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Southwestern Power Administration Annual Report 2008

Dear Secretary Chu, I am pleased to present the financial statements and operating data for Southwestern Power Administration (Southwestern) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2008. In FY 2008, Southwestern delivered over 7.3 billion kilowatt-hours of energy to its wholesale customers – nearly 31% more than average due to numerous record rainfall amounts in the southwest region. These record amounts produced revenues which exceeded the average annual revenue requirement by nearly $20 million and resulted in over $200 million in economic benefits to the region. Yet even as Southwestern exceeded its goals of marketing and delivering Federal hydroelectric power to our customers, we stayed focused on safety, security, and reliability. For example, we maintained our nearly 1,400 miles of high-voltage transmission lines, substations, and communications sites while achieving a Recordable Accident Frequency Rate of 0.0, a record that reflects Southwestern’s safety achievement of no recordable injuries for every 200,000 hours worked. We kept our rights-of-way secure from vegetation and other obstacles, work that not only supports our mission but also promotes reliability of the regional and National grid. We exceeded all North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Control Performance Standards (CPS- 1 and CPS-2), and maintained regulation and reserve obligations and reactive reserve margins to ensure the reliability of the bulk electric system, even during extended periods of restricted hydro operations due to unusually high project inflows. Finally, we continued our partnerships with the Department of Energy, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, our customers, and other Federal power stakeholders, partnerships that are vital to our continued success in marketing and delivering carbon-free, renewable, and domestically produced energy to our customers and to the Nation. Sincerely, Jon Worthington Administrator

Financial statement, operating data, Southwestern ↗

Hiding Critical Targets in Smart Grid Networks

With the integration of advanced communication technologies, the power grid is expected to greatly enhance efficiency and reliability of future power systems. However, since most electrical devices in power grid substations are connected via communication networks, cyber security of these communication networks becomes a critical issue. Real-World incidents such as Stuxnet have shown the feasibility of compromising a device in the power grid network to further launch more sophisticated attacks. To deal with security attacks of this spirit, this paper aims to hide critical targets from compromised internal nodes and hence protect them from further attacks launched by those compromised nodes. In particular, we consider substation networks and propose to add carefully-controlled dummy traffic to a substation network to make critical target nodes indistinguishable from other nodes in network traffic patterns. This paper describes the design and evaluation of such a scheme. Evaluations show that the scheme can effectively protect critical nodes with acceptable communication cost.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Communication Network Layer State Estimation Measurement Model for a Cyber-Secure Smart Grid

Network communication has been proven to be a very important tool and a key factor in the recent development and progress of the power grid operation. It is also considered as the foundation for the smart grid because information and communication are integrated into electricity distribution to achieve reliable and accurate knowledge of the power grid. In previous years, absorbing energy from substations and delivering it to customers was the only type of interaction we knew between utility companies and customers. Presently, the growing connections of small distributed generation units caused by the cost reduction of most of the technologies used in generation and storage of electrical energy, along with the potential benefits of renewable energy have pushed many researchers to look into the improvement of information and communication technologies (ICT) in order to ensure a bidirectional flow of power and data. Moreover, the evolution of information and communication technologies and its applications to smart grid have converted the smart grid into a cyber-physical system where vulnerabilities and additional security challenges such as cyber-threats and cyber-attacks have emerged. Previously, we have demonstrated that using machine learning-based processing on data gathered from communication networks and the power grid was a promising solution for detecting cyber threats by implementing a co-simulation of cyber-security for cross-layer strategy. Since the majority of the challenges observed can only be solved in the network communication layer, we present in this work a physics-based state estimation model of the communication network system towards enhanced cyber-physical security of the smart grid. Information integration with the previously developed machine learning model is developed, providing a enhanced cyber-physical security application for the smart grid. Easy-to-implement model, without hard-to-derive parameters, highlight potential aspects of the model for real-life applications.

Mathieu, Reynold↗

Risk-controlled Expansion Planning with Distributed Resources (REPAIR) v1.0

The Risk-controlled Expansion Planning with Distributed Resources (REPAIR) is an innovative tool to support decisions around utility grid planning to prevent and mitigate the impact of outages caused by routine equipment failures (reliability) or by extreme events (resilience), such as storms, earthquakes or wildfires that long term interruption of service. REPAIR is a risk-based optimization and decision-making model allowing informed and transparent "cost vs risk" decisions regarding infrastructural planning of electric utilities. The model considers long-term resilience and reliability planning strategies that rely on traditional infrastructure upgrade (e.g. circuit hardening, reinforcement, new substations, etc.) or new investment alternatives, such as DERs.

