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Project cost risk is the uncertainty in final project cost, contingent on initial budget, requirements and schedule. For a proposed mission, a dynamic simulation model relying for some of its input on a simple risk elicitation is used to identify and quantify systemic cost risk.
Successful projects require an integrated approach to managing cost, schedule, and risk. This is especially true for complex, multi-year projects involving multiple organizations. To explore solutions and leverage valuable lessons learned, NASA's Virtual Project Management Challenge will kick off a three-part series examining some of the challenges faced by project and program managers when it comes to managing these important elements. In this first session of the series, we will look at cost management, with an emphasis on the critical roles of cost estimating and cost reporting. By taking a proactive approach to both of these activities, project managers can better control life cycle costs, maintain stakeholder confidence, and protect other current and future projects in the organization's portfolio. Speakers will be Doug Comstock, Director of NASA's Cost Analysis Division, Kristin Van Wychen, Senior Analyst in the GAO Acquisition and Sourcing Management Team, and Mary Beth Zimmerman, Branch Chief for NASA's Portfolio Analysis Branch, Strategic Investments Division. Moderator Ramien Pierre is from NASA's Academy for Program/Project and Engineering Leadership (APPEL).
Current space project cost models attempt to predict space flight project cost via regression equations, which relate the cost of projects to technical performance metrics (e.g. weight, thrust, power, pointing accuracy, etc.). This paper examines the introduction of engineering management parameters to the set of explanatory variables. A number of specific engineering management variables are considered and exploratory regression analysis is performed to determine if there is statistical evidence for cost effects apart from technical aspects of the projects. It is concluded that there are other non-technical effects at work and that further research is warranted to determine if it can be shown that these cost effects are definitely related to engineering management.
Systems engineers often make use of cost Rules ofThumb in order to estimate cost during early phases of projectformulation. These Rules of Thumb typically take the form ofa sequence of percentages over which a total cost is allocatedacross NASA WBS elements. Rules of Thumb can then be usedto extrapolate cost from one or more known WBS elements tothe remaining unknown WBS elements, assisting early projectformulation architecture studies (such as those in JPL’s Team Xand A Team).A number of issues can arise when generating and using costRules of Thumb. For example, many records of project costsconsist of incomplete data. Typical methods of dealing withincomplete cost allocation data include (a) ignoring missionswith incomplete data, or (b) taking averages of the non-zero percentagesacross missions, but both of these methods can result inbiased estimates if the existence of incomplete data correlateswith total mission cost or any particular WBS element. Anothercommon example is cost reported in one or more incorrect WBSelements. This is especially prevalent in smaller missions whereit is more common for engineers to perform tasks that fall underthe purview of multiple WBS elements.Furthermore, a Rule of Thumb estimate is typically reported asa point estimate; there is no reported uncertainty around thepercentages used to generate an allocation. Even in the rarecase in which confidence intervals around mean percentages areprovided, there may be positive or negative correlations betweenWBS elements which can skew estimates.Here we attempt to address these problems by formulatingprobabilistic Rules of Thumb in which a distribution of allocationschemes, rather than a single allocation scheme, is generated.We use a bootstrap imputation method to simultaneouslyaccount for uncertainty in the missing data while using allavailable information contained in the dataset. The imputeddatasets are then input into a multivariate Bayesian modelwhich accounts for correlations between WBS elements andproperly accounts for uncertainty in the final Rule of Thumbpercentages and predictions. We describe the mathematicalmodel and provides snippets of R code utilizing the brms(Bayesian Regression Models using Stan) package. To illustratethis model, we generate a Bayesian Level 2 WBS Cost Rule ofThumb for MIDEX (Medium-Class Explorers) missions withdata extracted from NASA’s CADRe. We then compare thismethod’s performance with the classical Rule of Thumb method.
