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NASA NTRS2019

Model Based Engineering for Software Assurance

NASA's successful development of next generation space vehicles, habitats, and robotic systems will require reliable hardware and software systems. The aim of this initiative is to develop modeling methodology and tools to support Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) for software assurance and reliability analysis. This effort expands the Unified Modeling Language (UML) software design models to include fault data for the extraction of Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for software. We explored different modeling approaches to integrate the UML software design models with the Systems Modeling Language (SysML) system models to generate an integrated model and reliability tools that take into account software and hardware interfaces.The benefits of this concept directly affect the safety community with quick turnarounds to produce software assurance and reliability analysis artifacts and the ability to visualize failure effects, both hardware and software. The result is enhanced system design integrity and early identification of system risks. This initiative will enable software assurance activities early in the system design lifecycle, facilitating the discovery of design weaknesses and enhancing the capability to produce safe, hazard-free systems

Wang, Lui↗
NASA NTRS2019

Enabling Assurance in the MBSE Environment

A number of specific benefits that fit within the hallmarks of effective development are realized with implementation of model-based approaches to systems and assurance. Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) enabled by standardized modeling languages (e.g., SysML®) is at the core. These benefits in the context of spaceflight system challenges can include: Improved management of complex development, Reduced risk in the development process, Improved cost management, Improved design decisions. With appropriate modeling techniques the assurance community can improve early oversight and insight into project development. NASA has shown the basic constructs of SysML in an MBSE environment offer several key advantages, within a Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA) initiative.

Evans, John W.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Assurance of Autonomy for Robotic Space Missions

While there have been meetings on assurance of autonomy in other application areas, this meeting seeks to develop a roadmap for assurance of autonomy specifically for robotic space missions. Key characteristics that distinguish this application area include: the lack of detailed prior knowledge of the environments in which those missions are to operate; the challenges of mimicking deep space operating conditions for purposes of testing; the need to be highly assured of failsafe operation; limited and delayed (due to speed of light over solar system distances) communication; and the one/few-of-a-kind, must-work-the-first-time nature of most space missions.

Feather, Martin↗
NASA NTRS2018

A Hybrid Method of Assurance Cases and Testing for Improved Confidence in Autonomous Space Systems

Autonomous systems react intelligently to their environments, making them capable of handling many possible conditions, but challenging to test. We are investigating a new test development method that aims to maximize the confidence to be achieved by combining Assurance Cases with High Throughput Testing (HTT). Assurance Cases, developed for safety-critical systems, are a rigorous argument that the system satisfies a property (e.g., the Mars rover will not tip over during a traverse). They integrate testing, analysis, and environmental and operational assumptions, from which the set of conditions that testing must cover is determined. In our method, information from the Assurance Case is used to determine the test coverage needed, and then input to HTT to generate the minimal test suites needed to provide that coverage.

Huntsberger, Terry↗
NASA NTRS2018

Preparing to Assure Mission Success

Space flight missions are inherently risky. The mission operations assurance discipline grew out of strategies to control error and evolved into what today is an independent technical authority dedicated to achieving mission success. After the Mars Climate Orbiter loss, NASA made a set of recommendations for missions. Two of those recommendations led to the creation of today’s Mission Operations Assurance Manager role: (1) require an independent Mission Assurance representative during the operational phase of every flight project, and (2) require all flight projects to report and track post-launch anomalies. Since then, the MOAM role has been continually refined by lessons learned from its practice on more than 20 concurrent missions. The MOAM role requires significant operations experience as well as an additional set of skills. In the interests of developing a cadre of potential MOAMs, the MOAM training program was developed. It is a 14-unit set of presentations/discussions covering the 11 categories of MOAM tasks. It is offered to new MOAMs and interested systems engineers with an eye to preparing both types of personnel for present and future assignments, as well as building relationships among personnel of different organizations. MOAM training sessions include presentations on the various tools and processes employed by MOAMs, interspersed with mindset lessons illustrated via “war story” discussions of previous missions.

Bryant, Larry↗
NASA NTRS2020

Software assurance of autonomous spacecraft control

The work described addresses assurance of a planning and execution software system being added to an in-orbit CubeSat to demonstrate autonomous control of that spacecraft. Our focus was on how to develop assurance of the correct operation of the added software in its operational context, our approach to which was to use an assurance case to guide and organize the information involved.