Heleno, Miguel [Lawrence Berkeley National Laborat↗

Digital Assurance for Grid Reliability in the Era of Large Load Growth

The rapid expansion of large electric loads is reshaping the operational and regulatory landscape of the U.S. electric grid. These facilities are reaching new scales of expansion, now exceeding a gigawatt per site, and their highly sensitive, digitally driven behaviors introduce new reliability risks. Recent grid events, including large load losses following routine transmission disturbances, highlight the consequences of limited ride-through capability, inconsistent protection settings, inadequate modeling, and lack of behind-the-meter visibility. Parallels to earlier integration challenges of new grid technologies suggest that the grid’s existing processes, standards, and interconnection frameworks are no longer adequate for emerging large loads. This brief synthesizes lessons from the evolution of inverter-based resource regulation and applies them to large-load integration. It identifies critical gaps in modeling accuracy, interconnection processes, performance standards, and compliance mechanisms. Technical recommendations emphasize advanced monitoring, improved modeling, coordinated communication protocols, modernized substations, and structured behind-the-meter control schemes. Collectively, these measures provide a roadmap to maintain bulk power system reliability while enabling the continued growth of large, electrified digital infrastructure.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Designing and Operating Resilient Electric Distribution Grids [Slides]

In the past, electricity was produced by power plants on the transmission system and distributed to customers through substations. Now, distributed energy resources and dynamic loads are penetrating distribution grids, with their own energy production, resilience, and reliability challenges separate from the traditional model.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Model-centric distribution automation: Capacity, reliability, and efficiency

A series of analyses along with field validations that evaluate efficiency, reliability, and capacity improvements of model-centric distribution automation are presented. With model-centric distribution automation, the same model is used from design to real-time control calculations. A 14-feeder system with 7 substations is considered. The analyses involve hourly time-varying loads and annual load growth factors. Phase balancing and capacitor redesign modifications are used to better prepare the system for distribution automation, where the designs are performed considering time-varying loads. Coordinated control of load tap changing transformers, line regulators, and switched capacitor banks is considered. In evaluating distribution automation versus traditional system design and operation, quasi-steady-state power flow analysis is used. In evaluating distribution automation performance for substation transformer failures, reconfiguration for restoration analysis is performed. In evaluating distribution automation for storm conditions, Monte Carlo simulations coupled with reconfiguration for restoration calculations are used. As a result, the evaluations demonstrate that model-centric distribution automation has positive effects on system efficiency, capacity, and reliability.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Rolling Root Mean Square Based Multimodal Anomaly Detection for Real Time Monitoring of Smart Grid

Reliable real-time monitoring is valuable for maintaining the operational integrity of modern electrical smart grids. Deployment of heterogeneous sensing technologies in substations has enabled high-resolution, multichannel waveform monitoring, but also introduces challenges for anomaly detection due to noise, baseline drift, and modality-dependent signal characteristics. In this work, we present a computationally efficient unsupervised method for multimodal event detection based on Rolling Root Mean Square based Event Detection (RRMSED). The method is developed using in-house, field deployed sensors collecting data at a utility substation. The sensing system comprises voltage and current sensors, triaxial accelerometers, and magnetometers, collectively capturing electrical, vibrational, and magnetic waveform measurements at high temporal resolution. RRMSED operates by extracting rolling RMS energy features and their first-order temporal differences from consecutive waveform segments for each channel and then applying channel-specific statistical thresholds learned from historical data. A persistence-based exceedance logic is employed to robustly identify transient events while suppressing impulsive noise, and to provide precise temporal localization with high resolution. The framework is designed for continuous server-side operation and can be deployed in real time without requiring complex models. Experiments on simulated waveform data with known ground truth demonstrate low false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) rates. Application to real substation data shows RRMSED to identify events that are not captured by conventional monitoring indicators including fast transient detection algorithm currently deployed in the system. These results indicate that rolling RMS based features provide an effective and practical basis for real-time multimodal event detection in smart-grid substations.

