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NASA NTRS2018

Guidelines for Verification Strategies to Minimize RISK Based on Mission Environment, -Application and -Lifetime (MEAL)

There is a trend of compromising verification testing to address the cost and schedule constraints, which poses a high-risk posture for programs/projects. Current and emerging aerospace scientific and/or human exploration programs continue to pose new technological challenges. These technological challenges combined with finite budgets and truncated schedules are forcing designers, scientists, engineers, and managers to push technologies to their physical limits. In addition, budget and schedule pressures challenge how those technologies/missions are verified. A clear understanding of the different verification processes is needed to ensure the proper verification of the technology within the mission (i.e., capabilities, advantages, and limitations). The goal of verification is to prove through test, analysis, inspection, and/or demonstration that a product provides its required function while meeting the performance requirements. It is important that verification yield understanding of representative performance under worst-case conditions so that margins to failure can be evaluated for proposed applications. The capabilities, advantages, and limitations of the testing and inspection performed at each level are different, and the risk incurred by omitting a verification step depends on the level of integration as well as Mission, Environment, Application and Lifetime (MEAL). This paper focuses on verification processes. The goal of the verification process is to ensure the given avionics technology could be safely implemented on the given MEAL consistent with the program/project risk posture.

Gonzalez, Oscar↗
NASA NTRS2015

Risk of Adverse Cognitive or Behavioral Conditions and Psychiatric Disorders

The NASA commitment to human space flight includes continuing to fly astronauts on the ISS until it is decommissioned as well as possibly returning astronauts to the moon or having astronauts venture to an asteroid or Mars. As missions leave low Earth orbit and explore deeper space, BHP supports and conducts research to enable a risk posture that considers the risk of adverse cognitive or behavioral conditions and psychiatric disorders “acceptable given mitigations,” for pre-, in, and post-flight.The Human System Risk Board (HSRB) determines the risk of various mission scenarios using a likelihood (per person per year) by consequences matrix examining those risks across two categories—long term health and operational (within mission). Colors from a stoplight signal are used by HSRB and quickly provide a means of assessing overall perceived risk for a particular mission scenario. Risk associated with the current six month missions on the ISS are classified as “accepted with monitoring” while planetary missions, such as a mission to Mars, are recognized to be a “red” risk that requires mitigation to ensure mission success.Currently, the HSRB deems that the risk of adverse cognitive or behavioral conditions and psychiatric outcomes requires mitigation for planetary missions owing to long duration isolation and radiation exposure (see Table 1). While limited research evidence exists from spaceflight, it is well known anecdotally that the shift from the two week shuttle missions to the six month ISS missions renders the psychological stressors of space as more salient over longer duration missions. Shuttle astronauts were expected just to tolerate any stressors that arose during their mission and were successful at doing so (Whitmire et al, 2013). While it is possible to deal with stressors such as social isolation and to live with incompatible crewmembers for two weeks on shuttle, “ignoring it” is much less likely to be a successful coping mechanism on station. For the longer missions of the ISS, astronauts require a larger, more robust set of coping skills and more psychological support. Evidence of this are the number of BHP’s Operational Psychology (Op Psy) staff who have been awarded silver Snoopys by long duration astronauts†, in the statements of praise for the Op Psy and Family Support Office teams, and in the written and oral statements from flown astronauts regarding difficulty of longer missions and how much Op Psy helped.

Slack, Kelley J.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Long-Term Health Risk Quantification

