Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “systemic risk”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 91 records · Page 5
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2026

System-Level Integration of Modular Language Models for Real-Time Risk Assessment in Third-Party Risk Management Systems

Large enterprises typically rely on dedicated teams to govern and implement security measures throughout their supply chains, ensuring compliance with enterprise security procedures. There is a significant reliance on Third-Party Risk Management (TPRM) platforms, which often require complete, highly structured information from potential vendors. The review and compliance assurance processes are time- and labor intensive, often requiring several rounds of review between the supply chain security risk management teams, business users, and potential vendors, leading to delays in the supply chain processing and consumer experience. Significant challenges in the risk management paradigm include handling unstructured data in various formats and providing real-time feedback to users to reduce the required review time. This paper presents a novel solution to these challenges. A modular multi-step system architecture is proposed using advances in language processing, specifically for unstructured responses and provides real-time feedback (i.e., 3 seconds) so that users can improve their responses before the TPSRM team review. This novel system architecture will increase information accuracy and significantly reduce time and labor during the review process.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Medical Risk Estimates and Clinical Capability Needs for A Long Duration Artemis Mission

BACKGROUND Human exploration spaceflight missions to the Moon and Mars present unprecedented challenges for in-mission medical care. Compared with the ISS, the greater distance from Earth will mean increased mission durations, communication delays, limited to no resupply opportunities, and significant limitations on the evacuation of ill or injured crew. Spacecraft mass, volume, and power will be curtailed while higher demands will be placed on the crew’s knowledge, skills, and abilities. In this higher risk environment, it is important to: a) quantitatively estimate human system risk attributable to medical conditions, a process known as Probabilistic Risk Analysis, and b) use these estimates to inform medical system design. IMPACT (Informing Mission Planning via Analysis of Complex Tradespaces) is a PRA and medical trade space analysis tool developed by NASA to advance exploration mission medical system design. IMPACT v1.0 improves upon and will soon replace NASA’s existing tool, the Integrated Medical Model, with: a novel evidence base baselined to exploration environments; an expanded list of 119 medical conditions; a significant increase in the number of medical resources that can be utilized and in the flexibility of their use; and the modelling of time lost performing mission-specific tasks due to medical conditions. DISCUSSION: This abstract will present IMPACT estimates of medical system risk and clinical capability needs for an extended duration Artemis mission of approximately 9 months, with phases including outbound transit, 3 months on the Lunar Gateway space station, 3 months on the Lunar surface with EVAs, 3 months on Gateway (simulating the return phase of a Mars mission), and transit back to Earth. Medical system risk estimates include loss of crew life (LOCL), consideration of medical evacuation (known as return to definitive care – RTDC), and an estimate of crew time lost due to medical conditions (Task Time Lost – TTL). The presentation will also describe the medical conditions that are the greatest drivers of risk as well as the clinical capabilities and resources that have the largest effect on risk.

W Thompson↗
NASA NTRS2022

Medical Risk Estimates and Clinical Capability Needs for a Late Artemis Mission

BACKGROUND Human exploration spaceflight missions to the Moon and Mars present unprecedented challenges for in-mission medical care. Compared with the ISS, the greater distance from Earth will mean increased mission durations, communication delays, limited to no resupply opportunities, and significant limitations on the evacuation of ill or injured crew. Spacecraft mass, volume, and power will be curtailed while higher demands will be placed on the crew’s knowledge, skills, and abilities. In this higher risk environment, it is important to: a) quantitatively estimate human system risk attributable to medical conditions, a process known as Probabilistic Risk Analysis, and b) use these estimates to inform medical system design. IMPACT (Informing Mission Planning via Analysis of Complex Tradespaces) is a PRA and medical trade space analysis tool developed by NASA to advance exploration mission medical system design. IMPACT v1.0 improves upon and will soon replace NASA’s existing tool, the Integrated Medical Model, with: a novel evidence base baselined to exploration environments; an expanded list of 119 medical conditions; a significant increase in the number of medical resources that can be utilized and in the flexibility of their use; and the modelling of time lost performing mission-specific tasks due to medical conditions. DISCUSSION: This abstract will present IMPACT estimates of medical system risk and clinical capability needs for an extended duration Artemis mission of approximately 9 months, with phases including outbound transit, 3 months on the Lunar Gateway space station, 3 months on the Lunar surface with EVAs, 3 months on Gateway (simulating the return phase of a Mars mission), and transit back to Earth. Medical system risk estimates include loss of crew life (LOCL), consideration of medical evacuation (known as return to definitive care –RTDC), and an estimate of crew time list due to medical conditions (Task Time Lost –TTL). The presentation will also describe the medical conditions that are the greatest drivers of risk as well as the clinical capabilities and resources that have the largest effect on risk.

