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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Validation of Decompression Sickness Risk Mitigation Protocols for Planetary Spaceflight Missions

BACKGROUND: Apollo missions used a 100% O2 cabin atmosphere which effectively eliminated the risk of decompression sickness (DCS) during extravehicular activity (EVA) on the moon. NASA’s future missions to the moon and Mars are expected to use nitrox gas mixtures of up to 34% O2, 66% N2, which will reduce flammability risk compared with Apollo, but will necessitate Oxygen prebreathe prior to EVA to reduce DCS risk to acceptable levels. Prebreathe protocols used on the space shuttle and International Space Station are validated for microgravity EVAs, but the significantly increased risk of DCS during equivalent ambulatory EVAs make these protocols inapplicable to planetary EVA. An “exploration atmosphere” of 56.5 kPa (8.2 psia), 34% O2, 66% N2 has been recommended by NASA as a compromise that balances prebreathe duration, hypoxia, and flammability risk, assuming a 29.6 kPa (4.3 psi) spacesuit. However, this atmosphere may not be used for vehicles that do not support frequent EVA, and with commercial providers and international providers expected to provide landers, pressurized rovers, habitats, and spacesuits, different combinations of vehicle and spacesuit atmospheres are possible and will each require validated prebreathe protocols. OVERVIEW: Key components of a multi-year strategic roadmap include: 1) Establish hypobaric chamber facility capable of supporting 8-person EVA prebreathe validation tests at saturation atmospheres up to 36% O2; 2) validate an EVA physical workload simulation for use during prebreathe validation testing; 3) validate the recommended “exploration atmosphere” prebreathe protocol; 4) validate prebreathe protocols for additional atmospheric combinations that bound the most likely potential operating ranges of future vehicles and spacesuits; and 5) update DCS risk estimation models based on results of prebreathe validation studies. DISCUSSION: Details and data from completion of the first two steps of the strategic roadmap will be presented; the third step is currently underway, with pilot results provided in a companion presentation. Steps four and five will require a multi-year series of chamber tests; collaborations are being pursued.

Andrew F. J. Abercromby↗
NASA NTRS2005

Communicating Risk to Program Managers

Program Managers (PM) can protect program resources and improve chances of success by anticipating, understanding and managing risks. Understanding the range of potential risks helps one to avoid or manage the risks. A PM must choose which risks to accept to reduce fire fighting, must meet the expectations of stakeholders consistently, and avoid falling into costly "black holes" that may open. A good risk management process provides the PM more confidence to seize opportunities save money, meet schedule, even improve relationships with people important to the program. Evidence of managing risk and sound internal controls can mean better support from superiors for the program by building a trust and reputation from being on top of issues. Risk managers have an obligation to provide the PM with the best information possible to allow the benefits to be realized (Small Business Consortium, 2004). The Institute for Chartered Accountants in England and Wales sees very important benefits for companies in providing better information about what they do to assess and manage key business risks. Such information will: a) provide practical forward-looking information; b) reduce the cost of capital; c) encourage better risk management; and d) improve accountability for stewardship, investor protection and the usefulness of financial reporting. We are particularly convinced that enhanced risk reporting will help listed companies obtain capital at the lowest possible cost (The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England &Wales, June 2002). Risk managers can take a significant role in quantifying the success of their department and communicating those figures to executive (program) management levels while pushing for a broader risk management role. Overall, risk managers must show that risk management work matters in the most crucial place-the bottom line- as they prove risk management can be a profit center (Sullivan, 2004).

Shivers, C. Herbert↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Risk-Based SMA and Modernizing Risk Classification at GSFC

In 2014, in response to a large volume of feedback from industry, the science community, and internal to Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), GSFC’s Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Directorate began a transition to a risk-based implementation of SMA, departing from its longstanding practice of being primarily driven by a mostly static set of Mission Assurance Requirements. The transition started out with a pilot project involving risk-based acceptance of bare-printed circuit boards that was enormously successful, continued through a complete organizational transformation in 2015, and culminated with the baselining of formal Risk-Based SMA policy in 2016. In this presentation we will describe the risk-based SMA concept, segue into how it shapes a modernization of risk classification that GSFC has rolled out, and provide results from the original pilot project for risk-based SMA, involving the printed circuit board assurance process.

Jesse Leitner↗
NASA NTRS2005

GO/NO-GO - When is medical hazard mitigation acceptable for launch?