Bocchino, Robert↗
NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Mission Assurance (AMA) – A Conceptual Guide for NASA Missions

NASA is well acquainted with and skilled in conducting Risk Class A Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA). Class A missions are characterized as having highly specific performance with an ultra-low risk tolerance for risk and mission failure. But space is rapidly changing, and the space enterprise is challenged to pursue faster more agile mission developments with fewer resources and directed schedules. To meet this demand mission development teams face accepting more risk and trading performance within strict cost and schedule constraints. In responding to this challenge, The Aerospace Corporation has evolved the Adaptive Mission Assurance (AMA) approach. The benefit of an “adaptive” approach is most realized for smaller Research and Development (R&D), or Science and Technology (S&T) demonstration missions constrained by significantly smaller budgets and directed schedules. The challenge for these “risk tolerant, constraints-driven” missions is how to identify the most valuable mission assurance tasks that will fit within strict budgetary and schedule constraints for “gracefully” accepting risk that still achieves an agreeable expectation of mission success. AMA can respond to this challenge with little to no impact to team staffing or existing workload. This conceptual guide introduces AMA as a potential implementation for NASA Risk Class D and Sub-Class D missions.

Douglas A. Harris↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

AI/Ml Assurance

Presentation of the AI/ML (Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning) design assurance work done under the System-Wide Safety project to INCAS (Romanian National Institute for Aerospace Research). The meeting was organized by the Airspace Operations & Safety program (AOSP) in the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate. The presentation gave an overview of why assurance is needed for AI/ML applications, the industry and governmental drivers and a list of the assurance technology themes explored in SWS.

Safety↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Navigating the Complexities of Safety and Mission Assurance Across NASA's Partnership Landscape

As NASA increasingly pursues collaborative public-private partnerships and international efforts to advance space exploration goals, ensuring robust safety and mission assurance protocols has become more complex. The evolving dynamics introduce multifaceted challenges spanning regulatory oversight, governance and acquisition models, and technical standardization. To address these issues, NASA plans to prioritize deeper integration of safety and mission assurance principles from the formulation and acquisition stages when structuring partnerships and contracts. This embeds appropriate oversight from the start. Additionally, it is vital to establish an enterprise-level capability focused on identifying and resolving cross-cutting risks that transcend individual missions. Together, all these initial thoughts will form the basis of a broad roadmap of decisions that aims to ensure strategic alignment from policy to implementation allowing NASA to harmonize the currently fragmented safety and mission assurance ecosystem as it navigates the complexities introduced by the new era of public-private space partnerships.

Johnny T Nguyen↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Navigating the Complexities of Safety and Mission Assurance Across NASA's Partnership Landscape

As NASA increasingly pursues collaborative public-private partnerships and international efforts to advance space exploration goals, ensuring robust safety and mission assurance protocols has become more complex. The evolving dynamics introduce multifaceted challenges spanning regulatory oversight, governance and acquisition models, and technical standardization. To address these issues, NASA plans to prioritize deeper integration of safety and mission assurance principles from the formulation and acquisition stages when structuring partnerships and contracts. This embeds appropriate oversight from the start. Additionally, it is vital to establish an enterprise-level capability focused on identifying and resolving cross-cutting risks that transcend individual missions. Together, all these initial thoughts will form the basis of a broad roadmap of decisions that aims to ensure strategic alignment from policy to implementation allowing NASA to harmonize the currently fragmented safety and mission assurance ecosystem as it navigates the complexities introduced by the new era of public-private space partnerships.

Johnny T Nguyen↗
NASA NTRS2006

Quality Interaction Between Mission Assurance and Project Team Members

Mission Assurance independent assessments started during the development cycle and continued through post launch operations. In operations, Health and Safety of the Observatory is of utmost importance. Therefore, Mission Assurance must ensure requirements compliance and focus on process improvements required across the operational systems including new/modified products, tools, and procedures. The deployment of the interactive model involves three objectives: Team member Interaction, Good Root Cause Analysis Practices, and Risk Assessment to avoid reoccurrences. In applying this model, we use a metric based measurement process and was found to have the most significant effect, which points to the importance of focuses on a combination of root cause analysis and risk approaches allowing the engineers the ability to prioritize and quantify their corrective actions based on a well-defined set of root cause definitions (i.e. closure criteria for problem reports), success criteria and risk rating definitions.