Mukherjee, Subrata [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000309930338)↗

Performance Evaluation of Phasor Measurement Systems

After two decades of phasor network deployment, phasor measurements are now available at many major substations and power plants. The North American SynchroPhasor Initiative (NASPI), supported by both the US Department of Energy and the North American Electricity Reliability Council (NERC), provides a forum to facilitate the efforts in phasor technology in North America. Phasor applications have been explored and some are in today’s utility practice. IEEE C37.118 Standard is a milestone in standardizing phasor measurements and defining performance requirements. To comply with IEEE C37.118 and to better understand the impact of phasor quality on applications, the NASPI Performance and Standards Task Team (PSTT) initiated and accomplished the development of two important documents to address characterization of PMUs and instrumentation channels, which leverage prior work (esp. in WECC) and international experience. This paper summarizes the accomplished PSTT work and presents the methods for phasor measurement evaluation.

North American SynchroPhasor Initiative (NASPI)↗

Assessment of the Electrical Substation-Grid Testbed with Inside/Outside Devices and Distributed Ledger Technology

The electrical substation-grid testbed was created to integrate the GOOSE and/or DNP (Distributed Network Protocol) messages with time synchronized sources and Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT). The objective was to study the impact of faults and cyber-events at an electrical substation with inside (protective relays) and outside (power meters) substation devices. The electrical substation-grid testbed was based on the design of a 34.5/ 12.47 kV electrical substation (sectionalized bus configuration) with two power transformers, connected to radial power lines and load feeders. The electrical substation-grid testbed was installed at 252 lab space (Advanced Power System Protection), Grid Research Integration and Deployment Center (GRID-C), Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This testbed was created for Task 5, DarkNet project. The electrical substation-grid testbed was created to simulate fault and/or cyber events that could potentially result in damage to the electrical infrastructure. In addition, tests were run that are usually not allowed to be performed in an operational electrical power grid, because these test scenarios could trip breakers and/or generate fault situations that could potentially damage equipment. The number of tests performed in the electrical substation-grid testbed were executed in a better way than in a real electrical substation and/or power grid, because multiple tests could be run in a short period of time, and complex permits, and safety/ schedule restrictions like in a real electrical substation environment were not needed. The electrical substation-grid testbed was created using real measurement, communication, and protection devices that are used by electrical utilities, to have same conditions that we could observe in a real power grid or electrical substation. The electrical substation-grid testbed was based on using a real time simulator and expansion box with amplifiers that were wired to electrical substation-grid devices. This hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) was provided by protective relays, power meters, ethernet switches, remote terminal units, synchronized timing network clock, DLT devices, workstations, and servers. This report includes the design, installation, and assessment of the electrical substation-grid testbed that was similar to an operational electrical substation, integrating the power system protection, communication, and control systems. The results for the electrical substation-grid testbed were based on:• verifying the analog signals for protective relays and power meters, • observing the synchronized time source frame at devices, • authenticating the GOOSE (IEC 61850) and DNP messages from power meters and protective relays, and • verifying the trip conditions of protective relays at fault tests with the power system fault event detection, using DLT devices. For future work, the electrical substation-grid testbed with protective relays and power meters, using DLT and synchronized time source from DarkNet, will be used to study the impact of cyber-events at inside and outside substation devices. Advanced algorithms for detecting cyber-events produced by non-desired protective relay settings will be studied, to improve the detection and reliability of protection, control, and communication systems at power grids.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Data-Centric Communication Framework for Multicast IEC 61850 Routable GOOSE Messages over the WAN in Modern Power Systems

In this paper, a data-centric communication framework is proposed for multicast routable generic object-oriented substation event (GOOSE) messages (MRGM) over the wide area network (WAN) for effective substation-to-substation (SS2SS) and substation to control center (SS2CC) communications. In this structure, the IEC 61850 GOOSE message is transmitted over the WAN using the data distribution service (DDS) as a fast, reliable, and secure data-centric communication middleware. The main feature of this framework is its multicast capability, where several authorized subscribers can receive a published message simultaneously. This can significantly improve the system monitoring and control of the protection systems in modern smart grids, where intelligent schemes can be applied. The effectiveness of the proposed platform, in terms of total end-to-end delay between participants, is evaluated through experimental results obtained from the actual hardware-based test setup developed at the Florida International University (FIU) smart grid testbed. The results demonstrate that the latency between sending and receiving a GOOSE message among participants is within its maximum time span defined by the IEC 61850-90-5 working group for communications over the WAN.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Enhanced INL Power Grid Test Bed Infrastructure – Phase I