Medical support of spaceflight missions is composed of complex tasks and decisions that dedicated to maintaining the health and performance of the crew and the completion of mission objectives. Spacecraft represent one of the most complex vehicles built by humans, and are built to very rigorous design specifications. In the course of a Flight Readiness Review (FRR) or a mission itself, the flight surgeon must be able to understand the impact of hazards and risks that may not be completely mitigated by design alone. Some hazards are not mitigated because they are never actually identified. When a hazard is identified, it must be reduced or waivered. Hazards that cannot be designed out of the vehicle or mission, are usually mitigated through other means to bring the residual risk to an acceptable level. This is possible in most engineered systems because failure modes are usually predictable and analysis can include taking these systems to failure. Medical support of space missions is complicated by the inability of flight surgeons to provide "exact" hazard and risk numbers to the NASA engineering community. Taking humans to failure is not an option. Furthermore, medical dogma is mostly comprised of "medical prevention" strategies that mitigate risk by examining the behaviour of a cohort of humans similar to astronauts. Unfortunately, this approach does not lend itself well for predicting the effect of a hazard in the unique environment of space. This presentation will discuss how Medical Operations uses an evidence-based approach to decide if hazard mitigation strategies are adequate to reduce mission risk to acceptable levels. Case studies to be discussed will include: 1. Risk of electrocution risk during EVA 2. Risk of cardiac event risk during long and short duration missions 3. Degraded cabin environmental monitoring on the ISS. Learning Objectives 1.) The audience will understand the challenges of mitigating medical risk caused by nominal and off-nominal mission events. 2.) The audience will understand the process by which medical hazards are identified and mitigated before launch. 3.) The audience will understand the roles and responsibilities of all the other flight control positions in participating in the process of reducing hazards and reducing medical risk to an acceptable level.

Hamilton, Douglas R.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Public Risk Assessment Program

The Public Entry Risk Assessment (PERA) program addresses risk to the public from shuttle or other spacecraft re-entry trajectories. Managing public risk to acceptable levels is a major component of safe spacecraft operation. PERA is given scenario inputs of vehicle trajectory, probability of failure along that trajectory, the resulting debris characteristics, and field size and distribution, and returns risk metrics that quantify the individual and collective risk posed by that scenario. Due to the large volume of data required to perform such a risk analysis, PERA was designed to streamline the analysis process by using innovative mathematical analysis of the risk assessment equations. Real-time analysis in the event of a shuttle contingency operation, such as damage to the Orbiter, is possible because PERA allows for a change to the probability of failure models, therefore providing a much quicker estimation of public risk. PERA also provides the ability to generate movie files showing how the entry risk changes as the entry develops. PERA was designed to streamline the computation of the enormous amounts of data needed for this type of risk assessment by using an average distribution of debris on the ground, rather than pinpointing the impact point of every piece of debris. This has reduced the amount of computational time significantly without reducing the accuracy of the results. PERA was written in MATLAB; a compiled version can run from a DOS or UNIX prompt.

Mendeck, Gavin↗
NASA NTRS1975

Risk Management Technique for design and operation of facilities and equipment

The Risk Management System collects information from engineering, operating, and management personnel to identify potentially hazardous conditions. This information is used in risk analysis, problem resolution, and contingency planning. The resulting hazard accountability system enables management to monitor all identified hazards. Data from this system are examined in project reviews so that management can decide to eliminate or accept these risks. This technique is particularly effective in improving the management of risks in large, complex, high-energy facilities. These improvements are needed for increased cooperation among industry, regulatory agencies, and the public.

Fedor, O. H.↗
NASA NTRS2018

International Space Station Operational Experience and Its Impacts on Future Mission Supportability

Operational experience gained on the International Space Station (ISS) has enabled significant improvements in failure rate estimates for various Orbital Replacement Units (ORUs). These improved estimates, in turn, allow more efficient and accurate spare parts allocations for future missions, enabling significant reductions in both logistics mass and risk. This paper examines the value of ISS experience to date in terms of its impact on supportability for future missions. A supportability model is presented that assesses the spares required as a function of mission endurance and risk, taking into account uncertainty in failure rate estimates. Changes in ISS Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLSS) ORU failure rate estimates are described and discussed, both in terms of the overall population of ORUs and the evolution of failure rate estimates over time for a particular item. The value of those updated failure rate estimates is assessed by calculating the estimated spares mass requirements for two cases, using the initial, pre-ISS estimates and using the estimates informed by on-orbit experience. Hidden risk resulting from underestimated failure rates is also assessed. These results indicate that, for a 1,200-day Mars mission, ISS experience has enabled a 3.9 t to 6.0 t reduction in ECLSS spares mass required and uncovered failure rate underestimates that would have resulted in an order of magnitude increase in risk had they not been discovered and corrected. The implications of these results for system development and mission planning are discussed, including approaches to accelerate the rate of failure rate refinement and the risks associated with making changes or introducing new systems. Overall, test time is a critical factor that must be carefully considered in system development, and new systems must budget appropriate time for testing in a relevant environment or accept higher risk and logistics requirements on future missions.

