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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2021

Avionics Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) Guidelines

Based on the need to develop and adopt timely and up-to-date guidance to ensure that natural space radiation environment threats do not compromise mission success, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was solicited to develop and publish guidance for deriving radiation hardness assurance (RHA) requirements and for evaluating avionics hardware elements with respect to total ionizing dose, total non-ionizing dose, and single event effects. This document contains the outcome of the NESC assessment.

Guidelines↗
NASA NTRS2021

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 19-01-1: Mitigating Risks of Single-Event Effects in Space Applications

Since most Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) parts are intended for terrestrial applications, they are susceptible to a range of radiation threats in the space environment if the resulting effects are not properly characterized and mitigated. Even specially designed radiation-hardened parts may not be tolerant to all types of radiation effects. Radiation hardness is a multi-dimensional property of any part that describes intrinsic abilities to tolerate various radiation environments [1,2]. Effects to be concerned with include total ionizing dose, total non-ionizing dose, and single-event effects (SEE) – all of which depend on the mission, environment, application, and lifetime. Radiation effects concerns may be the same whether a EEE part is Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS), MIL-SPEC, or some other variant, all of which are susceptible to the same radiation threats [3]. SEE consequences range from recoverable faults to catastrophic failure. Like other random faults, SEE can be mitigated with informed circuit design practices at the device, card, and/or system level.

Single-event effects↗
NASA NTRS2006

Space Environment Effects on Materials : An Overview

A general overview on the space environment and its effects on materials is presented. The topics include: 1) Impact of Space Effects on Spacecraft Costs; 2) Space Environment Effects on Spacecraft by Source; 3) Primary Source of Space Effects: The Sun; 4) The Earth's Environment; 5) Trapped Radiation Belts; 6) Aurora Are Everywhere; 7) Spacecraft Interactions; 8) Atmospheric Effects; 9) Contaminant Effects on Materials; 10) Meteoroid/Debris Effects on Materials; 11) Spacecraft Surface Charging; 12) Surface Discharge Effects; 13) Internal Electrostatic Discharge--Satellite Killer; 14) Plasma Interactions DS-1 Ion Engines; 15) Radiation Effects on Spacecraft Systems and Materials; 16) Total Ionizing Dose Effects Total Ionizing Dose Effects; 17) Man-Made Sources of Space Effects Man-Made Sources of Space Effects; and 18) Space Environments Versus Interactions.

charged particles↗
NASA NTRS2017

Tutorial: Radiation Effects in Electronic Systems

This tutorial presentation will give an overview of radiation effects in electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) components as it applies to civilian space systems of varying size and complexity. The natural space environment presents many unique threats to electronic systems regardless of where the systems operate from low-Earth orbit to interplanetary space. The presentation will cover several topics, including: an overview and introduction to the applicable space radiation environments common to a broad range of mission designs; definitions and impacts of effects due to impinging particles in the space environment e.g., total ionizing dose (TID), total non-ionizing dose (TNID), and single-event effects (SEE); and, testing for and evaluation of TID, TNID, and SEE in EEE components.

total non-ionizing dose (TNID)↗
NASA NTRS2017

Current Status and Future Challenges in Risk-Based Radiation Engineering

This presentation covers the basis and challenges for radiation effects in electronic systems. The three main types of radiation effects in electronics are: 1) total ionizing dose (TID), 2) total non-ionizing dose (TNID) / displacement damage dose (DDD), and 3) single-event effect (SEE). Some content on relevant examples of effects, current concerns, and possible environmental model-driven solutions are also included.

Total Ionizing Dose (TID)↗
NASA NTRS1993

Fault handling schemes in electronic systems with specific application to radiation tolerance and VLSI design

