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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 163 records · Page 9

Radiation Tests on 2Gb NAND Flash Memories

We report on SEE and TID tests of highly scaled Samsung 2Gbits flash memories. Both in-situ and biased interval irradiations were used to characterize the response of the total accumulated dose failures. The radiation-induced failures can be categorized as followings: single event upset (SEU) read errors in biased and unbiased modes, write errors, and single-event-functional-interrupt (SEFI) failures.

NAND circuits↗

IBM powerPC 405 SEU mitigation using processor voting techniques in Xilinx Virtex-I1 pro FPGA

Not until recently, Xilinx has developed a new field programmable gate array (FPGA) device family, Virtex-I1 Pro. In this single device, not only dies it have density logic cells (3K to125K), gigabit connectivity, on chip memory, digital clock management, but also it can have up to four IBM PowerPC 405 Processor hard cores, running up to 400MHz and 633 Mbps. To utilize this cutting edge device in space applications, a few Single Event Upset (SEU) mitigation techniques need to be implemented to a design for the device. At Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), we have successfully demonstrated the feasibility of running multiple processors running in a lock step fashion to accomplish SEU mitigation and fault tolerance.

single event upset (SEU)↗

Xilinx Kintex-UltraScale Field Programmable Gate Array Single Event Effects (SEE) Heavy-Ion Test Report

This is an independent investigation that evaluates the single event destructive and transient susceptibility of the Xilinx Kintex-UltraScale device. Design/Device susceptibility is determined by monitoring the device under test (DUT) for Single Event Transient (SET) and Single Event Upset (SEU) induced faults by exposing the DUT to a heavy ion beam. Potential Single Event Latch-up (SEL) is monitored throughout heavy-ion testing by examining device current. This device does not have embedded mitigation. Hence, user implemented mitigation is investigated using Synopsys mitigation tools.

Single Event Transient (SET)↗

Microsemi RTG4 Rev C Field Programmable Gate Array Single Event Effects (SEE) Heavy-Ion Test Report

The goal of this study was to perform an independent investigation of single event destructive and transient susceptibility of the Microsemi RTG4 device. The devices under test were the Microsemi RTG4 field programmable gate array (FPGA) Rev C. The devices under test will be referenced as the DUT or RTG4 Rev C throughout this document. The DUT was configured to have various test structures that are geared to measure specific potential susceptibilities of the device. DesignDevice susceptibility was determined by monitoring the DUT for Single Event Transient (SET) and Single Event Upset (SEU) induced faults by exposing the DUT to a heavy ion beam. Potential Single Event Latch-up (SEL) was checked throughout heavy-ion testing by monitoring device current.

Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)↗

Single Event Effects in Highly Scaled Devices for Space Applications

This paper discusses single-event upset (SEU) in memories and microprocessors that are the "drivers" of highly scaled commercial integrated circuits. Despite the decrease in critical charge that occurs for highly scaled CMOS devices, recent test data has shown that SEU rates are actually somewhat lower for scaled devices compared to older devices with larger feature size. Hard errors, which are increasingly important for memories, are discussed along with conventional soft errors. Functional errors in memories and microprocessors are particularly significant, and tend to dominate the response of highly scaled devices from an application standpoint. Predictions for future devices are made using the Semiconductor Industry Roadmap along with recent modeling and radiation test results.

microelectronics↗

SEU System Analysis: Not Just the Sum of All Parts

Single event upset (SEU) analysis of complex systems is challenging. Currently, system SEU analysis is performed by component level partitioning and then either: the most dominant SEU cross-sections (SEUs) are used in system error rate calculations; or the partition SEUs are summed to eventually obtain a system error rate. In many cases, system error rates are overestimated because these methods generally overlook system level derating factors. The problem with overestimating is that it can cause overdesign and consequently negatively affect the following: cost, schedule, functionality, and validation/verification. The scope of this presentation is to discuss the risks involved with our current scheme of SEU analysis for complex systems; and to provide alternative methods for improvement.

