Talking Points on Reducing Software Vulnerabilities: Formal Methods
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Doyle, Richard↗
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Empirical Analysis and Automated Classification of Security Bug Reports
With the ever expanding amount of sensitive data being placed into computer systems, the need for effective cybersecurity is of utmost importance. However, there is a shortage of detailed empirical studies of security vulnerabilities from which cybersecurity metrics and best practices could be determined. This thesis has two main research goals: (1) to explore the distribution and characteristics of security vulnerabilities based on the information provided in bug tracking systems and (2) to develop data analytics approaches for automatic classification of bug reports as security or non-security related. This work is based on using three NASA datasets as case studies. The empirical analysis showed that the majority of software vulnerabilities belong only to a small number of types. Addressing these types of vulnerabilities will consequently lead to cost efficient improvement of software security. Since this analysis requires labeling of each bug report in the bug tracking system, we explored using machine learning to automate the classification of each bug report as a security or non-security related (two-class classification), as well as each security related bug report as specific security type (multiclass classification). In addition to using supervised machine learning algorithms, a novel unsupervised machine learning approach is proposed. An ac- curacy of 92%, recall of 96%, precision of 92%, probability of false alarm of 4%, F-Score of 81% and G-Score of 90% were the best results achieved during two-class classification. Furthermore, an accuracy of 80%, recall of 80%, precision of 94%, and F-score of 85% were the best results achieved during multiclass classification.
Cybersecurity↗
Security Vulnerability Profiles of Mission Critical Software: Empirical Analysis of Security Related Bug Reports
While some prior research work exists on characteristics of software faults (i.e., bugs) and failures, very little work has been published on analysis of software applications vulnerabilities. This paper aims to contribute towards filling that gap by presenting an empirical investigation of application vulnerabilities. The results are based on data extracted from issue tracking systems of two NASA missions. These data were organized in three datasets: Ground mission IVV issues, Flight mission IVV issues, and Flight mission Developers issues. In each dataset, we identified security related software bugs and classified them in specific vulnerability classes. Then, we created the security vulnerability profiles, i.e., determined where and when the security vulnerabilities were introduced and what were the dominating vulnerabilities classes. Our main findings include: (1) In IVV issues datasets the majority of vulnerabilities were code related and were introduced in the Implementation phase. (2) For all datasets, around 90 of the vulnerabilities were located in two to four subsystems. (3) Out of 21 primary classes, five dominated: Exception Management, Memory Access, Other, Risky Values, and Unused Entities. Together, they contributed from 80 to 90 of vulnerabilities in each dataset.
Goseva-Popstojanova, Katerina↗
Technical Reference Suite Addressing Challenges of Providing Assurance for Fault Management Architectural Design
Research into complexities of software systems Fault Management (FM) and how architectural design decisions affect safety, preservation of assets, and maintenance of desired system functionality has coalesced into a technical reference (TR) suite that advances the provision of safety and mission assurance. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program, with Software Assurance Research Program support, extracted FM architectures across the IV&V portfolio to evaluate robustness, assess visibility for validation and test, and define software assurance methods applied to the architectures and designs. This investigation spanned IV&V projects with seven different primary developers, a wide range of sizes and complexities, and encompassed Deep Space Robotic, Human Spaceflight, and Earth Orbiter mission FM architectures. The initiative continues with an expansion of the TR suite to include Launch Vehicles, adding the benefit of investigating differences intrinsic to model-based FM architectures and insight into complexities of FM within an Agile software development environment, in order to improve awareness of how nontraditional processes affect FM architectural design and system health management. The identification of particular FM architectures, visibility, and associated IV&V techniques provides a TR suite that enables greater assurance that critical software systems will adequately protect against faults and respond to adverse conditions. Additionally, the role FM has with regard to strengthened security requirements, with potential to advance overall asset protection of flight software systems, is being addressed with the development of an adverse conditions database encompassing flight software vulnerabilities. Capitalizing on the established framework, this TR suite provides assurance capability for a variety of FM architectures and varied development approaches. Research results are being disseminated across NASA, other agencies, and the software community. This paper discusses the findings and TR suite informing the FM domain in best practices for FM architectural design, visibility observations, and methods employed for IV&V and mission assurance.
