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At least 181 records · Page 10

Determination Of LETs Of SRAMs By Use Of A Laser

Report describes experimental study of use of microelectronic advanced laser scanner (MEALS) to cause single-event upsets (SEUs) in integrated logic circuits. Basic concepts of SEU testing by use of MEALS described in "Laser Scanner Tests for Single-Event Upsets" (NPO-18216), "Single-Event-Upset Laser Scanner With Optical Bias" (NPO-18217), and "More About Laser Scanner Tests for Single-Event Upsets" (NPO-18494). Study part of continuing effort to study SEU effects of ionizing radiation on such circuits and to use MEALS as relatively inexpensive SEU-prescreening laboratory apparatus serving as alternative to heavy-ion acclerator.

Kim, Quiesup↗

Frequency Dependence of Single-event Upset in Advanced Commerical PowerPC Microprocessors

This paper examines single-event upsets in advanced commercial SOI microprocessors in a dynamic mode, studying SEU sensitivity of General Purpose Registers (GPRs) with clock frequency. Results are presented for SOI processors with feature sizes of 0.18 microns and two different core voltages. Single-event upset from heavy ions is measured for advanced commercial microprocessors in a dynamic mode with clock frequency up to 1GHz. Frequency and core voltage dependence of single-event upsets in registers is discussed.

single-event upset (SEU)↗

SEU/SRAM as a Process Monitor

The SEU/SRAM is a 4-kbit Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) designed to detect Single-Event Upsets (SEUs) produced by high energy particles. This device was used to determine the distribution in the memory cell spontaneous flip potential.

distribution residual plots↗

Using Pipelined XNOR Logic to Reduce SEU Risks in State Machines

Single-event upsets (SEUs) pose great threats to avionic systems state machine control logic, which are frequently used to control sequence of events and to qualify protocols. The risks of SEUs manifest in two ways: (a) the state machine s state information is changed, causing the state machine to unexpectedly transition to another state; (b) due to the asynchronous nature of SEU, the state machine's state registers become metastable, consequently causing any combinational logic associated with the metastable registers to malfunction temporarily. Effect (a) can be mitigated with methods such as triplemodular redundancy (TMR). However, effect (b) cannot be eliminated and can degrade the effectiveness of any mitigation method of effect (a). Although there is no way to completely eliminate the risk of SEU-induced errors, the risk can be made very small by use of a combination of very fast state-machine logic and error-detection logic. Therefore, one goal of two main elements of the present method is to design the fastest state-machine logic circuitry by basing it on the fastest generic state-machine design, which is that of a one-hot state machine. The other of the two main design elements is to design fast error-detection logic circuitry and to optimize it for implementation in a field-programmable gate array (FPGA) architecture: In the resulting design, the one-hot state machine is fitted with a multiple-input XNOR gate for detection of illegal states. The XNOR gate is implemented with lookup tables and with pipelines for high speed. In this method, the task of designing all the logic must be performed manually because no currently available logic synthesis software tool can produce optimal solutions of design problems of this type. However, some assistance is provided by a script, written for this purpose in the Python language (an object-oriented interpretive computer language) to automatically generate hardware description language (HDL) code from state-transition rules.

Le, Martin↗

Single-Event Upset and Scaling Trends in New Generation of the Commercial SOI PowerPC Microprocessors

SEU from heavy-ions is measured for SOI PowerPC microprocessors. Results for 0.13 micron PowerPC with 1.1V core voltages increases over 1.3V versions. This suggests that improvement in SEU for scaled devices may be reversed. In recent years there has been interest in the possible use of unhardened commercial microprocessors in space because of their superior performance compared to hardened processors. However, unhardened devices are susceptible to upset from radiation space. More information is needed on how they respond to radiation before they can be used in space. Only a limited number of advanced microprocessors have been subjected to radiation tests, which are designed with lower clock frequencies and higher internal core voltage voltages than recent devices [1-6]. However the trend for commercial Silicon-on-insulator (SOI) microprocessors is to reduce feature size and internal core voltage and increase the clock frequency. Commercial microprocessors with the PowerPC architecture are now available that use partially depleted SOI processes with feature size of 90 nm and internal core voltage as low as 1.0 V and clock frequency in the GHz range. Previously, we reported SEU measurements for SOI commercial PowerPCs with feature size of 0.18 and 0.13 m [7, 8]. The results showed an order of magnitude reduction in saturated cross section compared to CMOS bulk counterparts. This paper examines SEUs in advanced commercial SOI microprocessors, focusing on SEU sensitivity of D-Cache and hangs with feature size and internal core voltage. Results are presented for the Motorola SOI processor with feature sizes of 0.13 microns and internal core voltages of 1.3 and 1.1 V. These results are compared with results for the Motorola SOI processors with feature size of 0.18 microns and internal core voltage of 1.6 and 1.3 V.