Single Event Upset (SEU) Testing↗

DFF Layout Variations in CMOS SOI—Analysis of Hardening by Design Options

Four D flip-flop (DFF) layouts were created from the same schematic in Sandia National Laboratories’ CMOS7 silicon-on-insulator (SOI) process. Single-event upset (SEU) modeling and testing showed an improved response with the use of shallow (not fully bottomed) N-type metal-oxide-semiconductor field-effect transistors (NMOSFETs), extending the size of the drain implant and increasing the critical charge of the transmission gates in the circuit design and layout. This research also shows the importance of correctly modeling nodal capacitance, which is a major factor determining SEU critical charge. Accurate SEU models enable the understanding of the SEU vulnerabilities and how to make the design more robust.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Single event phenomena: Testing and prediction

Highly integrated microelectronic devices are often used to increase the performance of satellite systems while reducing the system power dissipation, size, and weight. However, these devices are usually more susceptible to radiation than less integrated devices. In particular, the problem of sensitivity to single event upset and latchup is greatly increased as the integration level is increased. Therefore, a method for accurately evaluating the susceptibility of new devices to single event phenomena is critical to qualifying new components for use in space systems. This evaluation includes testing devices for upset or latchup and extrapolating the results of these tests to the orbital environment. Current methods for testing devices for single event effects are reviewed, and methods for upset rate prediction, including a new technique based on Monte Carlo simulation, are presented.

Kinnison, James D.↗

Annual Conference on Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects, Gatlinburg, TN, July 18-21, 1983, Proceedings

Topics discussed include radiation effects in devices; the basic mechanisms of radiation effects in structures and materials; radiation effects in integrated circuits; spacecraft charging and space radiation effects; hardness assurance for devices and systems; and radiation transport, energy deposition and charge collection. Papers are presented on the mechanisms of small instabilities in irradiated MOS transistors, on the radiation effects on oxynitride gate dielectrics, on the discharge characteristics of a simulated solar cell array, and on latchup in CMOS devices from heavy ions. Attention is also given to proton upsets in orbit, to the modeling of single-event upset in bipolar integrated circuits, to high-resolution studies of the electrical breakdown of soil, and to a finite-difference solution of Maxwell's equations in generalized nonorthogonal coordinates.

Source record↗

Closed-Loop Performance Measures for Flight Controllers Subject to Neutron-Induced Upsets

It has been observed that atmospheric neutrons can produce single event upsets in digital flight control hardware. The phenomenon has been studied extensively at the chip level, and now system level experiments are underway. In this paper analytical closed-loop performance measures for the tracking error are developed for a plant that is stabilized by a recoverable computer system subject to neutron induced upsets. The underlying model is a Markov jump-linear system with process noise. The steady-state tracking error is expressed in terms of a generalized observability Gramian.

Gray, W. Steven↗

Single-Event Effects Test Report Lattice Semiconductor, LCMXO3D-9400HC-5BG484I Field Programmable Gate Array

The purpose of this test was to characterize single event effects (SEE) in the LCMXO3D-9400HC-5BG484I, a low power and low density field programmable gate array (FPGA). The SEE concerns for the device that were investigated in this testing are single event upsets (SEUs) in the configuration static random-access memory (SRAM), SEUs in the FPGA fabric, single event latch up (SEL), and single event functional interrupts (SEFIs). Testing was conducted at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) on August 26th, 2024 and August 28th, 2024.

Adia M Wood↗

Single Event Effect Testing of the Micron MT46V128M8

The Micron MT46V128M8 was tested for single event effects (SEE) at the Texas AM University Cyclotron Facility (TAMU) in June of 2017. Testing revealed a sensitivity to device hang-ups classified as single event functional interrupts (SEFI) and possible soft data errors classified as single event upsets (SEU).

Single Event Functional Interrupts (SEFI)↗

Computing in the presence of soft bit errors

It is shown that single-event-upsets (SEUs) due to cosmic rays are a significant source of single bit error in spacecraft computers. The physical mechanism of SEU, electron hole generation by means of Linear Energy Transfer (LET), it discussed with reference made to the results of a study of the environmental effects on computer systems of the Galileo spacecraft. Techniques for making software more tolerant of cosmic ray effects are considered, including: reducing the number of registers used by the software; continuity testing of variables; redundant execution of major procedures for error detection; and encoding state variables to detect single-bit changes. Attention is also given to design modifications which may reduce the cosmic ray exposure of on-board hardware. These modifications include: shielding components operating in LEO; removing low-power Schottky parts; and the use of CMOS diodes. The SEU parameters of different electronic components are listed in a table.

