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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 127 records · Page 7

Cassini In-Flight Navigation Adaptations

In the nearly two decades of Cassini flight, adaptations to navigation processes were applied as characteristics unique to Cassini were identified and spacecraft configuration changes were implemented. Additionally, operational experience was leveraged into more efficient processes, better modeling, and more robust contingency strategies. Trajectory adjustments were implemented to allow further investigation of surprising science discoveries meriting more attention. Unique analyses were performed to determine how to best accomplish atypical science observations while maintaining acceptable risk levels. Descriptions of the most significant adaptations are organized according to the affected navigation subsystems: trajectory design, orbit determination, optical navigation, and maneuver design.

Wagner, Sean↗

Tools used in Space Radiation Operations

The goal of NASA's Radiation Health Program is to achieve human exploration and development of space without exceeding acceptable risk from exposure to ionizing radiation. The Space Radiation Analysis Group (SRAG) at NASA Johnson Space Center carries out this mission by following the philosophy of ALARA – As Low as Reasonably Achievable. SRAG utilizes a variety of tools to maintain awareness of space weather and to monitor the space radiation environment, both internal and external to the vehicle. SRAG develops and manages a wide variety of detectors that are located on the exterior and throughout the interior of the International Space Station and worn by crew. During Artemis I, SRAG provided detectors distributed within Orion’s interior and participated in the MARE experiment, which outfitted female phantoms with thousands of thermoluminescence detectors (TLD) and other dosimeters to better constrain the total dose accrued inside the human during a mission to the Moon. Motivated by the Artemis Exploration Class missions, SRAG and collaborators are developing forecasting capabilities for solar energetic particle (SEP) events and their biological impacts to crew. Tools that have come out of this work include the Acute Radiation Risk Tool (ARRT) and the SEP Scoreboards. This presentation will give an overview of the tools used in SRAG ops and currently under development to support our next steps in human space exploration.

space weather↗

LOFTID Aeroshell Thermal Response Uncertainty Analysis Utilizing the End-to-End Monte Carlo Approach

A probabilistic thermal margin process has been performed to design the flexible thermal protection system (FTPS) and select entry trajectory constraints given an acceptable risk level for the Low-Earth Orbit Flight Test of and Inflatable Decelerator (LOFTID) project. Uncertainties exist in atmospheric entry aeroheating environments and the predicted thermal response of thermal protection system (TPS) material. Entry vehicle TPS is often over-sized to mitigate uncertainty by combining conservative bounding scenarios together. The probabilistic thermal margin process allows engineers to make informed aeroshell design, flight design, and FTPS performance risk trades while preventing excessive FTPS margin from being applied. This paper describes the uncertainty analysis methodology used to carry out a probabilistic thermal margin process used for LOFTID’s aeroshell and explains how the calculated probability of exceeding flight allowable temperatures is used to design the FTPS and establish nominal flight design constraints. This probabilistic thermal margin process had never been applied to entry, decent, and landing design for a flown entry vehicle and it is one of the LOFTID project’s goals to demonstrate its merits.

Steven Andrew Tobin↗

Pre-Flight Hazardous Gas Assessment Methodology for the Space Launch System

The complexity of the Artemis I liquid rocket propulsion systems produces many sources of hazards during the operation of the vehicle. Pre-flight hazardous gas leakages pose fire and explosion risks to rocket that could potentially lead to loss of the vehicle, mission, and crew. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) uses a probability risk assessment strategy to assess the likelihood of the hazard and the consequence should the hazardous situation occur. For high probability hazards that pose a potentially catastrophic consequence to the vehicle, the most effective strategy for reducing the risk is accomplished by engineering and implementing systems that actively mitigate the hazard. A hazards analysis is completed to determine the likelihood and severity of each hazard. These hazard analyses are informed using relevant empirical data and physics-based analytical models. Time-accurate Computational Fluid Dynamics models used to quantify and understand the risks posed to Artemis I due to expulsions of hazardous gas near the vehicle. Several sources of hazardous gas that posed a risk to Artemis I during nominal pre-flight operations are analyzed in this work. The results of the analyses were used to develop flight rationale and make risk acceptance decisions for the Artemis I launch.

