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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 145 records · Page 8
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2008

Fault-Tolerant Coding for State Machines

Two reliable fault-tolerant coding schemes have been proposed for state machines that are used in field-programmable gate arrays and application-specific integrated circuits to implement sequential logic functions. The schemes apply to strings of bits in state registers, which are typically implemented in practice as assemblies of flip-flop circuits. If a single-event upset (SEU, a radiation-induced change in the bit in one flip-flop) occurs in a state register, the state machine that contains the register could go into an erroneous state or could hang, by which is meant that the machine could remain in undefined states indefinitely. The proposed fault-tolerant coding schemes are intended to prevent the state machine from going into an erroneous or hang state when an SEU occurs. To ensure reliability of the state machine, the coding scheme for bits in the state register must satisfy the following criteria: 1. All possible states are defined. 2. An SEU brings the state machine to a known state. 3. There is no possibility of a hang state. 4. No false state is entered. 5. An SEU exerts no effect on the state machine. Fault-tolerant coding schemes that have been commonly used include binary encoding and "one-hot" encoding. Binary encoding is the simplest state machine encoding and satisfies criteria 1 through 3 if all possible states are defined. Binary encoding is a binary count of the state machine number in sequence; the table represents an eight-state example. In one-hot encoding, N bits are used to represent N states: All except one of the bits in a string are 0, and the position of the 1 in the string represents the state. With proper circuit design, one-hot encoding can satisfy criteria 1 through 4. Unfortunately, the requirement to use N bits to represent N states makes one-hot coding inefficient.

Naegle, Stephanie Taft↗
NASA NTRS2010

Reprogrammable field programmable gate array with integrated system for mitigating effects of single event upsets

An integrated system mitigates the effects of a single event upset (SEU) on a reprogrammable field programmable gate array (RFPGA). The system includes (i) a RFPGA having an internal configuration memory, and (ii) a memory for storing a configuration associated with the RFPGA. Logic circuitry programmed into the RFPGA and coupled to the memory reloads a portion of the configuration from the memory into the RFPGA's internal configuration memory at predetermined times. Additional SEU mitigation can be provided by logic circuitry on the RFPGA that monitors and maintains synchronized operation of the RFPGA's digital clock managers.

Ng, Tak-kwong↗
NASA NTRS2011

Plug-and-Play Environmental Monitoring Spacecraft Subsystem

A Space Environment Monitor (SEM) subsystem architecture has been developed and demonstrated that can benefit future spacecraft by providing (1) real-time knowledge of the spacecraft state in terms of exposure to the environment; (2) critical, instantaneous information for anomaly resolution; and (3) invaluable environmental data for designing future missions. The SEM architecture consists of a network of plug-and- play (PnP) Sensor Interface Units (SIUs), each servicing one or more environmental sensors. The SEM architecture is influenced by the IEEE Smart Transducer Interface Bus standard (IEEE Std 1451) for its PnP functionality. A network of PnP Spacecraft SIUs is enabling technology for gathering continuous real-time information critical to validating spacecraft health in harsh space environments. The demonstrated system that provided a proof-of-concept of the SEM architecture consisted of three SIUs for measurement of total ionizing dose (TID) and single event upset (SEU) radiation effects, electromagnetic interference (EMI), and deep dielectric charging through use of a prototype Internal Electro-Static Discharge Monitor (IESDM). Each SIU consists of two stacked 2X2 in. (approximately 5X5 cm) circuit boards: a Bus Interface Unit (BIU) board that provides data conversion, processing and connection to the SEM power-and-data bus, and a Sensor Interface Electronics (SIE) board that provides sensor interface needs and data path connection to the BIU.

Patel, Jagdish↗
NASA NTRS2011

Polymeric Materials With Additives for Durability and Radiation Shielding in Space