Astronauts face hazards during spaceflight, including space radiation exposure, isolation and confinement, traveling far distances from Earth, reduced gravity levels, and closed and hostile environments. These hazards drive the definition of human health and performance risks associated with spaceflight. NASA’s Human System Risk Board maintains the human spaceflight risk posture for in-mission risks, as well as post-flight, Long-Term Health (LTH)risks potentially occurring later in the astronaut’s life. LTH risk encompasses the timeframe from immediately post-flight, through the rest of an astronaut’s career, through retirement, and until death. Possible LTH risk outcomes include the time and interventions needed for the astronaut to return to preflight physiological states after experiencing spaceflight hazards and recovery from any in-mission medical events that persist into the post-flight timeframe. It includes chronic complications that may arise due to experiencing in-flight medical conditions or injuries and medical conditions that occur later in life with a higher probability of occurrence or with more severity because of their spaceflight exposure. Finally, LTH risk outcomes can also include a reduction in life expectancy due to spaceflight exposures. There have been 144 medical conditions identified by NASA’s Lifetime Surveillance of Astronaut Health team to be associated with LTH risk. Epidemiological studies have been performed for some of these conditions to determine if astronauts suffer from an increased prevalence or severity of the condition due to their spaceflight experience compared to a comparable cohort .Differences in astronaut mortality or morbidity due to spaceflight experience were not detected in several of these studies. There were two cases where a modest increase in the incidence rate of astronaut LTH outcomes was detected. The first suggested an increase in the incidence of melanoma cases in astronauts, where the number of cases in astronauts were similar to the elevated number of cases observed in airplane pilots. The second provided some evidence of elevated numbers of cardiovascular disease events in astronauts compared to an appropriate healthy comparator cohort, which may warrant additional investigation. The lack of detection of LTH risk outcomes should not ease concerns about astronaut LTH. The studies highlighted here constitute only a small portion of the potential LTH conditions that could occur. Once epidemiological studies are performed on all conditions, significant findings may be detected. The analysis of astronaut LTH also suffers from limited numbers of data points because of the limited numbers of astronauts overall and the even fewer who have reached an age where LTH outcomes may begin to manifest. As shuttle and ISS astronauts begin to age and increase the feasibility of analysis, LTH outcomes may be detected. An application of risk quantification is the use of risk metrics within trade studies for resource prioritization and decision making. Trade studies regarding countermeasures to LTH risk outcomes would benefit from a quantification of LTH risk. NASA has ground-based processes in place such as astronaut screening and access to continuous medical monitoring and care during and after their astronaut career which are the main methods for mitigating LTH risk. In-mission countermeasures, such as acceptable levels of medical care and available countermeasures to counter spaceflight related physiological decrements, can mitigate a poor health and performance status immediately post-flight. Identifying appropriate risk metrics, obtaining valid quantities for them, and tying them to LTH countermeasures are necessary steps for realizing their use in trade studies. This presentation will highlight the challenges associated with the identification, quantification, and utilization of LTH risk metrics

Beth Lewandowski↗
NASA NTRS2025

Innovative Drug Selection, Storage, and Shelf-Life Strategies for Exploration Spaceflight

Medications have been a part of space travel dating back to the Apollo missions. A safe and effective medication formulary is essential to maintaining crew health and performance during long-duration spaceflight outside of low Earth orbit (LEO). Distance from Earth creates four key operational changes that increase medical risks, including communication, resupply, crewmember health, and evacuation. The current spaceflight pharmaceutical formulary consists of medications indicated to treat a variety of anticipated medical events and healthcare needs during spaceflight, but depends on a robust consumables resupply chain, which may be strained for a Lunar, and possibly non-existent for a Mars mission. The specific medications selections for the formulary may change to optimally align with the mission, crew compliment, and spacecraft design. Medical support at long-duration exploration missions will differ from LEO missions due to mission duration, lack of consumables resupply, prolonged exposure to space radiation, and the absence of emergency medical return capability. Loss of medication resupply limits or removes the ability to replace medications that have been exhausted or degraded, potentially exacerbating the medical risk posture. To address these anticipated risks, long-duration missions must consider use of novel medical technologies, treatment modalities, and smart medical systems that offer greater crew autonomy, such as physiologically based pharmacokinetic modeling, drug repurposing, on demand drug synthesis, or wearable drug delivery / monitoring devices. Once an ideal formulary for exploration space is determined, it is essential to establish the chemical and physical stability of each medication compound, as well as its safety by identifying its degradation profiles and products. Although few studies have been conducted to provide evidence on the physicochemical stability of pharmaceuticals during space missions, the data suggests that the spaceflight environment may promote degradation in some pharmaceuticals. Formulary drug purity and efficacy should be verified by pharmaceutical stability assessments, and can be realized non-destructively, and accessed in remote environments. Non-destructive pharmaceutical analysis and statistical modelling techniques could optimize exploration spaceflight medical care by enabling early detection of suboptimal therapeutics. Likewise, novel packaging, storage strategies, and dosage form innovations are promising countermeasures to optimize pharmaceutical shelf life, purity, and quality of exploration spaceflight medications. As we prepare for more distant exploration missions, risk management planning for astronaut healthcare should include the assembly of a medication formulary that is comprehensive enough to prevent or treat anticipated medical events, remains safe and chemically stable, and retains sufficient potency to last for the duration of the mission. Following extensive review of the literature, we will present innovative formulary optimization strategies, pharmaceutical stability assessment techniques, and storage and packaging solutions that could enhance drug safety and efficacy for future exploration spaceflight missions.