A Anderson↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Preliminary Medical Risk Estimates and Clinical Capability Needs for Artemis IV

BACKGROUND Human exploration spaceflight missions to the Moon and Mars present unprecedented challenges for in- mission medical care. Compared with the ISS, the greater distance from Earth will mean increased mission durations, communication delays, limited to no resupply opportunities, and significant limitations on the evacuation of ill or injured crew. Spacecraft mass, volume, and power will be curtailed while higher demands will be placed on the crew’s knowledge, skills, and abilities. In this higher risk environment, it is important to: a) quantitatively estimate human system risk attributable to medical conditions, a process known as Probabilistic Risk Analysis, and b) use these estimates to inform medical system design. IMPACT (Informing Mission Planning via Analysis of Complex Tradespaces) is a PRA and medical trade space analysis tool developed by NASA to advance exploration mission medical system design. IMPACT v1.0 improves upon and will soon replace NASA’s existing tool, the Integrated Medical Model, with: a novel evidence base baselined to exploration environments; an expanded list of 119 medical conditions; a significant increase in the number of medical resources that can be utilized and in the flexibility of their use; and the modelling of time lost performing mission-specific tasks due to medical conditions. METHODOLOGY: This abstract will present IMPACT estimates of medical system risk and clinical capability needs for the Artemis IV mission. Artemis IV is currently scheduled for 2026 and will visit the Gateway space station in lunar orbit prior to the second lunar landing of the Artemis program. The baseline Artemis IV mission that was modeled was 28 days in duration with phases including Orion outbound, 4 days on the Gateway space station in lunar orbit, 2 crew on the surface of the Moon for approximately one week, an additional 5 days on Gateway, and then return to Earth. This baseline was compared to two alternative 34-day design reference missions (DRMs) that shifted the lunar sortie earlier or later in the mission profile. Assumptions included 2 female and 2 male crew and a notional medical system mass of 25 kg. Medical system risk estimates include loss of crew life (LOCL), consideration of medical evacuation (known as return to definitive care – RTDC), and an estimate of crew time lost due to medical conditions (Task Time Lost – TTL). The presentation will also describe the medical conditions that are the greatest drivers of risk as well as the clinical capabilities and resources that have the largest effect on risk. RESULTS: All three DRMs had very low probability of LOCL from medical conditions, primarily due to short duration. RTDC was also similar across the DRMs. In contrast, TTL was higher in the early lunar sortie DRM due to earlier occurrence of EVA-related medical conditions. Taken as a whole, there was no clinically significant difference in medical risk across the three missions. Results for clinical capabilities and an example medical equipment list will be discussed but were similar across DRMs.

D Hilmers↗
NASA NTRS2024

Preliminary Medical Risk Estimates and Clinical Capability Needs for Late Artemis Missions

BACKGROUND Human exploration spaceflight missions to the Moon and Mars present unprecedented challenges for in- mission medical care. Compared with the ISS, the greater distance from Earth will mean increased mission durations, communication delays, limited to no resupply opportunities, and significant limitations on the evacuation of ill or injured crew. Spacecraft mass, volume, and power will be curtailed while higher demands will be placed on the crew’s knowledge, skills, and abilities. In this higher risk environment, it is important to: a) quantitatively estimate human system risk attributable to medical conditions, a process known as Probabilistic Risk Analysis, and b) use these estimates to inform medical system design. IMPACT (Informing Mission Planning via Analysis of Complex Tradespaces) is a PRA and medical trade space analysis tool developed by NASA to advance exploration mission medical system design. IMPACT v1.0 improves upon and will soon replace NASA’s existing tool, the Integrated Medical Model, with: a novel evidence base baselined to exploration environments; an expanded list of 119 medical conditions; a significant increase in the number of medical resources that can be utilized and in the flexibility of their use; and the modelling of time lost performing mission-specific tasks due to medical conditions. METHODOLOGY: This abstract will present IMPACT estimates of medical system risk and clinical capability needs for the Artemis IV mission. Artemis IV is currently scheduled for 2026 and will visit the Gateway space station in lunar orbit prior to the second lunar landing of the Artemis program. The baseline Artemis IV mission that was modeled was 28 days in duration with phases including Orion outbound, 4 days on the Gateway space station in lunar orbit, 2 crew on the surface of the Moon for approximately one week, an additional 5 days on Gateway, and then return to Earth. This baseline was compared to two alternative 34-day design reference missions (DRMs) that shifted the lunar sortie earlier or later in the mission profile. Assumptions included 2 female and 2 male crew and a notional medical system mass of 25 kg. Medical system risk estimates include loss of crew life (LOCL), consideration of medical evacuation (known as return to definitive care – RTDC), and an estimate of crew time lost due to medical conditions (Task Time Lost – TTL). The presentation will also describe the medical conditions that are the greatest drivers of risk as well as the clinical capabilities and resources that have the largest effect on risk. RESULTS: All three DRMs had very low probability of LOCL from medical conditions, primarily due to short duration. RTDC was also similar across the DRMs. In contrast, TTL was higher in the early lunar sortie DRM due to earlier occurrence of EVA-related medical conditions. Taken as a whole, there was no clinically significant difference in medical risk across the three missions. Results for clinical capabilities and an example medical equipment list will be discussed but were similar across DRMs.