Polymeric materials are attractive for use in space structures because of their light weight and high strength In addition, polymers are made of elements with low atomic numbers (Z), primarily carbon (C), hydrogen (H), oxygen (0), and nitrogen (N) which provide the best shielding from galactic cosmic rays (GCR) (ref. 1). Galactic cosmic rays are composed primarily of nuclei (i.e., fully ionized atoms) plus a contribution of about 2% from electrons and positrons. There is a small but significant component of GCR particles with high charge (Z > 10) and high energy (E >100 GeV) (ref. 2). These so-called HZE particles comprise only 1 to 2% of the cosmic ray fluence but they interact with very high specific ionization and contribute 50% of the long- term dose to humans. The best shield for this radiation would be liquid hydrogen, which is not feasible. For this reason, hydrogen-containing polymers make the most effective practical shields. Moreover, neutrons are formed in the interactions of GCR particles with materials. Neutrons can only lose energy by collisions or reactions with a nucleus since they are uncharged. This is a process that is much less probable than the Coulombic interactions of charged particles. Thus, neutrons migrate far from the site of the reaction in which they were formed. This increases the probability of neutrons reaching humans or electronic equipment. Fast neutrons (> 1 MeV) can interact with silicon chips in electronic equipment resulting in the production of recoil ions which can cause single event upsets (SEU) in sensitive components (ref. 3). Neutrons lose energy most effectively by elastic collisions with light atoms, particularly hydrogen atoms. Therefore, hydrogen-containing polymers are not only effective in interacting with GCR particles; they are also effective in reducing the energy of the neutrons formed in the interactions.

Kiefer, Richard↗
NASA NTRS2014

Investigation of HZETRN 2010 as a Tool for Single Event Effect Qualification of Avionics Systems

NASA's future missions are focused on deep space for human exploration that do not provide a simple emergency return to Earth. In addition, the deep space environment contains a constant background Galactic Cosmic Ray (GCR) radiation exposure, as well as periodic Solar Particle Events (SPEs) that can produce intense amounts of radiation in a short amount of time. Given these conditions, it is important that the avionics systems for deep space human missions are not susceptible to Single Event Effects (SEE) that can occur from radiation interactions with electronic components. The typical process to minimizing SEE effects is through using heritage hardware and extensive testing programs that are very costly. Previous work by Koontz, et al. [1] utilized an analysis-based method for investigating electronic component susceptibility. In their paper, FLUKA, a Monte Carlo transport code, was used to calculate SEE and single event upset (SEU) rates. This code was then validated against in-flight data. In addition, CREME-96, a deterministic code, was also compared with FLUKA and in-flight data. However, FLUKA has a long run-time (on the order of days), and CREME-96 has not been updated in several years. This paper will investigate the use of HZETRN 2010, a deterministic transport code developed at NASA Langley Research Center, as another tool that can be used to analyze SEE and SEU rates. The benefits to using HZETRN over FLUKA and CREME-96 are that it has a very fast run time (on the order of minutes) and has been shown to be of similar accuracy as other deterministic and Monte Carlo codes when considering dose [2, 3, 4]. The 2010 version of HZETRN has updated its treatment of secondary neutrons and thus has improved its accuracy over previous versions. In this paper, the Linear Energy Transfer (LET) spectra are of interest rather than the total ionizing dose. Therefore, the LET spectra output from HZETRN 2010 will be compared with the FLUKA and in-flight data to validate HZETRN 2010 as a computational tool for SEE qualification by analysis. Furthermore, extrapolation of these data to interplanetary environments at 1 AU will be investigated to determine whether HZETRN 2010 can be used successfully and confidently for deep space mission analyses.

Rojdev, Kristina↗
NASA NTRS2014

Investigation of HZETRN 2010 as a Tool for Single Event Effect Qualification of Avionics Systems

NASA's future missions are focused on long-duration deep space missions for human exploration which offers no options for a quick emergency return to Earth. The combination of long mission duration with no quick emergency return option leads to unprecedented spacecraft system safety and reliability requirements. It is important that spacecraft avionics systems for human deep space missions are not susceptible to Single Event Effect (SEE) failures caused by space radiation (primarily the continuous galactic cosmic ray background and the occasional solar particle event) interactions with electronic components and systems. SEE effects are typically managed during the design, development, and test (DD&T) phase of spacecraft development by using heritage hardware (if possible) and through extensive component level testing, followed by system level failure analysis tasks that are both time consuming and costly. The ultimate product of the SEE DD&T program is a prediction of spacecraft avionics reliability in the flight environment produced using various nuclear reaction and transport codes in combination with the component and subsystem level radiation test data. Previous work by Koontz, et al.1 utilized FLUKA, a Monte Carlo nuclear reaction and transport code, to calculate SEE and single event upset (SEU) rates. This code was then validated against in-flight data for a variety of spacecraft and space flight environments. However, FLUKA has a long run-time (on the order of days). CREME962, an easy to use deterministic code offering short run times, was also compared with FLUKA predictions and in-flight data. CREME96, though fast and easy to use, has not been updated in several years and underestimates secondary particle shower effects in spacecraft structural shielding mass. Thus, this paper will investigate the use of HZETRN 20103, a fast and easy to use deterministic transport code, similar to CREME96, that was developed at NASA Langley Research Center primarily for flight crew ionizing radiation dose assessments. HZETRN 2010 includes updates to address secondary particle shower effects more accurately, and might be used as another tool to verify spacecraft avionics system reliability in space flight SEE environments.

