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SiC power MOSFETs are space-ready in terms of typical reliability measures. However, single event burnout (SEB) often occurs at voltages 50% or lower than specified breakdown. Data illustrating burnout for 1200 V devices is reviewed and the space reliability of SiC MOSFETs is discussed.
As an emerging technology, silicon carbide (SiC) power MOSFETs are showing great potential for higher temperature/power rating, higher efficiency, and reduction in size and weight, which makes this technology ideal for high temperature, harsh environment applications such as downhole, medical, avionic, or even space applications. Radiation tolerance therefore becomes a critical aspect of the device performance in such environments. In this work, we explored radiation hardness of SiC devices to total ionizing dose (TID), neutron-induced single-event burnout (SEB), and heavy-ion induced single-event effects (SEE).
The transport, energy loss, and charge production of heavy ions in the sensitive regions of IRF 150 power MOSFETs are described. The dependence and variation of transport parameters with ion type and energy relative to the requirements for single event burnout in this part type are discussed. Test data taken with this power MOSFET are used together with analyses by means of a computer code of the ion energy loss and charge production in the device to establish criteria for burnout and parameters for space predictions. These parameters are then used in an application to predict burnout rates in a geostationary orbit for power converters operating in a dynamic mode. Comparisons of rates for different geometries in simulating SEU (single event upset) sensitive volumes are presented.
Space radiation in space systems present unique failure modes and considerations for reliability engineers. Radiation effects is not a one size fits all field. Threat conditions that must be addressed for a given mission depend on the mission orbital profile, the technologies of parts used in critical functions and on application considerations, such as supply voltages, temperature, duty cycle, and redundancy. In general, the threats that must be addressed are of two types-the cumulative degradation mechanisms of total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage (DD). and the prompt responses of components to ionizing particles (protons and heavy ions) falling under the heading of single-event effects. Generally degradation mechanisms behave like wear-out mechanisms on any active components in a system: Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Displacement Damage: (1) TID affects all active devices over time. Devices can fail either because of parametric shifts that prevent the device from fulfilling its application or due to device failures where the device stops functioning altogether. Since this failure mode varies from part to part and lot to lot, lot qualification testing with sufficient statistics is vital. Displacement damage failures are caused by the displacement of semiconductor atoms from their lattice positions. As with TID, failures can be either parametric or catastrophic, although parametric degradation is more common for displacement damage. Lot testing is critical not just to assure proper device fi.mctionality throughout the mission. It can also suggest remediation strategies when a device fails. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. (2) On the NEAR mission a functional failure was traced to a PIN diode failure caused by TID induced high leakage currents. NEAR was able to recover from the failure by reversing the current of a nearby Thermal Electric Cooler (turning the TEC into a heater). The elevated temperature caused the PIN diode to anneal and the device to recover. It was by lot qualification testing that NEAR knew the diode would recover when annealed. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. Single Event Effects (SEE): (1) In contrast to TID and displacement damage, Single Event Effects (SEE) resemble random failures. SEE modes can range from changes in device logic (single-event upset, or SEU). temporary disturbances (single-event transient) to catastrophic effects such as the destructive SEE modes, single-event latchup (SEL). single-event gate rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB) (2) The consequences of nondestructive SEE modes such as SEU and SET depend critically on their application--and may range from trivial nuisance errors to catastrophic loss of mission. It is critical not just to ensure that potentially susceptible devices are well characterized for their susceptibility, but also to work with design engineers to understand the implications of each error mode. -For destructive SEE, the predominant risk mitigation strategy is to avoid susceptible parts, or if that is not possible. to avoid conditions under which the part may be susceptible. Destructive SEE mechanisms are often not well understood, and testing is slow and expensive, making rate prediction very challenging. (3) Because the consequences of radiation failure and degradation modes depend so critically on the application as well as the component technology, it is essential that radiation, component. design and system engineers work togetherpreferably starting early in the program to ensure critical applications are addressed in time to optimize the probability of mission success.
This testing is to characterize the power MOSFETs for single-event gate rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB) response. Test results were compared against comparable voltage rated devices.
The results of recent Single Event Effect (SEE) testing of newly available power MOSFETS are presented.
This study was being undertaken to determine the single event effect susceptibility of the commercial Vishay 60-V TrenchFET power MOSFET. Heavy-ion testing was conducted at the Texas AM University Cyclotron Single Event Effects Test Facility (TAMU) and the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory BASE Cyclotron Facility (LBNL). In addition, initial 200-MeV proton testing was conducted at Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) Francis H. Burr Proton Beam Therapy Center. Testing was performed to evaluate this device for single-event effects from lower-LET, lighter ions relevant to higher risk tolerant space missions.