Fitz, Rhonda↗
Freddie Software Security Patching
Software applications become more complicated over time as they depend on many third-party, open-source libraries. The Freddie Platform Services team actively improves software security by addressing software bugs and vulnerabilities that negatively impact software applications, especially those providing real-time operations and services for the federal partners and industries. In order to detect bugs and patch vulnerabilities in software development and maintenance cycles, an automated and systematic approach is needed. This document describes what bugs and vulnerabilities are, and how they can be detected by using static code analyzers and software composition analysis tools. Once vulnerabilities are detected, the patching approaches, such as upgrading direct and transitive dependencies and loading custom classes first, are presented together with their strengths and weaknesses. In addition, patching walkthrough, example code, lessons learned throughout the vulnerability patching process and the recommended practices are discussed.
Chok Fung Lai↗
Ground Software Technologies – Embracing Change: Mission Drivers and Technology Opportunities to Enable Long Lived Missions
Mission lifecycles have proven to extend well beyond their original design. The benefits to this are countless but introduce challenges in today’s rapidly changing ground infrastructure and software technologies used to enable mission success. What remains constant is the risk posture missions maintain when accepting change and the use of new technologies. Larger missions are ready for change in early lifecycle development but near launch and especially in operations, few continue to evolve beyond what is set in place in phase C. This paper will discuss how the Advance Multi-Mission Operations System (AMMOS) intends to address, three driving missions concerns: Maintaining functionality (hardware/software) for decades, rapidly responding to security vulnerabilities in software, and finally the ability to quickly evolve infrastructure and software changes. These driving concerns are briefly described below: 1. Maintaining functionality (hardware/software) for decades. Hardware updates considerably faster than 10 years ago. Expectations that a system can remain in place for more than 10 years is no longer valid. Expecting to find hardware replacements for a system older than 5 years will increasingly become more and more challenging. How than do missions plan for hardware changes for long lived missions? Principle Objective: Provide abstraction by virtualizing and containerizing software abstract away any hardware dependencies and package up the application lightweight units. 2. Rapidly responding to security vulnerabilities in software. Cost is often the main impediment and largely driven by the revalidation and testing of system that undergo change. In todays, environment security updates are a major diver demanding systems remain up to date. How then do missions accept these changes and avoid large testing efforts? Principle Objective: Help reduce the cost of re-testing by automation of testing, deployment, and compartmentalizing change. 3. Ability to quickly evolve infrastructure and software changes. Responding quickly to change is similar to the second concern in this paper regarding security vulnerabilities. In this case, it address broader concerns of updating software and infrastructure on a more realistic timeline. How do missions stay up to date with the most recent versions of software and allowing for improved functionality? Principle Objective: Use continuous integration techniques at the system level to ensure rapid turnaround. This paper explores each of these concerns in more detail. It focuses the AMMOS’s current plans, challenges and current roadmap.
Giovannoni, Brian J.↗
The Spaceport Command and Control System Security Assessor Project
This Summer, I worked as a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Internships and Fellowships (NIF) intern under my mentor, Jill Giles within the Software Engineering Branch. Within this project, I worked alongside the Cyber Security branch to identify a list of Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) software to analyze, research, and gain insight about potential vulnerabilities within the software that could become a threat of attack. After identifying the list of COTS software, my team and I used Microsoft Excel to create a worksheet to easily organize and design a questionnaire about the software. Security reports weregiven to us to identify the software used on the machines in the firing rooms. With these reports, we created a script that would populate the database with the software information to identify potential security weaknesses of COTS software.The goal of the project was to produce a final report, summarizing the most vulnerable launch control system servers and configurations and document vulnerabilities, residual risk, likelihood, and consequence. This project is important for the Cyber Security and Information Technology branches because it will identify security weaknesses and help to mitigate risk. From the Spaceport Command and Control System Security Assessor Project, I learned how to properly identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities within software and how to mitigate the risks within the software. This project also taught me how to create databases using scripts and input files.
