LaRC Lessons Learned Workshop : 25 Years of JPL Experience Refining a Mature Lessons Learned Process
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The potential for errors in engineering judgement arguably present the highest level of risk when applied to interplanetary spaceflight. JPL has been refining its lessons learned process to optimize the collection and transfer of critical success factors applicable to current and future spaceflight projects.
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The 'lessons learned' process that follows each NASA payload-processing operation is described with attention given to the development of a knowledge base from the results. The process is based on the subjective evaluation of operations problems by test-team members following a mission. The lessons learned from four Space Shuttle missions - STS-26R, -29R, -30R, and -30 - are examined with categorizations of incidents which is based on operational, documentation, hardware, and software categories. Recommendations for ways to address the incidents are categorized similarly, with operational categories such as admonitory, documentation modifications, and support changes. A basic numerical dataset is developed based on the results, and the data show that STS-26R had the highest number of incidents. The process is found to be an effective educational tool in payload-processing operations because it disseminates key individual experiences.
This report has been developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) Risk Management team in close coordination with the Systems Engineering Team. This document provides a point-in-time, cumulative, summary of key lessons learned derived from the SE RFP Development process. Lessons learned invariably address challenges and risks and the way in which these areas have been addressed. Accordingly the risk management thread is woven throughout the document.
NASA’s Double Asteroid Redirection Test (DART) will be the first-ever planetary defense mission to demonstrate asteroid deflection using kinetic impactor technology. The DART spacecraft will utilize the NASA Evolutionary Xenon Thruster (NEXT), which is a successor to the NSTAR ion propulsion system that successfully propelled NASA’s Deep Space 1 and Dawn spacecraft. In 2015, NASA partnered with Aerojet Rocketdyne and ZIN Technologies on the NEXT-Commercial (NEXT-C) effort to manufacture a Flight-Qualified (TRL 8) power processing unit (PPU). The NEXT-C PPU was based on the heritage gridded ion thruster PPU from NSTAR and NEXT, but with significant improvements in performance and manufacturability. The design goals of the NEXT-C PPU were to achieve the technical performance goals of the PPU in size, mass, and efficiency over a wide range of input voltage and output power. This paper discusses the lessons learned from the design, build, and test of the NEXT-C PPU, and how challenges were overcome to deliver a Flight PPU.
NASA’s Double Asteroid Redirection Test (DART) will be the first-ever planetary defense mission to demonstrate asteroid deflection using kinetic impactor technology. The DART spacecraft will utilize the NASA Evolutionary Xenon Thruster (NEXT), which is a successor to the NSTAR ion propulsion system that successfully propelled NASA’s Deep Space 1 and Dawn spacecraft. In 2015, NASA partnered with Aerojet Rocketdyne and ZIN Technologies on the NEXT-Commercial (NEXT-C) effort to manufacture a Flight-Qualified (TRL 8) power processing unit (PPU). The NEXT-C PPU was based on the heritage gridded ion thruster PPU from NSTAR and NEXT, but with significant improvements in performance and manufacturability. The design goals of the NEXT-C PPU were to achieve the technical performance goals of the PPU in size, mass, and efficiency over a wide range of input voltage and output power. This paper discusses the lessons learned from the design, build, and test of the NEXT-C PPU, and how challenges were overcome to deliver a Flight PPU.
For every space mission, there are challenges with the launch site/field operations process that are addressed too late in the development cycle. This potentially causes schedule delays, cost overruns, and adds risk to the mission success. This paper will discuss how a single interface, representing the payload at the launch site in all phases of development, will mitigate risk, and minimize or even alleviate potential problems later on. Experience has shown that a single interface between the project and the launch site allows for issues to be worked in a timely manner and bridges the gap between two diverse cultures.
Conformal ablators are low density composite materials comprised of a flexible carbon felt based fibrous substrate and a high surface area phenolic matrix. These materials are fabricated to near net shape by molding the substrate, placing in a rigid matched mold and infusing with liquid resin through a vacuum assisted process. The open mold process, originally developed for older rigid substrate ablators, such as PICA, wastes a substantial amount of resin. In this work, a vacuum infusion process a type of liquid composite molding where resin is directly injected into a closed mold under vacuum is advanced for conformal ablators. The process reduces waste over the state-of-the-art technique. Small, flat samples of Conformal Phenolic Impregnated Carbon Ablator are infused using the new approach and subjected to a range of curing configurations and conditions. Resulting materials are inspected for quality and compared to material produced using the standard process. Lessons learned inform subsequent plans for process scale up.
A lessons learned system is a hallmark of a mature engineering organization A formal lessons learned process can help assure that valuable lessons get written and published, that they are well-written, and that the essential information is "infused" into institutional practice. Requires high-level institutional commitment, and everyone's participation in gathering, disseminating, and using the lessons
The software development process and product can and should be measured. The software measurement process at the Software Engineering Laboratory (SEL) has taught a major lesson: develop a goal-driven paradigm (also characterized as a goal/question/metric paradigm) for data collection. Project analysis under this paradigm leads to a design for evaluating and improving the methodology of software development and maintenance.