Brian R. Richardson↗

Benchmark Problem for Autonomous Urban Air Mobility

This paper introduces a Community Benchmark Problem (CBP) for Intelligent Contingency Management (ICM) for Urban Air Mobility (UAM) aircraft. The CBP aims to provide a common framework for measuring and comparing the progress of autonomy solutions for UAM aircraft in handling emergency situations. The paper proposes a methodology for defining and quantifying five measures of complexity that capture the challenges and requirements of ICM for UAM: Mission, Environmental, Autonomy, Decision-Making, and Mission Fault. In addition, it proposes a methodology for defining and quantifying mission risk acceptability with the same goals: Contingency Management, Mission Success, Operational, Mission Redefinition, and Environmental. We describe how to use these measures to track progress of the development of ICM capability, as well as to create scenarios and evaluate the performance of different autonomy solutions.

autonomy↗

Pre-Flight Hazardous Gas Assessment Methodology for the Space Launch System

The complexity of the Artemis I liquid rocket propulsion systems produces many sources of hazards during the operation of the vehicle. Pre-flight hazardous gas leakages pose fire and explosion risks to rocket that could potentially lead to loss of the vehicle, mission, and crew. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) uses a probability risk assessment strategy to assess the likelihood of the hazard and the consequence should the hazardous situation occur. For high probability hazards that pose a potentially catastrophic consequence to the vehicle, the most effective strategy for reducing the risk is accomplished by engineering and implementing systems that actively mitigate the hazard. A hazards analysis is completed to determine the likelihood and severity of each hazard. These hazard analyses are informed using relevant empirical data and physics-based analytical models. Time-accurate Computational Fluid Dynamics models used to quantify and understand the risks posed to Artemis I due to expulsions of hazardous gas near the vehicle. Several sources of hazardous gas that posed a risk to Artemis I during nominal pre-flight operations are analyzed in this work. The results of the analyses were used to develop flight rationale and make risk acceptance decisions for the Artemis I launch.

Brian R. Richardson↗

Community Benchmark Problem for Intelligent Contingency Management

This paper introduces a Community Benchmark Problem (CBP) for Intelligent Contingency Management (ICM) for Urban Air Mobility (UAM) aircraft. The CBP aims to provide a common framework for measuring and comparing the progress of autonomy solutions for UAM aircraft in handling emergency situations. The paper proposes a methodology for defining and quantifying five measures of complexity that capture the challenges and requirements of ICM for UAM: Mission, Environmental, Autonomy, Decision-Making, and Mission Fault. In addition, it proposes a methodology for defining and quantifying mission risk acceptability with the same goals: Contingency Management, Mission Success, Operational, Mission Redefinition, and Environmental. We describe how to use these measures to track progress of the development of ICM capability, as well as to create scenarios and evaluate the performance of different autonomy solutions.

autonomy↗

Towards Computational Functional Hazard Assessment (CFHA): A Gap Analysis and Concept for Emerging Aviation Systems

Given the current evolution of the National Airspace and future trajectory towards novel and evolving operations with varying levels of autonomy, complexity, and acceptable risk, there is an opportunity to support safety assurance by extending existing methodologies, such as Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA). In response to challenges in performing FHA for novel aviation concepts, we propose a concept for Computational Functional Hazard Assessment (CFHA), which provides processes, methods, and tools for incorporating external data to facilitate further exploration of the hazard space iterativelty throughout the design process. The core components of CFHA involve knowledge capture from historical and operational data, functional architecture specification via a formal modeling language, and simulation for hazardous scenario analysis. Through this concept, we aim to adapt conventional safety assessment to address the increasingly complex hazard space generated from emerging operations.