Owens, Andrew C.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Increasing Small Satellite Reliability- A Public-Private Initiative

At present, CubeSat components and buses are generally not appropriate for missions where significant risk of failure, or the inability to quantify risk or confidence, is acceptable. However, in the future we anticipate that CubeSats will be used for missions requiring reliability of 1-3 years for Earth-observing missions and even longer for Planetary, Heliophysics, and Astrophysics missions. Their growing potential utility is driving an interagency effort to improve and quantify CubeSat reliability, and more generally, small satellite mission risk. The Small Satellite Reliability Initiative (SSRI)—an ongoing activity with broad collaborative participation from civil, DoD, and commercial space systems providers and stakeholders—targets this challenge. The Initiative seeks to define implementable and broadly-accepted approaches to achieve reliability and acceptable risk postures associated with several SmallSat mission risk classes—from “do no harm” missions, to those associated with missions whose failure would result in loss or delay of key national objectives. These approaches will maintain, to the extent practical, cost efficiencies associated with small satellite missions and consider constraints associated with supply chain elements, as appropriate. The SSRI addresses this challenge from two architectural levels—the mission- or system-level, and the component- or subsystem-level. The mission- or system-level scope targets assessment approaches that are efficient and effective, with mitigation strategies that facilitate resiliency to mission or system anomalies while the component- or subsystem-level scope addresses the challenge at lower architectural levels. The initiative does not limit strategies and approaches to proven and traditional methodologies, but is focused on fomenting thought on novel and innovative solutions. This paper discusses the genesis of and drivers for this initiative, how the public-private collaboration is being executed, findings and recommendations derived to date, and next steps towards broadening small satellite mission potential.

SmallSat↗
NASA NTRS2008

Improved Verification for Aerospace Systems

Aerospace systems are subject to many stringent performance requirements to be verified with low risk. This report investigates verification planning using conditional approaches vice the standard classical statistical methods, and usage of historical surrogate data for requirement validation and in verification planning. The example used in this report to illustrate the results of these investigations is a proposed mission assurance requirement with the concomitant maximum acceptable verification risk for the NASA Constellation Program Orion Launch Abort System (LAS). This report demonstrates the following improvements: 1) verification planning using conditional approaches vice classical statistical methods results in plans that are more achievable and feasible; 2) historical surrogate data can be used to bound validation of performance requirements; and, 3) incorporation of historical surrogate data in verification planning using conditional approaches produces even less costly and more reasonable verification plans. The procedures presented in this report may produce similar improvements and cost savings in verification for any stringent performance requirement for an aerospace system.

Powell, Mark A.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Streamlining Ground Station Network Compatibility Test for Small Satellites

A team of eight subject matter experts at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) completed a Lean Six Sigma project to identify process improvements for the compatibility test process for small satellites planning to use the NASA Near Earth Network (NEN). Ground station network compatibility testing is designed to reduce the risk to missions by resolving issues between the spacecraft's flight communication and navigation components and the ground systems prior to launch. Compatibility testing, which consists of a series of tests performed over a period of months and documented in reports, is an important step meant to prevent post-launch anomalies that could lead to expensive troubleshooting or mission failure. Compared to traditional missions, small satellite missions typically have a smaller budget and compressed schedules, which can result in small satellite projects' willingness to accept the risk associated with less comprehensive compatibility testing. Optimization and or refinement of the compatibility test process for small satellite missions could alleviate some of the pressures inherent with these factors. The goal of the Lean Six Sigma project was to develop alternative scalable methods of compatibility testing for small satellites. The Lean Six Sigma approach and the results of the project are reviewed in this paper.