Vernie R Daniels↗
NASA NTRS2017

Increasing Small Satellite Reliability- A Public-Private Initiative

At present, CubeSat components and buses are generally not appropriate for missions where significant risk of failure, or the inability to quantify risk or confidence, is acceptable. However, in the future we anticipate that CubeSats will be used for missions requiring reliability of 1-3 years for Earth-observing missions and even longer for Planetary, Heliophysics, and Astrophysics missions. Their growing potential utility is driving an interagency effort to improve and quantify CubeSat reliability, and more generally, small satellite mission risk. The Small Satellite Reliability Initiative (SSRI)—an ongoing activity with broad collaborative participation from civil, DoD, and commercial space systems providers and stakeholders—targets this challenge. The Initiative seeks to define implementable and broadly-accepted approaches to achieve reliability and acceptable risk postures associated with several SmallSat mission risk classes—from “do no harm” missions, to those associated with missions whose failure would result in loss or delay of key national objectives. These approaches will maintain, to the extent practical, cost efficiencies associated with small satellite missions and consider constraints associated with supply chain elements, as appropriate. The SSRI addresses this challenge from two architectural levels—the mission- or system-level, and the component- or subsystem-level. The mission- or system-level scope targets assessment approaches that are efficient and effective, with mitigation strategies that facilitate resiliency to mission or system anomalies while the component- or subsystem-level scope addresses the challenge at lower architectural levels. The initiative does not limit strategies and approaches to proven and traditional methodologies, but is focused on fomenting thought on novel and innovative solutions. This paper discusses the genesis of and drivers for this initiative, how the public-private collaboration is being executed, findings and recommendations derived to date, and next steps towards broadening small satellite mission potential.

SmallSat↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Identified Risks of Adverse Outcomes Due to Inadequate Human Systems Integration Architecture in Human Spaceflight

The NASA Human System Risk Board (HSRB) has the overall responsibility for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks that it has identified to be associated with human spaceflight. As part of this process, the Board is charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to mitigate those risks, and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. One of the identified risks is due to inadequate human systems integration architecture (HSIA) and a driving factor of this risk is that given decreasing real-time ground support for execution of complex operations during future exploration missions, there is a possibility of adverse performance outcomes including that crew are unable to adequately respond to unanticipated critical malfunctions or detect safety critical procedural errors. The HSRB uses Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) as a communication tool for describing how astronaut exposure to spaceflight hazards leads to meaningful mission-level health and performance outcomes and as the basis for understanding intermediate causal relationships between risk contributing factors and countermeasures that link hazards to outcomes. The HSIA risk DAG will be presented and described. Historically, critical malfunctions requiring Crew/MCC management occurred at a rate of 1.7 times per year for ISS averaged over the lifetime and 3-4 times per year in the burn in phase for the vehicle. These averages do not include EVA data, which greatly increases the incident rate. Prior experience from the Apollo program showed 10/11 crewed missions experienced significant anomalies where crew relied heavily on MCC expertise in real-time. These failure patterns are in line with those observed in other complex engineered systems (e.g., oil rigs, launch systems, commercial aviation, etc.) It is likely that general malfunction and error rates are > 10% for short duration missions (<30 days), based on past and current spaceflight operations data. Likelihood of adverse outcomes has the potential to increase as crew conduct work with new, complex systems and with less ground support. For Low Earth Orbit missions and Lunar missions less than 30 days, assuming minimal comm delays, disruptions and bandwidth limitations, malfunctions and errors can affect mission objectives and crew health but may be mitigated by ground support. For Lunar missions greater than 30 days and any potential Mars mission malfunctions and errors can have Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission consequences due to reduced ground support (communication delays, constraints and blackouts) for more complex operations, as well as reduced resupply and evacuation options.

Daniel M Buckland↗
NASA NTRS2012

Improving Safety on the International Space Station: Transitioning to Electronic Emergency Procedure Books on the International Space Station

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) originally designed the International Space Station (ISS) to operate until 2015, but have extended operations until at least 2020. As part of this very dynamic Program, there is an effort underway to simplify the certification of Commercial ]of ]the ]Shelf (COTS) hardware. This change in paradigm allows the ISS Program to take advantage of technologically savvy and commercially available hardware, such as the iPad. The iPad, a line of tablet computers designed and marketed by Apple Inc., was chosen to support this endeavor. The iPad is functional, portable, and could be easily accessed in an emergency situation. The iPad Electronic Flight Bag (EFB), currently approved for use in flight by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), is a fraction of the cost of a traditional Class 2 EFB. In addition, the iPad fs ability to use electronic aeronautical data in lieu of paper in route charts and approach plates can cut the annual cost of paper data in half for commercial airlines. ISS may be able to benefit from this type of trade since one of the most important factors considered is information management. Emergency procedures onboard the ISS are currently available to the crew in paper form. Updates to the emergency books can either be launched on an upcoming visiting vehicle such as a Russian Soyuz flight or printed using the onboard ISS printer. In both cases, it is costly to update hardcopy procedures. A new operations concept was proposed to allow for the use of a tablet system that would provide a flexible platform to support space station crew operations. The purpose of the system would be to provide the crew the ability to view and maintain operational data, such as emergency procedures while also allowing Mission Control Houston to update the procedures. The ISS Program is currently evaluating the safety risks associated with the use of iPads versus paper. Paper products can contribute to the flammability risk and require manual updates that take time away from research tasks. The ISS program has recently purchased three iPads for the astronauts and the certification has been approved. The crew is currently using the iPads onboard. The results of this analysis could be used to discern whether the iPad is a viable option for use in emergencies by assessing the risk posture through the development of a quantitative probabilistic risk assessment (PRA).