The laser atmospheric wind sounder (LAWS) cost modeling activities were initiated in phase 1 to establish the ground rules and cost model that would apply to both phase 1 and phase 2 cost analyses. The primary emphasis in phase 1 was development of a cost model for a LAWS instrument for the Japanese Polar Orbiting Platform (JPOP). However, the Space Station application was also addressed in this model, and elements were included, where necessary, to account for Space Station unique items. The cost model presented in the following sections defines the framework for all LAWS cost modeling. The model is consistent with currently available detail, and can be extended to account for greater detail as the project definition progresses.
No abstract available
Large projects almost always exceed their budgets. Estimating cost is difficult and estimated costs are usually too low. Three different reasons are suggested: bad luck, overoptimism, and deliberate underestimation. Project management can usually point to project difficulty and complexity, technical uncertainty, stakeholder conflicts, scope changes, unforeseen events, and other not really unpredictable bad luck. Project planning is usually over-optimistic, so the likelihood and impact of bad luck is systematically underestimated. Project plans reflect optimism and hope for success in a supposedly unique new effort rather than rational expectations based on historical data. Past project problems are claimed to be irrelevant because "This time it's different." Some bad luck is inevitable and reasonable optimism is understandable, but deliberate deception must be condemned. In a competitive environment, project planners and advocates often deliberately underestimate costs to help gain project approval and funding. Project benefits, cost savings, and probability of success are exaggerated and key risks ignored. Project advocates have incentives to distort information and conceal difficulties from project approvers. One naively suggested cure is more openness, honesty, and group adherence to shared overall goals. A more realistic alternative is threatening overrun projects with cancellation. Neither approach seems to solve the problem. A better method to avoid the delusions of over-optimism and the deceptions of biased advocacy is to base the project cost estimate on the actual costs of a large group of similar projects. Over optimism and deception can continue beyond the planning phase and into project execution. Hard milestones based on verified tests and demonstrations can provide a reality check.
No abstract available
One method of evaluating the potential of emerging solar cell and array technologies is to compare their projected capabilities in space flight applications to those of established Si solar cells and arrays. Such an application-oriented comparison provides an integrated view of the elemental comparisons of efficiency, radiation resistance, temperature sensitivity, size, mass, and cost in combination. In addition, the assumptions necessary to make the comparisons provide insights helpful toward determining necessary areas of development or evaluation. Finally, as developments and evaluations progress, the results can be used in more precisely defining the overall potential of the new technologies in comparison to existing technologies. The projected capabilities of Si, InP, and GaAs cells and arrays are compared.
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It is very difficult for project managers to develop accurate cost and schedule estimates for large, complex software development projects. None of the approaches or tools available today can estimate the true cost of software with any high degree of accuracy early in a project. This paper provides an approach that utilizes a software development process simulation model that considers and conveys the level of uncertainty that exists when developing an initial estimate. A NASA project will be analyzed using simulation and data from the Software Engineering Laboratory to show the benefits of such an approach.
Within two years of being chartered in 1958 as an independent agency to conduct civilian pursuits in aeronautics and space, NASA absorbed either wholly or partially the people, facilities, and equipment of several existing organizations. These included the laboratories of the National Advisory Committee of Aeronautics (NACA) at Langley Research Center in Virginia, Ames Research Center in California, and Lewis Research Center in Ohio; the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) at Redstone Arsenal Alabama, for which the team of Wernher von Braun worked; and the Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) and their ongoing work on big boosters. These were especially valuable resources to jump start the new agency in light of the shocking success of the Soviet space probe Sputnik in the autumn of the previous year and the corresponding pressure from an impatient American public to produce some response. Along with these inheritances, there came some existing systems engineering and management practices, including project cost estimating methodologies. This paper will briefly trace the origins of those methods and how they evolved within the agency over the past three decades.
The 1510 worksheet used to calculate approved facility project cost estimates is explained. Topics covered include data base considerations, program structure, relationship of the 1510 form to the 1509 form, and functions which the application must perform: WHATIF, TENENTER, TENTYPE, and data base utilities. A sample NASA form 1510 printout and a 1510 data dictionary are presented in the appendices along with the cost adjustment table, the floppy disk index, and methods for generating the calculated values (TENCALC) and for calculating cost adjustment (CONSTADJ). Storage requirements are given.