D. Hilmers↗
DOE OSTI2025

System Safety Risk Analysis Models (SSRAM)

This presentation provides a high level overview of the System Safety Risk Analysis (SSRAM) methodology and motivation.

Clark, Andrew Jordan [Sandia National Laboratories↗
NASA NTRS2010

Risk-Informed Safety Assurance and Probabilistic Assessment of Mission-Critical Software-Intensive Systems

This report validates and documents the detailed features and practical application of the framework for software intensive digital systems risk assessment and risk-informed safety assurance presented in the NASA PRA Procedures Guide for Managers and Practitioner. This framework, called herein the "Context-based Software Risk Model" (CSRM), enables the assessment of the contribution of software and software-intensive digital systems to overall system risk, in a manner which is entirely compatible and integrated with the format of a "standard" Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), as currently documented and applied for NASA missions and applications. The CSRM also provides a risk-informed path and criteria for conducting organized and systematic digital system and software testing so that, within this risk-informed paradigm, the achievement of a quantitatively defined level of safety and mission success assurance may be targeted and demonstrated. The framework is based on the concept of context-dependent software risk scenarios and on the modeling of such scenarios via the use of traditional PRA techniques - i.e., event trees and fault trees - in combination with more advanced modeling devices such as the Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM) or other dynamic logic-modeling representations. The scenarios can be synthesized and quantified in a conditional logic and probabilistic formulation. The application of the CSRM method documented in this report refers to the MiniAERCam system designed and developed by the NASA Johnson Space Center.

Guarro, Sergio B.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Incorporation of Human Risk Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG) With Mishap Investigations to Un-Silo Knowledge

NASA’s Human System Risk Board (HSRB) has been a central driver in efforts to understand, mitigate, and communicate the 29 human systems risks monitored by the board. As a result of the collaboration between research, operations, and technical authorities, large bodies of knowledge have been collected and digested to represent the current understanding of the risks. As a part of these bodies of knowledge, directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) have been developed to communicate the current understanding of the causal relationship of the hazards, contributing factors, countermeasures, other risks, and outcomes that contribute to the overall risk. This risk knowledge is applied in a theoretical sense for potential incidents during exploration even while informed by surveillance data. However, there have been mishaps and close calls during past space exploration that intersect with one or more of the Human System Risks DAGs and knowledge bases. The purpose of this exercise was to un-silo this risk knowledge and connect it to the close call of EVA 23 through the development of a DAG representing the intersection of the HSRB Risks and the events of the close call. The development of the DAG occurred through an iterative process, with each iteration expanding and/or refining the nodes and connections described by the source materials. In addition to the risk documentation developed by the HSRB, lessons learned and other mishap investigation documents were utilized to understand the events that led to water entering the helmet of a crewmember on the EVA. New nodes specific to the events of EVA 23 were interconnected with existing HSRB DAG nodes and edges. Nodes within the DAG were defined within a “DAG-tionary” with any updates to a definition that may have previously existed from the HSRB DAGs, and edges were recorded in a matrix. Both the DAG-tionary and matrix describe where nodes and edges are present across the Risk and Mishap DAG. This DAG will then be reviewed by experts outside of HSRB and HRP to confirm that interpretations of the non-health related events (such as the engineering nodes) are represented accurately. DISCUSSION This process highlighted a method by which the knowledge generated among the contributing members of the HSRB Risks can be effectively adapted and utilized through the tools employed by the Risk Custodian teams. By leveraging these tools, new context and insights to the information at hand can be brought forward to address current spaceflight challenges. Moreover, un-siloing this knowledge through future DAGs and other efforts can drive interprofessional collaboration and foster communication. This will enable teams to work together more effectively, leveraging their diverse expertise to tackle the complex challenges of space exploration and human research. Ultimately, this collaboration will bring NASA closer to achieve agency goals and contribute to the overall shared mission and vision.