Carter-Journet, Katrina↗
NASA NTRS2014

Enabling More than Moore: Accelerated Reliability Testing and Risk Analysis for Advanced Electronics Packaging

For five decades, the semiconductor industry has distinguished itself by the rapid pace of improvement in miniaturization of electronics products-Moore's Law. Now, scaling hits a brick wall, a paradigm shift. The industry roadmaps recognized the scaling limitation and project that packaging technologies will meet further miniaturization needs or ak.a "More than Moore". This paper presents packaging technology trends and accelerated reliability testing methods currently being practiced. Then, it presents industry status on key advanced electronic packages, factors affecting accelerated solder joint reliability of area array packages, and IPC/JEDEC/Mil specifications for characterizations of assemblies under accelerated thermal and mechanical loading. Finally, it presents an examples demonstrating how Accelerated Testing and Analysis have been effectively employed in the development of complex spacecraft thereby reducing risk. Quantitative assessments necessarily involve the mathematics of probability and statistics. In addition, accelerated tests need to be designed which consider the desired risk posture and schedule for particular project. Such assessments relieve risks without imposing additional costs. and constraints that are not value added for a particular mission. Furthermore, in the course of development of complex systems, variances and defects will inevitably present themselves and require a decision concerning their disposition, necessitating quantitative assessments. In summary, this paper presents a comprehensive view point, from technology to systems, including the benefits and impact of accelerated testing in offsetting risk.

Ghaffarian, Reza↗
NASA NTRS2014

Exploration Systems Development (ESD) Approach to Enterprise Risk Management

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Exploration Systems Development (ESD) Division has implemented an innovative approach to Enterprise Risk Management under a unique governance structure and streamlined integration model. ESD's mission is to design and build the capability to extend human existence to deep space. The Enterprise consists of three Programs: Space Launch System (SLS), Orion, and Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO). The SLS is a rocket and launch system that will be capable of powering humans, habitats, and support systems to deep space. Orion will be the first spacecraft in history capable of taking humans to multiple destinations within deep space. GSDO is modernizing Kennedy's spaceport to launch spacecraft built and designed by both NASA and private industry. ESD's approach to Enterprise Risk Management is commensurate with affordability and a streamlined management philosophy. ESD Enterprise Risk Management leverages off of the primary mechanisms for integration within the Enterprise. The Enterprise integration approach emphasizes delegation of authority to manage and execute the majority of cross-program activities and products to the individual Programs, while maintaining the overall responsibility for all cross-program activities at the Division. The intent of the ESD Enterprise Risk Management approach is to improve risk communication, to avoid replication and/or contradictory strategies, and to minimize overhead process burden. This is accomplished by the facilitation and integration of risk information within ESD. The ESD Division risks, Orion risks, SLS risks, and GSDO risks are owned and managed by the applicable Program. When the Programs have shared risks with multiple consequences, they are jointly owned and managed. When a risk is associated with the integrated system that involves more than one Program in condition, consequence, or mitigation plan, it is considered an Exploration Systems Integration (ESI) Risk. An ESI risk may require visibility and risk handling by multiple organizations. The Integrated Risk Working Group (IRWG) is a small team of Risk experts that are responsible for collaborating and communicating best practices. In addition, the forum facilitates proper integration of risks across the Enterprise. The IRWG uses a Continuous Risk Management approach for facilitating the identification, analysis, planning, tracking, and controlling of ESI Risks. The ESD Division, Programs, and Integrated Task Teams identify ESI Risks. The IRWG maintains a set of metrics for understanding Enterprise Risk process and the overall Risk Posture. The team is also actively involved in the modeling of risk for Enterprise Performance Management. With the Enterprise being constrained in Schedule and Budget, and with significant technical complexity, the appropriate use of Risk Management techniques is crucial to the success of the Enterprise. The IRWG achieves this through the modified approach, providing a forum for collaboration on risks that cross boundaries between the separate entities.

Bauder, Stephen P.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Long-Term Health Metric Development Effort

