High Energy Resolution, Large FOV, Cylindrical Time-Encoded Imaging
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Kuchta, John↗
SEARCH · Search NASA
Results for “Time-encoded imaging”
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Unconventional Advancements in Single Crystal, Time-Encoded Imaging
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Kuchta, John [University of Michigan]↗
Spherical time-encoded radiation imaging simulations
Radiation source localization is important for nuclear nonproliferation and can be obtained using time-encoded imaging systems with unsegmented detectors. A scintillation crystal can be used with a moving coded-aperture mask to vary the detected count rate produced from radiation sources in the far field. The modulation of observed counts over time can be used to reconstruct an image with the known coded-aperture mask pattern. Current time-encoded imaging systems incorporate cylindrical coded-aperture masks and have limits to their fully coded imaging field-of-view. This work focuses on expanding the field-of-view to 4π by using a novel spherical coded-aperture mask. A regular icosahedron is used to approximate a spherical mask. This icosahedron consists of 20 equilateral triangles; the faces of which are each subdivided into four equilateral triangle-shaped voxels which are then projected onto a spherical surface, creating an 80-voxel coded-aperture mask. Furthermore, these polygonal voxels can be made from high-Z materials for gamma-ray modulation and/or low-Z materials for neutron modulation. In this work, we present Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) simulations and simple models programmed in Mathematica to explore image reconstruction capabilities of this 80-voxel coded-aperture mask.
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
COnfirmation using Gamma-ray Non-Imaging Zero-knowledge ANti-mask Time-encoding (COGNIZANT) Final Summary Report
In potential future arms reduction treaties in which the numbers of nuclear warheads may approach small numbers, using delivery systems as a proxy for the warheads themselves may be insufficient. Therefore, a technical means of verifying the presence of a nuclear warhead may become necessary. Verifying that a declared item actually is a warhead is technically challenging within a verification regime: providing assurance to the monitoring party that a presented item is a warhead while protecting sensitive information about that warhead may be required. It is generally believed that strong assurance will require the confirmation of key attributes that may reveal closely-guarded critical design information. This provides high confidence to the monitoring party, but presents a risk of information loss to the host. A verification system must overcome this hurdle. Over the last several decades, systems have been developed that balance host and monitoring partner needs by using sensitive information to confirm treaty accountable items (TAI) as warheads while sequestering that information behind an information barrier (1). These are designed to meet the needs of the host but places the onus on the monitor to authenticate the hardware, firmware, and software. Authentication requires that the monitor confirm that all components of the system have not been modified and work as intended. In 2014, Glaser et al. proposed applying the concept of “zero knowledge protocols” (ZKP) from the field of cryptography to the problem of warhead verification (2). In mathematical cryptography, ZKP is accomplished by challenging one party to solve a problem that is only possible if that party possesses the information being authenticated. After repeated challenges, the party provides confidence that it possesses this information without revealing any details about the information itself. Systems have been in development based on this idea at both Princeton and MIT (2) (3) (4). The final measurement results produced by these systems can be viewed by both the host and the monitoring party without the worry of revealing sensitive information. However, in both of these physical implementations, there remains an information barrier within the system. The need for a digital information barrier to protect a measurement result is eliminated, but it has been replaced with the need to sequester physical components of the system, potentially obfuscating the measurement process itself. Both implementations physically insert information into the system that requires protection to prevent undesired disclosure of sensitive information: in the Princeton method, one must physically load the complement of the expected image of a true warhead into the system, and in the MIT technique, one loads a collection of spectator foils whose thicknesses physically encrypt a measured spectrum. This complicates authentication of the hardware and measurement process. The CONFIDANTE/COGNIZANT concept developed in this project do not load sensitive information into the system at any time, and could therefore open the possibility of allowing the inspector to not only view the final data but also the measurement as it is being performed and all associated equipment.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Demonstration and Concept of Operations for a Zero-Knowledge Protocol Passive Imaging Measurement for Arms Control
Here, we present an imaging system that employs zero-knowledge protocols to protect sensitive geometrical information, along with procedures to increase confidence in the result. The goal of this work is to enable the inclusion of warhead confirmation measurements in future arms control treaties. We present a demonstration of both true positive and true negative measurements that validate models and establish authenticating procedures toward meeting acceptance requirements for use in nuclear facilities. We use a two-dimensional time-encoded fast neutron imaging system with an anti-symmetric mask pattern; the fast neutron count values exceeding minimum or maximum thresholds indicate that two measured items are not identical. Laboratory measurements over twenty trials show that alarm rates for negative confirmation measurements are within uncertainties of model predictions. Positive confirmation measurements indicate that alarm rates are large enough to encourage treaty compliance.
Sweany, Melinda Dominique [Sandia National Laborat↗