Rojdev, Kristina↗
NASA NTRS2015

Radiation-Hardened Electronics for Advanced Communications Systems

Novel approach enables high-speed special-purpose processors Advanced reconfigurable and reprogrammable communication systems will require sub-130-nanometer electronics. Legacy single event upset (SEU) radiation-tolerant circuits are ineffective at speeds greater than 125 megahertz. In Phase I of this project, ICs, LLC, demonstrated new base-level logic circuits that provide SEU immunity for sub-130-nanometer high-speed circuits. In Phase II, the company developed an innovative self-restoring logic (SRL) circuit and a system approach that provides high-speed, SEU-tolerant solutions that are effective for sub-130-nanometer electronics scalable to at least 22-nanometer processes. The SRL system can be used in the design of NASA's next-generation special-purpose processors, especially reconfigurable communication processors.

Whitaker, Sterling↗
NASA NTRS2018

NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) Single Event Effects (SEE) Test Guideline Update

The following are updated or new subjects added to the FPGA SEE Test Guidelines manual: academic versus mission specific device evaluation, single event latch-up (SEL) test and analysis, SEE response visibility enhancement during radiation testing, mitigation evaluation (embedded and user-implemented), unreliable design and its affects to SEE Data, testing flushable architectures versus non-flushable architectures, intellectual property core (IP Core) test and evaluation (addresses embedded and user-inserted), heavy-ion energy and linear energy transfer (LET) selection, proton versus heavy-ion testing, fault injection, mean fluence to failure analysis, and mission specific system-level single event upset (SEU) response prediction. Most sections within the guidelines manual provide information regarding best practices for test structure and test system development. The scope of this manual addresses academic versus mission specific device evaluation and visibility enhancement in IP Core testing.

Test guidelines↗
NASA NTRS2018

NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging Field Programmable Gate Array Single Event Effects Test Guideline Update

The following are updated or new subjects added to the FPGA SEE Test Guidelines manual: academic versus mission specific device evaluation, single event latch-up (SEL) test and analysis, SEE response visibility enhancement during radiation testing, mitigation evaluation (embedded and user-implemented), unreliable design and its affects to SEE Data, testing flushable architectures versus non-flushable architectures, intellectual property core (IP Core) test and evaluation (addresses embedded and user-inserted), heavy-ion energy and linear energy transfer (LET) selection, proton versus heavy-ion testing, fault injection, mean fluence to failure analysis, and mission specific system-level single event upset (SEU) response prediction. Most sections within the guidelines manual provide information regarding best practices for test structure and test system development. The scope of this manual addresses academic versus mission specific device evaluation and visibility enhancement in IP Core testing.

Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)↗
NASA NTRS2020

SEE Test and Data Analysis for Complex FPGA Systems

Critical space applications require knowledge of single event upset (SEU) susceptibility (mission survivability). Generic SEU test and analysis techniques do not provide adequate data for survivability analysis. This presentation provides information on how to: (1) Investigate (test for) SEU susceptibilities of tactical (mission specific) designs that are implemented in a SRAM-based FPGA; and (2) Analyze SEU cross-sections for use in survivability prediction.

Berg, Melanie↗
NASA NTRS2004

Frequency dependence of single-event upset in advanced commercial PowerPC microprocessors

Single-event upset (SEU) from heavy ions is measured for advanced commercial microprocessors in a dynamic mode with clock frequencies up to 1 GHz. Frequency and core voltage dependence of SEUs in registers and D-Cache are discussed. The results of our studies suggest the SEU in registers and D-Cache tend to increase with frequency. This might have important implications for the overall SEU trend as technology moves toward higher frequencies.

Farmanesh, F. F.↗
NASA NTRS2021

SEE Test Report for Texas Instruments TLV5618 2.7-V to 5.5-V Low-Power Dual 12-Bit Digital-to-Analog Converter with Power Down

The primary purpose of this testing was to characterize the Texas Instruments TLV5618 12-bit digital-to-analog converter (DAC) for single-event latchup (SEL) susceptibility. These data will be used to assess the SEL risk for the OSIRIS-REx Laser Altimeter (OLA). A secondary goal is to assess the susceptibility of the DAC to single-event transients (SET), single-event upsets (SEU), and other nondestructive SEE.