Accurate estimates can be created in less than a minute by applying powerful techniques and algorithms to create an Excel-based parametric cost model. In five easy steps you will learn how to normalize your company 's historical cost data to the new project parameters. This paper provides a complete, easy-to-understand, step by step how-to guide. Such a guide does not seem to currently exist. Over 2,000 hours of research, data collection, and trial and error, and thousands of lines of Excel Visual Basic Application (VBA) code were invested in developing these methods. While VBA is not required to use this information, it increases the power and aesthetics of the model. Implementing all of the steps described, while not required, will increase the accuracy of the results.
In most cost estimating applications at the NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC), it is desirable to present predicted cost as a range of possible costs rather than a single predicted cost. A cost risk analysis generates a range of cost for a project and assigns a probability level to each cost value in the range. Constructing a cost risk curve requires a good estimate of the expected cost of a project. It must also include a good estimate of expected variance of the cost. Many cost risk analyses are based upon an expert's knowledge of the cost of similar projects in the past. In a common scenario, a manager or engineer, asked to estimate the cost of a project in his area of expertise, will gather historical cost data from a similar completed project. The cost of the completed project is adjusted using the perceived technical and economic differences between the two projects. This allows errors from at least three sources. The historical cost data may be in error by some unknown amount. The managers' evaluation of the new project and its similarity to the old project may be in error. The factors used to adjust the cost of the old project may not correctly reflect the differences. Some risk analyses are based on untested hypotheses about the form of the statistical distribution that underlies the distribution of possible cost. The usual problem is not just to come up with an estimate of the cost of a project, but to predict the range of values into which the cost may fall and with what level of confidence the prediction is made. Risk analysis techniques that assume the shape of the underlying cost distribution and derive the risk curve from a single estimate plus and minus some amount usually fail to take into account the actual magnitude of the uncertainty in cost due to technical factors in the project itself. This paper addresses a cost risk method that is based on parametric estimates of the technical factors involved in the project being costed. The engineering process parameters are elicited from the engineer/expert on the project and are based on that expert's technical knowledge. These are converted by a parametric cost model into a cost estimate. The method discussed makes no assumptions about the distribution underlying the distribution of possible costs, and is not tied to the analysis of previous projects, except through the expert calibrations performed by the parametric cost analyst.
A model for estimating the cost required to do a cost estimate for Deep Space Network (DSN) projects that range from $0.1 to $100 million is presented. The cost of the cost estimate in thousands of dollars, C(sub E), is found to be approximately given by C(sub E) = K((C(sub p))(sup 0.35)) where C(sub p) is the cost of the project being estimated in millions of dollars and K is a constant depending on the accuracy of the estimate. For an order-of-magnitude estimate, K = 24; for a budget estimate, K = 60; and for a definitive estimate, K = 115. That is, for a specific project, the cost of doing a budget estimate is about 2.5 times as much as that for an order-of-magnitude estimate, and a definitive estimate costs about twice as much as a budget estimate. Use of this model should help provide the level of resources required for doing cost estimates and, as a result, provide insights towards more accurate estimates with less potential for cost overruns.
A model for estimating the cost required to do a cost estimate for Deep Space Network (DSN) projects that range from $0.1 to $100 million is presented. The cost of the cost estimate in thousands of dollars, C(sub E), is found to be approximately given by C(sub E) = K(/C(sub p)/(sup 0.35)) where C(sub p) is the cost of the project being estimated in millions of dollars and K is a constant depending on the accuracy of the estimate. For an order-of-magnitude estimate, K = 24; for a budget estimate, K = 60; and for a definitive estimate, K = 115. That is, for a specific project, the cost of doing a budget estimate is about 2.5 times as much as that for an order-of-magnitude estimate, and a definitive estimate costs about twice as much as a budget estimate. Use of this model should help provide the level of resources required for doing cost estimates and, as a result, provide insights towards more accurate estimates with less potential for cost overruns.