This paper presents two-photon absorption test results on an engineering single-event burnout- (SEB-) sensitive power MOSFET to verify that the energy deposition/charge ionization in the highly-doped substrate does not contribute to SEB. It is shown that for a vertical power MOSFET, the SEB sensitive volume is the lightly doped epitaxial layer; the most sensitive region is under the polysllicon gate.
In this paper, we irradiate a number of silicon power Schottky diodes from a variety of manufacturers. The tested diodes represent a wide assortment of reverse voltages and forward currents. Additionally, we review correlations between single-event failures in Schottky diodes and device electrical parameters. The spatial locations of failures in the diode are discussed, as well as a possible explanation for why the failures occur. Based on these correlations to date, we propose a derating scheme for Schottky diodes flown in a heavy ion environment and suggest screening procedures for decreasing the risks of such failures.
In this paper, we use high- and low-magnification optical microscope images, thermal infrared camera images, and scanning electron microscope images to identify failure locations in heavy-ion-irradiated Schottky diodes. After failures have been identified, the parts were cross-sectioned to describe the structure of the failures and energy dispersive x-ray spectroscopy was used to characterize the materials in the failure structures.
Heavy-ion radiation can result in silicon carbide power device degradation and/or catastrophic failure. Test procedures and data interpretation must consider the impact that heavy-ion induced off-state leakage current increases will have on subsequent single-event effect susceptibility and testability. On orbit, reliable performance in the presence of increased off-state leakage currents due to cumulative ion-induced non-catastrophic single-event effects must be assured over the mission lifetime. This work presents a large body of heavy-ion test data for different diode, power MOSFET, and JFET devices. Susceptibility to single-event effects is compared between SiC and Si power devices. Initial recommendations on heavy-ion radiation test methods for silicon carbide power devices are made and radiation hardness assurance is discussed with the goal of moving one step closer to reliably getting this technology off the ground into a broad array of spacecraft and instruments that will benefit from its unique capabilities.
Recent work for the NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging Program Power MOSFET task is presented. The Task technology focus, roadmap, and partners are given. Recent single-event effect test results on commercial, automotive, and radiation hardened trench power MOSFETs are summarized with an emphasis on risk of using commercial and automotive trench-gate power MOSFETs in space applications.
An overview of the NASA NEPP Program Silicon Carbide Power Device subtask is given, including the current task roadmap, partnerships, and future plans. Included are the Agency-wide efforts to promote development of single-event effect hardened SiC power devices for space applications.
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Silicon carbide power device technology has the potential to enable a new generation of aerospace power systems that demand high efficiency, rapid switching, and reduced mass and volume in order to expand space-based capabilities. For this potential to be realized, SiC devices must be capable of withstanding the harsh space radiation environment. Commercial SiC components exhibit high tolerance to total ionizing dose but to date, have not performed well under exposure to heavy ion radiation representative of the on-orbit galactic cosmic rays. Insertion of SiC power device technology into space applications to achieve breakthrough performance gains will require intentional development of components hardened to the effects of these highly-energetic heavy ions. This work presents heavy-ion test data obtained by the authors over the past several years for discrete SiC power MOSFETs, JFETs, and diodes in order to increase the body of knowledge and understanding that will facilitate hardening of this technology to space radiation effects. Specifically, heavy-ion irradiation data taken under different bias, temperature, and ion beam conditions is presented for devices from different manufacturers, and the emerging patterns discussed.
Heavy-ion radiation effects knowledge across SiC power devices is examined and insights for more rugged designs and appropriate test methods geared toward space applications are extracted. The conclusions drawn are supported by recent publicly reported heavy-ion test results of a modified SiC MOSFET design.
Spacecraft in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) are subject to numerous environmental hazards. Here I'll briefly discuss three environment factors that pose acute threats to the survival of spacecraft systems and crew: atmospheric drag, impacts by meteoroids and orbital debris, and ionizing radiation. Atmospheric drag continuously opposes the orbital motion of a satellite, causing the orbit to decay. This decay will lead to reentry if not countered by reboost maneuvers. Orbital debris is a by-product of man's activities in space, and consists of objects ranging in size from miniscule paint chips to spent rocket stages and dead satellites. Ionizing radiation experienced in LEO has several components: geomagnetically trapped protons and electrons (Van Allen belts); energetic solar particles; galactic cosmic rays; and albedo neutrons. These particles can have several types of prompt harmful effects on equipment and crew, from single-event upsets, latchup, and burnout of electronics, to lethal doses to crew.All three types of prompt threat show some dependence on the solar activity cycle. Atmospheric drag mitigation and large debris avoidance require propulsive maneuvers. M/OD and ionizing radiation require some form of shielding for crew and sensitive equipment. Limiting exposure time is a mitigation technique for ionizing radiation and meteor streams.