NASA policy requires each Program or Project to develop a plan for how they will address Lessons Learned. Projects have the flexibility to determine how best to promote and implement lessons learned. A large project might budget for a lessons learned position to coordinate elicitation, documentation and archival of the project lessons. The lessons learned process crosses all NASA Centers and includes the contactor community. o The Office of The Chief Engineer at NASA Headquarters in Washington D.C., is the overall process owner, and field locations manage the local implementation. One tool used to transfer knowledge between program and projects is the Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS). Most lessons come from NASA in partnership with support contractors. A search for lessons that might impact a new design is often performed by a contractor team member. Knowledge is not found with only one person, one project team, or one organization. Sometimes, another project team, or person, knows something that can help your project or your task. Knowledge sharing is an everyday activity at the Kennedy Space Center through storytelling, Kennedy Engineering Academy presentations and through searching the Lessons Learned Information system. o Project teams search the lessons repository to ensure the best possible results are delivered. o The ideas from the past are not always directly applicable but usually spark new ideas and innovations. Teams have a great responsibility to collect and disseminate these lessons so that they are shared with future generations of space systems designers. o Leaders should set a goal for themselves to host a set numbers of lesson learned events each year and do more to promote multiple methods of lessons learned activities. o High performing employees are expected to share their lessons, however formal knowledge sharing presentation are not the norm for many employees.
Full scale assembly welding of Ares I Upper Stage 5.5-Meter diameter cryogenic tank barrel segments has been performed at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). One full-scale developmental article produced under the Ares 1 Upper Stage project is the Manufacturing Demonstration Article (MDA) Barrel. This presentation will focus on the welded assembly of this barrel section, and associated lessons learned. Among the MDA articles planned on the Ares 1 Program, the Barrel was the first to be completed, primarily because the process of manufacture from piece parts (barrel panels) utilized the most mature friction stir process planned for use on the Ares US program: Conventional fixed pin Friction Stir Welding (FSW). This process is in use on other space launch systems, including the Shuttle s External Tank, the Delta IV common booster core, the Delta II, and the Atlas V rockets. The goals for the MDA Barrel development were several fold: 1) to prove out Marshall Space Flight Center s new Vertical Weld Tool for use in manufacture of cylindrical barrel sections, 2) to serve as a first run for weld qualification to a new weld specification, and 3) to provide a full size cylindrical section for downstream use in precision cleaning and Spray-on Foam Insulation development. The progression leading into the welding of the full size barrel included sub scale panel welding, subscale cylinder welding, a full length confidence weld, and finally, the 3 seamed MDA barrel processing. Lessons learned on this MDA program have been carried forward into the production tooling for the Ares 1 US Program, and in the use of the MSFC VWT in processing other large scale hardware, including two 8.4 meter diameter Shuttle External Tank barrel sections that are currently being used in structural analysis to validate shell buckling models.
The main contribution of this project is the combined knowledge of terrain relative navigation experts and lunar scientists who are familiar with both the lunar orbital imagery and the instruments that collected the data as well as how a TRN system utilizes map data. This knowledge comes in the form of published technical papers, benchmark map data sets, and software tools that can help others automate the process of creating the necessary maps for their own landing sites in the future. This document represents the project's plans to share all the lessons learned, processes developed, and applicable software tools with the public.
The present investigation is concerned with an evaluation of the lessons learned in connection with the flights of the Shuttle orbiters Columbia, Challenger, and Discovery. A description is provided of several general and specific lessons related to the processing of free-flying and attached payloads. John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC), as the prime launch and landing site, is responsible for managing all payload-to-payload, payload-to-simulated orbiter, and payload-to-orbiter operations. For each payload, a KSC Launch Site Support Manager (LSSM) is named as the primary point of contact for the customer. Attention is given to aspects of planning interaction, payload types, and problems of ground processing. The discussed lessons are partly related to the value of early contact between customers and KSC representatives, the primary point of contact, the launch site support plan, and the importance of customer participation.
Most failures occur at interfaces between organizations and hardware. Processing interface requirements at the start of a project life cycle will reduce the likelihood of costly interface changes/failures later. This can be done by adding Interface Control Documents (ICDs) to the Project top level drawing tree, providing technical direction to the Projects for interface requirements, and by funding the interface requirements function directly from the Project Manager's office. The interface requirements function within the Project Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) Office would work in-line with the project element design engineers early in the life cycle to enhance communications and negotiate technical issues between the elements. This function would work as the technical arm of the Project Manager to help ensure that the Project cost, schedule, and risk objectives can be met during the Life Cycle. Some ICD Lessons Learned during the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) Life Cycle will include the use of hardware interface photos in the ICD, progressive life cycle design certification by analysis, test, & operations experience, assigning interface design engineers to Element Interface (EI) and Project technical panels, and linking interface design drawings with project build drawings