Irom, Farokh↗

RH1020 Single Event Clock Upset Summary Report

This report summarizes the testing and analysis of "single event clock upset' in the RH1020. Also included are SEU-rate predictions and design recommendations for risk analysis and reduction. The subject of "upsets" in the RH1020 is best understood by using a model consisting of a global clock buffer and a D-type flip-flop as the basic memory unit. The RH1020 is built on the ACT 1 family architecture. As such, it has one low-skew global clock buffer with a TTL-level input threshold that is accessed via a single dedicated pin. The clock signal is driven to full CMOS levels, buffered, and sent to individual row buffers with one buffer per channel. For low-skew performance, the outputs of all of the RH1020 row buffers are shorted together via metal lines, as is done in the A1020B. All storage in the RH1020 consists of routed flip-flops, constructed with multiplexors and feedback through the routing segments. A simple latch can be constructed from a single (combinatorial or C) module; an edge-triggered flip-flop is constructed using two concatenated latches. There is no storage in the I/O modules. The front end of the clock buffering circuitry, at a common point relative to the row buffer, is a sub-circuit that was determined to be the most susceptible to heavy ions. This is due, in part, to its smaller transistors compared to the rest of the circuitry. This conclusion is also supported by SPICE simulations and an analysis of the heavy ion data, described in this report. The edge triggered D flip-flop has two single-event-upset modes. Mode one, called C-module upset, is caused by a heavy ion striking the C-module's sensitive area on the silicon and produces a soft single bit error at the output of the flip-flop. Mode two, called clock upset, is caused by a heavy ion strike on the clock buffer, generating a runt pulse interpreted as a false clock signal and consequently producing errors at the flip-flop outputs. C-module upset sensitivity in the RH1020 is essentially the same as that of its ACT 1 siblings (A1020, A1020A and A1020B), which were well tested, analyzed, and documented in the literature.

Katz, Richard B.↗

Current Radiation Issues for Programmable Elements and Devices

The purpose of this presentation is to discuss the COTS performance, clock upset / single event transient, device configuration upset, antifuse hardening, heavy ion SEU, total dose, proton sensitivities, latchup, and additional information and data.

Katz, Richard↗

An SEU immune logic family

A new logic family, which is immune to single event upsets, is described. Members of the logic family are capable of recovery, regardless of the shape of the upsetting event. Glitch propagation from an upset node is also blocked. Logic diagrams for an Inverter, Nor, Nand, and Complex Gates are provided. The logic family can be implemented in a standard, commercial CMOS process with no additional masks. DC, transient, static power, upset recovery and layout characteristics of the new family, based on a commercial 1 micron CMOS N-Well process, are described.

Canaris, J.↗

Characterizing SRAM Single Event Upset in Terms of Single and Double Node Charge Collection

A well-collapse source-injection mode for SRAM SEU is demonstrated through TCAD modeling. The recovery of the SRAM s state is shown to be based upon the resistive path from the p+-sources in the SRAM to the well. Multiple cell upset patterns for direct charge collection and the well-collapse source-injection mechanisms are then predicted and compared to recent SRAM test data.

Black, J. D.↗

Defect-sensitivity analysis of an SEU immune CMOS logic family

Fault testing of resistive manufacturing defects is done on a recently developed single event upset immune logic family. Resistive ranges and delay times are compared with those of traditional CMOS logic. Reaction of the logic to these defects is observed for a NOR gate, and an evaluation of its ability to cope with them is determined.

Ingermann, Erik H.↗

Anomalies due to single event upsets

The description of single event upsets (SEUs) in the spacecraft Anomalies Handbook is reviewed. The basic mechanism involved in SEUs is summarized and discussed in terms of circuit analysis. Calculation of SEU rate is analytically described and discussed. Departures from single step function dependence in the SEU rate is addressed.

Robinson, P. A., Jr.↗

Electronics Shielding and Reliability Design Tools

It is well known that electronics placement in large-scale human-rated systems provides opportunity to optimize electronics shielding through materials choice and geometric arrangement. For example, several hundred single event upsets (SEUs) occur within the Shuttle avionic computers during a typical mission. An order of magnitude larger SEU rate would occur without careful placement in the Shuttle design. These results used basic physics models (linear energy transfer (LET), track structure, Auger recombination) combined with limited SEU cross section measurements allowing accurate evaluation of target fragment contributions to Shuttle avionics memory upsets. Electronics shielding design on human-rated systems provides opportunity to minimize radiation impact on critical and non-critical electronic systems. Implementation of shielding design tools requires adequate methods for evaluation of design layouts, guiding qualification testing, and an adequate follow-up on final design evaluation including results from a systems/device testing program tailored to meet design requirements.

Wilson, John W.↗

Computing in the presence of soft bit errors

It is shown that single-event-upsets (SEUs) due to cosmic rays are a significant source of single bit error in spacecraft computers. The physical mechanism of SEU, electron hole generation by means of Linear Energy Transfer (LET), it discussed with reference made to the results of a study of the environmental effects on computer systems of the Galileo spacecraft. Techniques for making software more tolerant of cosmic ray effects are considered, including: reducing the number of registers used by the software; continuity testing of variables; redundant execution of major procedures for error detection; and encoding state variables to detect single-bit changes. Attention is also given to design modifications which may reduce the cosmic ray exposure of on-board hardware. These modifications include: shielding components operating in LEO; removing low-power Schottky parts; and the use of CMOS diodes. The SEU parameters of different electronic components are listed in a table.

Rasmussen, R. D.↗

TID, SEE and radiation induced failures in advanced flash memories

We report on TID and SEE tests of multi-level and higher density flash memories. Stand-by currents and functionality tests were used to characterize the response of radiation-induced failures. The radiation-induced failures can be categorized as followings: SEU read errors during irradiation, stuck-bit read errors verified post-irradiation, write errors, erase failures, multiple upsets, and single-event latch up.

Scheick, Leif Z.↗

SEU and Test Considerations for FPGA Devices

This viewgraph presentation provides an overview of Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), what they are, implementations in space missions, and current available technologies. Single Event Upsets (SEUs) and Single Event Transients (SETs) are discussed in relation to their effects on FPGAs. Testing goals, considerations, and data analysis are reviewed.

Berg, Malanie↗

Assessing application vulnerability to radiation-induced SEUs in memory

One of the goals of the Remote Exploration and Experimentation (REE) project at JPL is to determine how vulnerable applications are to single event upsets (SEUs) when run in low radiation space environments using commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components.

radiation SEU software vulnerability↗