Streamlining↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Improving Efficacy and Safety of Pharmacological Treatment Through Precision Medicine and Pharmacogenomics for Human Deep Space Exploration

INTRODUCTION: Future spaceflight will require increased crew medical autonomy as exploration class missions expanding duration and distance from Earth, especially for Mars missions. As mission duration increases, it will be even more essential to have appropriate amounts of effective medication to ensure the maintenance of crew health and performance. Conversely, mass and volume constraints will become more severe as future spaceflight expands beyond low Earth orbit, where resupply is difficult or becomes impossible. These constraints thus convey an urgency to further tailor medications included in the spacecraft formulary and increased examination of appropriate dosing regimens. BACKGROUND: Precision Health is an exciting area of cutting-edge research and medicine focused on maintaining an individual’s health and performance through in-depth understanding of an individual’s unique factors and molecular profiles. This approach can be adapted to better predict, monitor, and address physiological responses to the spaceflight environment. One example is the field of pharmacogenomics (PGX),the study of how the expressed genome impacts drug responses with the goal of prescribing the right dose of the right drug at the right time. Specifically, PGX testing provides valuable information on an individual’s precise allelic variations to guide physicians in making informed decisions on pharmaceutical choice and dosing to avoid adverse drug events and maximize pharmacological efficacy. The goal of this study was to evaluate which drugs in the current space pharmacy could be evaluated using PGX testing and to understand the potential impact on the health and wellness of the astronaut population. Additionally, we sought to evaluate clinically available FDA-approved PGX testing solutions to better understand its applicability. METHODS: A complete list of drugs onboard the International Space Station (ISS) was analyzed for risk and likelihood of drug failure and PGX actionability. This analysis encompassed both personal astronaut medications, including supplements and over the counter drugs (n=151) and ISS MedKit formulary medications (n=95). Duplicate medications and different formulations were removed, which resulted in 157 total drugs used in the subsequent analysis. A 5x5 risk assessment table was produced by examining the likelihood of drug failure compared to the consequence of drug failure. Likelihood of individual drug failure was defined by whether existing processes are sufficient to prevent adverse events, as ranked from 1 (very low, can easily be prevented) to 5 (very high, cannot be prevented) during a Mars mission. In contrast, the consequence of drug failure was defined by impact to safety, schedule, cost or technical and ranked from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high).A comprehensive assessment of commercially available PGX solutions is currently underway to evaluate specimen requirements, cost/benefit analysis (cost vs. number of alleles assessed), utility of variant analysis, relevance to inflight medication usage, quality of reporting in enabling clinical application, and ease of integration into electronic medical records. RESULTS: Risk assessments(LxC 5x5 table) indicated29medicationswere in the yellow or red zone driven predominantly by drug failure or safety concerns, with the remainder(n=128)of the medications in the green zone where risk is acceptable. We found that current PGX testing results could impact 21% of the total medications in the ISS MedKit and IMAK; of these, 9 medications currently have direct clinically actionable guidance available. Results of the clinical PGX solution evaluations as related to these medications will be presented. CONCLUSION: PGX testing has demonstrated clear benefits in terrestrial medicine and clinical environments for the selection of proper medications, avoiding adverse drug reactions, and maximizing drug efficacy. We propose that similar benefits would be bestowed on the astronaut and commercial spaceflight passenger population by performing preemptive pre-flight PGX testing to reduce risk of mission failure due to ineffective or toxic medications, improve targeting drug efficacy and safety, and further open the door to countermeasure research exploring PGX-related allelic variants. For example, PGX results could allow tailoring of specific medications at optimal doses more precisely to each individual astronaut, particularly in areas of space motion sickness, sleep aids, and analgesics. An additional benefit is that PGX results could provide information for better planning of the components of a space pharmacy for deep space missions to be more cost effective and more efficient in the utilization of limited pharmaceutical resources. Finally, while PGX testing of the astronaut corps is not currently conducted, this approach could provide immediate impact in support of mission success by reducing risks, optimizing astronaut performance, and providing valuable insights into long-term astronaut health. Such advancements in clinical decision making are important next steps in building dynamic individual risk profiles for astronauts, increasing crew autonomy and providing tailored countermeasures

Alice R W Tang↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Improving Efficacy and Safety of Pharmacological Treatment Through Precision Health and Pharmacogenomics