Naturally occurring space radiation particles can produce transient and permanent changes in the electrical properties of electronic devices and systems. In this work, the transient radiation effects on DRAM and CMOS SRAM were considered. In addition, the effect of total ionizing dose radiation of the switching times of CMOS logic gates were investigated. Effects of transient radiation on the column and cell of MOS dynamic memory cell was simulated using SPICE. It was found that the critical charge of the bitline was higher than that of the cell. In addition, the critical charge of the combined cell-bitline was found to be dependent on the gate voltage of the access transistor. In addition, the effect of total ionizing dose radiation on the switching times of CMOS logic gate was obtained. The results of this work indicate that, the rise time of CMOS logic gates increases, while the fall time decreases with an increase in total ionizing dose radiation. Also, by increasing the size of the P-channel transistor with respect to that of the N-channel transistor, the propagation delay of CMOS logic gate can be made to decrease with, or be independent of an increase in total ionizing dose radiation. Furthermore, a method was developed for replacing polysilicon feedback resistance of SRAMs with a switched capacitor network. A switched capacitor SRAM was implemented using MOS Technology. The critical change of the switched capacitor SRAM has a very large critical charge. The results of this work indicate that switched capacitor SRAM is a viable alternative to SRAM with polysilicon feedback resistance.

Attia, John Okyere↗
NASA NTRS1995

Radiation Evaluation of an Advanced 64Mb 3.3V DRAM and Insights into the Effects of Scaling on Radiation Hardness

In this paper, total ionizing dose radiation evaluations of the Micron 64 Mb 3.3 V, fast page mode DRAM and the IBM LUNA-ES 16 Mb DRAM are presented. The effects of scaling on total ionizing dose radiation hardness are studied utilizing test structures and a series of 16 Mb DRAMs with different feature sizes from the same manufacturing line. General agreement was found between the threshold voltage shifts of 16 Mb DRAM test structures and the threshold voltage measured on complete circuits using retention time measurements. Retention time measurement data from early radiation doses are shown that allow internal failure modes to be distinguished.

Radiation Hardness↗
NASA NTRS2001

Radiation Effects on DC-DC Converters

In this work, several DC-DC converters were designed and built. The converters are Buck Buck-Boost, Cuk, Flyback, and full-bridge zero-voltage switched. The total ionizing dose radiation and single event effects on the converters were investigated. The experimental results for the TID effects tests show that the voltages of the Buck Buck-Boost, Cuk, and Flyback converters increase as total dose increased when using power MOSFET IRF250 as a switching transistor. The change in output voltage with total dose is highest for the Buck converter and the lowest for Flyback converter. The trend of increase in output voltages with total dose in the present work agrees with those of the literature. The trends of the experimental results also agree with those obtained from PSPICE simulation. For the full-bridge zero-voltage switch converter, it was observed that the dc-dc converter with IRF250 power MOSFET did not show a significant change of output voltage with total dose. In addition, for the dc-dc converter with FSF254R4 radiation-hardened power MOSFET, the output voltage did not change significantly with total dose. The experimental results were confirmed by PSPICE simulation that showed that FB-ZVS converter with IRF250 power MOSFET's was not affected with the increase in total ionizing dose. Single Event Effects (SEE) radiation tests were performed on FB-ZVS converters. It was observed that the FB-ZVS converter with the IRF250 power MOSFET, when the device was irradiated with Krypton ion with ion-energy of 150 MeV and LET of 41.3 MeV-square cm/mg, the output voltage increased with the increase in fluence. However, for Krypton with ion-energy of 600 MeV and LET of 33.65 MeV-square cm/mg, and two out of four transistors of the converter were permanently damaged. The dc-dc converter with FSF254R4 radiation hardened power MOSFET's did not show significant change at the output voltage with fluence while being irradiated by Krypton with ion energy of 1.20 GeV and LET of 25.97 MeV-square cm/mg. This might be due to fact that the device is radiation hardened.

Zhang, De-Xin↗
NASA NTRS2015

Compendium of Current Single Event Effects for Candidate Spacecraft Electronics for NASA

NASA spacecraft are subjected to a harsh space environment that includes exposure to various types of ionizing radiation. The performance of electronic devices in a space radiation environment are often limited by their susceptibility to single event effects (SEE). Ground-based testing is used to evaluate candidate spacecraft electronics to determine risk to spaceflight applications. Interpreting the results of radiation testing of complex devices is and adequate understanding of the test condition is critical. Studies discussed herein were undertaken to establish the application-specific sensitivities of candidate spacecraft and emerging electronic devices to single-event upset (SEU), single-event latchup (SEL), single-event gate rupture (SEGR), single-event burnout (SEB), and single-event transient (SET). For total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage dose (DDD) results, see a companion paper submitted to the 2015 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects Conference (NSREC) Radiation Effects Data Workshop (REDW) entitled "compendium of Current Total Ionizing Dose and Displacement Damage for Candidate Spacecraft Electronics for NASA by M. Campola, et al.

