SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “radiation single-event upset”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 55 records · Page 3

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRS1983

Annual Conference on Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects, Gatlinburg, TN, July 18-21, 1983, Proceedings

Topics discussed include radiation effects in devices; the basic mechanisms of radiation effects in structures and materials; radiation effects in integrated circuits; spacecraft charging and space radiation effects; hardness assurance for devices and systems; and radiation transport, energy deposition and charge collection. Papers are presented on the mechanisms of small instabilities in irradiated MOS transistors, on the radiation effects on oxynitride gate dielectrics, on the discharge characteristics of a simulated solar cell array, and on latchup in CMOS devices from heavy ions. Attention is also given to proton upsets in orbit, to the modeling of single-event upset in bipolar integrated circuits, to high-resolution studies of the electrical breakdown of soil, and to a finite-difference solution of Maxwell's equations in generalized nonorthogonal coordinates.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2014

Compendium of Single Event Effects, Total Ionizing Dose, and Displacement Damage for Candidate Spacecraft Electronics for NASA

We present results and analysis investigating the effects of radiation on a variety of candidate spacecraft electronics to proton and heavy ion induced single event effects (SEE), proton-induced displacement damage (DD), and total ionizing dose (TID). Introduction: This paper is a summary of test results.NASA spacecraft are subjected to a harsh space environment that includes exposure to various types of ionizing radiation. The performance of electronic devices in a space radiation environment is often limited by its susceptibility to single event effects (SEE), total ionizing dose (TID), and displacement damage (DD). Ground-based testing is used to evaluate candidate spacecraft electronics to determine risk to spaceflight applications. Interpreting the results of radiation testing of complex devices is quite difficult. Given the rapidly changing nature of technology, radiation test data are most often application-specific and adequate understanding of the test conditions is critical. Studies discussed herein were undertaken to establish the application-specific sensitivities of candidate spacecraft and emerging electronic devices to single-event upset (SEU), single-event latchup (SEL), single-event gate rupture (SEGR), single-event burnout (SEB), single-event transient (SET), TID, enhanced low dose rate sensitivity (ELDRS), and DD effects.

Single Event Effects↗

NASA NTRS1994

Uncertainties in radiation effect predictions for the natural radiation environments of space

Future manned missions beyond low earth orbit require accurate predictions of the risk to astronauts and to critical systems from exposure to ionizing radiation. For low-level exposures, the hazards are dominated by rare single-event phenomena where individual cosmic-ray particles or spallation reactions result in potentially catastrophic changes in critical components. Examples might be a biological lesion leading to cancer in an astronaut or a memory upset leading to an undesired rocket firing. The risks of such events appears to depend on the amount of energy deposited within critical sensitive volumes of biological cells and microelectronic components. The critical environmental information needed to estimate the risks posed by the natural space environments, including solar flares, is the number of times more than a threshold amount of energy for an event will be deposited in the critical microvolumes. These predictions are complicated by uncertainties in the natural environments, particularly the composition of flares, and by the effects of shielding. Microdosimetric data for large numbers of orbits are needed to improve the environmental models and to test the transport codes used to predict event rates.

Mcnulty, P. J.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Markovian Statistical Data Analysis of Single-Event Upsets Triggered by High Intensity Neutrons

This paper analyzes data from a single-event upset experiment conducted at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Statistical tools, based on well-known x(sup 2) hypothesis testing theory, are used to determine if sequences of upsets can be modeled as a homogeneous Markov chain of a specific order. The experiment consisted of radiating a new experimental flight control computer (FCC) with a high intensity neutron beam while the FCC controlled a simulation of a Boeing 737. The analyzed data is a sequence of states that indicates when the FCC is under an upset condition.

Lakdawala, Anushka V.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Single-Event Upset and Scaling Trends in New Generation of the Commercial SOI PowerPC Microprocessors

SEU from heavy-ions is measured for SOI PowerPC microprocessors. Results for 0.13 micron PowerPC with 1.1V core voltages increases over 1.3V versions. This suggests that improvement in SEU for scaled devices may be reversed. In recent years there has been interest in the possible use of unhardened commercial microprocessors in space because of their superior performance compared to hardened processors. However, unhardened devices are susceptible to upset from radiation space. More information is needed on how they respond to radiation before they can be used in space. Only a limited number of advanced microprocessors have been subjected to radiation tests, which are designed with lower clock frequencies and higher internal core voltage voltages than recent devices [1-6]. However the trend for commercial Silicon-on-insulator (SOI) microprocessors is to reduce feature size and internal core voltage and increase the clock frequency. Commercial microprocessors with the PowerPC architecture are now available that use partially depleted SOI processes with feature size of 90 nm and internal core voltage as low as 1.0 V and clock frequency in the GHz range. Previously, we reported SEU measurements for SOI commercial PowerPCs with feature size of 0.18 and 0.13 m [7, 8]. The results showed an order of magnitude reduction in saturated cross section compared to CMOS bulk counterparts. This paper examines SEUs in advanced commercial SOI microprocessors, focusing on SEU sensitivity of D-Cache and hangs with feature size and internal core voltage. Results are presented for the Motorola SOI processor with feature sizes of 0.13 microns and internal core voltages of 1.3 and 1.1 V. These results are compared with results for the Motorola SOI processors with feature size of 0.18 microns and internal core voltage of 1.6 and 1.3 V.

