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Dickson, Peter

Publications and source records attributed to Dickson, Peter.

At least 19 records

Standardizing an Intermediate-Scale High Explosive Safety Test Suite

Small-scale safety testing, while successful in screening out extremely dangerous explosive compositions, does not fully characterize the explosive hazards associated with handling larger, consolidated or bare charges. It is proposed that intermediate-scale tests using consolidated charges in the range 25 mg – 1 kg are warranted to satisfactorily address the hazards. A standard for this intermediate-scale testing should be developed, proofed, peer-reviewed and adopted to assist in the development of safe new high explosive compositions across the complex. This whitepaper explains why current small-scale safety testing is insufficient to characterize the handling hazard, identifies the guiding aspects of explosive response that drive the handling hazards associated with larger consolidated charges, and proposes a suite of tests/experiments that can serve as a starting point for an intermediate-scale safety standard.

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A Review of the Beirut Ammonium Nitrate Explosion [Slides]

In September 2013, the cargo ship MV Rhosus, an 87 m, single-deck cargo ship with two cargo holds totaling around 4000 m 3 , was chartered to transport 2750 metric tonnes of bagged (in 1000 kg sacks) explosives-grade ammonium nitrate from a Georgian fertilizer manufacturer (Rustavi Azot LLC) to an explosives manufacturer (Fábrica de Explosivos Moçambique) in Mozambique. Visual details on the subsequent explosion are provided.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

LA-R43S6-L1 Postshot Report [Slides]

The Ranchero LA-R43S6-L1 test (formerly referred to as LA-43S-L1. The R specifically designates it is a Ranchero device and the 6 indicates a 6” high explosive charge diameter in anticipation of using larger diameters in the future.) was conducted on 3/8/17 with good success. The experiment was the first test of a “Swooped” Ranchero flux compression generator (FCG), and the load for the test was an aluminum imploding liner. In addition to the swoop, the stator was anodized to provide an insulating layer instead of one or more layers of polyethylene as had been the case for all earlier Ranchero tests. Using the Firing point TA-39-88 capacitor bank, 3.5 MA was delivered to the FCG for the initial magnetic field, and 36.4 MA were delivered to the load having an initial inductance of 2.5 nH. Implosion speeds over 1.1 cm/us were recorded, which exceeds previous LANL solid liner experimental results. The test was diagnosed with 18 PDV channels, 12 of which recorded liner implosion data, and the other 6 of which tracked the FCG armature during flux compression. These armature expansion data recorded during flux compression are the first of their kind, and it was previously unknown, due to unknown effects of the SF 6 in the flux compression volume, whether or not the expansion could be recorded using the PDV technique. Post shot 2D MHD calculations employed a complete external circuit model, and an improved flux diffusion model not available prior to the test. Results from these simulations show very good agreement with the experimental result. Four PDV channels recorded the liner implosion viewed radially outward from the center of the liner. All four of these probes recorded implosion velocities greater that 1 cm/µs, with the cylindrical center displaced by ~2 mm from actual center. Four PDV channels looked at +10° angles from the CMU wall, and four looked at -10° angles. A glide plane interaction is shown moving toward the center of the liner in MHD calculations, and PDV probes provide confirmation. The high explosive (HE) in the LA-R43S6-L1 test was PBX 9501 which had to be glued together in many pieces, and the test was preceded by a camera test to verify that the PBX 9501 could be assembled with acceptable tolerance in glue joints to prevent severing the armature during expansion. The camera test verified an acceptable armature performance, and results are given in complete detail in a post shot report LA-UR-19-20124, and summarized here. This report provides complete detail of the considerable body of data obtained on the test and in the post shot calculations. It is prepared in Power Point for ease of preparation and future review. Shot documentation available in the LANL on-line library are included as references, and non-referenceable documents will be cited and stored in an LA- R43S6-L1 post shot folder stored on an M-6 shared drive. Fabrication drawings are also maintained in an M-6 shared drive and paper files are available from M-6 personnel. This report will be maintained as a PowerPoint document on the shared drive, as well, since included movies will play and graphs from Excel files retain information in the PowerPoint versions. PDF versions are required for clearance and are not to large to send by e-mail.