Rasmussen, R. D.↗

Design Tools for Reconfigurable Hardware in Orbit (RHinO)

The Reconfigurable Hardware in Orbit (RHinO) project is focused on creating a set of design tools that facilitate and automate design techniques for reconfigurable computing in space, using SRAM-based field-programmable-gate-array (FPGA) technology. These tools leverage an established FPGA design environment and focus primarily on space effects mitigation and power optimization. The project is creating software to automatically test and evaluate the single-event-upsets (SEUs) sensitivities of an FPGA design and insert mitigation techniques. Extensions into the tool suite will also allow evolvable algorithm techniques to reconfigure around single-event-latchup (SEL) events. In the power domain, tools are being created for dynamic power visualiization and optimization. Thus, this technology seeks to enable the use of Reconfigurable Hardware in Orbit, via an integrated design tool-suite aiming to reduce risk, cost, and design time of multimission reconfigurable space processors using SRAM-based FPGAs.

French, Mathew↗

Interplanetary Particle Environment. Proceedings of a Conference

A workshop entitled the Interplanetary Charged Particle Environment was held at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) on March 16 and 17, 1987. The purpose of the Workshop was to define the environment that will be seen by spacecraft operating in the 1990s. It focused on those particles that are involved in single event upset, latch-up, total dose and displacement damage in spacecraft microelectronic parts. Several problems specific to Magellan were also discussed because of the sensitivity of some electronic parts to single-event phenomena. Scientists and engineers representing over a dozen institutions took part in the meeting. The workshop consisted of two major activities, reviews of the current state of knowledge and the formation of working groups and the drafting of their reports.

Feynman, Joan↗

FPGA-Based, Self-Checking, Fault-Tolerant Computers

A proposed computer architecture would exploit the capabilities of commercially available field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) to enable computers to detect and recover from bit errors. The main purpose of the proposed architecture is to enable fault-tolerant computing in the presence of single-event upsets (SEUs). [An SEU is a spurious bit flip (also called a soft error) caused by a single impact of ionizing radiation.] The architecture would also enable recovery from some soft errors caused by electrical transients and, to some extent, from intermittent and permanent (hard) errors caused by aging of electronic components. A typical FPGA of the current generation contains one or more complete processor cores, memories, and highspeed serial input/output (I/O) channels, making it possible to shrink a board-level processor node to a single integrated-circuit chip. Custom, highly efficient microcontrollers, general-purpose computers, custom I/O processors, and signal processors can be rapidly and efficiently implemented by use of FPGAs. Unfortunately, FPGAs are susceptible to SEUs. Prior efforts to mitigate the effects of SEUs have yielded solutions that degrade performance of the system and require support from external hardware and software. In comparison with other fault-tolerant- computing architectures (e.g., triple modular redundancy), the proposed architecture could be implemented with less circuitry and lower power demand. Moreover, the fault-tolerant computing functions would require only minimal support from circuitry outside the central processing units (CPUs) of computers, would not require any software support, and would be largely transparent to software and to other computer hardware. There would be two types of modules: a self-checking processor module and a memory system (see figure). The self-checking processor module would be implemented on a single FPGA and would be capable of detecting its own internal errors. It would contain two CPUs executing identical programs in lock step, with comparison of their outputs to detect errors. It would also contain various cache local memory circuits, communication circuits, and configurable special-purpose processors that would use self-checking checkers. (The basic principle of the self-checking checker method is to utilize logic circuitry that generates error signals whenever there is an error in either the checker or the circuit being checked.) The memory system would comprise a main memory and a hardware-controlled check-pointing system (CPS) based on a buffer memory denoted the recovery cache. The main memory would contain random-access memory (RAM) chips and FPGAs that would, in addition to everything else, implement double-error-detecting and single-error-correcting memory functions to enable recovery from single-bit errors.

Some, Raphael↗