Destani Satora Van Arsdalen↗
Assessing application vulnerability to radiation-induced SEUs in RAM
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
radiation SEU software vulnerability↗
Security Vulnerability Profiles of NASA Mission Software: Empirical Analysis of Security Related Bug Reports
NASA develops, runs, and maintains software systems for which security is of vital importance. Therefore, it is becoming an imperative to develop secure systems and extend the current software assurance capabilities to cover information assurance and cybersecurity concerns of NASA missions. The results presented in this report are based on the information provided in the issue tracking systems of one ground mission and one flight mission. The extracted data were used to create three datasets: Ground mission IVV issues, Flight mission IVV issues, and Flight mission Developers issues. In each dataset, we identified the software bugs that are security related and classified them in specific security classes. This information was then used to create the security vulnerability profiles (i.e., to determine how, why, where, and when the security vulnerabilities were introduced) and explore the existence of common trends. The main findings of our work include:- Code related security issues dominated both the Ground and Flight mission IVV security issues, with 95 and 92, respectively. Therefore, enforcing secure coding practices and verification and validation focused on coding errors would be cost effective ways to improve mission's security. (Flight mission Developers issues dataset did not contain data in the Issue Category.)- In both the Ground and Flight mission IVV issues datasets, the majority of security issues (i.e., 91 and 85, respectively) were introduced in the Implementation phase. In most cases, the phase in which the issues were found was the same as the phase in which they were introduced. The most security related issues of the Flight mission Developers issues dataset were found during Code Implementation, Build Integration, and Build Verification; the data on the phase in which these issues were introduced were not available for this dataset.- The location of security related issues, as the location of software issues in general, followed the Pareto principle. Specifically, for all three datasets, from 86 to 88 the security related issues were located in two to four subsystems.- The severity levels of most security issues were moderate, in all three datasets.- Out of 21 primary security classes, five dominated: Exception Management, Memory Access, Other, Risky Values, and Unused Entities. Together, these classes contributed from around 80 to 90 of all security issues in each dataset. This again proves the Pareto principle of uneven distribution of security issues, in this case across CWE classes, and supports the fact that addressing these dominant security classes provides the most cost efficient way to improve missions' security. The findings presented in this report uncovered the security vulnerability profiles and identified the common trends and dominant classes of security issues, which in turn can be used to select the most efficient secure design and coding best practices compiled by the part of the SARP project team associated with the NASA's Johnson Space Center. In addition, these findings provide valuable input to the NASA IVV initiative aimed at identification of the two 25 CWEs of ground and flight missions.