INTRODUCTION: Future spaceflight will require increased crew medical autonomy as exploration class missions expand in duration and distance from Earth, especially for Mars missions. As mission duration increases, it will be essential to have appropriate amounts of effective medication to ensure the maintenance of crew health and performance. Conversely, mass and volume constraints will become more severe as future spaceflight expands beyond low Earth orbit, where resupply is difficult or becomes impossible. These constraints thus convey an urgency to tailor medications for individual crewmembers and further examine appropriate dosing regimens. BACKGROUND: Precision Health is an exciting area of medicine focused on maintaining an individual’s health and performance through in-depth understanding of an individual’s unique clinical and environmental history, genetic makeup, and molecular profiles. This approach can be adapted to better predict, monitor, and address physiological responses to the spaceflight environment. A subset of this field is pharmacogenomics (PGX), the study of how the expressed genome impacts drug responses with the goal of prescribing the right dose of the right drug at the right time. Specifically, PGX testing provides valuable information on an individual’s precise allelic variations to guide physicians in making informed decisions on drug choice and dosing to avoid adverse events and maximize efficacy. The study goal was to identify which current space pharmacy drugs could be evaluated using PGX testing and to understand the potential impact on the health and wellness of the astronaut population. Additionally, we sought to evaluate clinically available FDA-approved PGX testing solutions to better understand its applicability. METHODS: A complete list of drugs on the ISS was analyzed for risk and likelihood of drug failure and PGX actionability. This analysis encompassed both astronauts’ personal medications, including supplements and over the counter drugs (n=151) contained in the ISS medical accessory kit (IMAK), and ISS MedKit formulary medications (n=95). Duplicate medications and different formulations were removed, which resulted in a total of 157 drugs used in the subsequent analysis. A 5x5 risk assessment table was produced by examining the likelihood of drug failure compared to the consequence of drug failure (LxC). Likelihood of individual drug failure was defined by whether existing processes are sufficient to prevent ineffective treatment or impactful side effect events, as ranked from 1 (very low, can easily be prevented) to 5 (very high, cannot be prevented) during a Mars mission. In contrast, the consequence of drug failure was defined by impact to safety, schedule, cost, or technical criteria and ranked from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high). An assessment of PGX reference laboratories is currently underway to evaluate sample requirements, benefit analysis (cost vs. utility of allele variant analysis), relevance to inflight medication usage, quality of reporting in enabling clinical application, and ease of integration into electronic medical records. RESULTS: Risk assessments (LxC 5x5 table) indicated 128 medications were in the green zone where risk is acceptable, with the remaining 29 of the medications in the yellow or red zone driven predominantly due to drug failure or safety concerns. We found that current PGX testing results could impact 21% of the total medications in the ISS MedKit and IMAK; of these, 9 medications currently have direct clinically actionable guidance available. Results of the clinical PGX solution evaluations as related to these medications will be presented. CONCLUSION: PGX testing has demonstrated clear benefits in terrestrial medicine and clinical environments for the selection of proper medications, avoiding adverse drug reactions, and maximizing drug efficacy. We propose that similar benefits would be bestowed on the astronaut and commercial spaceflight passenger population by performing preemptive preflight PGX testing to reduce risk of mission failure due to ineffective or toxic medications, improve drug efficacy, and further open the door to countermeasure research. For example, PGX results could allow tailoring of specific medications at optimal doses more precisely to each individual astronaut, particularly in areas of space motion sickness, sleep aids, and analgesics. An additional benefit is that PGX results could provide information for better planning of the components of a space pharmacy for deep space missions to be more effective and efficient in the utilization of limited pharmaceutical resources. Finally, while PGX testing of the astronaut corps is not currently conducted, this approach could provide immediate impact in support of mission success by reducing risks, optimizing astronaut performance, and providing valuable insights into long-term astronaut health. Such advancements in clinical decision making are important next steps in building dynamic individual risk profiles for astronauts, increasing selection of the best treatment choice, and providing tailored countermeasures for individual crewmembers.