Irom, Farokh↗

NASA NTRS2014

Criticality of Low-Energy Protons in Single-Event Effects Testing of Highly-Scaled Technologies

We report low-energy proton and low-energy alpha particle single-event effects (SEE) data on a 32 nm silicon-on-insulator (SOI) complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) latches and static random access memory (SRAM) that demonstrates the criticality of using low-energy protons for SEE testing of highly-scaled technologies. Low-energy protons produced a significantly higher fraction of multi-bit upsets relative to single-bit upsets when compared to similar alpha particle data. This difference highlights the importance of performing hardness assurance testing with protons that include energy distribution components below 2 megaelectron-volt. The importance of low-energy protons to system-level single-event performance is based on the technology under investigation as well as the target radiation environment.

random access memory↗

NASA NTRS2014

Single-Event Effect Response of a Commercial ReRAM

We show heavy ion test results of a commercial production-level ReRAM. The memory array is robust to bit upsets. However the ReRAM system is vulnerable to SEFIs due to upsets in peripheral circuits, including the sense amplifier.

commercial-off-the-shelf (COT)↗

NASA NTRS2004

Tradeoffs in Flight Design Upset Mitigation in State of the Art FPGAs: Hardened by Design vs. Design Level Hardening

This presentation compares and contrasts the effectiveness and the system/designer impacts of the two main approaches to upset hardening: the Actel approach (RTSX-S and RTAX-S) of low-level (inside each flip-flop) triplication and the Xilinx approach (Virtex and Virtex2) of design-level triplication of both functional blocks and voters. The effectiveness of these approaches is compared using measurements made in conjunction with each of the FPGAs' manufacturer: for Actel, published data [1] and for Xilinx, recent results from the Xilinx SEE Test Consortium (note that the author is an active and founding member). The impacts involve Actel advantages in the areas of transistor-utilization efficiency and minimizing designer involvement in the triplication while the Xilinx advantages relate to the ability to custom tailor upset hardness and the flexibility of re-configurability. Additionally, there are currently clear Xilinx advantages in available features such as the number of I/O's, logic cells, and RAM blocks as well as speed. However, the advantage of the Actel anti-fuses for configuration over the Xilinx SRAM cells is that the latter need additional functionality and external circuitry (PROMs and, at least a watchdog timer) for configuration and configuration scrubbing. Further, although effectively mitigated if done correctly, the proton upset-ability of the Xilinx FPGAs is a concern in severe proton-rich environments. Ultimately, both manufacturers' upset hardening is limited by SEFI (single-event functional interrupt) rates where it appears the Actel results are better although the Xilinx Virtex2-family result of about one SEFI in 65 device-years in solar-min GCR (the more intense part of the galactic cosmic-ray background) should be acceptable to most missions

radiation effects↗

NASA NTRS2006

Single Event Effects Test Results for Advanced Field Programmable Gate Arrays

Reconfigurable Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) from Altera and Actel and an FPGA-based quick-turnApplication Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) from Altera were subjected to single-event testing using heavy ions. Both Altera devices (Stratix II and HardCopy II) exhibited a low latchup threshold (below an LET of 3 MeV-cm2/mg) and thus are not recommended for applications in the space radiation environment. The flash-based Actel ProASIC Plus device did not exhibit latchup to an effective LET of 75 MeV-cm2/mg at room temperature. In addition, these tests did not show flash cell charge loss (upset) or retention damage. Upset characterization of the design-level flip-flops yielded an LET threshold below 10 MeV-cm2/mg and a high LET cross section of about lxlO-6 cm2/bit for storing ones and about lxl0-7 cm2/bit for storing zeros . Thus, the ProASIC device may be suitable for critical flight applications with appropriate triple modular redundancy mitigation techniques.