quality↗
NASA NTRS2008

Environmental Assurance Program for the Phoenix Mars Mission

The Phoenix Mars mission involves delivering a stationary science lander on to the surface of Mars in the polar region within the latitude band 65 deg N to 72 deg N. Its primary objective is to perform in-situ and remote sensing investigations that will characterize the chemistry of the materials at the local surface, subsurface, and atmosphere. The Phoenix spacecraft was launched on August 4, 2007 and will arrive at Mars in May 2008. The lander includes a suite of seven (7) science instruments. This mission is baselined for up to 90 sols (Martian days) of digging, sampling, and analysis. Operating at the Mars polar region creates a challenging environment for the Phoenix landed subsystems and instruments with Mars surface temperature extremes between -120 deg C to 25 deg C and diurnal thermal cycling in excess of 145 deg C. Some engineering and science hardware inside the lander were qualification tested up to 80 deg C to account for self heating. Furthermore, many of the hardware for this mission were inherited from earlier missions: the lander from the Mars Surveyor Program 2001 (MSP'01) and instruments from the MSP'01 and the Mars Polar Lander. Ensuring all the hardware was properly qualified and flight acceptance tested to meet the environments for this mission required defining and implementing an environmental assurance program that included a detailed heritage review coupled with tailored flight acceptance testing. A heritage review process with defined acceptance success criteria was developed and is presented in this paper together with the lessons learned in its implementation. This paper also provides a detailed description of the environmental assurance program of the Phoenix Mars mission. This program includes assembly/subsystem and system level testing in the areas of dynamics, thermal, and electromagnetic compatibility, as well as venting/pressure, dust, radiation, and meteoroid analyses to meet the challenging environment of this mission.

thermal testing↗
NASA NTRS2020

In-time System-wide Safety Assurance (ISSA) Concept of Operations and Design Considerations for Urban Air Mobility (UAM)

Emerging operations involving Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), such as Urban Air Mobility (UAM), pose a challenge to safety assurance and to accessibility within the National Airspace System (NAS).In particular, the public has a low tolerance for risk in aviation and the current NAS tends to be labor-intensive with limited ability to scale up for UAM. In response to this landscape, NASA is collaborating with industry to define a Concept of Operations (ConOps) for In-time System-Wide Safety Assurance (ISSA) for scalable UAM involving a service-oriented architecture. This architecture focuses safety investments for technological solutions that can overcome safety related barriers for emerging operations. By working with industry, consensus can be reached on desirable system traits that are based on integration and fusion of data and leverage increasingly autonomous and automated systems. These complex systems can identify anomalies, precursors, and trends that together enable more proactive management of operational risks. AAM and UAM elevate the need for risk management in relation to increasing density and heterogeneity of vehicles and operations. Whereas safety in today’s NAS is built on a history of programs and technologies that react to incidents and accidents, AAM presents an opportunity to leverage that experience and its implications and proactively integrate safety into the earliest designs of vehicles and systems. In a perfect world AAM and UAM would not be inherently dangerous but until then ensuring the highest quality of safety requirements is the bridge to mitigating risks.

In-Time System-Wide Safety Assurance↗
NASA NTRS1993

Mission Operations and Command Assurance: Flight Operations Quality Improvements

Mission Operations and Command Assurance (MO&CA) is a Total Quality Management (TQM) task on JPL projects to instill quality in flight mission operations. From a system engineering view, MO&CA facilitates communication and problem-solving among flight teams and provides continuous process improvement to reduce risk in mission operations by addressing human factors. The MO&CA task has evolved from participating as a member of the spacecraft team to an independent team reporting directly to project management and providing system level assurance. JPL flight projects have benefited significantly from MO&CA's effort to contain risk and prevent rather than rework errors. MO&CA's ability to provide direct transfer of knowledge allows new projects to benefit from previous and ongoing flight experience.

mission↗
NASA NTRS1993

Mission Operations and Command Assurance: Flight Operations Quality Improvements

Flight mission operations systems place human operators in demanding, high risk environments. The objective of Mission Operations and Command Assurance (MO&CA) is to help improve the operational reliability of flight projects by reducing error -- Pareto Analysis shows that the human is the largest error category. MO&CA is a system level task reporting to project flight management and JPL Systems Assurance Division. MO&CA provides direct transfer of knowledge, continuous process improvement, and communication facilitation.

mission↗