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CISME report on experiments with HMX powder, PBX 9501 prills, and heated PBX 9501

The ability to predict post-ignition explosive response is relevant to explosives safety, particularly weapons assembly/disassembly operations that must operate under a sufficiently conservative safety basis to meet risk mitigation criteria for inadvertent nuclear detonation (IND). In particular, hazard determinations hinge on whether the PBX 9501 main charge can ultimately attain detonation from an initial, non-shock, ignition stimulus. The CISME experiment uses a spherical explosive charge, which is thermally ignited in the center using a fiber-delivered infrared laser pulse. This ignition mechanism - i.e. a localized thermal hotspot - is representative of the ignition-causing insults typical in accident scenarios, including low-velocity impact, drop, skid, and punch events. In fiscal year 2018 CISME experiments were conducted with pristine PBX 9501 spheres, confined and unconfined. Sub-detonative, low-violence reactions were observed. Here we report experiments conducted since 2018. The explosive charge was varied: experiments were conducted with room temperature pour-density HMX powder and prills of PBX 9501, and heated, thermally damaged PBX 9501. Experiments were conducted in a confined configuration, with two 4 mm-thick stainless-steel hemispherical shells bolted around the sphere. Detonation, via DDT (deflagration-to-detonation transition) was observed in the 3-inch diameter powdered HMX and the 6-inch diameter heated and thermally-damaged PBX 9501 tests. No transition to DDT was observed in smaller diameters for those configurations, and no DDT was observed for pour-density prills of PBX 9501 of any diameter. The original test series demonstrated that the response of pristine, undamaged PBX 9501 to a central ignition is relatively benign. This new test series shows that increased porosity, lack of polymer binders and thermal damage can greatly increase the violence of the post-ignition response, up to and including detonation. These results bridge the explosive response of PBX 9501 from sub-detonative through detonation as a function of diameter and provide valuable test cases for modeling efforts that strive to capture the DDT threshold. By exploring explosive response in a more representative 3D geometry, we can also benchmark these new results to more plentiful DDT datasets generated from testing in 1D tube confinement (the historical test configuration)–the configuration upon which almost all DDT models were developed.

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Heavily Confined PBX 9501 Experiment Report FY2020

Most accidental insults to explosives are invariably thermal in nature—either direct thermal via application of heat or indirect thermal when mechanical energy is converted to heat. The key question is whether the initial thermal insult transitions into a violent explosive response. If the ultimate violence attained is moderate, nearby personnel may be harmed or killed, but Inadvertent Nuclear Detonation (IND) will not occur. However, if the explosive ultimately transitions from deflagration to detonation (DDT) then IND becomes a concern. PBX 9501 is not an insensitive high explosive (IHE). It has been conclusively demonstrated that mechanically and thermally damaged PBX 9501 can readily DDT in heavy confinement. However, it is currently unknown whether pristine explosive—i.e. thermally and mechanically undamaged— is capable of DDT. Three experiments were conducted in order to determine whether very heavily confined pristine PBX 9501 is capable of DDT. All experiments used identical 6-inch diameter spherical charges of PBX 9501 confined in a 350 lb. hardened steel vessel with >2.5-inch thick walls. The first, primary experiment tested pristine PBX 9501 and was thermally ignited at the center of using a laser over optical fiber. Two additional baseline experiments were performed for comparison: the second test was initiated at the center using a detonator; the third test was bulk heated until self-ignition (cookoff). Velocimetry data in combination with hydrocode simulations suggest that a classical detonation wave did not develop in the pristine, thermally ignited PBX 9501. Reaction violence was approximately equivalent—in terms of ultimate energy output—as a full detonation, but the acceleration of metal fragments occurred more slowly than in a detonation-driven scenario.

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IHE Material and IHE Subassembly Qualification Test Description and Criteria (v. 14.7)

The purpose of the deflagration-to-detonation test is to demonstrate that an IHE material will not undergo deflagration-to-detonation transition (DDT) under stockpile relevant conditions of scale, confinement, and material condition. Inherent in this test design is the assumption that ignition does occur, with onset of deflagration. The test design will incorporate large margins and replicates to account for the stochastic nature of DDT events.