Raymond Ladbury↗
NASA NTRS2013

What Reliability Engineers Should Know about Space Radiation Effects

Space radiation in space systems present unique failure modes and considerations for reliability engineers. Radiation effects is not a one size fits all field. Threat conditions that must be addressed for a given mission depend on the mission orbital profile, the technologies of parts used in critical functions and on application considerations, such as supply voltages, temperature, duty cycle, and redundancy. In general, the threats that must be addressed are of two types-the cumulative degradation mechanisms of total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage (DD). and the prompt responses of components to ionizing particles (protons and heavy ions) falling under the heading of single-event effects. Generally degradation mechanisms behave like wear-out mechanisms on any active components in a system: Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Displacement Damage: (1) TID affects all active devices over time. Devices can fail either because of parametric shifts that prevent the device from fulfilling its application or due to device failures where the device stops functioning altogether. Since this failure mode varies from part to part and lot to lot, lot qualification testing with sufficient statistics is vital. Displacement damage failures are caused by the displacement of semiconductor atoms from their lattice positions. As with TID, failures can be either parametric or catastrophic, although parametric degradation is more common for displacement damage. Lot testing is critical not just to assure proper device fi.mctionality throughout the mission. It can also suggest remediation strategies when a device fails. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. (2) On the NEAR mission a functional failure was traced to a PIN diode failure caused by TID induced high leakage currents. NEAR was able to recover from the failure by reversing the current of a nearby Thermal Electric Cooler (turning the TEC into a heater). The elevated temperature caused the PIN diode to anneal and the device to recover. It was by lot qualification testing that NEAR knew the diode would recover when annealed. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. Single Event Effects (SEE): (1) In contrast to TID and displacement damage, Single Event Effects (SEE) resemble random failures. SEE modes can range from changes in device logic (single-event upset, or SEU). temporary disturbances (single-event transient) to catastrophic effects such as the destructive SEE modes, single-event latchup (SEL). single-event gate rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB) (2) The consequences of nondestructive SEE modes such as SEU and SET depend critically on their application--and may range from trivial nuisance errors to catastrophic loss of mission. It is critical not just to ensure that potentially susceptible devices are well characterized for their susceptibility, but also to work with design engineers to understand the implications of each error mode. -For destructive SEE, the predominant risk mitigation strategy is to avoid susceptible parts, or if that is not possible. to avoid conditions under which the part may be susceptible. Destructive SEE mechanisms are often not well understood, and testing is slow and expensive, making rate prediction very challenging. (3) Because the consequences of radiation failure and degradation modes depend so critically on the application as well as the component technology, it is essential that radiation, component. design and system engineers work togetherpreferably starting early in the program to ensure critical applications are addressed in time to optimize the probability of mission success.

DiBari, Rebecca↗
NASA NTRS2016

Single Event Effects in FPGA Devices 2015-2016

This presentation provides an overview of single event effects in FPGA devices 2015-2016 including commercial Xilinx V5 heavy ion accelerated testing, Xilinx Kintex-7 heavy ion accelerated testing. Mitigation study, and investigation of various types of triple modular redundancy (TMR) for commercial SRAM based FPGAs.

Single Event Upset (SEU) Testing↗
NASA NTRS2016

Single Event Effects in FPGA Devices 2015-2016

This presentation provides an overview of single event effects in FPGA devices 2015-2016 including commercial Xilinx V5 heavy ion accelerated testing, Xilinx Kintex-7 heavy ion accelerated testing, mitigation study, and investigation of various types of triple modular redundancy (TMR) for commercial SRAM based FPGAs.

Xilinx V5↗
NASA NTRS1989

Variation in SEU sensitivity of dose-imprinted CMOS SRAMs

The authors report on an experimental study of dose-induced changes in SEU (single-event-upset) sensitivity of CMOS static RAMs. Two time regimes were investigated following exposure of memories to cobalt-60 gamma rays: the near term, within a few hours after exposure, and the long term, after many days. Samples were irradiated both at room and at liquid nitrogen temperatures. The latter procedure was used in order to freeze in the damage state until SEU measurements could be made prior to annealing. Results show that memories damaged by dose are more sensitive to upsets by heavy ions. The induced changes are substantial: threshold linear energy transfer (LET) values decreased by as much as 46 percent and asymptotic cross sections increased by factors of two to four (unannealed samples).

Stassinopoulos, E. G.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Xilinx Virtex-5QV (V5QV) Independent SEU Data

This is an independent study to determine the single event destructive and transient susceptibility of the Xilinx Virtex-5QV (SIRF) device. A framework for evaluating complex digital systems targeted for harsh radiation environments such as space is presented.

Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)↗