Samuel Jacobs↗
DOE OSTI2024

Risk-based System Upgrade Planning for AOT-IC [Capstone Project]

The Accelerator Operations and Technology Instrumentation and Controls Group (AOT IC) at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) has established a comprehensive risk-based system upgrade planning strategy which has been utilized as a tool to prioritize system upgrade projects for the past several years. A challenge with the current system is that the group often lacks the data to quantify the probability and impact of system failures, so the group often relies instead on qualitative risk assessments as well as evaluations of a potential upgrade project’s alignment with group strategy and vision to prioritize projects. A proposed framework to enable quantitative risk probability and impact assessments has been developed and tested on three pilot systems chosen to broadly represent the types and conditions of equipment used by the group. The proposed framework incorporates availability data gathered from the LANSCE control room logbooks and the LANSCE work control system, as well as a system health evaluation which is conducted from a variety of resources to assess the probability of equipment failure. The impact of system failure is viewed from the perspective of impact on mission and schedule, where spares status, system documentation status, and the functional distribution of deployed systems are used to quantify these impacts.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Method for Validating Causal Diagrams of Human Health Risk in Space Flight

The complexity of cause-and-effect relationships between spaceflight hazards and resulting health conditions clouds understanding of the totality of human system risk in space. In response, NASA has introduced Directed Acyclic Graphs (causal diagrams) into the human systems risk management process. These diagrams allow for a common understanding of the mechanisms that lead from unique hazards of spaceflight to the health outcomes important to agencies and astronauts. However, the paucity of available biomedical data from spaceflight creates a need for methods of validating causal models that can accommodate data from spaceflight model analogs. Here we outline one approach utilizing open-access rodent bone datasets from the Ames Life Sciences Data Archive. The properties of directed acyclic graphs themselves can provide an epistemological and statistical framework for validation of a priori causal representations of human system risk in space flight. The assumed causal connections on the graph creates sets of logical implications: variables that – if the causal diagram is correct – should be correlated, as well as sets that should be conditionally independent. By testing these implied correlations and conditional independencies both statistically and heuristically, we can provide evidence for or against specific causal pathways on the causal diagram. In addition to validation of expert-generated causal diagrams, machine learning techniques can learn the most likely structure of a causal diagram from a given dataset. Comparison with and reconciliation between machine-learned causal diagrams and expert-generated diagrams is another technique for challenging assumptions and improving our understanding of causal mechanisms. Accurately representing complex causation is essential to systemic understanding of human health risks in space travel. Having a robust system of validating causal diagrams helps us arrive at more accurate representations of causal systems. This process will be integral to developing the countermeasures necessary for extended exploration of the moon and Mars.

Robert Reynolds↗
NASA NTRS2001

Use of System Safety Risk Assessments for the Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM)

This paper discusses the System Safety approach used to assess risk for the Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM). Previous to the first RSRM flight in the fall of 1988, all systems were analyzed extensively to assure that hazards were identified, assessed and that the baseline risk was understood and appropriately communicated. Since the original RSRM baseline was established, Thiokol and NASA have implemented a number of initiatives that have further improved the RSRM. The robust design, completion of rigorous testing and flight success of the RSRM has resulted in a wise reluctance to make changes. One of the primary assessments required to accompany the documentation of each proposed change and aid in the decision making process is a risk assessment. Documentation supporting proposed changes, including the risk assessments from System Safety, are reviewed and assessed by Thiokol and NASA technical management. After thorough consideration, approved changes are implemented adding improvements to and reducing risk of the Space Shuttle RSRM.

Greenhalgh, Phillip O.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Capability for Integrated Systems Risk-Reduction Analysis

NASA's Human Research Program (HRP) is working to increase the likelihoods of human health and performance success during long-duration missions, and subsequent crew long-term health. To achieve these goals, there is a need to develop an integrated understanding of how the complex human physiological-socio-technical mission system behaves in spaceflight. This understanding will allow HRP to provide cross-disciplinary spaceflight countermeasures while minimizing resources such as mass, power, and volume. This understanding will also allow development of tools to assess the state of and enhance the resilience of individual crewmembers, teams, and the integrated mission system. We will discuss a set of risk-reduction questions that has been identified to guide the systems approach necessary to meet these needs. In addition, a framework of factors influencing human health and performance in space, called the Contributing Factor Map (CFM), is being applied as the backbone for incorporating information addressing these questions from sources throughout HRP. Using the common language of the CFM, information from sources such as the Human System Risk Board summaries, Integrated Research Plan, and HRP-funded publications has been combined and visualized in ways that allow insight into cross-disciplinary interconnections in a systematic, standardized fashion. We will show examples of these visualizations. We will also discuss applications of the resulting analysis capability that can inform science portfolio decisions, such as areas in which cross-disciplinary solicitations or countermeasure development will potentially be fruitful.