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The Response of Explosives to Accidental Stimuli

This brief discussion of the non-shock response of explosives is intended to introduce the reader to the basic concepts involved, and as additional reading to a live class on the subject. Explosives are generally designed to detonate – a specific kind of explosion in which a shock wave – a supersonic discontinuity in pressure, density and particle velocity – passes through the material and triggers fast chemical decomposition, liberating energy that is available to support the shock wave which would otherwise die out. The result may perhaps be usefully visualized as a rocket-propelled shock wave. Ideally, an explosive would detonate reliably when required while behaving as an inert material in all other circumstances. Modern engineered explosives, such as those used in nuclear weapons, largely meet the first criterion but fail the second because, even though they are very difficult to detonate unintentionally, they also exhibit non-detonative energetic decomposition responses to accidental stimuli that can range from mild to very violent. There are two distinct elements to a full understanding of this regime of behavior: 1. How do accidental stimuli cause the onset of decomposition? 2. What determines the violence of the ensuing reaction? In order to understand these elements, we must first consider the full range of behaviors of commonly used explosives. This course is intended to introduce the student to the basic concepts and to encourage further reading on the subject.

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LA-43-S-CT Post Shot

LA-43-S-CT was conducted on 12/14/15to verify the performance of the HE/Armature system intended for use in a new configuration of Ranchero Flux Compression Generators (FCGs). Subsystem tests preceded this experiment, and a synopsis of the issues explored in these is presented. The system was viewed by two fast framing cameras, an array of PDV probes, and an electronic streak camera that provide very good time and space resolution for motion of the armature during expansion. The test is described in very good detail, and the result is that the armature system is adequate for use in the Ranchero 43-S system for future physics tests.

Ranchero↗

Low-voltage detonator response to electrostatic discharge

Most explosives exhibit some level of sensitivity to electrostatic discharge. Low-voltage detonators (a.k.a blasting caps) are commonly referred to as Low-Energy Electro-explosive Devices (LEEED), a category that may indicate elevated sensitivity to induced current and/or electrostatic discharge (ESD). These devices comprise a resistive bridge wire (~ 2 Ω) surrounded by a pyrotechnic or primary explosive such as lead styphnate, in contact with a primary explosive charge, typically dextrinated lead azide, followed by an output charge, generally PETN. The 50% firing current is typically around 1 A.

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Shock Initiation Response of PBX 9502 Considering Rarefaction Wave Effects

The effect of rarefaction waves on the shock initiation processes of impacted explosives is investigated. The Scaled Uniform Reactive Front (SURF) explosives model is convenient for this investigation because mechanisms responsible for ignition, i.e., the physics of hot spots, is based on the shock pressure, while rarefactions are controlled by local pressure and treated separately in SURF. One -dimensional gas gun experiments are used to calibrate the ignition portion of SURF. Impact experiments conducted using thin disk and small diameter rods, where controlled one- and two-dimensional rarefactions are introduced, allow the local pressure-dependence of SURF to be parameterized.The Theory of Singular Surfaces was invoked to elucidate the thermo-mechanical and thermo-chemical behavior. Room and elevated (250°C) temperature conditions were explored. In all cases SURF could be parameterized to match the experimental results. In doing so, the role of rarefactions on the shock initiation process was gleaned.

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PBX 9502 air-gap tests

A small number of simple air-gap tests were performed on 1-inch diameter PBX 9502 cylinders to determine an approximate threshold for detonation failure. The primary diagnostics were streak imaging and dent measurements in a steel witness plate. Relight was found to occur, with negligible excess transit time, for air gaps up to 1 mm. Relight did not occur with a 3-mm air gap.

