide state regulatory authorities and nuclear material owners a way to improve accountancy for accidental gains of nuclear material, including the provision of reports to the IAEA, in order to meet their safeguards agreements. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements for non-nuclear weapons states requires accountancy for all nuclear material. As defined in Article XX of the IAEA statute, nuclear material includes source materials: "uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature," and special fissionable material: "plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233". For IAEA Member States to meet their requirements under comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSA), safeguards are to be applied on "all source or special fissionable material," which "includes all nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards". Therefore, accidental gains and losses of nuclear material must be reported to the IAEA. An accidental gain occurs when a state unexpectedly adds nuclear material to their inventory by various means such as seizing smuggled material or the discovery of legacy items previously unaccounted for. The material type and quantity must be added to the State's inventory by updating domestic records and then communicated to the IAEA.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