INTRODUCTION Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a methodology applied when high-stakes decisions need to be made about complex systems. PRA often uses risk minimization to aid decision making, such as when establishing vehicle requirements or resource allocations. The NASA Human System Risk Board (HSRB) maintains the human spaceflight risk postures, many of which have in-mission medical outcomes, but the full risk set also includes performance and Long-Term Health (LTH) outcomes. An effort is underway to determine the dependencies between LTH risk outcomes and mission characteristics and to identify metrics for quantifying LTH outcomes. The LTH metrics will be incorporated into future PRA tools currently under development to support crew health and performance decision making. LONG-TERM HEALTH (LTH) RISK LTH risk encompasses the timeframe from immediately post-flight, through the rest of an astronaut’s career, through retirement, and until death. LTH outcomes include the time and interventions needed for the astronaut to return to preflight physiological states after experiencing spaceflight hazards and recovery from any in-mission medical events that persist into the post-flight timeframe. It includes chronic complications that may arise due to experiencing in-flight medical conditions or injuries and medical conditions that occur later in life with a higher probability of occurrence or with more severity because of their spaceflight exposure. Finally, LTH outcomes can also include a reduction in life expectancy due to spaceflight exposures. Eighteen of the HSRB risks contain an LTH component, each with a unique incidence rate and consequence severity. ON-GOING LTH METRIC DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS Based on guidance from a stakeholder workshop held on June 1, 2023, only LTH outcomes with causes tied to spaceflight experience that are significantly different from normal healthy aging and which can be affected by changes in in-mission resources are targeted for inclusion within the PRA modeling efforts. Current on-going efforts include a sensitivity analysis of potential in-flight medical conditions to determine which conditions may persist into post-flight and how the consequences may be affected by in-mission medical resources. Also underway is determination of differences in the time for a return to preflight physiological baselines when in-flight countermeasures are available versus when they are not. Analyses performed with publicly available astronaut data and collaborations with the Lifetime Surveillance of Astronaut Health team are being designed to understand which LTH outcomes differ significantly from natural healthy aging. Information exchanges are also occurring with LTH risk custodians to understand how they quantify outcomes. FUTURE PLANS Risk characteristics will be determined for each LTH risk that meets our inclusion criteria and the dependencies of their outcomes to in-mission resources and mission characteristics will be established. The individual risks will be integrated together into one or more high level LTH metrics for inclusion in the PRA tool, so that LTH risks can be considered along with in-mission risks during crew health and performance system decision support trade studies.

B. E. Lewandowski↗
NASA NTRS2014

2014 SRP Integration Transcript

HRP's mission is to reduce the risks to human health and performance during long-duration spaceflight. The HRP Integrated Research Plan (IRP) contains the research plans for the 32 risks that require research to characterize and mitigate. From its inception the "integrate" aspect of the IRP has denoted the integrated nature of risks to human health and performance. Even though each risk in the IRP has its own research plan and is tracked separately, the interrelated nature of health and performance requires that they be addressed in an integrative or holistic fashion so that the connectedness of physiological systems within the human body and the integrated response to spaceflight can be addressed. Common characteristics of the spaceflight environment include altered gravity, atmospheres, and light/dark cycles; space radiation; isolation; noise; and periods of high or low workload. Long-term exposure to this unique environment produces a suite of physiological effects such as stress; vision, neurocognitive, and anthropometric changes; circadian misalignment; fluid shifts; cardiovascular deconditioning; immune dysregulation; and altered nutritional requirements. Expanding cross-disciplinary integrative approaches that synthesize concepts or data from two or more disciplines would improve the identification and characterization risk factors, and enable the development of countermeasures relevant to multiple risks. Cross-disciplinary approaches might also help to illuminate problem areas that may arise when a countermeasure adversely impacts risks other than those which it was developed to mitigate, or to identify groupings of physiological changes that are likely to occur that may impact the overall risk posture. In 2014 HRP embarked on a pilot study that combined four SRPs (and 12 HRP risks) - Behavioral Health, Sensorimotor, Cardiovascular, and Bone/Muscle - specifically to discuss cross-disciplinary integration. The points outlined below were suggested to seed the discussion, within the bounding constraint that research plans must be feasible and relevant to the HRP mission. While these were suggested starting points, the overall guiding principle was to allow free discussion from panel members on any aspect of integrated research that they felt was important, Existing cross-disciplinary integration as documented in the IRP (HRR), Existing or needed integration already identified by HRP, but not yet well defined within the IRP, Areas of integration that are missing.

Steinberg, Susan↗
NASA NTRS2014

Cabin Environment Physics Risk Model

This paper presents a Cabin Environment Physics Risk (CEPR) model that predicts the time for an initial failure of Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) functionality to propagate into a hazardous environment and trigger a loss-of-crew (LOC) event. This physics-of failure model allows a probabilistic risk assessment of a crewed spacecraft to account for the cabin environment, which can serve as a buffer to protect the crew during an abort from orbit and ultimately enable a safe return. The results of the CEPR model replace the assumption that failure of the crew critical ECLSS functionality causes LOC instantly, and provide a more accurate representation of the spacecraft's risk posture. The instant-LOC assumption is shown to be excessively conservative and, moreover, can impact the relative risk drivers identified for the spacecraft. This, in turn, could lead the design team to allocate mass for equipment to reduce overly conservative risk estimates in a suboptimal configuration, which inherently increases the overall risk to the crew. For example, available mass could be poorly used to add redundant ECLSS components that have a negligible benefit but appear to make the vehicle safer due to poor assumptions about the propagation time of ECLSS failures.