vulnerability↗
Quantitative Comparison of Proprietary and Open-Source Georeferencing Tools for Use with Astronaut Photography
The Crew Earth Observations (CEO) Facility within the Earth Science and Remote Sensing Unit at NASA’s Johnson Space Center supports the acquisition, analysis, and curation of astronaut photography of Earth’s surface and atmosphere. Astronauts on the International Space Station (ISS) respond to requests from CEO to acquire imagery of scientific and education targets, to include high profile targets in response to activations from the International Charter for Space & Major Disasters (also known as the International Disaster Charter, or IDC) and NASA’s Disasters Program. CEO facilitates the acquisition of astronaut photography in response to IDC events and delivers georeferenced data products to the United States Geological Survey (USGS) for distribution to the disaster community. Using GeoRef, an internal web-based tool developed in collaboration with NASA’s Ames Research Center, CEO generates data packages of georeferenced imagery, uncertainty images for assessing control and tie point accuracy, and metadata documenting raw and processed data. Operational experience with the Georef software identified vulnerabilities to internal code and server errors that can significantly increase time of data production. As such, CEO developed a backup procedure in case the GeoRef software experiences front-end or back-end errors. A system using OSGEO’s open-source QGIS software combined with a semi-automated pipeline using the object-oriented Python language and the Geospatial Abstract Library for generating metadata is quantitatively compared to GeoRef’s data package for quality and productivity. Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) provides a standard measurement of data quality as it relates to ground error. Assessing RMSE measurements generated from georeferenced astronaut photographs acquired with different obliquity and focal length offers a comprehensive accuracy assessment of the software’s transformation algorithms. This assessment will indicate the software's ability to produce data products with the least ground-error or highest data quality regarding ground accuracy. In addition, a comparison of the software’s efficiency in generating a data package that includes georeferenced images, metadata, and uncertainty images for measuring tie/ground point error was performed. Initial results, based on the comparison of three nadir-facing astronaut photographs acquired with a 95mm focal length, reveal the QGIS-based system's average RMSE is 2.36 (pixels) suggesting its georectification system produces data products that meet and perhaps improve upon Georef solution's average RMSE of 32.99 (pixels). However, the QGIS system was unable to reproduce two unique Georef data products, uncertainty images for measuring tie and control point errors and a translated unwrapped image. In addition, the Georef software is designed to accept handheld camera pose information from a hardware component (Geosens) scheduled for deployment on the ISS in late 2018; this information is intended to provide increased accuracy and auto-registration capability for astronaut photographs. Future work is expected to determine the QGIS-based georectification system’s potential as an open-source alternative (and operational backup) to Georef for georeferencing the full range of resolutions and viewing angles unique to handheld digital camera imagery in support of ISS disaster response activities.
Jagge, Amy M.↗
Using software security analysis to verify the secure socket layer (SSL) protocol
nal Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) have tens of thousands of networked computer systems and applications. Software Security vulnerabilities present risks such as lost or corrupted data, information the3, and unavailability of critical systems. These risks represent potentially enormous costs to NASA. The NASA Code Q research initiative 'Reducing Software Security Risk (RSSR) Trough an Integrated Approach '' offers, among its capabilities, formal verification of software security properties, through the use of model based verification (MBV) to address software security risks. [1,2,3,4,5,6] MBV is a formal approach to software assurance that combines analysis of software, via abstract models, with technology, such as model checkers, that provide automation of the mechanical portions of the analysis process. This paper will discuss: The need for formal analysis to assure software systems with respect to software and why testing alone cannot provide it. The means by which MBV with a Flexible Modeling Framework (FMF) accomplishes the necessary analysis task. An example of FMF style MBV in the verification of properties over the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) communication protocol as a demonstration.
software↗
Model based verification of the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) Protocol for NASA systems
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has tens of thousands of networked computer systems and applications. Software Security vulnerabilities present risks such as lost or corrupted data, information theft, and unavailability of critical systems. These risks represent potentially enormous costs to NASA. The NASA Code Q research initiative 'Reducing Software Security Risk (RSSR) Trough an Integrated Approach' offers formal verification of information technology (IT), through the creation of a Software Security Assessment Instrument (SSAI), to address software security risks.
software security↗
Assessing application vulnerability to radiation-induced SEUs in memory
One of the goals of the Remote Exploration and Experimentation (REE) project at JPL is to determine how vulnerable applications are to single event upsets (SEUs) when run in low radiation space environments using commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components.