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Isolator fragmentation and explosive initiation tests

Three tests were conducted to evaluate the effects of firing an isolator in proximity to a barrier or explosive charge. The tests with explosive were conducted without a barrier, on the basis that since any barrier will reduce the shock transmitted to the explosive, bare explosive represents the worst-case from an inadvertent initiation perspective. No reaction was observed. The shock caused by the impact of a representative plastic material on both bare and cased PBX 9501 is calculated in the worst-case, 1-D limit, and the known shock response of the HE is used to estimate minimum run-to-detonation lengths. The estimates demonstrate that even 1-D impacts would not be of concern and that, accordingly, the divergent shocks due to isolator fragment impact are of no concern as initiating stimuli.

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Isolator fragmentation and explosive initiation tests

Three tests were conducted to evaluate the effects of firing an isolator in proximity to a barrier or explosive charge. The tests with explosive were conducted without barrier, on the basis that since any barrier will reduce the shock transmitted to the explosive, bare explosive represents the worst-case from an inadvertent initiation perspective. No reaction was observed. The shock caused by the impact of a representative plastic material on both bare and cased PBX9501 is calculated in the worst-case, 1-D limit, and the known shock response of the HE is used to estimate minimum run-to-detonation lengths. The estimates demonstrate that even 1-D impacts would not be of concern and that, accordingly, the divergent shocks due to isolator fragment impact are of no concern as initiating stimuli.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

The Thermal Response of TATB-Based PBXs

In the design mode of operation, TATB-­based PBXs, such as PBX 9502 or LX-­17, are promptly initiated by a detonator and booster system. In abnormal situations, such as accidents, a wide variety of non-­design-­mode insults can arise and it is desirable that these do not produce detonation but rather that, at most, they lead to a low chemical energy release. The most significant abnormal hazard is the direct shock initiation threat arising from high-­velocity fragment impact. This is quite well defined and may result in a detonative response if the fragment is large enough and fast enough. However, it is of considerably greater significance to the safety envelope of these explosives whether they are at all capable of DDT (deflagration-­to-­detonation transition), either at ambient or elevated temperatures since accidental insults to the explosive, either mechanical or thermal, that may produce local burning are both more numerous and more likely than shock loading. The purpose of this document is to demonstrate, based on the accumulated body of conservative experimental testing, that in explosive geometries and masses relevant to the Weapons Program, TATB-­based PBXs do not present a deflagration-­to-­detonation transition (DDT) hazard at any temperature. This is a significant statement since it removes detonative outcome concerns from the majority of insult scenarios on TATB-­based charges. It does not address the response of included detonator and booster assemblies, the response of which must be considered separately.

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Ranchero Armature Test LA-19.4-CT-3: PBX-9501 Explosive with no smoothing layer. Firing point 88, 9/16/13

LA-19.4-CT-3 (CT-3) was the third camera test in a series beginning in 1/11, which diagnose the performance of 6 mm thick, 6061 T-0 Al Ranchero armatures. [The test LA-43-CT-2 (CT-2) is described in LA-UR-14-21983.] The goal of CT-3 was to verify that PBX-9501, with 18 mm point spacing and no smoothing layer, could be used for Ranchero generator armatures in place of PBXN-110, which had been used in all previous Ranchero applications. CT-1 and CT-2 both had 43 cm long slapper detonator systems imbedded in the cast PBXN-110 explosive, but manufacturing a charge for a similar 9501 test was not cost effective. Instead, a single cylinder of 9501, 19.368 cm long and 15.494 cm (6.100”)in diameter, had a groove machined to accommodate a row of 11 SE-1 detonators with 18 mm point spacing along the mid-plane of the cylinder. The expansion of the armature looks like a slapper assembly along almost ½ of the circumference, and provides adequate proof of concept. Removing the smoother from PBXN-110-driven armatures increased the armature velocity from 3.1 mm/μs to 3.3 mm/μs, as seen in CT-2, and the velocity measured on CT-3 increased to 3.8 mm/μs. In addition, the camera records show that the surface of the armature is smooth enough, and free from ruptures for an expansion of greater that 2X. The advantage of using 9501 is that it precludes concerns about blow-outs seen when bubbles are left in the cast material, and gives extra velocity. The disadvantage is that the machined explosives are more expensive.

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