Risk↗
NASA NTRS2011

Development of Risk Uncertainty Factors from Historical NASA Projects

NASA is a good investment of federal funds and strives to provide the best value to the nation. NASA has consistently budgeted to unrealistic cost estimates, which are evident in the cost growth in many of its programs. In this investigation, NASA has been using available uncertainty factors from the Aerospace Corporation, Air Force, and Booz Allen Hamilton to develop projects risk posture. NASA has no insight into the developmental of these factors and, as demonstrated here, this can lead to unrealistic risks in many NASA Programs and projects (P/p). The primary contribution of this project is the development of NASA missions uncertainty factors, from actual historical NASA projects, to aid cost-estimating as well as for independent reviews which provide NASA senior management with information and analysis to determine the appropriate decision regarding P/p. In general terms, this research project advances programmatic analysis for NASA projects.

Amer, Tahani R.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Fast Paced, Low Cost Projects at MSFC

What does an orbiting microsatellite, a robotic lander and a ruggedized camera and telescope have in common? They are all fast paced, low cost projects managed by Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) teamed with successful industry partners. MSFC has long been synonymous with human space flight large propulsion programs, engineering acumen and risk intolerance. However, there is a growing portfolio/product line within MSFC that focuses on these smaller, fast paced projects. While launching anything into space is expensive, using a managed risk posture, holding to schedule and keeping costs low by stopping at egood enough f were key elements to their success. Risk is defined as the possibility of loss or failure per Merriam Webster. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) defines risk using procedural requirement 8705.4 and establishes eclasses f to discern the acceptable risk per a project. It states a Class D risk has a medium to significant risk of not achieving mission success. MSFC, along with industry partners, has created a niche in Class D efforts. How did the big, cautious MSFC succeed on these projects that embodied the antithesis of its heritage in human space flight? A key factor toward these successful projects was innovative industry partners such as Dynetics Corporation, University of Alabama in Huntsville (UAHuntsville), Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU APL), Teledyne Brown Engineering (TBE), Von Braun Center for Science and Innovation (VCSI), SAIC, and Jacobs. Fast Affordable Satellite Technology (FastSat HSV01) is a low earth orbit microsatellite that houses six instruments with the primary scientific objective of earth observation and technology demonstration. The team was comprised of Dynetics, UAHuntsvile, SAIC, Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) and VCSI with the United States Air Force Space Test Program as the customer. The team completed design, development, manufacturing, environmental test and integration in one year. FastSat HSV01 also deployed a Poly Picosatellite Orbital Deployer (PPOD) for a separate nano ]satellite class spacecraft (Cubesat: Nano Sail Demonstration) in partnership with Ames Research Center. The Robotic lunar lander is a MSFC JHU APL partnership that led to the development of a flexible architecture for landers to support robotic missions to a wide range of lunar and asteroid destinations. The team started with the goal of meeting NASA agency directives that led to the creation of a test bed focusing on GN&C and software to demonstrate the descent and landing on any airless body for the final 30 to 60 meters. The team created a complex technology demonstration as well as Guidance Control and Navigation (GN&C) algorithms providing autonomous control of the lander. The team uses a green propellant of 90% hydrogen peroxide and has completed 18 successful test flights. The International Space Station (ISS) SERVIR Environmental Research and Visualization System (ISERV) is a technology demonstration payload to assist the SERVIR project with environmental monitoring for disaster relief and humanitarian efforts. The ISERV project was a partnership with TBE. The ISERV payload consists of a commercial off the shelf camera, telescope, and MSFC developed power distribution box and interfaces on ISS with the Window Observational Research Facility in the US Lab. MSFC has identified three key areas that enabled the low cost mission success to include culture, partnering, and cost/schedule control. This paper will briefly discuss these three Class D efforts, FastSat HSV-01, the Robotic Lunar Lander and the ISERV camera system, the lessons learned, their successes and challenges.

Watson-Morgan, Lisa↗
NASA NTRS2016

Operational Implementation of a Pc Uncertainty Construct for Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis

Earlier this year the NASA Conjunction Assessment and Risk Analysis (CARA) project presented the theoretical and algorithmic aspects of a method to include the uncertainties in the calculation inputs when computing the probability of collision (Pc) between two space objects, principally uncertainties in the covariances and the hard-body radius. The output of this calculation approach is to produce rather than a single Pc value an entire probability density function that will represent the range of possible Pc values given the uncertainties in the inputs and bring CA risk analysis methodologies more in line with modern risk management theory. The present study provides results from the exercise of this method against an extended dataset of satellite conjunctions in order to determine the effect of its use on the evaluation of conjunction assessment (CA) event risk posture. The effects are found to be considerable: a good number of events are downgraded from or upgraded to a serious risk designation on the basis of consideration of the Pc uncertainty. The findings counsel the integration of the developed methods into NASA CA operations.

assessment↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance Integration - the Future of Safe Deep Space Human Exploration