Field Programmable Gate Arrays↗

NASA NTRS2013

What Reliability Engineers Should Know about Space Radiation Effects

Space radiation in space systems present unique failure modes and considerations for reliability engineers. Radiation effects is not a one size fits all field. Threat conditions that must be addressed for a given mission depend on the mission orbital profile, the technologies of parts used in critical functions and on application considerations, such as supply voltages, temperature, duty cycle, and redundancy. In general, the threats that must be addressed are of two types-the cumulative degradation mechanisms of total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage (DD). and the prompt responses of components to ionizing particles (protons and heavy ions) falling under the heading of single-event effects. Generally degradation mechanisms behave like wear-out mechanisms on any active components in a system: Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Displacement Damage: (1) TID affects all active devices over time. Devices can fail either because of parametric shifts that prevent the device from fulfilling its application or due to device failures where the device stops functioning altogether. Since this failure mode varies from part to part and lot to lot, lot qualification testing with sufficient statistics is vital. Displacement damage failures are caused by the displacement of semiconductor atoms from their lattice positions. As with TID, failures can be either parametric or catastrophic, although parametric degradation is more common for displacement damage. Lot testing is critical not just to assure proper device fi.mctionality throughout the mission. It can also suggest remediation strategies when a device fails. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. (2) On the NEAR mission a functional failure was traced to a PIN diode failure caused by TID induced high leakage currents. NEAR was able to recover from the failure by reversing the current of a nearby Thermal Electric Cooler (turning the TEC into a heater). The elevated temperature caused the PIN diode to anneal and the device to recover. It was by lot qualification testing that NEAR knew the diode would recover when annealed. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. Single Event Effects (SEE): (1) In contrast to TID and displacement damage, Single Event Effects (SEE) resemble random failures. SEE modes can range from changes in device logic (single-event upset, or SEU). temporary disturbances (single-event transient) to catastrophic effects such as the destructive SEE modes, single-event latchup (SEL). single-event gate rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB) (2) The consequences of nondestructive SEE modes such as SEU and SET depend critically on their application--and may range from trivial nuisance errors to catastrophic loss of mission. It is critical not just to ensure that potentially susceptible devices are well characterized for their susceptibility, but also to work with design engineers to understand the implications of each error mode. -For destructive SEE, the predominant risk mitigation strategy is to avoid susceptible parts, or if that is not possible. to avoid conditions under which the part may be susceptible. Destructive SEE mechanisms are often not well understood, and testing is slow and expensive, making rate prediction very challenging. (3) Because the consequences of radiation failure and degradation modes depend so critically on the application as well as the component technology, it is essential that radiation, component. design and system engineers work togetherpreferably starting early in the program to ensure critical applications are addressed in time to optimize the probability of mission success.

DiBari, Rebecca↗

NASA NTRS2003

Neutron Particle Effects on a Quad-Redundant Flight Control Computer

This paper describes a single-event upset experiment performed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. A closed-loop control system consisting of a Quad-Redundant Flight Control Computer (FCC) and a B737 simulator was operated while the FCC was exposed to a neutron beam. The purpose of this test was to analyze the effects of neutron bombardment on avionics control systems operating at altitudes where neutron strikes are probable. The neutron energy spectrum produced at the Los Alamos National Laboratory is similar in shape to the spectrum of atmospheric neutrons but much more intense. The higher intensity results in accelerated life tests that are representative of the actual neutron radiation that a FCC may receive over a period of years.

Eure, Kenneth↗

NASA NTRS2004

Single Event Effects in Highly Scaled Devices for Space Applications

This paper discusses single-event upset (SEU) in memories and microprocessors that are the "drivers" of highly scaled commercial integrated circuits. Despite the decrease in critical charge that occurs for highly scaled CMOS devices, recent test data has shown that SEU rates are actually somewhat lower for scaled devices compared to older devices with larger feature size. Hard errors, which are increasingly important for memories, are discussed along with conventional soft errors. Functional errors in memories and microprocessors are particularly significant, and tend to dominate the response of highly scaled devices from an application standpoint. Predictions for future devices are made using the Semiconductor Industry Roadmap along with recent modeling and radiation test results.

microelectronics↗

NASA NTRS1989

Product assurance technology for procuring reliable, radiation-hard, custom LSI/VLSI electronics

Advanced measurement methods using microelectronic test chips are described. These chips are intended to be used in acquiring the data needed to qualify Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC's) for space use. Efforts were focused on developing the technology for obtaining custom IC's from CMOS/bulk silicon foundries. A series of test chips were developed: a parametric test strip, a fault chip, a set of reliability chips, and the CRRES (Combined Release and Radiation Effects Satellite) chip, a test circuit for monitoring space radiation effects. The technical accomplishments of the effort include: (1) development of a fault chip that contains a set of test structures used to evaluate the density of various process-induced defects; (2) development of new test structures and testing techniques for measuring gate-oxide capacitance, gate-overlap capacitance, and propagation delay; (3) development of a set of reliability chips that are used to evaluate failure mechanisms in CMOS/bulk: interconnect and contact electromigration and time-dependent dielectric breakdown; (4) development of MOSFET parameter extraction procedures for evaluating subthreshold characteristics; (5) evaluation of test chips and test strips on the second CRRES wafer run; (6) two dedicated fabrication runs for the CRRES chip flight parts; and (7) publication of two papers: one on the split-cross bridge resistor and another on asymmetrical SRAM (static random access memory) cells for single-event upset analysis.