Seydou Mbaye↗

Towards Functional Hazard Assessment (CFHA): A Gap Analysis and Concept for Emerging Aviation Systems

Given the current evolution of the National Airspace and future trajectory towards novel and evolving operations with varying levels of autonomy, complexity, and acceptable risk, there is an opportunity to support safety assurance by extending existing methodologies, such as Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA). In response to challenges in performing FHA for novel aviation concepts, we propose a concept for Computational Functional Hazard Assessment (CFHA), which provides processes, methods, and tools for incorporating external data to facilitate further exploration of the hazard space iterativelty throughout the design process. The core components of CFHA involve knowledge capture from historical and operational data, functional architecture specification via a formal modeling language, and simulation for hazardous scenario analysis. Through this concept, we aim to adapt conventional safety assessment to address the increasingly complex hazard space generated from emerging operations.

Seydou Mbaye↗

Achieving Accelerated Cleanup of Cesium Contaminated Stream at the Savannah River Site; Collaboration between Stakeholders, Regulators, and the Federal Government - 13182

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a 310-square-mile United States Department of Energy (US DOE) nuclear facility located along the Savannah River near Aiken, South Carolina that contains six primary stream/river systems. The Lower Three Runs Stream (LTR) is one of the primary streams within the site that is located in the southeast portion of the Savannah River Site and is a large black water stream system that originates in the northeast portion of SRS and follows a southerly direction before it enters the Savannah River. During reactor operations, secondary reactor cooling water, storm sewer discharges, and miscellaneous wastewater was discharged and contaminated a 36 kilometer stretch of Lower Three Runs Stream that narrows providing a limited buffer of US DOE property along the stream and flood plain. Based on data collected during 2009 and 2010 under Recover Act Funding, the stream was determined to be contaminated with cesium-137 at levels that exceeded acceptable risk based limits. As efficiencies were realized within the SRS Recovery Act Program, funding was made available to design, permit and execute remediation of the LTR. This accelerated Project allowed for the remediation of 36 kilometers of LTR in only nine months from inception to completion, contributing significantly to the Foot Print Reduction of SRS. The scope consisted of excavation and disposal of more than 2064 cubic meters of contaminated soil, and installing 11 kilometers of fence and 2,000 signs at 1000 locations. Confirmatory sampling and analysis, and radiological surveying were performed demonstrating that soil concentrations met the cleanup goals. The project completed with a very good safety record considering the harsh conditions including, excessive rain in the early stages of the project, high summer temperatures, swampy terrain, snakes, wild boar, insects and dense vegetation. The regulatory approval process was compressed by over 75% and required significant efforts from SRS's stakeholders including the regulators, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), and the public including local property owners and the SRS Citizens Advisory Board. Stakeholder buy-in was critical in the up-front planning in order to achieve this challenging cleanup. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Lower Three Runs Remediation Safety Preparation Strategy - 13318

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a 310-square-mile United States Department of Energy (US DOE) nuclear facility located along the Savannah River near Aiken, South Carolina that contains six primary stream/river systems. The Lower Three Runs Stream (LTR) is one of the primary streams within the site that is located in the southeast portion of the Savannah River Site. It is a large blackwater stream system that originates in the northeast portion of SRS and follows a southerly direction before it enters the Savannah River. During reactor operations, secondary reactor cooling water, storm sewer discharges, and miscellaneous wastewater was discharged and contaminated a 20 mile stretch of Lower Three Runs Stream that narrows and provides a limited buffer of US DOE property along the stream and flood-plain. Based on data collected during the years 2009 and 2010 under American Recovery and Re-investment Act funding, the stream was determined to be contaminated with cesium-137 at levels that exceeded acceptable risk based limits. In agreement with the Environmental Protection Agency and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, three areas were identified for remediation [1] (SRNS April 2012). A comprehensive safety preparation strategy was developed for safe execution of the LTR remediation project. Contract incentives for safety encouraged the contractor to perform a complete evaluation of the work and develop an implementation plan to perform the work. The safety coverage was controlled to ensure all work was observed and assessed by one person per work area within the project. This was necessary due to the distances between the fence work and three transects being worked, approximately 20 miles. Contractor Management field observations were performed along with DOE assessments to ensure contractor focus on safe performance of the work. Dedicated ambulance coverage for remote worker work activities was provided. This effort was augmented with access to medical evacuation services. The areas where the work was performed were remote and difficult to get emergency vehicles to in a timely manner in case of an accident. Satellite phones were utilized due to intermittent phone coverage. High visibility vests were utilized to enable any hunters in the area to see the workers; due to the limited buffer areas along the stream route. An innovative approach to providing the necessary protection for workers during periods of extreme heat and humidity was also employed, which included the use of 'heat islands' with fans and crew trailers and ice vests for workers. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Lessons Learned from Demolition of Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant - 20507