As a foundational element of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Campaign, the Gateway is an incrementally built cislunar spacecraft that will serve as a platform for deep space human exploration, science, and technology demonstration. The Gateway will be a unifying catalyst for international partners around the world to establish sustained deep space scientific investigations, lunar surface access, and missions to Mars. As human exploration moves farther away from Earth, spacecraft designs must prioritize and optimize mass and volume allocations, while minimizing human and spacecraft risk. To accomplish this objective, the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance functions develop, implement, and ensure compliance with requirements, in concert with the accurate characterization and transparent communication of residual hazard risks, for integrated safety, reliability and maintainability and quality assurance. Safety and Mission Assurance was a key contributor during Gateway program pre-formulation and formulation activities where safety and reliability analysis was embedded in the Gateway Systems Engineering and Integration team. During these early program stages, a preliminary Gateway Integrated Hazard Analysis and Preliminary Gateway Probabilistic Risk Assessment assisted in Gateway architectural and operational definition as part of a risk-informed design process. As the deep space architecture has matured, the integrated Safety and Mission Assurance analyses have matured, new safety review processes have been developed, and requirements have been refined to ensure compliance with integrated safety and mission assurance objectives. The Gateway Program is currently concluding the preliminary design review informed milestone, where the primary objectives included: - Ensured completeness and consistency of the preliminary design, including the meeting of all requirements within appropriate margins and acceptable risk posture. - Identification of any major issues moving forward to the Critical Design phase. At this milestone, Safety and Mission Assurance provided numerous products, including Gateway Top Risks and Risk Mitigation Plans, updated integrated hazard analyses, updated probabilistic risk assessment, Crew Survival Analysis Report, and updated Safety and Mission Assurance Requirements and Plans. These products provide a many-faceted perspective on the inherent risk and available mitigations involved in flying the current proposed vehicle design and anticipated stack configurations. In addition, Safety and Mission Assurance identified top technical, process and workforce concerns to be addressed as the program progresses toward the critical design phase. This paper will detail the evolution of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance integration functions, provide its current status and lessons learned for future human spaceflight programs. Throughout this paper the key tenets of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance will be discussed: - Application of a risk-informed approach to identify and mitigate areas of highest risk. - Leverage of valuable processes and lessons learned from earlier spaceflight programs. - Development of Safety and Mission Assurance products to inform design risk trades. - Utilization of common Safety and Mission Assurance practices to identify safety risks for multiple perspectives: top-down, bottom-up, and across lines of integration. - Approval of safety hazards at the appropriate level of authority, keeping most deliberation closest to design expertise and elevating risks of greatest concern for program-level consideration. - Championing of Safety and Mission Assurance processes and forums to foster a pervasive safety culture that is transparent, inclusive, and collaborative between all partners. These tenets have allowed the Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance function to play a key role in optimized vehicle design evolution, and early identification and mitigation of Gateway program and Artemis mission risk.

Helen Vaccaro↗
NASA NTRS2014

Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) Development Risk Communication