Buehler, M. G.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Testing Electronic Devices for Single-Event Upset

Report prepared describes equipment and summarizes both pretest and onsite procedures for testing of digital electronic devices for susceptibility to single-event upset. Term "single-event upset" denotes variety of temporary or permanent bit flips or latchup induced by single particles of ionizing radiation. Vacuum chamber houses device under test while exposed to ion beam. Vacuum chamber and associated equipment must be brought to ion-beam facility for test.

Nichols, D. K.↗

NASA NTRS2004

FPGA-Based, Self-Checking, Fault-Tolerant Computers

A proposed computer architecture would exploit the capabilities of commercially available field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) to enable computers to detect and recover from bit errors. The main purpose of the proposed architecture is to enable fault-tolerant computing in the presence of single-event upsets (SEUs). [An SEU is a spurious bit flip (also called a soft error) caused by a single impact of ionizing radiation.] The architecture would also enable recovery from some soft errors caused by electrical transients and, to some extent, from intermittent and permanent (hard) errors caused by aging of electronic components. A typical FPGA of the current generation contains one or more complete processor cores, memories, and highspeed serial input/output (I/O) channels, making it possible to shrink a board-level processor node to a single integrated-circuit chip. Custom, highly efficient microcontrollers, general-purpose computers, custom I/O processors, and signal processors can be rapidly and efficiently implemented by use of FPGAs. Unfortunately, FPGAs are susceptible to SEUs. Prior efforts to mitigate the effects of SEUs have yielded solutions that degrade performance of the system and require support from external hardware and software. In comparison with other fault-tolerant- computing architectures (e.g., triple modular redundancy), the proposed architecture could be implemented with less circuitry and lower power demand. Moreover, the fault-tolerant computing functions would require only minimal support from circuitry outside the central processing units (CPUs) of computers, would not require any software support, and would be largely transparent to software and to other computer hardware. There would be two types of modules: a self-checking processor module and a memory system (see figure). The self-checking processor module would be implemented on a single FPGA and would be capable of detecting its own internal errors. It would contain two CPUs executing identical programs in lock step, with comparison of their outputs to detect errors. It would also contain various cache local memory circuits, communication circuits, and configurable special-purpose processors that would use self-checking checkers. (The basic principle of the self-checking checker method is to utilize logic circuitry that generates error signals whenever there is an error in either the checker or the circuit being checked.) The memory system would comprise a main memory and a hardware-controlled check-pointing system (CPS) based on a buffer memory denoted the recovery cache. The main memory would contain random-access memory (RAM) chips and FPGAs that would, in addition to everything else, implement double-error-detecting and single-error-correcting memory functions to enable recovery from single-bit errors.

Some, Raphael↗

NASA NTRS2009

Comparison of TID Response and SEE Characterization of Single and Multi Level High Density NAND Flash Memories

Heavy ion single-event measurements and TID response for 8Gb commercial NAND flash memories are reported. Radiation results of multi-level flash technology are compared with results from single-level flash technology. In general, these commercial high density memories appear to be much less susceptible to SEE and have better TID response compared to older generations of flash memories. The charge pump survived up to 600 krads.

nonvolatile memory↗

NASA NTRS2015

Single-Event Effect Performance of a Conductive-Bridge Memory EEPROM

We investigated the heavy ion SEE characteristics of an EEPROM based on CBRAM technology. SEFI is the dominant type of SEE for each operating mode (standby, read-only, write/read). We also observed single bit upsets in the CBRAM cell, during write/read tests. the SEULET threshold is between 10 and 20 MeV * sq cm/mg, with an upper fluence limit of 3 × 10(exp 6) cm(exp -2) at 10 MeV * sq cm/mg. In the stand by mode, the CBRAM array appears immune to bit upsets.

single event effects↗

NASA NTRS2001

Single-event upset in the PowerPC750 microprocessor

In this paper we report results of single-event tests of the PowerPC750 from Motorola and IBM, which are identical designs which are manufactured with advanced processes that uses a minimum feature size of 0.29 and 0.28 mu m, respectively.

single↗