spacecraft electronics↗
NASA NTRS2013

What Reliability Engineers Should Know about Space Radiation Effects

Space radiation in space systems present unique failure modes and considerations for reliability engineers. Radiation effects is not a one size fits all field. Threat conditions that must be addressed for a given mission depend on the mission orbital profile, the technologies of parts used in critical functions and on application considerations, such as supply voltages, temperature, duty cycle, and redundancy. In general, the threats that must be addressed are of two types-the cumulative degradation mechanisms of total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage (DD). and the prompt responses of components to ionizing particles (protons and heavy ions) falling under the heading of single-event effects. Generally degradation mechanisms behave like wear-out mechanisms on any active components in a system: Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Displacement Damage: (1) TID affects all active devices over time. Devices can fail either because of parametric shifts that prevent the device from fulfilling its application or due to device failures where the device stops functioning altogether. Since this failure mode varies from part to part and lot to lot, lot qualification testing with sufficient statistics is vital. Displacement damage failures are caused by the displacement of semiconductor atoms from their lattice positions. As with TID, failures can be either parametric or catastrophic, although parametric degradation is more common for displacement damage. Lot testing is critical not just to assure proper device fi.mctionality throughout the mission. It can also suggest remediation strategies when a device fails. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. (2) On the NEAR mission a functional failure was traced to a PIN diode failure caused by TID induced high leakage currents. NEAR was able to recover from the failure by reversing the current of a nearby Thermal Electric Cooler (turning the TEC into a heater). The elevated temperature caused the PIN diode to anneal and the device to recover. It was by lot qualification testing that NEAR knew the diode would recover when annealed. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. Single Event Effects (SEE): (1) In contrast to TID and displacement damage, Single Event Effects (SEE) resemble random failures. SEE modes can range from changes in device logic (single-event upset, or SEU). temporary disturbances (single-event transient) to catastrophic effects such as the destructive SEE modes, single-event latchup (SEL). single-event gate rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB) (2) The consequences of nondestructive SEE modes such as SEU and SET depend critically on their application--and may range from trivial nuisance errors to catastrophic loss of mission. It is critical not just to ensure that potentially susceptible devices are well characterized for their susceptibility, but also to work with design engineers to understand the implications of each error mode. -For destructive SEE, the predominant risk mitigation strategy is to avoid susceptible parts, or if that is not possible. to avoid conditions under which the part may be susceptible. Destructive SEE mechanisms are often not well understood, and testing is slow and expensive, making rate prediction very challenging. (3) Because the consequences of radiation failure and degradation modes depend so critically on the application as well as the component technology, it is essential that radiation, component. design and system engineers work togetherpreferably starting early in the program to ensure critical applications are addressed in time to optimize the probability of mission success.

DiBari, Rebecca↗
DOE OSTI2024

A neutron fluence map of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Godiva IV critical assembly

A neutron fluence map and a total ionizing dose map of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Godiva IV fast burst critical assembly was generated using passive reactor dosimetry, comprised of sulfur pellets and thermoluminescent dosimeters. Godiva IV is an unmoderated, fast burst, critical assembly constructed of approximately 65 kg of highly enriched uranium fuel alloyed with 1.5 % molybdenum for strength. The mapping was performed during a single 75.6 ºC temperature rise burst operation, with the top and sides of the cylindrical Godiva-IV Top Hat covered in passive dosimetry. Dosimetry was placed in a symmetric pattern around the Top Hat, with higher concentrations near the control rods and burst rod. A specific portion of the lower quadrant of the burst rod was mapped to confirm a testing region where the neutron fluence varied by no more than ± 5%. The results will be used to assess the neutron, gamma, and total ionizing dose environment in three-dimensional space around the assembly for higher fidelity experiment placement, active dosimetry positioning, and radiation field characterization.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