Idaho National Laboratory (INL), a Department of Energy (DOE) laboratory, owns, operates, and maintains transmission and distribution power grid infrastructure to support the INL multi program mission. Sections of this power infrastructure, known as the INL Power Grid Test Bed, have been and are being used by government and industry to develop, demonstrate, and validate technologies for the modern grid, including smart grid, on a full scale utility test bed. INL’s power grid includes 61 miles of 140 MW, 138 kV rated electrical power transmission supplying seven main substations, each feeding a separate facility complex (or ‘city’) within the INL’s 890 square mile Site. This power grid is fed by three commercial utilities into the INL’s main control substation, but is operated independently from the commercial utility through its primary substation and command and control center. Within the INL complex, one of the seven complexes, the Critical Infrastructure Test Range Complex (CITRC), has been designated as the INL complex for supporting critical infrastructure research and testing. This complex includes its own substation and 13.8kV distribution network, all configurable and controlled by the INL research and development programs. Through investment partnership with the DOE Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE OE), INL is enhancing its existing distribution infrastructure to expand the types of testing that can be conducted and increase flexibility for testing configurations. The enhancement of the INL Power Grid Test Bed will enable development and full scale testing of smart-grid-related technologies and smart devices including testing interoperability, operational performance, reliability, and resiliency contribution at multiple distribution voltage classes, specifically 15kV, 25kV, and 35kV. The expected time frame for completion of the Phase I portion of the enhancement would be 4th quarter fiscal year (FY) 2015.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Architecture and Methods for Substation SCADA Cybersecurity: Best Practices

There are over 3000 electricity providers in the United States, encompassing investor and publicly owned utilities as well as electric cooperatives. There has been ongoing trends to increasingly automate and provide remote control and monitoring of electric energy delivery systems. The deployment of computer network technologies has increased the efficiency and reliability of electric power infrastructure. However, the increased use of digital communications has also increased the vulnerability to malicious cyber attacks [1]. In 2004 the National Research Councils (National Academies) formed a committee of specialists to address these vulnerabilities and propose possible solutions with an objective to prioritize the R&D needs for developing countermeasures. The committee addressed many potential concerns in the electric power delivery system and classified them based upon different criteria and presented recommendations to minimize the gap between the academic research directions and the needs of the electric utility industry. The complexity and diversity of the electric power delivery system in the U.S. has opened many ports for attackers and intruders [1]. This complexity and diversity is attributed to the fact that power delivery system is a network of substations, transmission and distribution lines, sub-networks of controlling, sensing and monitoring units, and human operator involvement for running the system [1]. Accordingly, any incident such as the occurrence of a fault or disturbance in this complex network cannot be deferred and should be resolved within an order of milliseconds, otherwise there is risk of large-scale outages similar to the occurrences in India and the U.S. in 2003 [2]. There are three main vulnerabilities in supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems commonly identified—physical vulnerability, cyber vulnerability and personal vulnerability [1]. In terms of cyber threats, SCADA systems are the most critical elements in the electric power grid in the U.S. Unauthorized access to a SCADA system could enable/disable unexpected equipment (such as disable the protection system or a circuit breaker) which could cause large scale disruptions of electric power delivery. This paper provides an overview of power system SCADA technologies in transmission substations (Section 2) and summarizes the best practices for implementing a cyber security program. After introducing SCADA system operations in Section 2, a description of the security challenges for SCADA systems is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, NECRC Critical Infrastructure Protection standards CIP-002 through CIP-009 are summarized. An overview of industry best practices is presented in Section 5.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

U328 Electrical Reliability Project Soil Sampling and Analysis Plan

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL’s) Project Management Office (PMO) is planning to install an underground electrical duct bank at the 3200 block of the Livermore Site (project). The proposed project will include a new electrical substation and feeders, demolition and replacement of the U328C utility building with a new structure to the west, re-routing of utilities, and update of the parking lot. This Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) outlines the procedures to collect and evaluate environmental samples for disposition of the excavated soil during the project and geotechnical samples for pavement design. This SAP has been prepared and is organized to be consistent with LLNL's Soils Screening and Management Plan (SSMP) (LLNL, 2022), as well as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Data Quality Objectives (DQO) process (EPA, 2006). In addition to the environmental samples, geotechnical samples will be collected by Consolidated Engineering Laboratories (CEL) on behalf of PMO. Geotechnical samples will be collected from a dedicated geotechnical boring location or co-located with environmental samples. Collection and evaluation of the geotechnical samples is determined by CEL and is therefore not discussed in this SAP.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