There are clear advantages of development of a Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) for a crewed mission to Mars. NTR for in-space propulsion enables more ambitious space missions by providing high thrust at high specific impulse (approximately 900 sec) that is 2 times the best theoretical performance possible for chemical rockets. Missions can be optimized for maximum payload capability to take more payload with reduced total mass to orbit; saving cost on reduction of the number of launch vehicles needed. Or missions can be optimized to minimize trip time significantly to reduce the deep space radiation exposure to the crew. NTR propulsion technology is a game changer for space exploration. However, "NUCLEAR" is a word that is feared and vilified by some groups and the hostility towards development of any nuclear systems can meet great opposition by the public as well as from national leaders and people in authority. Communication of nuclear safety will be critical to the success of the development of the NTR. Why is there a fear of nuclear? A bomb that can level a city is a scary weapon. The first and only times the Nuclear Bomb was used in a war was on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War 2. The "Little Boy" atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 and the "Fat Man" on Nagasaki 3 days later on August 9th. Within the first 4 months of bombings, 90- 166 thousand people died in Hiroshima and 60-80 thousand died in Nagasaki. It is important to note for comparison that over 500 thousand people died and 5 million made homeless due to strategic bombing (approximately 150 thousand tons) of Japanese cities and war assets with conventional non-nuclear weapons between 1942- 1945. A major bombing campaign of "firebombing" of Tokyo called "Operation Meetinghouse" on March 9 and 10 consisting of 334 B-29's dropped approximately1,700 tons of bombs around 16 square mile area and over 100 thousand people have been estimated to have died. The declaration of death is very clear for conventional weapons and then the declaration of death due to radiation becomes vague and unclear. This may have been due to people mis-understanding the dangers and effects of radiation when assessing the damage and harm to people initially, but it is also become insidious when expressing opposition to nuclear energy. A nuclear radiation accident can be scary due to the power involved and the fear of radiation release. The International Atomic Energy Agency defines a nuclear and radiation accident a "an event that has led to significant consequences to people, the environment or the facility." There have been 3 commercial nuclear reactor accidents (Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Fukushima) that stand out to the public and much of the information about the result and impact to workers, environment, and public can be misleading. Often information is presented without clear correlation with radiation and other pertinent information is left out presenting a very scary situation to affect the emotions of the reader. A very boring but "critically acclaimed" movie was made in 1979 called "The China Syndrome" starring Jane Fonda and Jack Lemmon. The film was released on March 16, 1979, 12 days before the 3-Mile Island nuclear accident in Pennsylvania. The basis from the movie was from a few nuclear plant incidents and in particular, the Brown's Ferry Alabama Power Plant fire. In one scene from the movie, a physicist Dr. Elliott Lowell played by Donald Hotton states that a China Syndrome event would make "an area the size of Pennsylvania" permanently uninhabitable. Real serious nuclear incidents like Chernobyl and Fukushima are often sited to make people fear the consequences of using nuclear power. However, the consequences are at best poorly communicated and at worst fictitiously inflated to instigate social unrest against nuclear power. There is an article being circulated on Facebook with a title "28 Signs that the (US) West Coast is being absolutely fried with nuclear radiation from Fukushima" which focus on mis-information and fear mongering. Nuclear power and NTR are powerful resources that can open many doors for future prosperity and capability. With great power comes great responsibility. Radiation and its effects need to be better understood, quantified, and communicated. A human mission to mars has its own risks of deep space radiation and is considered a considerable risk at 400 milli-Sieverts per year in deep space and 245 milli-Sieverts per year on the surface of Mars as measured by the Mars Curiosity mission. Although these quantities of ionizing radiation are within the astronaut career limit, it exceeds the yearly average amounts of ionizing radiation. Astronaut crews have experienced these levels of radiation before, but for durations shorter than a year, and a mission to Mars could possibly be 3 years in length. There is also evidence that people can comfortably handle higher levels of ionizing radiation where the radiation occurs naturally like Ramsar, Iran when people can experience 270 milli-Sieverts per year. A risk posture that the development, test, and flight of an NTR will meet opposition from groups who oppose nuclear energy must be likely and the impact can be sever to the effort. Active risk mitigation must be taken for an NTR full-scale development project. The NTR design must take into account safety for transport and off nominal conditions. Nuclear fuel element must consider containment of fission products and Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) that may meet less opposition should be considered for safety and security reasons. Even though testing was conducted on Rover/NERVA safely and successfully in the 60's with exhaust sent heavenward in to open air, modern testing of NTR must consider full containment and no release of ionizing radiation to the public and must meet the current requirement of no more than 0.1 milli-Sieverts per year to the public. 0.1 milli-Sieverts is equivalent to eating one banana or a 20 hour plane flight. Good communication with the public and regulatory agencies will be essential to show that all effort is applied toward protection to the public and astronauts. The inspiring endeavor to put humans on Mars to study the planet, search for life, and learn more about this Solar System will be full of risks but it will be worth it. NTR will be worth the development effort if it allows humans to explore our Solar System.

Kim, Tony↗
NASA NTRS2020

IV&V Assurance Case Design for Artemis II

As human-rated missions like those in NASA’s Artemis program continue to grow in both size and complexity, and the role of software in achieving mission objectives expands dramatically, NASA’s Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Teams face evolving challenges in assuring the safety and performance of the safety- and mission-critical embedded software that is essential to landing astronauts on the surface of the Moon by 2024. Key among these challenges is IV&V’s desire to present a cohesive, integrated assurance statement to its stakeholders that encapsulates and summarizes our assurance positions across the integrated Artemis systems and their combined role in support of a safe and successful flight. In order to meet this challenge, the IV&V Teams have begun a transition to using formal assurance case concepts and documentation in the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) to build an argument in support of software assurance. IV&V recognizes significant benefits to the logical argumentation structure provided by assurance cases and GSN over our current practices for documenting and managing assurance claims. In order to reap these benefits, IV&V is integrating the use of assurance case concepts with our paradigm of follow-the-risk capability based assurance. Because of this, assurance cases created and used by IV&V are distinct from the sort of assurance case created by a development project or embedded software assurance organization. IV&V’s assurance cases depend much less upon standards and regulations, and more on evidence captured by IV&V regarding the environment, requirements, design, and implementation. IV&V constructs an independent network of claims based on an independent decomposition of arguments. Based upon the risk posture of these claims and their associated software and software artifacts, IV&V then develops and executes engineering analyses and testing, which provide evidence to either support or refute the claim. This emerging risk-informed assurance case methodology is being put into practice as IV&V plans for support of the Artemis II mission, the first flight of the Orion capsule and Space Launch System with astronauts on board.

Gerek Whitman↗