radiation SEU software vulnerability↗
IT Security Support for the Spaceport Command Control Systems Development Ground Support Development Operations
Security is one of the most if not the most important areas today. After the several attacks on the United States, security everywhere was heightened from Airports to the communication among the military branches legionnaires. With advanced persistent threats (APTs) on the rise following Stuxnet, government branches and agencies are required, more than ever, to follow several standards, policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of a breach. Attack vectors today are very advanced and are going to continue to get more and more advanced as security controls advance. This creates a need for networks and systems to be in an updated and secured state in a launch control system environment. FISMA is a law that is mandated by the government to follow when government agencies secure networks and devices. My role on this project is to ensure network devices and systems are in compliance with NIST, as outlined in FISMA. I will achieve this by providing assistance with security plan documentation and collection, system hardware and software inventory, malicious code and malware scanning and configuration of network devices i.e. routers and IDSsIPSs. In addition I will be completing security assessments on software and hardware, vulnerability assessments and reporting, conducting patch management and risk assessments. A guideline that will help with compliance with NIST is the SANS Top 20 Critical Controls. SANS Top 20 Critical Controls as well as numerous security tools, security software and the conduction of research will be used to successfully complete the tasks given to me. This will ensure compliance with FISMA and NIST, secure systems and a secured network. By the end of this project, I hope to have carried out stated above as well as gain an immense knowledge about compliance, security tools, networks and network devices, policies and procedures.
computer information security↗
IT Security Support for the Spaceport Command Control Systems Development Ground Support Development Operations
Security is one of the most if not the most important areas today. After the several attacks on the United States, security everywhere has heightened from airports to the communication among the military branches legionnaires. With advanced persistent threats (APT's) on the rise following Stuxnet, government branches and agencies are required, more than ever, to follow several standards, policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of a breach. Attack vectors today are very advanced and are going to continue to get more and more advanced as security controls advance. This creates a need for networks and systems to be in an updated and secured state in a launch control system environment. FISMA is a law that is mandated by the government to follow when government agencies secure networks and devices. My role on this project is to ensure network devices and systems are in compliance with NIST, as outlined in FISMA. I will achieve this by providing assistance with security plan documentation and collection, system hardware and software inventory, malicious code and malware scanning, and configuration of network devices i.e. routers and IDS's/IPS's. In addition, I will be completing security assessments on software and hardware, vulnerability assessments and reporting, and conducting patch management and risk assessments. A guideline that will help with compliance with NIST is the SANS Top 20 Critical Controls. SANS Top 20 Critical Controls as well as numerous security tools, security software and the conduction of research will be used to successfully complete the tasks given to me. This will ensure compliance with FISMA and NIST, secure systems and a secured network. By the end of this project, I hope to have carried out the tasks stated above as well as gain an immense knowledge about compliance, security tools, networks and network devices, as well as policies and procedures.
security↗
Improving Security of Ground System Software
An estimated 84% of all security breaches are application-related, not firewall violations. To what extent is your organization focused on addressing security issues in its software? Software plays a critical role in mission success, and software similarly plays a role in mission security. However, software can introduce vulnerabilities to the system, such as use of a COTS product that has a backdoor, or a hole in the security of the system deliberately left in place by designers or maintainers. The motivations for such holes are not always sinister, but can provide a means for malicious intrusion into the mission. Students will learn an approach to securing ground software within the context of federal information systems. Federal requirements, coding standards, tool usage will be discussed as part of the solution to securing software.
Bailey, Brandon↗
An integrated approach to reducing information technology security risk in the software life cycle
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
security toolset↗
Safety-Critical Partitioned Software Architecture: A Partitioned Software Architecture for Robotic
The flight software on virtually every mission currently managed by JPL has several major flaws that make it vulnerable to potentially fatal software defects. Many of these problems can be addressed by recently developed partitioned operating systems (OS). JPL has avoided adopting a partitioned operating system on its flight missions, primarily because doing so would require significant changes in flight software design, and the risks associated with changes of that magnitude cannot be accepted by an active flight project. The choice of a partitioned OS can have a dramatic effect on the overall system and software architecture, allowing for realization of benefits far beyond the concerns typically associated with the choice of OS. Specifically, we believe that a partitioned operating system, when coupled with an appropriate architecture, can provide a strong infrastructure for developing systems for which reusability, modifiability, testability, and reliability are essential qualities. By adopting a partitioned OS, projects can gain benefits throughout the entire development lifecycle, from requirements and design, all the way to implementation, testing, and operations.
(Avionics Application Standard Software Interface ↗