Mindock, J.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Managing Programmatic Risk for Complex Space System Developments

Risk management strategies have become a recent important research topic to many aerospace organizations as they prepare to develop the revolutionary complex space systems of the future. Future multi-disciplinary complex space systems will make it absolutely essential for organizations to practice a rigorous, comprehensive risk management process, emphasizing thorough systems engineering principles to succeed. Project managers must possess strong leadership skills to direct high quality, cross-disciplinary teams for successfully developing revolutionary space systems that are ever increasing in complexity. Proactive efforts to reduce or eliminate risk throughout a project's lifecycle ideally must be practiced by all technical members in the organization. This paper discusses some of the risk management perspectives that were collected from senior managers and project managers of aerospace and aeronautical organizations by the use of interviews and surveys. Some of the programmatic risks which drive the success or failure of projects are revealed. Key findings lead to a number of insights for organizations to consider for proactively approaching the risks which face current and future complex space systems projects.

Panetta, Peter V.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Probabilistic physics of failure approach to fusion systems & Risk-efficiency optimization of nuclear co-generation [Slides]

An overview of the progress made towards two separate summer internship projects: a probabilistic physics of failure approach to fusion systems and a risk efficiency optimization of nuclear co-generation. Original version summarized the progress through end of June, and the revision version summarizes the progress through the entire internship to August 1st.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS1995

Non-GEO mobile satellite systems: A risk assessment

Since 1991, The MITRE Corporation has performed several independent evaluations of proposed mobile satellite service (MSS) systems that would operate from low Earth orbit (LEO) or medium Earth orbit (MEO), also known as intermediate circular orbit (ICO). This paper introduces a top level Risk Taxonomy tailored to summarize the technical and programmatic risks that MITRE has identified. In general, as risks are identified and addressed, a system's technical characteristics, cost and schedule are affected. This paper traces changes in three key parameters - satellite launch mass, system cost, and system schedule - for each of the five original non-GEO MSS systems for which license applications were made to the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from November 1990 until June 1991. Finally, specific risk areas are identified using the Risk Taxonomy as a framework for discussion.

Gaffney, Leah M.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Risk-based System Upgrade Planning for AOT-IC Presentation [Slides]

The number of deployed systems and different HW/SW form factors makes it difficult to maintain a complete understanding of their health which leads to a reduced level of certainty when assessing risk and trying to prioritize system upgrade efforts. AOT-IC must constantly plan and execute system upgrade and replacement projects to ensure the longevity of the control system. There are many more projects needed than the group can realistically accomplish given schedule and resource constraints. The group must prioritize their upgrade projects to choose only the highest priority projects to execute each year. Currently plans upgrade and replacement projects based on alignment with mission needs, group vision, resource availability, and qualitative risk assessments based on SME estimates. The group maintains a risk register. This is useful as a tool for shaping strategic planning but currently lacks the quantitative data and process needed to generate accurate risk assessments.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Machine Learning for the Validation of Expert-Elicited Causal Risk Diagrams

Exposure to spaceflight poses risk to human health in complex ways. To help manage this risk, the Human Systems Risk Board (HSRB) at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) maintains a set of causal diagrams that attempt to explain how spaceflight hazards generate health risks and lead to adverse outcomes both in-mission, immediately post-mission, and over the long term. These causal risk diagrams are formulated as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) and can function as knowledge graphs of connected risks and outcomes. These DAGs have proven useful for communication, and, through network analysis, have allowed for the identification of structurally important factors in the risk network. However, the utility these DAGs provide is directly proportional to their verisimilitude, making assessment of this trait using empirical data – whether from actual human spaceflight or various spaceflight analogue exposures and model organisms – a high priority. In this research we explore the use of machine learning algorithms to learn DAG structure from empirical data as a means of evaluating human-elicited DAG structures. To do so, we test several different graph structure-learning algorithms on data concerning changes in the bones of rats and mice after exposure to either spaceflight or a spaceflight analogue. We explore potential methods for indexing the similarity between each algorithm’s output DAG with all the others and with that of the expert-elicited DAG. We discuss next steps in this ongoing line of research and open science initiatives underway to complete them.

directed acyclic graphs↗