Pharmacogenomics↗
DOE OSTI1995

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 36, No. 2, July-December 1995]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHORNOBYL ACCIDENT: 195 The Chornobyl Accident Revisited, Part III: Chernobyl Source Term Release Dynamics and Reconstruction of Events During the Active Phase, A. R. Sich; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 218 Second ANS Workshop on the Safety of Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Plants, R. A. Bari; 234 Elements of a Nuclear Criticality Safety Program, C. M. Hopper; 243 Rickover, Excellence, and Criticality Safety Programs, R. E. Wilson; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 249 Transient Analysis of the PIUS Advanced Reactor Design with the TRAC-PF1/MOD2 Code, B. E. Boyack, J. L Steiner, S. C. Harmony, H. J. Stumpf, and J. F. Lime; 278 The Hierarchy-By-Interval Approach to Identifying Important Models that Need Improvement in Severe-Accident Simulation Codes, T. J. Heames, M. Khatib-Rahbar, J. E. Kelly, R. P. Jenks-Johnson, and Y.-S. Chen; 290 RELAP5/MOD3 Code Coupling Model, R. P. Martin; 299 Missiles Caused by Severe Pressurized-Water Reactor Accidents, R. Krieg; DESIGN FEATURES: 310 Validation of COMMIX with Westinghouse AP-600 PCCS Test Data, J. G. Sun, T. H. Chien, J. Ding, and W T. Sha; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 321 Spent Nuclear Fuel Characterization for a Bounding Reference Assembly for the Receiving Basin for Off-Site Fuel, S. D. Kahook, R. L. Garrett, L. R. Canas, and M J. Beckum; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 332 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 335 Reactor Coolant System Blowdown at Wolf Creek on September 17, 1994, J. V. Kauffman and S. L. Israel; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 344 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Oueener; 349 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1995; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 320 Symposium on Acceptability of Risk From Radiation—Application to Manned Space Flight; 320 24th DOE/NRC Nuclear Air Cleaning and Treatment Conference; 361 Radiation Biology and Radiation Protection— Modern Developments and Tendencies in Radiation Biology; 362 1997 IEEE Sixth Conference on Human Factors and Power Plants; 354 The Authors; 360 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol. 36.

05 NUCLEAR FUELS↗
DOE OSTI2025

The Dynamic Tripolar Strategic Balance: A Net Assessment (Workshop Summary)

On December 9-10, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted a workshop titled “The Dynamic Tripolar Strategic Balance: A Net Assessment.” The discussion was guided by the following key questions: • By what metrics should the strategic balance be assessed? • How dynamic is the balance? How fragile? • Is the United States gaining strategic advantage, losing it, or holding steady, overall? • In order to gain new advantages or re-gain advantages lost, can or should the United States prioritize some domains and accept more risk in others? If so, which ones?

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2026

Technical Justifications for Outdoor Bulk Gaseous Hydrogen Storage Setback Distances

Setback distances define a prescribed distance between a potentially hazardous system and different types of other systems, people, buildings, or materials that may be exposed to that hazard. Riskinformed separation distances are not meant to completely eliminate risk, but rather to limit the risk to an acceptable level. A sensitivity study of risk suggested that a leak size of 3% of the pipe cross-sectional area would be a conservative but reasonable basis. Calculation of the setback distances for gaseous hydrogen was done in a deterministic manner, using a selected leak size and harm criteria for each group of exposures. Harm criteria have been updated to better reflect the exposure types under consideration, and to be consistent with setback distances for liquid hydrogen. The resulting setback distance values are primarily driven by radiative heat flux values for all exposure groups. For the typical pipe sizes, the setback distances slightly increase compared to the previous version of NFPA 2.

08 HYDROGEN↗
NASA NTRS1972

Solid rocket motors for the Space Shuttle booster.

The evolution of the space shuttle booster system is reviewed from its initial concepts based on liquid-propellant reusable boosters to the final selection of recoverable, solid-fuel rocket motors. The rationale associated with each of the several major decisions in the evolution process is discussed. It is shown that the external tank orbiter configuration emerging from the latest studies takes maximum advantage of the solid rocket motor development experience and promises to be the optimum configuration for fulfilling the paramount shuttle program requirements of minimum total development risk within acceptable costs.

Odom, J. B.↗
NASA NTRS1978

Energy efficient engine: Preliminary design and integration studies

A mixed exhaust, direct drive fan turbofan configuration was selected from four candidates. This choice was based on its ability to exceed study goals of 12% lower thrust specific fuel consumption and 5% lower direct operating cost by the 1990's with commercially acceptable technical risk and relative mechanical simplicity. The evaluation leading to configuration selection is discussed. Necessary technology advancements are identified and related to the goals.

Gray, D. E.↗
NASA NTRS1983

Aeroassisted orbit transfer window opens on missions

Studies of aeroassisted spacecraft orbit transfer conducted over the last two decades have produced an extensive literature and a well developed technology base, which suggest the obtainability of substantial performance improvements over all-propulsive spacecraft maneuvers. In such cases as that of multipass aerobraking, in which the vehicle is transferred from its approach velocity to a highly elliptic orbit about the planet by means of a rocket burn, followed by the circularization of the orbit through many high altitude atmospheric passes, the technology appears to be ready for application. In most other areas of aeroassisted orbit transfer, further work is required to reduce design risks to acceptable levels.

Walberg, G. D.↗