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC), a Jacobs owned company, is making significant progress demolishing the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), which has long been known as one of the most hazardous buildings in the DOE Environmental Management Complex (DOE Complex). The facility is located on the Hanford Site and produced plutonium metal during the Cold War. Production was stopped in 1989, the facility was formally shut down in 1996, and material processing was completed in 2004. After approximately 25 years of demolition preparations, open-air demolition of the main portions of the Hazard Category II nuclear facility began in November 2016. To prepare the PFP for demolition, CHPRC employees performed some of the most hazardous work across the DOE Complex. In addition to extensive demolition preparations, including a wide-reaching communication strategy across the Hanford Site, CHPRC implemented robust controls and monitoring during demolition, and when necessary, adjusted demolition practices and sequence to maintain employee safety and project efficiency. Demolition of the main PFP building began in November 2016. The technical complexity, high hazards and radiological concerns have all led to a difficult demolition environment. Following a spread of contamination at the project site beyond the radiological boundaries in December 2017, work was halted and a recovery plan was generated to allow the demolition work to continue. After the implementation of additional controls and concurrence from regulatory agencies and DOE, the demolition was ready to resume work and reinitiated in August 2018. There are a number of lessons learned from the demolition activities and recovery plan process. This paper allows CHPRC and DoE's Richland Operations Office (RL) to share lessons learned and progress to date with other challenging and hazardous projects across the DOE Complex. Understanding the risk acceptance level is critical to execution of any open-air demolition project and is unique to each facility. Four key lessons learned from this project include: 1) plan execution issues, 2) stakeholder communication issues, 3) watching for summit fever and 4) minimizing exposed contaminated surfaces during demolition. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

APPLICATION OF OBJECTIVES-DRIVEN ASSURANCE CASES TO SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT IN AN EVOLVING ACQUISITION MODEL

System properties such as “safety” and “dependability” cannot, in practice, be proven, and must be argued in an “assurance case” aimed at supporting risk-acceptance decisions that have to be made by system acquirers and/or regulatory authorities. The paper is concerned with applications of the “assurance case” idea early in design and development of new systems, when (apart from dedicated testing) the only available operating experience information derives from previous (non-identical) systems. Much of the discussion is based on an evolving acquisition model at the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration; previously, most major systems were developed in-house, but some major systems will now be developed by and acquired from commercial providers. Key points discussed include the following. (1) By promoting a particular kind of focused discussion between acquirers and providers, the use of assurance cases should be particularly valuable under the new acquisition model. (2) In principle, objectives-driven (sometimes called “performance-based”) approaches to assurance of performance have significant advantages in cases where they are applicable. (3) For truly novel systems, completeness of the safety analysis is a significant issue; it is important for the assurance case to include a commitment by the provider (or applicant) to seriously pursue analysis of operating experience, so that previously unrecognized hazards can be identified and addressed. (4) Inquiries into major accidents often point to deficiencies in management oversight in all parts of the life cycle; management processes need to be addressed in the formulation and the implementation of an assurance case. Under the new acquisition model, these considerations imply a serious reconsideration of the way in which the development process is managed by both providers and acquirers.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Application of Objectives-Driven Assurance Cases to System Development in an Evolving Acquisition Model