The Impact of Behind-the-Meter Heterogeneous Distributed Energy Resources on Distribution Grids

The increasing integration of distributed energy resources (DERs) on the electric grid brings new challenges and opportunities for utility grid operations. With the rapid deployment of DERs, there is emerging interest in integrating these controllable devices with utility operations at all levels for monitoring and management. To understand the challenges with increasing behind-the-meter (BTM) DERs and to identify the needs in deploying advanced controls, a comprehensive grid impact study is indispensable. This paper presents the analysis which help visualize the DER impact on the grid, identify the challenges and provides an insight into the new distribution management and control needs to enable reliable and resilient grid operations.

behind-the-meter↗

High Temperature Superconducting Underground Cable

The purpose of this Project was to design, build, install and demonstrate the technical feasibility of an underground high temperature superconducting (HTS) power cable installed between two utility substations. In the first phase two HTS cables, 320 m and 30 m in length, were constructed using 1st generation BSCCO wire. The two 34.5 kV, 800 Arms, 48 MVA sections were connected together using a superconducting joint in an underground vault. In the second phase the 30 m BSCCO cable was replaced by one constructed with 2nd generation YBCO wire. 2nd generation wire is needed for commercialization because of inherent cost and performance benefits. Primary objectives of the Project were to build and operate an HTS cable system which demonstrates significant progress towards commercial progress and addresses real world utility concerns such as installation, maintenance, reliability and compatibility with the existing grid. Four key technical areas addressed were the HTS cable and terminations (where the cable connects to the grid), cryogenic refrigeration system, underground cable-to-cable joint (needed for replacement of cable sections) and cost-effective 2nd generation HTS wire. This was the world’s first installation and operation of an HTS cable underground, between two utility substations as well as the first to demonstrate a cable-to-cable joint, remote monitoring system and 2nd generation HTS.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

High Penetration Power Electronics Grid: Modeling and Simulation Gap Analysis

Increased penetration of power electronics in the grid is happening through development of high-power drives (like in Type 3 or 4 wind turbines, industrial drives, etc.), high-voltage direct current (HVdc) systems, flexible alternating current transmission systems (FACTS), energy storage systems (ESSs), inverter-based renewables like solar and wind, electric vehicle chargers, and other technologies. Ongoing research and development in new power electronic technologies including, but not limited to, solid-state power substations (SSPS), extreme fast charging (XFC), solid-state transformers, and multi-port power electronics that integrate multiple sources/loads will further increase penetration levels. To ensure stakeholders can integrate high penetration of power electronic technologies safely and reliably requires tools and methods to assess and evaluate their impact on the grid. Objectives: This report surveys, assesses, and analyzes commercially available and open-source tools that can support the assessment and evaluation of power electronics in future grids with high penetration levels. The study includes aspects that range from power flow analysis to dynamics evaluation (including hardware-in-the-loop – HIL testing) for such systems. The challenges and gaps associated with the current generation of toolsets available to assess the technical impact of introducing high penetration of power electronics are reported. The method is summarized in Figure ES-1.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Distribution-Connected PV's Response to Voltage Sags at Transmission-Scale

The ever increasing amount of residential- and commercial-scale distribution-connected PV generation being installed and operated on the U.S.'s electric power system necessitates the use of increased fidelity representative distribution system models for transmission stability studies in order to ensure the continued safe and reliable operation of the grid. This paper describes a distribution model-based analysis that determines the amount of distribution-connected PV that trips off-line for a given voltage sag seen at the distribution circuit's substation. Such sags are what could potentially be experienced over a wide area of an interconnection during a transmission-level line fault. The results of this analysis show that the voltage diversity of the distribution system does cause different amounts of PV generation to be lost for differing severity of voltage sags. The variation of the response is most directly a function of the loading of the distribution system. At low load levels the inversion of the circuit's voltage profile results in considerable differences in the aggregated response of distribution-connected PV Less variation is seen in the response to specific PV deployment scenarios, unless pushed to extremes, and in the total amount of PV penetration attained. A simplified version of the combined CMPLDW and PVD1 models is compared to the results from the model-based analysis. Furthermore, the parameters of the simplified model are tuned to better match the determined response. The resulting tuning parameters do not match the expected physical model of the distribution system and PV systems and thus may indicate that another modeling approach would be warranted.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