System properties such as “safety” and “dependability” cannot, in practice, be proven, and must be argued in an “assurance case” aimed at supporting risk-acceptance decisions that have to be made by system acquirers and/or regulatory authorities. The paper is concerned with applications of the “assurance case” idea early in design and development of new systems, when (apart from dedicated testing) the only available operating experience information derives from previous (non-identical) systems. Much of the discussion is based on an evolving acquisition model at the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration; previously, most major systems were developed in-house, but some major systems will now be developed by and acquired from commercial providers. Key points discussed include the following. (1) By promoting a particular kind of focused discussion between acquirers and providers, the use of assurance cases should be particularly valuable under the new acquisition model. (2) In principle, objectives-driven (sometimes called “performance-based”) approaches to assurance of performance have significant advantages in cases where they are applicable. (3) For truly novel systems, completeness of the safety analysis is a significant issue; it is important for the assurance case to include a commitment by the provider (or applicant) to seriously pursue analysis of operating experience, so that previously unrecognized hazards can be identified and addressed. (4) Inquiries into major accidents often point to deficiencies in management oversight in all parts of the life cycle; management processes need to be addressed in the formulation and the implementation of an assurance case. Under the new acquisition model, these considerations imply a serious reconsideration of the way in which the development process is managed by both providers and acquirers.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Assessment of Zero Power Critical Experiments and Needs for a Fission Surface Power System

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is providing funding to the Department of Energy to assess, develop, and test nuclear technologies that could provide surface power to a lunar outpost. Sufficient testing of this fission surface power (FSP) system will need to be completed to enable a decision by NASA for flight development. The near-term goal for the FSP work is to conduct the minimum amount of testing needed to validate the system performance within an acceptable risk. This paper provides an assessment of the current modeling capabilities and quantifies a preliminary bias associated with the modeling methods for designing the nuclear reactor. Advanced analysis techniques using Zero Power Plutonium Reactor (ZPPR)-20C data should provide sufficient information to preclude the necessity of a cold critical test of the FSP. Further testing to reduce uncertainties in the beryllium and uranium cross-section data should reduce the overall uncertainty in the computational models.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Pitfalls and Precautions When Using Predicted Failure Data for Quantitative Analysis of Safety Risk for Human Rated Launch Vehicles

Launch vehicle reliability analysis is largely dependent upon using predicted failure rates from data sources such as MIL-HDBK-217F. Reliability prediction methodologies based on component data do not take into account risks attributable to manufacturing, assembly, and process controls. These sources often dominate component level reliability or risk of failure probability. While consequences of failure is often understood in assessing risk, using predicted values in a risk model to estimate the probability of occurrence will likely underestimate the risk. Managers and decision makers often use the probability of occurrence in determining whether to accept the risk or require a design modification. Due to the absence of system level test and operational data inherent in aerospace applications, the actual risk threshold for acceptance may not be appropriately characterized for decision making purposes. This paper will establish a method and approach to identify the pitfalls and precautions of accepting risk based solely upon predicted failure data. This approach will provide a set of guidelines that may be useful to arrive at a more realistic quantification of risk prior to acceptance by a program.

Hatfield, Glen S.↗

Pitfalls and Precautions When Using Predicted Failure Data for Quantitative Analysis of Safety Risk for Human Rated Launch Vehicles

Launch vehicle reliability analysis is largely dependent upon using predicted failure rates from data sources such as MIL-HDBK-217F. Reliability prediction methodologies based on component data do not take into account system integration risks such as those attributable to manufacturing and assembly. These sources often dominate component level risk. While consequence of failure is often understood, using predicted values in a risk model to estimate the probability of occurrence may underestimate the actual risk. Managers and decision makers use the probability of occurrence to influence the determination whether to accept the risk or require a design modification. The actual risk threshold for acceptance may not be fully understood due to the absence of system level test data or operational data. This paper will establish a method and approach to identify the pitfalls and precautions of accepting risk based solely upon predicted failure data. This approach will provide a set of guidelines that may be useful to arrive at a more realistic quantification of risk prior to acceptance by a program.

Hatfield, Glen S.↗